Judgment Jamuar, J. 1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs arising out of a suit for redemption. The suit has been dismissed by both the Courts below. 2. The relevant facts are these; There were two brothers, Bihari and Harihar. Bihari had a son and a grandson but both are dead. Harihar had a son Kashi, and Kashi had two sons, Pritam and Nouratan. Nouratan had a son named Birja, Harihar, Kashi and Nouratan are all dead. 3. Bihari had obtained some property from his father-in-law with whom he was once living as gharjamai. On the 5th May, 1916, Bihari executed a usufructuary mortgage deed in favour of the defendants for a consideration of Rs. 2400/-. The execution of this mortgage deed was by Bihari alone as he alone had been recorded in the survey khatian, After the death of Bihari, Harihar & Kashi & Nouratan all being dead, Pritam and Birja succeeded him. It has been found by the Court of appeal below that this was so. Then, on the 13th July, 1944, Pritam for self and as guardian of his minor nephew, Birja, sold the property, which had been the subject-matter of the mortgage bond of the year 1916, to the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs. 4000.00 by a deed of that date, and the plaintiffs undertook to pay off the mortgage debt under the document of the 5th May, 1916, to the mortgagees. 4. On the 12th June, 1845, the plaintiffs brought their suit for redemption out of which this appeal has arisen. The suit was resisted on the main ground that although the document executed by Bihari on the 5th May, 1916, in favour of the defendants, would appear to have been a usufructuary mortgage yet, in fact, it was a sale of the property mentioned in the bond outright, Both the Courts below gave effect to this defence and thus dismissed the plaintiffs suit for redemption. 5. On second appeal to this Court Mr. J.C. Sinha has contended on behalf of the appellants, the plaintiffs, that the Courts below have fallen in error in coming to that decision inasmuch as the transaction of the year 1916 was a usufrucuary mortgage as evidenced by the recitals in the bond itself, and no evidence of any subsequent event ought to have been taken in order to construe that transaction as an out and out sale. Mr. Dasu Sinha, appearing for the respondents supported the conclusions, of the Courts below and argued that subsequent events could be examined in order to find out whether the transaction of the year 1916 was usufructuary mortgage or a sale outright. 6. The, trial Court construed the bond of the year 1916 as a usufructuary mortgage; but it said that, in "view of the custom against the transfer-ability of occupancy holding, the document was described as an ijara although in reality the subsequent events show that it was out and out sale. The Court of appeal below supported that view of the trial Court. 7. Now, the subsequent events upon which the Court of appeal below based its finding that the transaction was a sale, were these: (1) that the defendants had been treated as tenants by all the landlords except one in respect of the property which was the subject-matter of the bond of 1916, (2) that the defendants were mentioned as such in the road cess returns filed by the landlords & (3) there had been an exchange of some piece of land between defendant No. 1 and one Chander Singh by which a portion of the land in suit was in possession of Chander Singh, the deed of exchange being dated the 18th July, 1941. The Court of appeal below also mentions a fact which apparently goes against the case of the defendants that the transaction was a sale, and that fact is this. The mortgagees are co-sharers of the Tauzi in which the land in suit is situated. The Tauzi was the Subject-matter of a Cpllectorate partition in 1915-16. At that time, one of the mortgagees, Bhagwan Das, had filed an objection petition (Ex. 5) stating therein that the house which was in the mortgage should be allotted to his takhta as otherwise it would create complication. In this objection petition, Bhagwan Das had stated that the transaction of the year 1916 was a mortgage and not a sale. The plaintiffs relied in the Courts below upon this statement to support their case of the transaction having been a mortgage. In this objection petition, Bhagwan Das had stated that the transaction of the year 1916 was a mortgage and not a sale. The plaintiffs relied in the Courts below upon this statement to support their case of the transaction having been a mortgage. But the Courts below did not accept the contention of the plaintiffs on the ground that Bhagwan Das having been a co-sharer landlord could not have stated during the batwara proceedings that the transaction was a sale, as such a statement would have entitled the other co-sharer landlords to treat the house and the other mortgaged properties as bakasht and these landlords would have claimed a share in the same. 8. The main point for decision in this appeal, however, is whether the Courts below were entitled to take into consideration the subsequent conduct or the subsequent events in order to construct the bond of 1916. Mr. J.C. Sinha, in the first instance, relied upon the case of Bhagwat Rai V/s. Ramasis Rai, AIR 1952 Pat 431 (A). This was a case where the facts were very similar to those of the present case before me. The question to be determined in that case was also whether the plaintiffs could be granted a decree for redemption with respect to certain land. The main, ground of defence was that the document relied upon by the plaintiffs, though in form a mortgage deed, was intended to operate as a sale. There, too, it was contended on behalf of the defendants that the device had to be resorted to since under the law then prevalent the holding could not be transferred unless there was custom of transferability in the village. The Courts fallow held that the transaction was a sale and not a mortgage. Their Lordships observed that the lower appellate Court was of the opinion that the document should be construed as a usufructuary mortgage and that in it there was no indication that the transaction was a sale; but in view of the other evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants with respect to, the conduct of the parties, the lower Court held that the document was in reality out and out sale. The circumstances upon which the lower appellate Court had based its decision were these: (a) that in the Record-of-Rights there was an entry in respect of the lands in question that the transaction was a sale; (b) that no steps had been, taken to rectify that entry; (c) that though the due date in the mortgage bond was for the year 1309 Fs. no action was taken to redeem the bond for a long time and (d) that the defendants had applied under Sec.112A of the Bihar Tenancy Act for getting the rent of the land in suit reduced; and the rent was in fact reduced by the Rent Reduction Officer, and the defendants had been paying rent at the reduced rate to the landlords. It was in view of these circumstances that the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the transaction, though in form a usufructuary mortgage, was intended to operate as an outright sale of the lands in question. 