JUDGMENT Dayal, J. - This is a first appeal against the decree of the court below decreeing the Plaintiffs' suit for arrears of rent and for the ejectment of the Defendants. Manohar Lal, Defendant No. 1, appealed against the decree. He died during the pendency of the appeal and his widow and his son were substituted in his place. Defendant No. 2 also got himself transposed as an Appellant from the array of Respondents. None appeared for Defendant No. 2 at the time of the hearing of the appeal and therefore his appeal is dismissed in default with costs. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that Defendant No. 1 was in occupation of the western shop and the eastern shop of house No. 76/3 Helsey Road, Kanpur, and also of a godown No. 46/75 in Qooli Bazar, Kanpur. The Plaintiffs' case was that Defendant No. 1 took the western shop and the godown on rent in October, 1941 at Rs. 200 a month and also agreed to pay electric charges for the consumption of electricity in the entire premises of No. 76/3. The portion of the premises other than the shops consisted of a faw rooms on the ground floor and rooms on the first and second floors. It was also alleged that the Defendant took the eastern shop of house No. 76/3 at a rental of Rs. 100 per month. Defendant No. 2 was also in occupation of the eastern shop as sub-tenant of Defendant No. 1 according to the Defendant No. 1 and as a partnership firm of which Defendant No. 1 was also a partner according to the Plaintiffs' allegation. 3. The suit was contested on the ground that the rent of the ground floor of the building was Rs. 125 a month, and that of the godown was Rs. 75 and that the Defendant No. 1 Was not responsible for the entrie electric charges. 4. It was alleged by the Defendant that after the partition of the joint family consisting of Manohar Lal and Rishab Kumar in 1938 the joint family business continued as a partnership business that the partnership also was dissolved when Rishab Kumar died in August, 1941 and that the actual division of the partnership assets, etc., took place on the 19th of October, 1941. It is alleged that since the partnership came into existence the rent of the two shops and the ground floor of the house was Rs. 250 a month till such time that Manohar Lal's family occupied one of the floors of the house and that after his family left residing there the rent due from the firm to Rishab Kumar for the ground floor of house No. 76/3 was reduced to Rs. 125. It was further alleged that when Defendant No. 1 vacated rooms on the ground floor in favour of the Plaintiffs as they were required by them, the rent of the two shops alone was to be Rs. 75 a month. 5. The learned Civil Judge did not find in favour of the Plaintiff that the rent of the western shop and godown was Rs. 200 and of the eastern shop was Rs. 100. He did not agree with the Defendant that the Defendant had also taken on rent the rooms on the ground floor and that the rent was reduced from Rs. 125 to Rs. 75 when those two rooms were vacated. He found that the rent of the two shops and the godown was Rs. 200 per month. He also agreed with the Plaintiffs' contention that the Defendant was liable for the entire electric charges. He further found on the basis of the agreed statements of the Learned Counsel for the parties that calculating the rent at Rs. 200 a month the rent due to the Plaintiffs would come to Rs. 1,780 after taking into consideration the payments made by the Defendant. He accordingly decreed the suit for Rs. 1,780 and for the eviction of the Defendants. 6. Against this decree the Defendants appealed. The Plaintiffs filed a cross-objection claiming the dismissal of the suit for some of the amounts of the rent claimed, contending that the court below should have fixed the monthly rental of the shops and the godown at Rs. 300 a month. 7. 1,780 and for the eviction of the Defendants. 6. Against this decree the Defendants appealed. The Plaintiffs filed a cross-objection claiming the dismissal of the suit for some of the amounts of the rent claimed, contending that the court below should have fixed the monthly rental of the shops and the godown at Rs. 300 a month. 7. During the pendency of the appeal the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act No. III of 1947) came into force, and it is also contended for the Appellants that, in view of Section 15 of this Act, no decree for ejectment can be passed or can be confirmed in the absence of the decree being justified or any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the Act. 8. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties, perused the evidence on the record and are of opinion that there exists no good reason to differ from the appreciation of evidence and the finding arrived at by the court below on the question of the rent of the shops and the godown. Suffice it to say that the document, Ex. 1, dated the 31st of March, 1942, fully supports the conclusion of the court below. Along with this letter the Defendant sent a cheque of Rs. 1200 to Shrimati Satyavati, guardian of the minor-Plaintiffs, and stated in the letter that this amount was being sent for rent of shop No. 76/3, Helsey Road, and 46/75 godown at Chhapar Mohal, commencing from the 20th of October, 1941, to the 19th of April, 1942. No objection seems to have been taken at the time to the effect that this was not the correct amount of rent for the period and was short by Rs. 600. In fact, a note admitted by Shrimati Satyavati Devi in her deposition to have been made by her manager at the time is to the effect that the rent for the period before the 20th of October, 1941, is still due and that account in respect thereof has not yet been made up. When such a note was being made, it could have also been noted that the amount of Rs. 1,200 was not the correct amount of rent for six months and was short by Rs. 600. 9. The contention for the Defendant that the rent was reduced by Rs. When such a note was being made, it could have also been noted that the amount of Rs. 1,200 was not the correct amount of rent for six months and was short by Rs. 600. 