JUDGMENT : This is a Second Appeal by Mulla Zawar Hussain plaintiff against the order of dismissal of his suit for the recovery of the mortgage money by the sale of the house mortgaged in his favour by Shrimati Bhoori Bai, mother of the defendants-respondents . Both the trial Court and the first Appellate Court were of the opinion that the whole of the house was the ancestral property belonging to the husband and the son of Shrimati Bhoori Bai, and that the house was mortgaged by her without any legal necessity. The suit for the enforcement of the mortgage and for the realisation of the mortgage money by the sale of the house was, therefore, dismissed. 2. Along with the Second Appeal the plaintiff has moved an application for amendment of para 1 of the plaint and also filed a certified copy of the gift-deed said to have been executed by Nand Kishore, husband of Shrimati Bhoori Bai. As a result of the amendment it was sought to plead that at the time of the mortgage Shrimati Bhoori Bai had half the share in the house in her absolute ownership as her stridhan property and the other half as an heir of her predecessor son in which she could have a life interest only. 3. Formal amendment of the plaint is not necessary as the latest version of the plaintiff could be covered by Issue No. 1 which runs as below : "Whether the defendant's mother Bhoori Bai was not entitled to sell or mortgage the house, if so what is its effect on the suit ?" The important point for consideration in connection with this issue was if the whole of the house was the Stridhan property of Shrimati Bhoori Bai, and if not whether a part of it was in her absolute ownership and in the rest she had a life interest only. A proper finding to this issue can be given on consideration of the evidence already adduced by the parties and also by taking into consideration the certified copy of the gift-deed filed by the plaintiff, which has now been admitted by the defendants. Consequently it is neither necessary to allow amendment of the plaint nor is it necessary to direct recording of additional evidence or to ask for a fresh finding on issue 1. or on an issue to be re-drafted by me. Consequently it is neither necessary to allow amendment of the plaint nor is it necessary to direct recording of additional evidence or to ask for a fresh finding on issue 1. or on an issue to be re-drafted by me. Further the adoption of either of the these alternatives would result in the waste of time of this court and also of the lower Courts without serving any useful purpose. 4. In the mortgage deed dated 26-4-1945 (Ex. 2) Shrimati Bhoori Bai had made a reference to the gift-deed dated 8-8-1934 executed by Nand Kishore in her favour and also in favour of her son Moolchand. This fact appears to have been conceded by Lachman Singh (D.W. 1), who is the son-in-law of Shrimati Bhoori Bai. What Lachman Singh has deposed is that Bhoori Bai had got this house from her husband, Nand Kishore, and it was after the death of Moolchand that Bhoori Bai inherited the house from Moolchand as his mother. This would support the assertion contained in the mortgage-deed. Suck appear to be the facts from the gift-deed also. It is, therefore, proved beyond doubt that Nand Kishore had made a gift of the house to his wife and his son giving to each of them half the share in the house. But in this gift-deed there is also an assertion that the house was an ancestral one. The question, therefore, arises is whether a father could make a gift of an ancestral immoveable property to his wife who is not a member of the coparcenary and could to the most claim maintenance from the joint properties. 5. Section 226 of the Principles of Hindu Law by D.F. Mulla 11th Edn, gives the answer to the above question. It lays down that a Hindu father can make a gift of the ancestral immovable property for "pious purposes" only and even then of a small proportion of the entire estate. This view has been adopted by many High Courts. In Rayakkal v. Subbanna 16 Mad 84 (A) it was held that a Hindu father had no power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property to his wife and married daughters, with the result that the alienation was set aside in to and not only to the extent of the share of the minor son. In Rayakkal v. Subbanna 16 Mad 84 (A) it was held that a Hindu father had no power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property to his wife and married daughters, with the result that the alienation was set aside in to and not only to the extent of the share of the minor son. A similar view was taken in Jinnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmaya Krishnappa, 59 Bom 459 : (AIR 1935 Bom 324) (B) and Ganga Bisheshar v. Pirthi Pal 2 All 635 (C), where the gift of joint ancestral property to the daughter or her father not having been made with the consent of the son, was declared invalid, not only to the extent of the son's share in such property but altogether. The facts of these two cases are somewhat different, but the principle kid down therein would be applicable with equal force to an alienation in favour of the wife. 6. To get over this difficulty it was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that a mere assertion in the gift-deed that the property was an ancestral one was not sufficient to give such a finding, and that when the gift was in favour of Moolchand also it could be presumed that he had given his consent to the gift, with the result that he and now the defendants, could not challenge the validity of the gift. If the house was not an ancestral one, it would have either been purchased by Nand Kishore or been constructed by him after purchasing the site. In either case Nand Kishore would have clearly indicated in the gift-deed how he was claming title to the house, it is only for ancestral property one very often feels difficulty in tracing out or how it was acquired by his ancestors. Thus even if there was no recital in the gift-deed to support that the house was the ancestral property of the donor it could be presumed that it was an ancestral property. But in the present case there is an assertion in the gift-deed that the house being gifted was an ancestral one. There could be no reason for Nand Kishore to make a wrong assertion in the document on this point. Consequently it will establish beyond doubt that the house being joint ancestral property belonged to both the father and the son as members of a Joint Hindu family. There could be no reason for Nand Kishore to make a wrong assertion in the document on this point. Consequently it will establish beyond doubt that the house being joint ancestral property belonged to both the father and the son as members of a Joint Hindu family. 