9. It was argued in the High Court that the lower appellate Court was debarred under Section 92 of the Evidence Act from admitting or examining any oral evidence as to the conduct of the parties for showing that the transaction was not a usufructuary mortgage but an outright sale of the land. The contention was that the entire evidence with respect to the conduct of the parties must be rejected and that it ought to be held upon the clear terms of the document itself that the transaction, was a usufructuary mortgage. 10. Their Lordships when delivering judgment observed as follows: "Upon this survey of the authorities, it is plain that in the present case, the evidence of subsequent conduct was not admissible in evidence in view of Section 92 of the Evidence Act and the lower appellate Court misdirected itself in taking into account such evidence and in reaching the conclusion that though the document was in form a usufructuary mortgage it should be construed as an outright sale of the land in suit." The plaintiffs were accordingly granted a preliminary decree for redemption of the lands in dispute. 11 Mr. J. C. Sinha also relied upon the case of Ram Narain Prasad Singh V/s. Manki Singh, AIR 1954 Pat 562 (B). This decision also supports his contention. 12. 11 Mr. J. C. Sinha also relied upon the case of Ram Narain Prasad Singh V/s. Manki Singh, AIR 1954 Pat 562 (B). This decision also supports his contention. 12. The law as laid down by this Court is, that where a document on its face constitutes a mortgage, and the terms in the bond clearly indicate that the transaction was that of a usufructuary mortgage and not an absolute sale, oral evidence of subsequent events would not be admissible to prove the contrary. Proviso 6 of Section 92 of the Evidence Act can only be resorted to where there is any ambiguity in the document itself, that is to say, where there is any difficulty in the construction of the language of the document. In a case where the language of a document is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for examining the transaction by reference to subsequent events. 13. Mr. Dasu Sinha, appearing for the respondents, has strongly relied upon certain cases of the Calcutta High Court for the contrary contention. He referred to the case of Khankar Abdur Rahman V/s. Ali Hafez, ILR 28 Cal 256 (C), where, as the placitum shows, it was held that under the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act oral evidence of the acts and conduct of parties is admissible to show that a certain conveyance was really a mortgage by way of a conditional sale. This Case relied upon a previous decision of its Court, viz., the case of Preonath Shaha V/s. Madhusudan Bhuiya, ILR 25 Cal 603 (FB) (D). It is necessary to state at this stage that the Privy Council case of Balkishen Das V/s. Legge, 27 Ind App 58 (E) was cited before their Lordships in support of the view that oral evidence under Section 92 of the Evidence Act was not admissible, but their Lordships held that the case of Balkishen Das did "not in any way affect the rule laid down in ILR 25 Cal 603 (D). In the case of 27 Ind App 58 (E), it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that oral evidence of intention is inadmissible for the purpose either of construing the deeds or proving the intention of the parties. The Calcutta cases, upon which Mr. In the case of 27 Ind App 58 (E), it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that oral evidence of intention is inadmissible for the purpose either of construing the deeds or proving the intention of the parties. The Calcutta cases, upon which Mr. Dasu Sinha has placed reliance, came to be directly considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Maung Kyin V/s. Ma Shwe Law, 44 Ind App 236: (AIR 1917 PC 207) (P). It will appear from the report at the foot of page 242 that both the Calcutta cases ILR 25 Cal 603 (PB) (D) and ILR 28 Cal 256 (C) were brought to the notice of their Lordships. In the first paragraph at page 243 of the report, when dealing with those cases, their Lordships stated as follows: "In the opinion of their Lordships, this series of cases definitely ceased to be of binding authority after the judgment of this Board pronounced by Lord Devey in 27 Ind App 58 (PC) (E)." Then their Lordships proceeded to say that notwithstanding the decision of the Board in the above mentioned case, a certain conflict of authority on the subject still remained in India; and then their Lordships referred with approval to the case of Achutaramraju V/s. M. Subbaraju, ILR 25 Mad 7 (G). In this latter case, their Lorships of the Madras High Court differed from the view taken in the two Calcutta cases upon which reliance was placed on behalf of the respondents and they held that the question was really concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Balkishen Das. 14. In this view of the matter, I must hold that the Courts below were in error in judging the nature of the transaction of the year 1916 by reference to subsequent events. The proper manner was to construe the bond of 1916 as it stood. It has been found by both the Courts below that as a true construction of the bond itself the transaction was a usufructuary mortgage and not a sale. I would accordingly construe the document in that manner, and in that manner alone, without reference to the subsequent events and discarding the oral evidence under the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act. 15. I would accordingly construe the document in that manner, and in that manner alone, without reference to the subsequent events and discarding the oral evidence under the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act. 15. This appeal must, therefore, be allowed with costs throughout and the decree of, the lower Court must be set aside. The plaintiffs must be granted a preliminary decree for redemption of the lands in suit. It is stated that the plaintiffs have already deposited the amount due in the Court of the Munsif. If such a deposit has been made, the learned Munsif will now pass a final decree for redemption in the usual terms.