JUDGMENT : CHATURVEDI, J. 1. This is defendant's appeal against an order passed by the District Judge, Indore, on 5-2-1954, in Civil Original Suit No. 91 of 1953 appointing a receiver for the realisation of rent of the mortgaged property. 2. The plaintiffs had filed a suit against the defendant for Rs. 2,23,337-7-6 on the basis of a simple mortgage deed dated 10-7-1947 of house No. 69 situated at Juna Topkhana Main Road, Indore, executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiffs as security for Rs. 1,75,000. The rate of interest was As. 0-8-6 per cent per month. 3. On 2-1-1954 an application with an affidavit for appointing receiver over the aforesaid house was presented by the plaintiffs on certain grounds. The defendant opposed this application denying the contentions of the plaintiffs, and stating definitely that the present value of the house in suit is Rs. 35,50,000 which is definitely more than the amount claimed in the suit plus the cost and 'ad interim' interest. It was added that the defendant had paid Rs. 35,000 over and above the amount shown by the plaintiffs as received from the defendant. It was also contended before the District Judge that the plaintiff's affidavit was not in accordance with law and should not be acted upon. The District Judge overruled the defendant's objections and passed an order appointing a receiver. 4. Mr. Bharucha, on behalf of the appellant, contends that the order is wrong and should not have been made. Much argument was addressed to us about R. 1, O. 40, Civil P.C., the material portion of which runs as follows : "Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by order : (a) appoint a receiver to any property whether before or after decree." The use of the word 'appears' indicates a lesser degree of probability than would be necessary if proof had been required. But the word 'may' cannot be read as 'must' and words 'just and convenient' cannot be ignored altogether. A mortgagor, where the mortgage is a simple mortgage, is entitled to remain in possession of the mortgaged property until such time as that property has been brought to sale in due course of law. Naturally, a receiver would not be appointed of the mortgaged property in a simple mortgage unless there is some substantial ground for interference. A mortgagor, where the mortgage is a simple mortgage, is entitled to remain in possession of the mortgaged property until such time as that property has been brought to sale in due course of law. Naturally, a receiver would not be appointed of the mortgaged property in a simple mortgage unless there is some substantial ground for interference. So it is clear that in case of simple mortgage, the powers conferred by O. 40, R. 1 are not to be exercised, as a matter of course. The discretion given by this rule is one that should be used with greatest care and caution. Of course, it is not necessary that a strong case should be made out to justify the appointment of a receiver in a case of a simple mortgage, yet it is necessary that a fair 'prima facie' case is established before the order for appointing a receiver is made. The Court has to be cautious to see that instead of serving the useful purpose for which it was framed, the rule does not give unscrupulous and rancorous litigants an engine for any unjustifiable interference with the rights of a mortgagor under the pretence and protection of legal sanction. If the Court has any suspicion that the plaintiffs have put forward their claim in an inflamed and exaggerated form and that their application for the appointment of a receiver is made only to cause annoyance to the Court; but the Court has to see that the discretion must be exercised soundly on a view of the whole circumstances of the case, not merely the circumstances which might make the appointment expedient for the protection of the property, but all the circumstances connected with the right which is asserted and has to be established. It may be that stronger grounds may be necessary when the mortgagor resides in the mortgaged house than when the house is let off to tenants. But in either case the test will be whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver, and due weight is to be given to all the relevant circumstances when are bound to vary from case to case. But in either case the test will be whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver, and due weight is to be given to all the relevant circumstances when are bound to vary from case to case. The accumulation of arrears of Interest, the realisation of rent from the tenants but its non-payment to the mortgagee, the omission to repair the house, the attempt to make the mortgage security inadequate or to reduce its value, and the alienation of other properties- all will be factors to be taken into consideration. In each case, the Court has to answer two questions : (i) Is there any possibility of the security being reduced in value before the case is decided ? (ii) It is just and convenient to saddle the mortgaged property with the expenses of a receiver ? 5. Several decisions were cited at the bar, but we are clear in mind that the view expressed by us alone is in consonance with that expressed by this Court in its earlier decisions reported in 'Bishwanath v. Kanak Mal'. 1953 Madh-B LJ 276 (A), 'Bachhraj v. Ramprasad', 1954 Madh-B LJ 1034 : ((S) Am 1955 Madh-B 40) (B). 'Krishna Kumar v. H.H. Maharaja Scindia', 1955 Madh-B LJ 1941 : (AIR 1956 Madh-B 44) (C) and 'Bhawaniram v. Mahomed Hussain', 1954 Madh-B LJ 883 : ((S) AIR 1955 Madh-B 199) (D). 