Judgment Imam, J. 1. This Criminal Revision No. 875 of 1954 is directed against the order of the trial Court convicting the two petitioners, Alamgir and As Mohammad, under Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to two months simple imprisonment, each. Against this order of the trial Court, an appeal was preferred before the learned Additional Sessions Judge who dismissed the appeal but reduced the sentence in the case of both the petitioners to a fine of Rs. 50 each, that is to say, he set aside the sentence of two months simple imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 50. When this application was heard in part by Mr. Justice Chaudhary on 4-1-1955, a rule was issued for enhancement of the sentence. This application in revision, therefore, has been heard together with the rule that has been issued for enhancement bf the sentence. 2. The prosecution case in short is that on the 27th of October, 1952, the complainant, P.W. 1 found his wife missing and while searching for her he was informed by P.W. 4 that he, P.W. 4, had seen P.W. 1s wife in the house of the accused on the 27th of October, 1952. A sanha was lodged at the Police station as well as a complaint was filed on the 28th of October, 1952. Production warrant was issued, but the woman, namely, the wife of the complainant, was not produced and she is still untraced. It is said that the complainant went to the house of the accused and he found the accused there and Alamgir said he had married the complainants wife. 3. The first point taken before us is that as the prosecution case stands, there is no evidence of taking away or inducing away the wife of the complainant. That appears to be so. The prosecution case never was that the petitioners had taken away or induced away the wife of the complainant. The charge was not for this at all. The charge was for detaining wrongfully the wife of the complainant and not for taking away or inducing away his wife. 4. The next point submitted was that there Was nothing to show that the wife of the complainant was detained by the petitioners. It is submitted that there is no evidence that the wife of the complain ant had left the house of . 4. The next point submitted was that there Was nothing to show that the wife of the complainant was detained by the petitioners. It is submitted that there is no evidence that the wife of the complain ant had left the house of . the complainant under coercion and that she did not act according to her own free will. It is true that there is no evidence in what circumstances the wife of the complainant left the house of the complainant. It is also submitted that when the complainant went to the house of the petitioners there was no sign on the part of the wife of the complainant to show that she resented being kept in the house of the petitioners, and thus if she was there of her own free will, there could be no question of any detention. . For this purpose we have been referred to a number of cases. The first case is Emperor V/s. Mahiji Fula, ILR 58 Bom 88: (AIR 1933 Bom 489) (A). That is a case in which it was held that it had to be shown that the woman was kept against her free will. With this view, in my opinion, no objection can be taken. In Prithi Missir V/s. Harak Nath Singh, ILR (1937) 1 Cal 166: (AIR 1936 Cal 450) (B), it was observed that it had to be shown that the accused did something in order to establish detention. With this view again there can be no difference. In Ramnarayan Baburao V/s. Emperor, AIR 1937 Bom 186 (C), it was observed that "detention" meant keeping back and that this keeping back might not be as a result of any physical force. Similar was the view in the case reported in Bhopan V/s. Chhotey, 1948 All LJ 486: (AIR 1949 All 23) (D). There is a case of this Court in Banarsi Raut V/s. Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 432 (E), where it was observed as follows: "In the first of these cases it has to be observed that the accused was not aware of. the fact that the woman was a married, woman, and from the facts stated in the report of the second case, it does not appear that there was evidence of the knowledge of the marriage or of the accused having had sexual intercourse. With the woman. the fact that the woman was a married, woman, and from the facts stated in the report of the second case, it does not appear that there was evidence of the knowledge of the marriage or of the accused having had sexual intercourse. With the woman. In the Punjab case it was held that providing shelter for a married woman was such an inducement as to amount to detention within the meaning of Sec. 498. That appears to be the accepted interpretation of the word detention in Sec. 498 and the only question is whether in the circumstances of this case it can be held that there was such an inducement or precaution of the women as would come within the meaning of the word detention". It is, therefore, an authority for the view that if there is an inducement or persuasion by reason of which the woman is kept back then this would be deemed to be detention as understood in Sec. 498 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. it was submitted that this decision of the Patna High Court might have been different if the decision of Harnam Singh V/s. Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 295 (F), had been considered. I do not think it was possible for his Lordship to consider the Lahore case as the decision was in 1938 whereas the Lahore case is of 1939. But this case of Lahore, namely, AIR 1939 Lah 295 (F), has undoubtedly held that persuasion or inducement is not sufficient for the purpose of holding that there was detention as understood in Sec. 498 of the Indian Penal Code. This decision was arrived at in the Lahore case after reference was made to a Division Bench in view of the conflicting decisions. In the Lahore case a number of cases of other High Courts have been considered, namely, of Bombay, Calcutta, and other High Courts. The Division Bench held that detention could not include persuasion by means of blandishment or similar inducements which would leave the woman free to go if she wished. With great respect to their Lordships of the Lahore High Court, I do not agree with that view at all. 6. Detention, means, as it has been held in the Calcutta, Allahabad and Bombay cases referred to above, keeping back. With great respect to their Lordships of the Lahore High Court, I do not agree with that view at all. 6. Detention, means, as it has been held in the Calcutta, Allahabad and Bombay cases referred to above, keeping back. This may take place either by physical force, that is to say, the person detained is kept back by physical force or threat, or it may be due to deception practised on the person concerned, or it may be due to inducement or persuasion, that is to say, a rosy picture may be painted before the person concerned and on account of this rosy picture the person concerned remains in the house, or money may be offered by way of inducement, or it may be even an offer to marry. All this and many others may well be inducement or persuasion which would ultimately keep back the individual concerned, and so long as that individual is under the influence of that persuasion or inducement and, is kept back, he must be deemed to be detained. The view expressed by Agarwala, J. in the Patna case just referred to is, in my opinion, correct and I see no reason to differ from it. The question, therefore, is whether on the facts of the present case there was any detention or not. It is true that we do not know how the wife of the complainant left the house, but we do get this that one of the accused Alamgir married the complainants wife and this could only have been because he had offered to marry her and she had agreed to marry him. Thus, in my opinion, there was persuasion or inducement by reason of which she remained on the house of the petitioner Alamgir. That being so, she was in my opinion, detained within the meaning of that word in Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. The next point taken was that the petitioners have been implicated out of enmity. (After discussing the evidence, the judgment proceeded:) In my opinion, there is no substance in this point, namely, that on account of enmity the accused had been implicated in this case. 8. it was next submitted that the prosecutiom witnesses are interested. It is true that P.Ws 5 and 2 are related to P.W. 1. (After discussing the evidence, the judgment proceeded:) In my opinion, there is no substance in this point, namely, that on account of enmity the accused had been implicated in this case. 8. it was next submitted that the prosecutiom witnesses are interested. It is true that P.Ws 5 and 2 are related to P.W. 1. There is one witness Sulaiman Mian who is in no way related to the complainant, nor is the other witness Shakur Mian. I am not prepared to reject the evidence of the witnesses related to P. W. 1 merely because they are relations. After all it must be remembered that some witnesses had to be examined on the question of marriage and who else can prove the marriage better than the relations of the complainant himself. 9. Finally, it was submitted that there was. no proof of marriage that is to say, there was no reliable evidence to show that Rahmatia was the wife of P.W. 1. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the evidence of P. W. 1, who is the complainant. He has deposed that Rahmatia is his legally married wife and that he married her about eleven years ago: the Nikah was performed by Makbul Mian who is dead and "that Khalil Mian, one of the witnesses, in the case, was a witness of this Nikah. He also deposed that since this marriage Rahmatia used to live with him. The evidence of P. W. 2 also is that he attended the complainants marriage with Rahmatia and that the Sharriage took place during the summer season. P. W. 5 has deposed on this point as follows : "The dowry of complainants wife was fixed for Rs. 32-8-0 and 2 Dinar given and the Kazi wrote note on paper and gave it to the complainant". At this stage I would refer to the evidence of P. W. I in cross-examination which is also to the same effect: "I was married at Mohanya in Baisakh, Many people besides P. Ws. had attended my marriage. The dowry was fixed at Rs. 32/8/- and 2 Dinar only. Nothing was asked from me or my wife at the time of marriage." It is submitted that because nothing was asked of P.W. 1 or his wife at the time of the marriage, this marriage must be deemed to be illegal. had attended my marriage. The dowry was fixed at Rs. 32/8/- and 2 Dinar only. Nothing was asked from me or my wife at the time of marriage." It is submitted that because nothing was asked of P.W. 1 or his wife at the time of the marriage, this marriage must be deemed to be illegal. It was also submitted that the actual words that were used at the time of marriage must be proved as has been held in some cases. In my opinion it is not possible to give the exact words that were used at the time of the Nikah in every case more specially in a case where the marriage has taken place a number of years ago, as in this case something like twelve years ago. The name of the person who