Judgment The petitioner, a revenue peon drawing Rs.51 a month employed in the office of the Chief Engineer for Irrigation seeks to revise an order passed by the Additional Judge of the Court of Small Causes confirming an order by the Rent Controller directing his eviction from a portion of a building with a separate door number 543 in Pycrofts Road, Triplicane. It is not disputed that this peon’s wife did here a business in betel and curd and that the petitioner has been in occupation as a tenant for twenty-five years. The respondent was also a tenant from the same landlord of premises with a separate door number, 542 until by a registered sale deed, Exhibit P.2 dated 9th October, 1953, he purchased both the door numbers, 542 and 543. He, then, on the footing of his purchase and on the plea that he wanted the premises occupied by the petitioner for an extension of his own maligai and provision stores, applied to evict the petitioner. Both the Courts concurred in finding that the respondent bona fide required premises No. 543 for an extension of his own business. Both Courts also concurred in holding that this was not an application for eviction which could be dismissed under the proviso to section 7 which requires its rejection if the Controller was satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. I can only express my surprise at both the Courts taking this view, as both petitioner and respondent were both tenants in the same position and doing business in these adjacent premises. Respondent prospered in his maligai business and after purchasing the entire building he is seeking to evict the petitioner out of his long standing tenancy of about twenty-five years, leaving him no place to carry on his business. It is all very well for the Courts to take the view that the petitioner can find some other place in which to carry on with his wife business in betel and curd. It is all very well for the Courts to take the view that the petitioner can find some other place in which to carry on with his wife business in betel and curd. This proviso is of particular application to cases coming within the scope of section 7(3) (c) and applies to a landlord who is occupying only a part of the building, whether residential or non-residential, seeking to evict a tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on. A building is defined in section 2(1) as “any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes.” Part of a building also, therefore comes within the scope of the definition of the word “building” and it is in the light of this definition that section 7(3) (c) has to be interpreted. It is under this section that the landlord seeks eviction of the petitioner. The learned Additional Judge rejected the legal position taken for the petitioner that the premises Nos.542 and 543 were separate buildings with separate entries into the road and no inter-connecting door from one to the other. From the sketch filed, they appear to be structurally in one building in the ordinary sense in the ownership of one owner before the entire building was purchased in 1953 by the respondent. There can, however, be no doubt at all that premises 542 and 543 were each a building as defined by section 2(1) of the Act and the fact that a municipal assessment notice Exhibit P. 3 showed that these two door numbers were treated as only one property does not affect this legal position. For purposes of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 a building means any building or hut or part of a building let separately for residential or non-residential purposes. Assuming that the premises let to the petitioner and occupied by him for the past twenty-five years were part of the same structural building, nonetheless the premises would fall within the definition of a building under section 2(1). Assuming that the premises let to the petitioner and occupied by him for the past twenty-five years were part of the same structural building, nonetheless the premises would fall within the definition of a building under section 2(1). Nor can the purchase by the respondent himself, a tenant of a separate building under Exhibit P.2 as defined by section 2(1) give him any right to evict this long standing tenant under section 7(3) (c). It is true that the respondent by his purchase has become a landlord and there seems at first blush some force in his plea that by reason of his purchase he is now occupying only part of building, though what he did occupy as tenant before his purchase was a building as defined by section 2(1) and that he is therefore entitled to evict the respondent from the premises as part of his building though they constituted a ‘building’ under section 2(1). The position is not free from difficulty in view of the statute defining a building as also part of a building. It is in the light of this definition that section 7(3) (c) has to be applied to the present case. As I see it, the position is in no way different to that of a landlord doing business in one building purchasing a building next to his and seeking to eject from it a long standing tenant doing business there for twenty-five years. To such a case section 7(3) (c) would in my opinion not apply. Nor will it apply to the present case merely by reason of the fact that the portions of this building in which petitioner and respondent did business separately are comprised in one structural building, the whole of which was purchased by the respondent. As it appears to me, it is sufficient for purpose of excluding the operation of 7(3) (c) if petitioner and respondent were in occupation as tenants of two separate buildings as defined in the Act. I do not see. how the building so defined in the occupation