Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This application in revision arises out of an order passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Arrah, dated the 5th of August, 1954, rejecting summarily the application filed by the petitioner under Sec.39 of the Guardians and Wards Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for discharge of the opposite party and for his own appointment as the guardian of a minor named Jagnarain Singh, son of the Sukhdeo Singh. 2. In order to appreciate the points raised in this case it will be necessary to give, a few facts leading to the institution of the proceeding. On the 7th of February, 1953, the opposite party Ramraj Singh filed an application for being appointed as the guardian of the aforesaid minor. He claimed to be the maternal uncle of the minor concerned and stated in his application that the minor had no other near relation besides him except the mother. He was appointed guardian by the District Judge of Shahabad on the 18th of May, 1953. On the 18th of February, 1954, the petitioner filed an application under Section 39 of the Act. He stated that he was the own maternal uncle of the minor and that the opposite party secured an order for his own appointment as guardian of the minor after having suppressed the processes and having put false materials before the Court. It was also stated in the petition that the security offered by the opposite party as required by the District Judge was given with respect to land over which he had no claim of any right or title. It was further alleged that the mother of the minor was in the keeping of one Khobhari Mahton, a relation of the opposite party and she has got a son through that Khobhari Mahton. A still more serious allegation was made against the opposite party to the effect that he had got the entire property of the minor transferred by a registered sale deed in favour of the wife of the said Khobhari Mahton but when the petitioner raised agitation a reconveyance was taken from his wife. It was, therefore, stated that the interest of the opposite party was adverse to that of the minor. It was, therefore, stated that the interest of the opposite party was adverse to that of the minor. On these grounds a prayer was made for the discharge of the opposite party and for the appointment of the petitioner as the guardian of the minor. 3. This application was admitted by the District Judge on the 8th of April, 1954, who passed an order for issue of notice to the opposite party asking him to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. On the 21st of May, 1954, one Ramchandra Singh, claiming to be an uncle of the minor, made an application for his own appointment as guardian of the minor and for the discharge of the opposite party. On the 8th of June, 1954, an application purported to have been filed on behalf of Musammat Ramdasi, mother of the minor, was made for the discharge of the opposite party and for the appointment of Ramchandra Singh as guardian. On that very date the opposite party appeared and filed an application to be relieved of guardianship inasmuch as two designing persons have filed objection to his continuing as guardian of the boy. He, however, did not challenge, any of the statements made by the petitioner in his application under Sec.39 of the Act. Later on on the 26th of June, 1954; the mother of the minor withdrew her application filed on the 8th of June, 1954, alleging that she had not made any such application. The parties, thereafter, took steps to have the witnesses summoned. The case ultimately was posted for hearing on the 28th of July, 1854, before the learned Second Additional District Judge, to whom it was transferred. On that date the petitioner filed certain documents and filed hazri of his witnesses. The case was taken up on that day and without taking any evidence in the case the learned Second Additional District Judge heard arguments of the parties on the question under consideration. The order sheet of that day clearly shows that the parties did not represent to the Court that they would not adduce evidence; rather the first paragraph of the order of that day regarding documents filed by the petitioner shows that the admissibility or otherwise of those documents would be considered when tendered into evidence. The order sheet of that day clearly shows that the parties did not represent to the Court that they would not adduce evidence; rather the first paragraph of the order of that day regarding documents filed by the petitioner shows that the admissibility or otherwise of those documents would be considered when tendered into evidence. The second paragraph of the order then shows that the learned second Additional District Judge heard the lawyer of all the parties on the matter under consideration and fixed the 5th of August, 1954, for orders. On that he summarily dismissed the application after giving reasons for the same. Against that order the petitioner has come up in revision to this Court. 