Thayammal. v. Rangaswami Reddy. — 1955 DIGILAW 131 (MAD)

Rajamannar, C.J.-This appeal against the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore involves an interesting question of law on which there is no direct authority. The facts necessary for a disposal of this appeal are: One Rama Reddi died in or about 1900, leaving behind him surviving his widow, Sinna Gangammal and his mother Peria Gangammal. A posthumous daughter, Nanjammal, was born to him subsequently. He left behind him considerable properties. Sinna Gangammal, as the widow, succeeded to Rama Reddi’s estate. She died in or about 1922, and after her death, Nanjammal, her daughter, succeeded. She died on 1st May, 1934. She had two sons, Rangaswami Reddi and Muthuswami Reddi, who became entitled to the estate as reversioners to their maternal grandfather, Rama Reddi. Sinna Gangammal and Nanjammal had made alienations of the properties which had belonged to Rama Reddi and had devolved on them. By two sale deeds, dated 31st March, 1937 and 8th April, 1947, Rangaswami Reddi on his behalf and as guardian of his minor brother, Muthuswami Reddi, conveyed all the properties to which they were entitled as reversioners to the appellant before us, Thayammal. In the first of these sale deeds (Exhibit A-3) it was provided that the purchaser should file a suit in pursuance of the sale and obtain delivery of possession and that the two vendors shall also join with her and file the suit as plaintiffs and see that possession was given to the purchaser. It was further provided that the vendors themselves shall collect the income from the properties from the date of their mother’s death till the date of the sale. On 9th April, 1947, the suit out of which this appeal arises, was filed by three plaintiffs, namely, Thayammal, the purchaser, Rangaswami Reddi and Muthuswami Reddi. Muthuswami Reddi was still a minor and was represented by Rangaswami Reddi as his next friend. On 9th April, 1947, the suit out of which this appeal arises, was filed by three plaintiffs, namely, Thayammal, the purchaser, Rangaswami Reddi and Muthuswami Reddi. Muthuswami Reddi was still a minor and was represented by Rangaswami Reddi as his next friend. Paragraph 14 of the plaint contained the following prayers: “(a) declare that the 1st plaintiff is entitled to the plaint properties and order the defendant to deliver possession of the plaint properties to the 1st plaintiff; (b) order that an account be taken as regards the income due to the 2nd plaintiff from 1st May, 1934 to 31st March, 1947; (c) decree further mesne profits to the 1st plaintiff at the rate of Rs.3,000 per year; (d) the defendants do deliver possession of the B schedule properties to the 1st plaintiff; (e) to order the defendant to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiffs; (f) to grant such and further reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit under the circumstances of the case.” The suit, as already mentioned, was filed on 9th April, 1947, more than twelve years after the date of the death of the last limited owner on 1st May, 1934. It was, therefore, barred by limitation. But it was alleged in the plaint that the second plaintiff, Rangaswami Reddi, was born on 19th December, 1928, and the third plaintiff, Muthuswami Reddi was born on 7th April, 1931 and as both of them were minors when the reversionary right opened to them in May, 1934, the suit was not barred by limitation, under sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Limitation Act. The third plaintiff, Muthuswami Reddi, became a major on 7th April, 1949. On 5th July, 1949, he executed a deed of relinquishment in favour of the first defendant, Rangaswami Reddi, in and by which for a consideration of a sum of Rs.2,000 Muthuswami relinquished all his right and interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The deed also contained the following further recitals: “The sale deed executed by my elder brother to Thayammal is only nominal. The debts recited in the said sale deed are false. There was bo cash available at all for payment. I did not get any benefit on account of the said sale. My elder brother had no right or justification to sell away my share. The said sale cannot however bind me. The debts recited in the said sale deed are false. There was bo cash available at all for payment. I did not get any benefit on account of the said sale. My elder brother had no right or justification to sell away my share. The said sale cannot however bind me. without myself prosecuting the suit in the Sub-Court O.S.No.108 of 1947, I shall, so far as I am concerned, present a petition myself as plaintiff for withdrawing the suit and see it is dismissed.” On 7th July, 1949, evidently in pursuance of the deed of relinquishment, Muthuswami Reddi (3rd plaintiff), filed an application, I.A.No.1319 of 1949, praying that the Court may be pleased to strike out his name as a co-plaintiff. In support of this application, he filed an affidavit in which he stated that he had attained majority on 8th April, 1949, that he was not willing to prosecute this suit, that the sale in favour of the first plaintiff was not binding on him, that he had given