6. When once the lower Court in the exercise of its discretion, after considering all the facts, has come to a conclusion, it is for the appellant to show that the Court exercised its discretion improperly. Mr. Bharucha, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the affidavit filed by the plaintiffs with their application for the appointment of a receiver must be rejected; and if that is rejected, contends the learned counsel, there will be no evidence in this case on which the learned District Judge's order can be sustained. Now, there is no rule which requires the filing of an affidavit for establishing a 'prima facie' case. Such a case may be apparent from the pleadings or from the admission of the defendants made in the written statement. Now, there is no rule which requires the filing of an affidavit for establishing a 'prima facie' case. Such a case may be apparent from the pleadings or from the admission of the defendants made in the written statement. If, however, an affidavit is filed to establish a case, it must comply with the terms of R. 3(1) of O. 19, Civil P.C. which runs as follows : "Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted provided that the grounds thereof are stated." It is well-settled that when matters are stated to be true on information or belief but source of information or ground of belief are not disclosed, no notice need be taken of the affidavit. The Supreme Court in 'State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog'. AIR 1952 SC 317 (E) drew attention to and approved the remarks of Jenkins C.J. and Woodroffe, J. in 'Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar', 37 Cal 259 (F). It was observed that when the matter deposed to is not based on personal knowledge the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. If the sources of information are not mentioned, the affidavit cannot be used as evidence in any judicial proceeding. (Duraiswamy Chetty v. Govind Chetty, 23 Ind Cas 377 : (AIR 1914 Mad 366 (2)) (G). 7. There is no doubt that the affidavit sworn to on 2-1-1954 by the respondents in this case suffers from the deficiencies pointed out above. The appellants stated that the fact that value of the property is going down every day "is true according to our information" and that the defendant had mortgaged his other property is also true "according to our information." They further stated that "the fact that out of Rs. 30,000 which the defendant had taken for repairs, nothing has been spent on repairs is true within our knowledge and according to our information." It was pointed out in 'Federal India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Anand Rao Dixit', AIR 1944 Nag 161 (H) that identical facts could not be verified both on knowledge and information. As sources of information are not disclosed, the affidavit was not properly verified and ought to have been rejected by the District Judge. Ltd. v. Anand Rao Dixit', AIR 1944 Nag 161 (H) that identical facts could not be verified both on knowledge and information. As sources of information are not disclosed, the affidavit was not properly verified and ought to have been rejected by the District Judge. It is a matter of regret that laxity in matter of proper verification of the affidavits is not discouraged by the Courts below. 8. On 28-1-1954, the defendant filed an application and took objection to the form of the affidavit sworn to by the plaintiff's on 2-1-1954. Then on 2-2-1954 the plaintiff Ram Narain filed another affidavit sworn to by him on the same day stating that all the facts stated "were true within the deponent's knowledge." No objection has been taken by Mr. Bharucha to this affidavit which avoided the deficiencies found to exist in the previous affidavit. This affidavit is in accordance with the terms of R. 3(1) of O. 19, C.P.C. and is a valid one. During the month that elapsed plaintiff Ram Narain must have obtained knowledge by ascertaining all the relevant facts stated in the affidavit and so no objection can be taken on this ground. From this affidavit it is clear that (i) the arrears of interest have accumulated and now amount to Rs. 48,336-7-1, (ii) that the defendant has been realising about Rs. 900 per month rent from the tenants but has not been paying anything to the plaintiff, (iii) that he has not spent anything on repairs of the house, and (iv) that the defendant has already mortgaged his other houses Nos. 504, 972, 1017 and 1018 in Mhow, (v) that it is false that he ever paid Rs. 35,000 towards the principal or interest in the case and (vi) that the house cannot now fetch more than Rs. 1,75,000. The learned District Judge has relied upon these facts and there is no doubt that considering the vague and evasive statements in the affidavit of the defendant the Court was entitled to prefer the affidavit of Ram Narain plaintiff. The defendant admitted that the house was let off to tenants and that he gets rent, but he threw the responsibility for it on his sons who, according to him, take and utilise the rent. He also admitted that he had not spent any sum on the repairs of the house. The defendant admitted that the house was let off to tenants and that he gets rent, but he threw the responsibility for it on his sons who, according to him, take and utilise the rent. He also admitted that he had not spent any sum on the repairs of the house. It is also clear that interest has been in arrears and has been accumulating and the learned District Judge also believed that other houses of the defendants have been mortgaged. Under these circumstances, we are of opinion, that the discretion exercised by the District Judge in appointing a receiver cannot be said to be improper and the appeal must fail. 9. We, therefore, dismiss it with costs. 10. SAMVATSAR, J. :- I agree. Appeal dismissed.