performed the Nikah has been given. He cannot possibly be examined because he is dead. A witness , to the marriage namely, P.W. 5, has been examined and he deposed to the effect that the marriage had taken place, that Nikah was performed and that the Kaji wrote down on the paper the contract of marriage. These, in my opinion, are quite sufficient to establish the fact that there was a marriage. For to hold otherwise would mean this. If the Mollah cannot be produced, if the witnesses present at the time of the wedding cannot be produced, one cannot prove his marriage even though he has been legally married. Such a state of affairs was never contemplated either by law or by society. The facts of each case must be taken into consideration. In the present case, the marriage took place long time ago. it has been proved that Nikah had taken place, that the amount of dower was fixed and that dower was accepted. it has also been proved that the fact of the marriage was reduced to writing. Furthermore, it has been proved that the complainant was living with this woman for twelve years might be unhappily. This fact also goes to corroborate the evidence of the witnesses that there was marriage. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that the complainant was not married to Rahmatia. it was submitted that Rahmatia had married twice, that is to say, she was married before she married . This fact also goes to corroborate the evidence of the witnesses that there was marriage. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that the complainant was not married to Rahmatia. it was submitted that Rahmatia had married twice, that is to say, she was married before she married . the complainant, and as she had left her former husband, the second marriage could not be legal and the former marriage subsisted there being no divorce. This submission is based on no evidence whatsoever. The evidence simply is that Rahmatia had married once before she married the complainant. There is no evidence to the effect that Rahmatia left her former husband or that the former husband left her. How that marriage came to an end is not in evidence. it cannot in these circumstances be held that the former marriage subsisted and, therefore, the second marriage must be deemed to be illegal. In fact the marriage with the complainant was never challenged in the Court below at all. What was being challenged was that the second marriage, that is the marriage with the complainant, could not be legal in view of the fact that Rahmatia was already married once before. As I have already pointed out, the mere fact that Rahmatia was married once before does not necessarily show that the subsequent marriage was not legal, because the former marriage may have legally ended either by divorce or death. In my opinion, therefore it is fully established that the complainant was married to Rahmatia and that Rahmatia is his wife. 10. I would at this stage refer to the case of As Mohammad. It was submitted on his behalf that there was nothing to show that As Mohammad took part in the detention of the woman concerned. The evidence of P. W. 1 on this point is as follows : Accused As Mohd. threatened me and said, go away1, do what you like". This, in my opinion, is sufficient overt act to establish the common intention that As Mohammad had with his brother Alamgir to detain the woman in question. It is true that the charge framed against As Mohammad is only under Section 498 and not under Sec. 498/34, Indian Penal Cade. threatened me and said, go away1, do what you like". This, in my opinion, is sufficient overt act to establish the common intention that As Mohammad had with his brother Alamgir to detain the woman in question. It is true that the charge framed against As Mohammad is only under Section 498 and not under Sec. 498/34, Indian Penal Cade. But I do not think that it is at all necessary to frame a charge under Sec.34 for the purpose of convicting the petitioner As Mohammad under Sec. 498/34, Indian Penal Code, provided the facts and circumstances of the case establish the common intention. I have already pointed out that there is evidence on the record to show that As Mohammad had in fact taken an active part in detaining the woman. In question. He had threatened the complainant and told him to go away and do what he liked. 11. The next point to be considered is that of sentence. In my opinion the lower appellate Court was fully unjustified in reducing the sentence to a fine of Rs. 50.00 for an offence of this nature. Even if it be considered that the woman in question is an unchaste one, there can be no ground for people trying to detain other peoples wives, and if they do so, they must pay the penalty for it. The trial Court had imposed a sentence of two months simple imprisonment. That sentence, in my opinion, was also lenient. But the lower appellate Court in spite of the leniency of the sentence reduced it to a fine of Rs. 50.00 each. In my opinion, the sentence must be enhanced in view of the nature of the offence that has been committed. Women in this country, whether chaste or unchaste, must be protected as intended by the legislature, and it is the duty of the Court to see that they are given sufficient protection. I would enhance the sentence passed against the petitioners to six months rigorous imprisonment each and alter the conviction of the petitioner As Mohammad under Sec. 498, Indian Penal Code, to that under Sec. 498/34, Indian Penal Code. The rule for enhancement of the sentence is, therefore made absolute and the application in revision is dismissed. Ramaswami, J. 12 I agree.