9. The contention for the Defendant that the rent was reduced by Rs. 50 when he vacated the rooms on the ground floor does not appeal to us to be correct. According to Manohar Lal's statement it had been agreed with Rishab Kumar during his lifetime when the firm was paying Rs. 125 rent for the ground floor that the rent would be reduced by Rs. 50 if the firm at any time vacated the two rooms on the ground floor. We are not prepared to believe that there would have been any such anticipated agreement between the partners of the firm when there was not even a question of Manohar Lal's family vacating the residential portion of the house. It is true that the court below observed at one place that it appeared that the proprietors of the firm used the ground floor for purposes of sitting and for meeting customers on occasions but such a use of the room by the proprietors would not make those rooms as rooms let to the firm. A firm is not expected to take two rooms merely for this purpose. If the firm had taken those rooms on rent much more regular, greater and frequent use of those rooms would have been made by the firm. 10. It follows, therefore, that the decree of the court below for Rs. 1,780 is correct and that the appeal in this respect should fail and that the cross-objection should also fail. 11. It has been held in Lala Raj Narain v. Sita Ram Sri Kishen Das 1951 A.W.R. (H.C.) 115 and other cases that the provisions of Section 15 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act would apply to pending suits at the stage of appeals. 11. It has been held in Lala Raj Narain v. Sita Ram Sri Kishen Das 1951 A.W.R. (H.C.) 115 and other cases that the provisions of Section 15 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act would apply to pending suits at the stage of appeals. The contention for the Appellants is based on the provisions of Section 3, Sub-section (1) Clause (a) of the Act which is: Subject to any order passed under Sub-section (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand.... 12. Clause (a) in its present form exists from November, 1954, but it makes no difference whether we consider the old clause or the present clause. The contention for the Appellants centres round the expression "notice of demand". It is urged that the notice which the Plaintiff served on the Defendants in view of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be taken to be a notice complying with the provisions of this Clause (a), inasmuch as that notice did not mention the correct amount of arrears of rent. The amount mentioned in the notice was Rs. 5,999/12/- calculated on the basis of the monthly rental being Rs. 300. The correct amount for that period according to the finding of the court below and confirmed by us would have been Rs. 1,780. The contention is that as the notice contained an incorrect and exaggerated amount of arrears of rent, it was not the notice contemplated by the expression "notice of demand" in Clause (a). When this contention was raised at the first hearing of the appeal some months back we were inclined to agree with the contention and it was then urged for the Respondents that in view of what had happened subsequent to the decree the Appellants would be barred from raising this objection. We gave time to the Respondents to put in writing what those subsequent events were and on their doing so gave an opportunity to the Appellants to put in their reply. We gave time to the Respondents to put in writing what those subsequent events were and on their doing so gave an opportunity to the Appellants to put in their reply. We heard the Learned Counsel for the parties a second time specially as several months had elapsed since the first hearing and now hold a different view and therefore did not consider it necessary to enter into the question of the subsequent events and their effect. 13. The contention for the Appellants that the notice of demand would be bad in law and would not amount to a proper notice of demand is based on the considerations of the Common Law of England and on the cases reported in Sri Kishen v. Sri Narain AIR 1950 Ajm 16, Jamna Lal v. Ram Bilas AIR 1950 Ajm 17 and Ramdhan v. Jagdish Pershad AIR 1951 Ajm 54. The English cases referred to are John Febian v. Winston 78 E.R. 465, Duncomb v. Tickridge 82 E.R. 933, Duppa v. Baskerville 85 E.R. 336 and Doe on the Demise, of Wheeldon v. Paul 172 E.R. 568. These English cases do not interpret the expression "notice of demand". They considered the expression 'demand' as a condition precedent for the re-entry of the landlord on the happening of a default in the payment of rent. It does not appear from the first case John Fabian v. Winston 78 E.R. 465 that the amount claimed was not the correct amount due. Possibly it appears that emphasis was laid on the fact that at the time of making the demand it was not made clear for what period the amount claimed, which was due, was due. The second case Duncomb v. Tickridge 82 E.R. 933 also does not indicate that the demand of rent was of an excessive amount. From the context it is possible that the demand of rent included the sum which had just become due and which could be demanded and also included previous arrears as well. In the third case Duppa v. Baskerville 85 E.R. 336 the reference is not to any portion of judgment but to note No. 16 at page 374. This note lays down the various things which were required by the common law to be previously done by the reversioner to entitle him to re-enter where there is a condition of re-entry reserved for non-payment of rent. This note lays down the various things which were required by the common law to be previously done by the reversioner to entitle him to re-enter where there is a condition of re-entry reserved for non-payment of rent. Of the conditions the first is that there must be a demand of the rent; the second is that the demand must be of the precise rent due, for if he demands a penny more or less, it will be ill; and the third condition is that it must be made precisely upon the day when the rent is due and payable by the lease to save the forfeiture. The circumstances under which such strict conditions were laid down for a demand to be a good demand for the purposes of forfeiture of tenancy we do not know. The last case is Doe on the Demise of Wheeldon v. Paul 172 E.R. 568. In this case the demand was for 193-10-0 while the annual rent payable quarterly was . 