JUDGMENT : KHAN, J. 1. The plaintiff, who is the mortgagee of the property in question (which later on he leased to the mortgagors who are the defendants in this case) brought this suit on the basis of a rent-note for the recovery of arrears of rent and also for eviction of the defendants. The suit was originally filed before the District Judge, Shajapur and was numbered as Civil Original Suit No. 3 of Samvat 1992. On the question of Court-fees being raised by the defendants, the Court held that the court-fee was insufficient and directed the plaintiff to pay it on the value of the property, the possession of which was being sought. When the plaintiff paid the required court-fees, it was discovered that on account of the value of the property, the suit had become beyond the jurisdiction of the District Judge and that the proper forum for it was the then High Court of Gwalior State, where suits of the valuation of above Rs. 50,000 were filed on its original side. The District Judge in consequence returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The returned plaint was thereafter filed on the original side of the High Court and the suit was numbered as Case No. 2 of Samvat 2001. The defendant raised the plea of limitation and also took objections under O. 2, R. 2, Civil P.C. While the suit was pending in the High Court, its original civil jurisdiction was abolished and the case again came on the file of the District Judge, Shajapur. The learned District Judge, dismissed the suit as barred by time, holding that at the time the suit was filed in the High Court, the claim had become time barred and that the plaintiff hail not asked in the plaint for the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act, though arguments were allegedly addressed to the Court on the point. Aggrieved by this decision, the plaintiff has filed this first appeal. 2. It is frankly conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that when after the return of the plaint by the District Judge, Shajapur, the suit was filed before the High Court, it was beyond time and that the plaint did not contain any express statement of the ground on which exemption from limitation was sought. 2. It is frankly conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that when after the return of the plaint by the District Judge, Shajapur, the suit was filed before the High Court, it was beyond time and that the plaint did not contain any express statement of the ground on which exemption from limitation was sought. But it is contended that there was an endorsement of the District Judge, who returned the plaint and that the endorsement contained the date of original presentation as well as the date of the return of the plaint. This was enough to entitle the plaintiff to claim the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act and as a matter of fact, the Court was addressed on the point by both the parties. The learned counsel for the respondent counters this argument by saying that according to O. 7, R. 6, Civil P.C., ground of exemption from limitation must be inserted in the plaint and non-compliance with this rule of pleading is fatal. 3. I have no doubt that where exemption from the law of limitation is claimed, the plaint must show the ground on which such exemption is sought. Order 7 R. 6, Civil P.C. is clear on the point. But this is a matter which pertains to the domains of pleadings and although legal education in our country has progressed and we are justified in demanding increasing competence from legal practitioner, yet, those who have experience of the Courts in the country know well enough that in the matter of pleadings there is yet room for much improvement. But where circumstances appear on the face of the record, which entitle the plaintiff to claim the benefit of S. 14 Limitation Act (in this case there is an endorsement on the plaint of the date on which the suit was originally instituted when it was admittedly within time and there is also an endorsement, showing the date of the return of the plaint for presentation to proper Court) and where arguments have been heard by the Court, relating to the question as to whether the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act should be given or not, I think the Courts should not take a mere technical view of a question which is a matter of pleading only. The Courts exist for doing real and substantial justice and must steer clear of mere technicalities. The Courts exist for doing real and substantial justice and must steer clear of mere technicalities. The law cannot provide rules for all cases I that may arise. An eminent jurist has observed that "it is the duty of the Judges to apply laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by express provisions, but to all cases also, to which a just application of them may be made and which appear to be comprehended either within the express sense of the law or within the consequences, that may be gathered from it". In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that where facts on which the benefits of S. 14, Limitation Act can be claimed appear on the face of the record (as in the present case) that must be deemed sufficient compliance with the provision of law and the learned District Judge would have been well advised to go into the merits of the questions arising under S. 14 of the Act. 4. In- 'Sukhbir Singh v. Piarelal', AIR 1923 Lah 591 (A), a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in a similar case has observed. "A suit was returned to be presented to the proper Court. When it was so presented to the latter Court, it was beyond time. On the plaint no statement, as required under O. 7 R. 6 was made; held, no statement was necessary as there was the endorsement of the Court, returning the plaint giving the dates of original presentation and the date of return and the circumstances entitling the plaintiff to claim the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act appeared on the face of the record. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred us to a Single Bench case of the Madras High Court 'Ramaswami Chetti v. Anaiya Padayachi', AIR 1936 Mad 545 (B) in which the learned Judge observed that "it is obligatory as a matter of pleading to show the grounds upon which exemption from limitation is claimed. Consequently unless the plaint is amended, it will not be open to a party to rely on an exemption not pleaded in the plaint". 6. Consequently unless the plaint is amended, it will not be open to a party to rely on an exemption not pleaded in the plaint". 6. Although the Lahore view referred to above was not followed, yet it appears that the Lahore case was not cited before the learned Judge, who followed the view expressed in a Division Bench of that Court 'Palani Chetty v. Sevugan Chetty', AIR 1933 Mad 395 (C) in which it was held that unless the plaint was amended, it would not be open to a party to rely on an exemption not pleaded in the plaint. In the first place it is not clear whether sufficient facts were or were not already on the record which would have helped in the determination of the question under S. 14. Limitation Act, and secondly; even the Madras view is not in favour of throwing out the case of the plaintiff because of a outright defect in the pleading, but it seems an opportunity to amend the plaint was accorded. But I prefer to follow the Lahore case and hold that where circumstances entitling the plaintiff to claim the benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act appear on the face of the record, in fact the returned plaint must be treated to be a part of the new plaint; for this reason it would be unnecessary to have the plaint amended and then to order the case to proceed. 7. Now in coming to a decision whether the plaintiff is entitled to any exemption under S. 14 of the Act, the Court has to consider a, number of propositions. Since the trial Court did not consider the matter on merits, we think it proper to send the case back so that the trial Court may consider the question on merits. 8. Appeal allowed and the case is sent back to the Court with the above direction. Costs of this appeal shall be provided in the revised decision. The plaintiff shall get a certificate for the return of Court-fees. 9. CHATURVEDI, J. :- I agree that the case be remanded for a decision on merits according to law and that the costs will abide the event and Court-fees will be refunded. Case remanded.