7. The deed of gift was not witnessed by the son of the donor, namely Moolchand, nor does the son appear to have been present at the time of the registration of the document. Consequently, there is no evidence to show that Moolchand, the other coparcener of the Joint Hindu Family, had given his consent to the gift. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has, however, urged that the consent of the son could be presumed from the assertion contained in the gift-deed that both the donees had accepted the gifted property and also from the circumstance that the father and the son were living in the house jointly and the father was not likely to make a gift without consulting his son. None of those contentions appeal to me. A gift is complete only after the donee has, given his acceptance and actually accepts the property being gifted. In other words, the gift is not valid unless it is accompanied by delivery of possession of the subject of the gift from the donor to the donee, but where from the nature of the case physical possession cannot be delivered, the donor must do all the acts so as to entitle the donee to obtain possession. It is to indicate delivery of possession that it is invariably mentioned in a gift-deed that possession has been delivered to the donee or that he has accepted the gifted property. In cases where there can be actual delivery of possession such an assertion in the gift-deed can prove the consent of the donee; but where there is no transfer of physical possession as in the present case, where fattier, mother and son would have continued to reside in the house as before, a recital in the gift-deed cannot prove the consent of one of the donees specially when the gift is clearly against his interest. Before the gift was made the house belonged jointly to Nand Kishore and his son, Moolchand and each had half share in the house. Before the gift was made the house belonged jointly to Nand Kishore and his son, Moolchand and each had half share in the house. Nand Kishore gifted the whole of the house not only his share and gave half share to his wife, Bhoori Bai and the remaining half share to Moolchand. Thus Moolchand did not at all gain by the gift. In other words therefore the execution of the gift-deed by Nand Kishore in favour of both Bhoori Bai and Moolchand cannot prove the knowledge of consent of Moolchand. It may also be mentioned though at the risk of repetition that had the gift been made with the knowledge or consent of Moolchand, it is likely that he would have accompanied his father at the time of the registration of the document and would have signed the document either as an attesting witness or to identify his father. The non-existence of his signature or thumb mark on the gift-deed is a strong circumstance to suggest his absence at the time of the gift, and consequently to entitle an inference in his favour namely that he had not given consent to the gift being made to his mother. 8. Jointness of the family or joint residence of the father and son cannot also prove that the gift was made with the consent of the son. When mother and son are not on bad terms, the mother generally does not become owner or co-owner of the property which in due course would go to her son. It is only when she apprehends that she would not be properly maintained by her son, that she induces her husband to transfer some of the properties to her so that on his death she may not have to go a begging. Thus the fact that Nand Kishore made a gift in favour of his wife will on the other hand show that Moolchand and his parents were not on cordial terms. In these circumstances Nand Kishore could not make a gift in favour of his wife without consulting his son. 9. It may however, be mentioned that the consent of son namely Moolchand could have been presumed if the gift was followed by partition of the house or by some overt act of the mother, Bhoori Bai suggesting that she was claiming title to the house on the basis of the gift. 9. It may however, be mentioned that the consent of son namely Moolchand could have been presumed if the gift was followed by partition of the house or by some overt act of the mother, Bhoori Bai suggesting that she was claiming title to the house on the basis of the gift. One of such acts could be by making alterations in the house at her expense, against the interest of the son or by dealing with the property as an owner. Apparently no such constructions were made, not did Bhoori Bai mortgage the house while her son was alive. Thus there is no factor in support of the plaintiffs contention that Moolchand had given his consent to the gift in favour of his mother. 10. To sum up, the plaintiff-appellant has failed to prove that Nand Kishore had made the gift with the consent or knowledge of his son, Moolchand, and consequently the gift of the ancestral immovable property to his wife Shrimati Bhoori Bai which was not and could not be for any 'pious purpose' recognised under the Hindu Law, was invalid and is liable to be set aside. When gift is ignored the sole owner of the disputed house on the death of Nand Kishore would be his son, Moolchand and on the death of Moolchand it would be inherited by his mother Shrimati Bhoori Bai and she would only have a life interest therein. Shrimati Bhoori Bai, being not a full owner could not in any way alienate the ancestral house except for her life time, unless of course the alienation was made for legal necessity. Both the lower courts are of opinion that the present mortgages were not for legal necessity. This concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with in Second Appeal. Further, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has not brought to my notice any reliable evidence on this point. When the mortgages were not for legal necessity, they would not be binding on the reversioners nor can the ancestral-property be sold in payments of such debts. The suit was therefore, liable to dismissal with costs and was rightly dismissed by the lower courts. 11. The Second Appeal has thus no force, and it is hereby dismissed with costs of all the Courts. Appeal dismissed.