75. The demand should have been of a quarter's rent only. The demand was also not made at a proper time and it was held that the demand was not a good one. As already mentioned, the expression that we have to interpret and give effect to is a notice of demand and not the mere word "demand". It appears to us, therefore, that these English cases are of not much help as a guide in interpreting the expression "notice of demand." 14. Of the Ajmer cases the first case dealt with the notice demanding rent at an enhanced rate. It was held that the Plaintiff Respondent was not entitled to demand rent at the enhanced rate and that the notice of demand was, in the circumstances, not a proper one. In the second case Jamna Lal v. Ram Bilas AIR 1950 Ajm 17 the notice was in a very vague term and did not mention the amount of the arrears of rent and the period to which the arrears related. It was held that such a notice was not notice within the meaning of Section 9(1)(a) of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. It was held that such a notice was not notice within the meaning of Section 9(1)(a) of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. In the third case Ramdhan v. Jagdish Pershad AIR 1951 Ajmer 54 the notice of demand gave four days to pay the arrears and the plaint did not seek eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had failed to pay the arrears of rent due within a month of the service of notice on him. It was held, therefore, that the tenant could not have been evicted on the ground that he had failed to pay the arrears of rent in court on the first day of hearing of the suit. After holding so it was also observed: Moreover, a landlord has to demand only the correct amount of the arrears of rent and not such arrears of rent as would not be recognisable by a court of law. Such defective notice, in my opinion, would not entitle the landlord to ask for the eviction of tenant, in case the arrears of rent are not paid within a month of the service of notice on him or on the first day of the hearing of the suit. 15. In one of these three cases the various provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947, were discussed at length. The reasons for the view expressed so far as it affects the validity of notice on account of the inaccuracy in the amount of arrears of rent were also not mentioned. Section 4 of that Act authorises the landlord to increase the rent payable by the tenant in certain circumstances. Section 8, provides for the landlord's wish to increase the rent of any premises by giving notice of his intention to make the increase and further provides that in so far as such increase is permissible under the Act it will be due and recoverable in respect of the period of tenancy after the end of the month, in which the notice was given. 16. 16. The relevant provisions of Section 9 as are necessary for our purposes to consider are: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, no court shall pass any decree in favour of landlord, or make any order in favour of a landlord whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting any tenant, whether or not the period of the tenancy has terminated, unless it is satisfied either-- (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of any arrears of rent due, within one month of the service on him in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882), of a notice of demand by the landlord: Provided that no eviction shall be ordered under this clause if the tenant pays in court on the first day of hearing such arrears of rent together with the costs of the suit, or.... There is no provision in the Act as to what the court has to do when in a suit for eviction on the ground of the non-payment of rent the tenant deposits in court the amount of arrears of rent and costs of the suit in accordance with the proviso. Of course, the amount deposited will necessarily have to be paid to the Plaintiff for the arrears of rent. The question, however, arises that if the amount deposited be not the amount claimed and mentioned in the notice but is less, what procedure the court has to follow? Has the court to determine the amount or it cannot? If it cannot, it stands to reason that in the context of the various provisions of that Act the arrears mentioned in the notice should be the precise amount of arrears of rent and should not be the amount which on enquiry be found to be erroneous. The view expressed in the three Ajmer cases may be on the basis of such consideration. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act does not contain a proviso like that of Section 9(1)(a) of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. A new section in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act has been added. It deals with a situation similar to the one contemplated in Section 9 of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act. A new section in the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act has been added. It deals with a situation similar to the one contemplated in Section 9 of the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act. This in Section 7-B. Its relevant provisions are: (1) When any tenant, who is in occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an order made under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 7, is in arrears of rent or any instalment thereof (where it is payable in instalments) for more than three months the landlord may make an application to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for an order of ejectment of the tenant from the accommodation. (2)(a) The application shall contain the following particulars: .... (iii) The arrears claimed and the rate at which they are claimed. .... (b) .... (3) On the making of the application under Sub-section (1) the Munsif shall, without unnecessary delay, serve by registered post or otherwise a notice on the tenant asking him to pay the amount of arrears within 15 days of the service thereof, or to show cause within the said period why an order directing him to be evicted from the accommodation be not passed against him. (4) If within the time allowed in the notice under Sub-section (3), the tenant pays into court the amount mentioned therein, the Munsif shall dismiss the application and direct the amount deposited to be paid to the landlord in satisfaction of the arrears and shall make such order as to costs as may appear to him to be just and proper. (5) Where the tenant has been duly served with the notice under Sub-section (3) but has failed to deposit the amount mentioned within the time allowed therein, and he does not file any objection, the Munsif shall, notwithstanding anything in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, make an order directing that the tenant be evicted from the accommodation and pay the costs of the application. (6) .... (6) .... (7) If the tenant appears in reply to the notice under Sub-section (3) and files an objection other than an objection as to costs of these proceedings, the Munsif shall inform the applicant that he may, subject to the payment of court-fee within such time, as may be specified, have the application treated as a plaint in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent alone: Provided that the tenant shall not be permitted to file any objection, unless he has deposited in court the amount mentioned in the notice or furnishes security to the satisfaction of the court.... It would appear from these provisions that the application of the landlord for the ejectment of a tenant need not contain the precise amount of arrears of rent due at the time of the application. In case it does not contain the exact amount and the tenant disputes that amount the remedy of eviction is not obtainable to the landlord by the summary order of the court but would be available if he is able to prove that the tenant was in arrears in the suit in case he pays the necessary court fees and gets the application converted into a plaint. 17. There appears to us, therefore, no particular reason why the notice of demand must in order to be a valid notice contain such amount of the arrears of rent as be ultimately admitted by the tenant to be correct or be ultimately found by the court to be correct on the contention of the Defendant. The tenant is called upon to pay the arrears of rent, which, in the first instance, means the amount mentioned in the notice. If the tenant does not admit the correctness of that amount and does not like to pay the full amount, there seems to be no reason why he should not pay at least such amount as he considers to be due. If he makes such a payment he safeguards his position and the fault would be entirely the landlord's if he goes to court seeking eviction of the tenant. He will fail in his suit if the tenant succeeds in satisfying the court that he had paid up the arrears of rent due, even though the demand was for a larger amount. He will fail in his suit if the tenant succeeds in satisfying the court that he had paid up the arrears of rent due, even though the demand was for a larger amount. The Plaintiff will succeed if the tenant fails to establish that and the Plaintiff succeeds in establishing that in spite of what the tenant had paid some amount of arrears of rent still remained due after one month of the service of notice. There seems to be no good reason why the simple expression "notice of demand" whose main purpose must be to warn the tenant that he has overlooked paying rent and should pay it should be interpreted so strictly as the term "demand" is interpreted under the Common Law of England that the notice of demand means a notice of demand for the precise amount ultimately found due at the time the notice was given. If the Legislature intended the notice of demand to be so precise and any defect in the notice to be so vital to the interests of the landlord, it could have very easily used a clearer language in Clause (a) to indicate its intention. It has been urged that the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was enacted for the benefit of the tenants as the preamble shows that the Act was to provide for preventing the eviction of tenants during a limited period and that its provisions be liberally interpreted. Under the general law the landlord is free to terminate the tenancy of his tenant by a notice conforming to the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. His general right was restricted for a limited period by this Act, and there is no reason why the restriction placed should be interpreted in favour of the tenant even if the language has to be stretched. The restrictions have to be interpreted in a normal manner. Interpreting Clause (a), Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, we are of opinion that it is not necessary for the validity of a notice of demand that the amount of arrears of rent mentioned in it should be the exact amount found due on the date of the notice by the court in case the amount is contested on behalf of the contending Defendant. 18. 18. We are, therefore, of opinion that the notice served on the Defendant by the Plaintiffs u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and at a time when there was not in existence the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act happened to satisfy the requirements of Section 3, Sub-section (1), Clause (a) of the Act and is therefore not a bad notice. The result is that Section 15 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act does not stand in the way of confirming the decree for the ejectment of the Defendants from the premises in suit. 19. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs We also dismiss the cross-objections with costs.