up all his rights to the 1st defendant, and that it was therefore just and necessary that he should be permitted to withdraw from the suit and the suit claim so far as it related to him be dismissed. On behalf of plaintiffs 1 and 2, a counter-affidavit was filed by the 1st plaintiff’s husband denying the material allegations made by Muthuswami Reddi and stating that the petitioner could give up, if he wanted, the relief, namely, the recovery of a moiety of the mesne profits due from 1st May, 1934, to 31st March, 1947, but not anything else, and it was submitted that the petitioner was a necessary and proper party to the suit, and in case he was not willing to be a plaintiff he should be transposed as a defendant. On 18th July, 1949, the learned Subordinate Judge passed the following order: “He will be transposed as defendant, as he would be a proper party. In the event of its being found that he is not necessary, he can urge his contention regarding his costs. Amendment of plaint if so advised, to be made tomorrow.” On 19th July, 1949, the first defendant filed an application, I.A.No.1437 of 1949, praying that the Court may direct plaintiffs 1 and 2 to carry out legally essential amendments to the plaint, consequent on the transposition of the 3rd plaintiff as. Amendment of plaint if so advised, to be made tomorrow.” On 19th July, 1949, the first defendant filed an application, I.A.No.1437 of 1949, praying that the Court may direct plaintiffs 1 and 2 to carry out legally essential amendments to the plaint, consequent on the transposition of the 3rd plaintiff as. a defendant. The affidavit filed by the 1st defendant in support of this application gives an indication as to what really prompted the application. In this affidavit, the 1st defendant stated that as the 3rd plaintiff had given up his claim for past mesne profits, the second plaintiff could ask for nothing more than his own share, and hence the value of the relief asked for by the plaintiff would stand automatically cut down, and therefore it had to be suitably amended to conform to what could be legally claimed by plaintiffs 1 and 2 alone. The obvious implication was that when the relief was amended, the value would be less than the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge’s Court. The husband of the 1st plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit pleading that the jurisdiction of the Court should be determined by the value of the suit at the time of the institution, and subsequent events could not divest the Court of its jurisdiction. He also stated that there was no necessity for amending any of the allegations of the plaint or any of the reliefs. On 21st July, 1949, the 1st defendant took out another application, I.A.No.1488 of 1949 for an order of dismissal of the 3rd plaintiff’s claim. On this an order was passed as follows: “The claim of the 3rd plaintiff so far as the defendants are concerned, will stand dismissed. The prior order regarding transposition stands.” On 1st September, 1949, the learned Subordinate Judge made an order on I.A. No.1437 of 1949 directing amendment of the plaint in view of his prior order in I.A.No.1319 of 1949. The 1st plaintiff accordingly applied for an amendment of the plaint (I.A.No.1918 of 1949). The amendment prayed for was consequential on the striking off of Muthuswami as a plaintiff and his transposition as a defendant. The 1st defendant objected to the sufficiency of the amendments prayed for and wanted further amendments to be made. The 1st plaintiff accordingly applied for an amendment of the plaint (I.A.No.1918 of 1949). The amendment prayed for was consequential on the striking off of Muthuswami as a plaintiff and his transposition as a defendant. The 1st defendant objected to the sufficiency of the amendments prayed for and wanted further amendments to be made. On this petition, the learned Subordinate Judge made an order on 17th September, 1949, directing plaintiffs 1 and 2 to make suitable amendments in certain paragraphs, namely, 10, 13 and 14(b). Then followed a series of petitions: (1) I.A.No.1919 of 1949 filed on 29th August, 1949, by the 2nd plaintiff praying that he may be permitted to continue the suit alone, transposing the 1st plaintiff as defendant, if necessary ; (2) I.A.No.2171 of 1949 by the 1st plaintiff, for an amendment of the plaint as directed by the learned Judge: (3) I.A.No.2172 of 1949 by the 2nd plaintiff also for amendment, and (4) I.A.No.2260 of 1949 dated 8th October, 1949, by the 2nd plaintiff purporting to be under Order 23, rule 1 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that he may be permitted to withdraw from the suit and also withdraw his claim against defendants. On 8th October, 1949, all these applications were disposed of. I.A.No.1919 of 1949 was dismissed as not pressed. I.A.No.2171 of 1949 was allowed, I.A.No. 2172 of 1949 was also dismissed as not pressed. On I.A.No.2260 of 1949 (2nd plaintiff’s petition for withdrawal), the pleader for the 1st plaintiff made the following endorsement: " No objection to the petitioner withdrawing from the claim, but he may be transposed as a defendant." The 2nd plaintiff himself made an endorsement as follows: "I, the 2nd plaintiff, withdraw from the suit. I do not want the reliefs sought for against the defendants. I pray for permission." On this, the learned Judge passed the following order on 8th October, 1949, the same day on which the other petitions were disposed of: "Permitted. The claim made on behalf of second plaintiff is withdrawn by him, and in the circumstances, each party to bear his own costs. I pray for permission." On this, the learned Judge passed the following order on 8th October, 1949, the same day on which the other petitions were disposed of: "Permitted. The claim made on behalf of second plaintiff is withdrawn by him, and in the circumstances, each party to bear his own costs. If first plaintiff wants the second plaintiff to be on record he will be transposed as defendant on his application." On 14th October, 1949, the Vakil for the 1st plaintiff filed the following memorandum on behalf of the 1st plaintiff: "The 1st plaintiff does not want the 2nd plaintiff to be transposed as a defendant as the 2nd plaintiff has been permitted to withdraw his claim in I.A.No.2260 of 1949. So there is no necessity to amend the plaint." On 18th October, 1949, another memorandum was filed on behalf of the 1st plaintiff stating that the amended plaint carrying out the amendments ordered in I.A. Nos.1918 of 1949 and 2171 of 1949 was filed and that the withdrawal of the 2nd plaintiff’s claim as permitted in I.A.No.2260 of 1949 was mentioned in the amended plaint. When the suit was taken up for trial, three issues were heard as preliminary issues, namely, issues 4, 10 and 15. They are in the following terms: "(4) Whether the suit is in time in so far as Rangaswami Reddi and defendant 17 are concerned? Whether in any event, the suit is in time in so far as 1st plaintiff is concerned? (10) Whether the 1st plaintiff’s claim is within the jurisdiction of this Court? (15) Whether the suit is in time against defendants 12 to 16? We are not concerned in this appeal with the third of these issues relating to defendants 12 to 16. The learned Subordinate Judge held in favour of the 1st plaintiff on issue 10 on the ground that the proper forum would be the Court which could entertain the claim on the date of the institution of the suit and subsequent events would not oust its jurisdiction. He, however, answered issue 4 against the 1st plaintiff. He, therefore, dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the 1st plaintiff. He, however, answered issue 4 against the 1st plaintiff. He, therefore, dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the 1st plaintiff. The reasoning on which the learned trial Judge found issue 4 against the 1st plaintiff is this: The 3rd plaintiff had repudiated the sales in favour of the 1st plaintiff on attaining majority and the 2nd plaintiff had been permitted to withdraw from the action and the 1st plaintiff did not want him even to continue as a defendant. The privilege under section 6 being personal could not be assigned and the 1st plaintiff could not take the benefit of the extended period of limitation and continue the suit. Two questions have been mixed up in dealing with issue 4, one, whether the suit is barred by limitation, and another, whether the suit could be continued, having regard to the events which happened subsequent to the institution of the suit. The learned trial Judge was evidently inclined to hold that the suit as framed was not barred by time. In paragraph 12, he says: " If the plaint had gone on as originally framed, no question of limitation can arise." And his final conclusion is: “On the facts of the case as they exist at present, it is no longer open to the 1st plaintiff to continue the action.” Taking the question of limitation, it is obvious that the question whether a suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of the presentation of the plaint. There is no provision in the Limitation Act under which a suit, which was in time on the date of the institution, could subsequently become barred by time. We are, of course, not referring to the case of an additional party corning on record. For the purpose of deciding the question of limitation, the allegations in the plaint and the reliefs claimed must be analysed to ascertain the real nature and scope of the suit. There were three plaintiffs, of whom the 1st plaintiff was the transferee from the other two plaintiffs. For the purpose of deciding the question of limitation, the allegations in the plaint and the reliefs claimed must be analysed to ascertain the real nature and scope of the suit. There were three plaintiffs, of whom the 1st plaintiff was the transferee from the other two plaintiffs. It was conceded by respondent’s counsel that the suit so far as plaintiffs 2 and 3 were concerned, was not barred by limitation, because the 3rd plaintiff was a minor on the date of the institution of the suit and the 2nd plaintiff had not attained majority more than three years before suit. Though the suit was brought more than twelve years after the death of the widow, the suit was saved from the bar of limitation by reason of section 6 of the Limitation Act. So far, there is no dispute. It was also conceded by