4. It is undisputed that the proceedings under the provisions of the Act cannot be disposed of summarily. In Sayad Shahu V/s. Hapija Begam, ILR 17 Bom 560 (A), a Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the procedure under Act VIII of 1890 (the present Guardians and wards Act) is not intended to be summary. The same view was taken in Gopalrao V/s. Shrawan, AIR 1923 Nag 36 (B). In Rasuian Bibi v Rahamatulla Khan, AIR 1931 Cal 59 (C), a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held as follows : "Once an order appointing a guardian has been made no attempt should be made by the party against whom the order has been made to get that order set aside or varied unless there are substantial grounds and only after the working out of the previous order has had a proper chance. And if the party is desirous of putting fresh facts before the Court and bringing to the notice of the Court circumstances which might throw a different light on the matters from that it bore before on the previous occasion and the parties desire to adduce evidence it is incumbent on the Court to hear and record the evidence, refused to do which amounts to such an irregularity as would bring the case under the provisions of Sec.115 of the Civil Procedure Code." Under Sec.13 of the Act, on the day fixed for the hearing of the application, or as soon afterwards as may be, the Court shall hear such evidence as may be adduced in support of or in opposition to the application. It appears from the order-sheet of the 28th of July, 1954, itself that the petitioner was prepared to adduce evidence. The learned Additional District Judge has, therefore, committed a material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in summarily dismissing the application made by the petitioner. 5. Even on merits his order does not seem to be justified. He was under a mistaken impression that an order of discharge could only be made if the case came within the purview of Clauses (a) to (d) of Sec.39 of the Act. On the allegations made in the petition filed by the petitioner, the case could come rather within the purview of Clauses (e) and (g) of that section. According to these two clauses, the Court may, on the application of any person interested, or of its own motion, remove a guardian appointed by or declared by the Court, or a guardian appointed by or other instrument, if there has been contumacious disregard of any provision of the Act of any order of the Court or if the guardian has an interest adverse to the faithful performance of his duties. One of the allegations made by the petitioner in his application is, as already stated, that the petitioner is the maternal uncle of the minor. This is not denied by the opposite party. Even then he mentioned in his application for appointment of guardian that the minor had no other relation. He stated in that petition that he was the maternal uncle of the minor. From his petition it appears that he is the son of Komal Singh. From the Vakalatnama filed by Musammat Ramdasi, the mother of the minor, it appears that she is the daughter of Budhan Koeri. The petitioner Antu Mahton is also the son of Budhan Koeri. It is thus clear that the opposite party could not be at least the own mama of the minor. It is argued that he might toe the mama of the minor, though not his own mama. The petitioner Antu Mahton is also the son of Budhan Koeri. It is thus clear that the opposite party could not be at least the own mama of the minor. It is argued that he might toe the mama of the minor, though not his own mama. But if that be so, then he must have been aware of the fact that the petitioner was his own mama and the fact that even then he mentioned in his petition that the minor had no other relation speaks for itself as to how he intended to conceal real facts from the Court and attempted to obtain his appointment by practising fraud on the Court. This is contumacious disregard of the provisions of the Act. Sec.10 (e) of the Act re-quires the applicant to give the names of the near relations of the minor and their residence. This provision has been clearly disregarded. 6. The allegation that the opposite party had once got the entire properties of the minor transferred in favour of the wife of Khobhari Mahton with whom the mother of the minor had illicit connection is very serious and that is the reason why the interest of the opposite party is alleged to be adverse to that of the minor. An enquiry with regard to this matter should have been made before disposing of the application. It was also alleged, as already stated, that the property given in security did not belong to the opposite party. Though this allegation was not refuted by him in the court below, it has been stated here on affidavit that he repurchased the same under a kebala. Cleverly enough, it is not mentioned whether this kebala is a registered kebala or a kista kebala and as to what is the date of this kebala. An enquiry should also have been made in regard to this matter inasmuch as if it were to be found that the land given in security did not belong to the opposite party, it would amount to a disregard of the provisions of the Act. I need not discuss the other matter raised by the learned Counsel for the opposite party before me in view of the order that I propose to pass. 7. The actual questions that fell to be decided in this case have not been dealt with by the learned Additional District Judge. I need not discuss the other matter raised by the learned Counsel for the opposite party before me in view of the order that I propose to pass. 7. The actual questions that fell to be decided in this case have not been dealt with by the learned Additional District Judge. The case has, therefore, to go back to him for rehearing. 8. The result, therefore, is that the application is allowed, the order of the learned Additional District Judge is set aside and the case is sent back to him for fresh decision in accordance with law after giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence in support of their allegations. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Hearing fee: Rs. 16