of the petitioner who is in the occupation of such building is protected, can cease to be a ‘building’ and only become part of a building merely by virtue of the respondent’s purchase of both premises. I do not see. how the building so defined in the occupation of the petitioner who is in the occupation of such building is protected, can cease to be a ‘building’ and only become part of a building merely by virtue of the respondent’s purchase of both premises. To take a different view would be to put a premium on tenants of portions of buildings, after becoming prosperous and expanding their business, acquiring the entire building and then seeking to evict other tenants in occupation of parts of the building each of which is nonetheless defined as a “separate building” under that Act. Even assuming that section 7(3) (c) which is far from easy to interpret, is held to be applicable, equitable protection is accorded to a long standing tenant under the proviso to section 7(3). In the present case the Rent Controller took into consideration against the petitioner that he was a Government servant not permitted to conduct business, who allowed his wife to run this betel and curd shop. This is, as it appears to me, a wholly irrelevant consideration. The petitioner is a peon, in the Chief Irrigation Engineer’s office on leave preparatory to retirement on a pension of Rs.12 a month. Even while he was working as a peon, his wife was perfectly entitled to supplement his meagre pay of Rs.51 in all by running betel and curd shop. Nor does the fact that the shop was rented in the name of the peon make any difference. The view of the Rent Controller is summed up in these two sentences: “Admittedly he has not been personally conducting the business but it was being conducted ” by his wife, who is a different legal entity and he is a Government servant who gets a regular monthly income. Since the respondent had not put forth that he has not been able to get alternative accommodation, and since he happens to be a Government Servant who is not expected to trade, I am inclined to believe that no hardship would be caused to him which would outweigh the advantage to the petitioner.“ With this view in its relevancy to the equities in this case I must express my emphatic dissent. I am unable to see anything improper in the wife of a peon helping to supplement the scanty income of the husband by earning separately nor in the peon giving her all the assistance he could without detriment to his official duties. It is not disputed that this family with several children to support have done this business in these premises for twenty-five years. They are said to live in a separate house about three-fourth furlong away. But the small premises in which this shop was run is next to Pycroft’s Market and so far as I can see, the respondent has not been able to suggest any alternative premises for this tenant whom he seeks to evict. Under section 5 (2) of the English Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act of 1919, where a person has purchased a house, a Court may make an order for recovery of possession if he requires it for his own occupation or that of some person in his employ if after considering all the circumstances of the case, including especially the alternative accommodation -available to the tenant, the Court considers it reasonable to make such an order. The onus of finding alternative accommodation does not wholly rest upon the tenant and in such a case it is open to the landlord to indicate alternative accommodation available and suitable for his purposes without severely damnifying any”business he may be running. In the India Act there is no reference to availability of alternative accommodation but this is undoubtedly a circumstance to be taken into consideration in applying the equitable proviso, which gives a Court a very wide discretion to reject an application for eviction, if satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In this case I am quite satisfied that the desire of the respondent to get extra accommodation for the expansion of his business is perfectly bona fide. His advocate complains that there is only a 6½ feet narrow passage available to him for carrying provisions into his shop. But he started his grain business a few years ago under these conditions knowing perfectly well that the petitioner was a long established tenant of the adjacent No.543 for more than twenty years. His advocate complains that there is only a 6½ feet narrow passage available to him for carrying provisions into his shop. But he started his grain business a few years ago under these conditions knowing perfectly well that the petitioner was a long established tenant of the adjacent No.543 for more than twenty years. This is a case of conflict of equities which a Court has to resolve in the light of the proviso. As it appears to me, the Rent Controller relied on irrelevant considerations in coming to his decision. This is a case in which this peon due to retire shortly with his family are going to be put to very great hardship indeed if they are to be evicted out of their business premises where they ran a shop in betel and curd to eke out their small salary. Particularly on the eve of his retirement eviction from these premises would be a far greater hardship than if the peon was in service. I have no hesitation in holding that the balance of equity contemplated by this proviso is clearly on the side of the petitioner and that he cannot be evicted by the respondent whose application under this proviso must be rejected. The petition is allowed but in the circumstances I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. R.M. ------ Petition allowed.