learned counsel for the appellant that if the suit had been brought only by the 1st plaintiff, it would have been barred, because he would not have been entitled to the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act. It is well established that the special provision of section 6 of the Limitation Act confers a purely personal exemption on a certain class of persons, and the exemption as such cannot be taken advantage of by the transferee from the person under disability. It is sufficient to refer to two of the leading authorities, the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Rudra Kant Surma Sircar v. Nobo Kishore Surma Biswas1 and the decision of our Court in Rangaswamy Chetti v. Thangavelu Chetti2. It is equally clear from the authorities that when a person entitled to the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act transfers property to another, though the transferee himself may not be entitled to the benefit of that section, a suit could be filed by the transferor and that the transferee and such a suit would not be barred though ultimately the benefit of the decision in the suit would go to the transferee. In Hanmant Gurundth v. Ramappa Lagamappa3,the learned Judges were not doubt dealing with a case coming under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. In Hanmant Gurundth v. Ramappa Lagamappa3,the learned Judges were not doubt dealing with a case coming under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. There, the transferee as the 1st plaintiff and the transferor as plaintiff No.2 together brought a suit for possession after setting aside an alienation by the guardian of the minor transferor. In that case, a decree was passed in favour of plaintiff No.1, the transferee, for possession, and the claim of plaintiff No. 2 was dismissed as he could get no relief. One of the defendants filed an appeal to the High Court, and it was contended that the suit was time-barred because the 2nd plaintiff was not interested in the suit, as he had sold away all his right to the 1st plaintiff and the 1st plaintiff himself was not entitled to the benefit of Article 44 of the Limitation Act, This contention was overruled. The learned Judges observed: “No doubt it may be said in this case that the suit is substantially by the transferee, and that plaintiff No. 2 is joined to save limitation, even though he had no interest in the suit. We agree that plaintiff No.2 is joined to save limitation, but we are of opinion that it is open to the parties to save limitation by adopting that course in view of the provisions of Article 44. We are satisfied that the plaintiff No.2 was entitled to sue to set aside the sale in spite of the transfer in favour of plaintiff No.1.” The principle of this decision would, in our opinion, equally apply in the application of section 6 of the Limitation Act. Indeed, this was done in a later decision of the Bombay High Court in Bandu Annaji v. Yeshwant Ramarao4. That was a case under section 6 of the Limitation Act. There, the mother of a minor as guardian sold a property. The minor on attaining majority assigned his right to recover the property to another, and a suit was brought by the assignor and assignee jointly for recovery of the property on the ground that the sale by the mother was void. It was held that though an assignee from a person who was a minor could not claim the benefit of section 6, the suit which was brought by both the assignor and the assignee was in time. It was held that though an assignee from a person who was a minor could not claim the benefit of section 6, the suit which was brought by both the assignor and the assignee was in time. The learned Judge followed the ruling in Hanmant Gurunath v. Ramappa Lagamappa1. The learned Judge pointed out that the vendee had every right to ask his vendor to join as a co-plaintiff in suing to recover possession of the property. He said: “In fact, after having sold the property and recovered consideration for the same from plaintiff she was bound to join plaintiff 1 in this suit in order to fulfil her obligations under the sale deed.” These last observations are apposite having regard to the recitals in the sale deed Exhibit A-3, namely: “We shall also join with you and file a suit as plaintiffs and see possession is given to you.” The decision in Ramaswami v. Govindammal2, also takes substantially the same view. In that case, the transferor was not even ranked as a co-plaintiff; he was only a defendant. But the learned Judge held that though he was impleaded as a defendant, he was substantially a co-plaintiff Mr.Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the respondent, tried to distinguish these decisions by contending that the plaint in this case is really a combination of two plaints, one by the 1st plaintiff and the other by plaintiffs 2 and 3 because distinct reliefs have been prayed for by the several plaintiffs. While we agree that in a sense it is true that the 1st plaintiff was interested in one relief and plaintiffs 2 and 3 in another relief, so far as the relief of possession is concerned it was a prayer by all the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs prayed that the Court may be pleased to order the defendants to deliver possession of the plaint-properties to the 1st plaintiff. This prayer must be read along with the averment in paragraph 8 of the plaint which sets out the sale deeds executed by plaintiffs 2 and 3 in favour of the 1st plaintiff and with the provision in the sale-deed, Exhibit A-3, to which we have referred above. The suit, therefore, is a suit by all the three plaintiffs in respect of possession, though plaintiffs 2 and 3 agree that the possession may be given to the 1st plaintiff. The suit, therefore, is a suit by all the three plaintiffs in respect of possession, though plaintiffs 2 and 3 agree that the possession may be given to the 1st plaintiff. We are not inclined to take a technical view of the pleading, as all that could be done in the circumstance was done. After executing the sale deeds, obviously plaintiffs 2 and 3 could not claim possession for themselves. It was not necessary that they should first have obtained possession and then they should deliver possession to the 1st plaintiff. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings plaintiffs 2 and 3 were entitled to ask the Court to pass a decree for possession in favour of their transferee, the 1st plaintiff. This is what they did ask. We have no hesitation in holding that the suit as framed was not barred by limitation. We have next to consider the effect of subsequent events. The 3rd plaintiff was a minor on the date of the institution of the suit. When he attained majority he was entitled to elect whether he would proceed with the suit or abandon it’ Order 32, rule 13, provides that where a minor co-plaintiff oil attaining majority desires to repudiate the suit, he shall apply to have his name struck out as co-plaintiff and the Court if it finds that he is not a necessary party, shall dismiss him from the suit. But if the Court finds he is a necessary party, the Court may direct him to be made a defendant. We have already mentioned how the 3rd plaintiff did repudiate the suit after attaining majority and he was made a defendant evidently because he was deemed to be necessary party to the suit. It was not contended that the suit failed immediately on the 3rd plaintiff being transposed as a defendant. It was assumed, and it was not disputed before us that the suit could have continued with plaintiffs 1 and 2. It is by reason of the 2nd plaintiff’s subsequent conduct and action that it has been held that the suit cannot go on. Now, let us see what he wanted to do. He first filed an application I.A.No.1919 of 1949, praying that he may be permitted to continue the suit as sole plaintiff. The petition was eventually dismissed as not pressed. Now, let us see what he wanted to do. He first filed an application I.A.No.1919 of 1949, praying that he may be permitted to continue the suit as sole plaintiff. The petition was eventually dismissed as not pressed. He filed another application I.A.No.2172 of 1949, for amendment of the plaint on the footing that he would prosecute the suit as sole plaintiff (Vide his affidavit filed in the application). This petition also was dismissed as not pressed. Finally he filed a petition purporting to be under Order 23, rule 1 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that he may be permitted to withdraw from the suit and to withdraw his claim against the defendants. The pleader for the 1st plaintiff made an endorsement that he has no objection to the petitioner withdrawing from the claim. The learned Judge, by his order dated 8th October, 1949, permitted the 2nd plaintiff to withdraw the claim made on his behalf. He added that if the first plaintiff wanted the 2nd plaintiff on record, he would be transposed as defendant on his application. The 1st plaintiff’s vakil made his attitude quite clear by the memorandum which he filed on 14th October, 1949, that the 1st plaintiff did not want the second plaintiff to be transposed as a defendant. Under Order .23, rule 1(4) of the Code, the Court is not authorised to permit one of several plaintiffs to withdraw without the consent of the others. The 2nd plaintiff, therefore, could not altogether withdraw from the suit without the consent of the other plaintiff, namely, plaintiff 1. On behalf of the 1st plaintiff, his vakil no doubt stated that there was no objection to the 2nd plaintiff withdrawing his claim. We understand this to mean that the 1st plaintiff had no objection to the 2nd plaintiff withdrawing his claim to the relief which he sought for himself, namely, the relief of accounting. We do not understand this to mean that the 1st plaintiff was giving his consent to the withdrawal by the and plaintiff from the suit in so far as it prayed for the delivery of possession of the property to the 1st plaintiff. As we have already observed, the 2nd plaintiff joined with the 1st plaintiff for the purpose of this prayer. As we have already observed, the 2nd plaintiff joined with the 1st plaintiff for the purpose of this prayer. We find nowhere the 1st plaintiff consenting to the 2nd plaintiff withdrawing from the suit in this respect. It is clear that without such consent the Court had no jurisdiction to permit the 2nd plaintiff to withdraw from the suit altogether. Even if the order of the learned Judge, dated 8th October, 1949, is deemed to have so permitted him, we hold that the order was wrong. The result is that so far as the prayer in paragraph 14(a) of the plaint is concerned, it must be taken as if the 2nd plaintiff is still on record. Mr.Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the respondent, put his case from a different aspect, mainly relying on the analogy of cases arising under Article 44 of the Limitation Act. His argument was that it was open to the 2nd plaintiff as reversioner to affirm the alienations made by the limited owners, and he must be deemed to have done this by choosing to withdraw his claim. We have no evidence here of such an affirmation. On the other hand, the amendment which he sought in I.A.No.2172 of 1949 is on the footing that the defendants have been in unlawful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. It is also highly doubtful if after having sold away the property to the 1st plaintiff he had still the right to affirm the transactions. Indeed, he had unequivocally disaffirmed the transaction in the sale deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff. It is on that footing that he purported to convey the properties to the 1st plaintiff. The case of an alienation by a minor’s guardian stands on a basis entirely different from that of an alienation by a limited owner like a widow. In the former case, the alienation is binding on the minor unless it is set aside. It is not void, it is voidable. In the case of an alienation by a limited owner, prima facie an alienation beyond her lifetime is not valid and binding on the reversioner. It is only if the alienee establishes certain circumstances that the alienation can convey to him the absolute interest in the property conveyed. It is not void, it is voidable. In the case of an alienation by a limited owner, prima facie an alienation beyond her lifetime is not valid and binding on the reversioner. It is only if the alienee establishes certain circumstances that the alienation can convey to him the absolute interest in the property conveyed. When, therefore, a minor purports to transfer property which had already been alienated by his guardian to another, he cannot convey title to the property as such. He is really transferring his right to recover the properties after setting aside the alienations. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Javerbhai v. Kabhai1 on which Mr.Gopalaswami Ayyangar relies relates to an alienation by a guardian; the minor after attaining majority transferred the property to another and brought a suit along with him to set aside the previous sale by his guardian. Subsequently, the vendor made an application to withdraw from the suit, and without any objection on the part of the purchaser he was allowed to withdraw from the suit. It was held that the purchaser alone had no authority to continue the suit because by such withdrawal from the suit he must be deemed to have elected to acquiesce in the sale by his guardian and his interests became extinguished under Article 44 read with section 28 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judge held that what was assigned to the purchaser was not the property but his right to sue for it. This reasoning cannot apply to a sale by a reversioner after the reversion has opened, of property belonging to the last male holder. He is not bound to set aside the alienations by the limited owner because they are not per se binding on him. This decision is of no help to the respondent. There is, however, one observation in the judgment of Patkar, J., which is of special interest. The learned Judge said: “In the present case the minor has withdrawn from the suit without any objection by the appellant, i.e. the subsequent purchaser. This decision is of no help to the respondent. There is, however, one observation in the judgment of Patkar, J., which is of special interest. The learned Judge said: “In the present case the minor has withdrawn from the suit without any objection by the appellant, i.e. the subsequent purchaser. It is doubtful whether plaintiff 2 who had attained majority could have been allowed to withdraw from the suit without the consent of the subsequent purchaser, the appellant before us, under O. 23, r. 1, sub-rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.” Mr.Gopalaswami Ayyangar was unable to refer us to any authority in support of his contention that even after a transfer of his interest in the property the reversioner could affirm the alienation by the limited owner to the detriment of the purchaser. In these circumstances, we disagree with the learned Judge in his finding that it is no longer open to the 1st plaintiff to continue the action. The appeal is allowed and the suit is remanded to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore for disposal of the other issues except issue 10, the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on which, was not challenged before us. No order as to costs in the appeal. The appellant is entitled to a refund of the Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.