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1955 DIGILAW 141 (MAD)

Uthaman Chettiar v. T. K. Thiagaraja Pillai

1955-04-19

PANCHAPAKESA AYYAR

body1955
Judgement JUDGMENT :- This is a petition by one Utharaan Chettiar to revise the order of the Subordinate Judge of Pudukottai, dated 3-8-1954 in I.A. No. 509 of 1953 in O.S. No. 95 of 1952, dismissing that petition which had been filed under O. 8-A, R. 1, C.P.C., for granting leave to issue a third party notice to one Lakshmanan Chettiar. The suit itself was one for recovering a sum of Rs. 3,500 on a promissory note executed by the petitioner in favour of the plaintiff Thyagaraja Pillai. According to the petitioner he agreed along with his sisters son-in-law Lakshmanan Chettiar, to buy certain properties for Rs. 4,500 from the plaintiffs son-in-law, and paid Rs. 1,000 by way of advance and executed a promissory note for the balance of Rs. 3,500. He contended that as the contract of sale was vitiated by false and fraudulent representations made by the plaintiff and his son-in-law, it could not be enforced against him and he and his sisters son-in-law would not be liable to pay the balance of Rs. 3,500 and were also entitled to recover Rs. 1,000 the advance paid already. It is in pursuance of this contention that he put in an application for a third party notice for adding Lakshmanan Chettiar. The lower court dismissed the petition holding that there was no justification to grant leave for issuing a third party notice to Lakshmanan Chettiar, as the alleged claim to contribution from Lakshmanan Chettiar was not evidenced by the promissory note and the door would be opened for every unscrupulous litigant who wished to protract the proceedings of court to allege an agreement of indemnity or contribution with any man in the street, and thereby procure on frivolous grounds, a needless prolongation of the trial if leave were to be granted in such cases. 2. I have perused the entire records, and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. A. Sundaram Iyer, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the lower court went wrong in not distinguishing between justifiable cases of third party notice and frivolous or vexatious cases. According to him, though the promissory note was executed only by the petitioner, be could prove that Lakshmanan Chettiar, his sisters son-in-law would be liable for half the amount, if decreed and it was unjustifiable to drive him to a separate suit for contribution or indemnity. According to him, though the promissory note was executed only by the petitioner, be could prove that Lakshmanan Chettiar, his sisters son-in-law would be liable for half the amount, if decreed and it was unjustifiable to drive him to a separate suit for contribution or indemnity. He conceded that if in a promissory note suit a defendant who had executed the promissory note solely were allowed to contend that several other persons, whose names are not even mentioned in the promissory note were also liable for the promissory note amount and allowed leave for third party notices to be issued to them, it would unnecessarily complicate and delay proceedings in court, and waste the time of courts. But he contended that this was not such a case, as he had already made the allegations that Lakshmanan Chettiar was equally liable with him, if there was any real liability, in the written statement and there was also an issue framed in the suit as to whether Lakshmanan Chettiar was a necessary party. Though there is some force in his arguments, and though I agree with him that "in suitable cases", third party notices can be issued even in suits on promissory notes I am of opinion that this is not a fit case for my interfering with the lower courts order which has not been proved to be vitiated by any error of law, or material irregularity or to have caused any failure of justice. 3. The promissory note in this suit did not recite that the promissory note was being executed by the petitioner for an amount of Rs. 3,500 duo by him and Lakshmanan Chettiar jointly under the contract of sale. If there were such a recital, the petitioner might have had a good case for leave to issue a third party notice. Lakshmanan Chettiar need not have been a joint executor of the promissory note as contended by the plaintiff as in that case, a third party notice would be meaningless as he would be a co-defendant. But where no reference at all was made to Lakshmanan Chettiar or his joint liability along with, the petitioner, in file promissory note, it is, in my opinion, inexpedient, inadvisable, and dangerous to issue a third party notice, simply because this contention was set forth in the written statement and there is an issue also in the suit. But where no reference at all was made to Lakshmanan Chettiar or his joint liability along with, the petitioner, in file promissory note, it is, in my opinion, inexpedient, inadvisable, and dangerous to issue a third party notice, simply because this contention was set forth in the written statement and there is an issue also in the suit. Any defendant in a promissory note suit can also allege in the written statement that several other persons are jointly liable with him, and want third party notices to be issued to them, even though the plaintiff does not claim any remedy against them and does not admit their liability. Suits on promissory notes and negotiable instruments stand on a different footing from other suits, and third party notices can only be issued to them when justified by the contents of the promissory note etc. In my opinion an objective test applicable to all cases is necessary to prevent the waste of time of courts by unnecessary third party notices even though it may cause hardship in a few cases of genuine joint liability not disclosed in the promissory note. Such hardship in rare cases is inevitable when "general principles" are applied. Thus, limitation wipes out not only bogus debts but also real debts. In that view, I am of opinion that this petition should be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed, but without costs, in the peculiar circumstances. Revision petition dismissed.