Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the plaintiff in a suit for damages for wrongful injunction. 2. The facts may be shortly stated as follows: Defendants 1 to 4 are brothers and constituted a joint Hindu family of which the 1st defendant was the manager. Their mother is the 5th defendant. The plaintiff had made loan of moneys under a promissory note to the 1st defendant for meeting some family needs. For realisation thereof the plaintiff filed O.S. No. 2063 of 1107 in the Nagercoil Munsiff's Court against the 1st defendant as manager of the joint family and obtained decree. In due course of execution he purchased in satisfaction of the decree certain properties belonging to the family on 26.11.1108. But just before he could obtain delivery in execution, of the properties so purchased, the 4th defendant filed separate suit O.S. No. 20 of 1109 in the Nagercoil District Court for partition of the joint family properties incidentally questioning various obligations undertaken by the 1st defendant as if on behalf of the family inclusive of the promissory note in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was impleaded as the 3rd defendant in that suit. Pending the trial and disposal of that suit O.S. No. 20 of 1109 the 4th defendant applied for and obtained temporary injunction against the plaintiff restraining the delivery in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 1063 of 1107 of the properties sold in court auction. That order was passed on 8.3.1109 and was confirmed after hearing the plaintiff. Subsequently on the motion apparently of the 4th defendant, receiver was appointed over all the properties of the family inclusive of the properties purchased by the plaintiff and involved in O.S. No. 20 of 1109 and the profits collected by the receiver was distributed to the members of the family periodically towards their maintenance. The 4th defendant happened to function as such receiver for certain period. The suit O.S. No. 20 of 1109 was ultimately disposed of under Ext. I judgment dated 30.11.1118. The decree and the court sale obtained by the plaintiff was in the event upheld as against the family and the temporary injunction which till then had enured was dissolved by specific order dated 7.4.1119 so enabling the plaintiff to take delivery on 29.6.1119 of the properties he had purchased. I judgment dated 30.11.1118. The decree and the court sale obtained by the plaintiff was in the event upheld as against the family and the temporary injunction which till then had enured was dissolved by specific order dated 7.4.1119 so enabling the plaintiff to take delivery on 29.6.1119 of the properties he had purchased. As a result of the injunction order wrongly obtained by the 4th defendant, the plaintiff had been deprived of the profits of the properties during all the time between the date of his purchase and the dissolution of the injunction and he has laid this suit therefore for damages for the loss of the yield during this interval. This suit was filed on 23.5.1120. 3. The main contest in the case was by the 4th defendant and we are concerned at this stage, with only one of his contentions viz., as to the maintainability of the suit. The contention was elaborated was that the plaintiff, to sustain the action, had to prove malice and want of reasonable and probable cause in the matter of the injunction process obtained by the 4th defendant in the prior suit O.S. No. 20 of 1109. But there was neither allegations nor proof in support thereof. The court below after analysing the evidence let in by the parties came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not made out either malice or want of reasonable and probable cause as contended for by the 4th defendant. On that ground it dismissed the suit leaving the rest of the questions in the case undetermined and hence this appeal by the plaintiff. 4. The plaintiff in this appeal has limited his relief as one for compensation for loss sustained during the period of three years previous to suit. According to learned counsel for plaintiff, it is possible on this basis to view the suit as one for the recovery of profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant and so the suit would undoubtedly be maintainable, for, no question of malice or want of reasonable and probable cause will then arise. Learned counsel said he was accepting the findings of fact entered by the court below as to 'malice' and 'want of reasonable and probable cause' as also the proposition of law which that court applied, as to the maintainability of the suit viewed as one for damages for abuse of process of court. And the argument proceeded that the plaintiff's title stood fully vindicated in the action O.S. No. 20 of 1109 in which again the profits of the property were collected by receiver of court. Such profits must belong to the plaintiff owner of the property and to the extent they were wrongfully received by defendants 1 to 4 the plaintiff had therefore a cause of action against them for reimbursement at least up to the limit of three years allowed under Art.109 of the Limitation Act. 5. But is it possible to sustain the suit as one for relief on the ground of trespass simpliciter to which indeed the argument of learned counsel reduces itself. If the order of injunction obtained by the 4th defendant cannot be viewed as one passed without jurisdiction or as otherwise void it is that order alone that is the ultimate cause of the loss to the plaintiff. The appointment of receiver in respect of the properties that really appertained to the plaintiff was at a stage when the plaintiff had been effectively restrained by order of court from exercising his right of possession. The true principle which has then to be applied is that where the interference with the plaintiff's possession is by way of valid or regular order of court, the only action which lies is one of trespass and not trespass simpliciter. Justice B.K. Mukherjea, as he then was, stated the distinction in Rupendra Nath v. Trinayani Devi, AIR 1944 Calcutta 289: "If a litigant takes out any form of legal process which is void for want of jurisdiction and in so doing commits an act in the nature of trespass he will be liable in an action of trespass and no question of malice or want of reasonable and probable cause would arise; but if there was a valid or subsisting order of the Court at the time when the processes are taken out, the action would be one on the case and it would be necessary to prove malice before the plaintiff could recover damages". It seems to us that by merely avoiding the word "damages" and using the words "loss of profits" the plaintiff cannot make his position any better. Learned counsel depended upon certain decisions rendered under Art.109 of the Limitation Act which held that a suit for profits actually and wrongfully received by the defendant in wrongful possession is a suit for mesne profits and will be governed by that Article and there may be a wrongful receipt within the meaning of that Article even in cases where the possession of the defendant against whom profits are claimed did not originate in a wrongful act. See Feroz Shah v. Mohamed Akbar Khan, 1939 P.C.178. Reference was also made to cases where the question was discussed whether possession obtained under an order of the court which was subsequently set aside was wrongful possession or otherwise within the meaning of Art.109. See Siddalingam v. Bhimana, AIR 1936 Madras 731. But these cases cannot help the solution as to the sustainability of the suit itself where wrongful receipt by the defendant of the profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff has behind it the support of an order of court passed with jurisdiction, as for example orders for attachment before judgment or for injunction. 6. In our opinion the essence of the action is the malicious abuse of the process of the court and you cannot ignore it by merely framing the suit as one for loss of profits on ground of trespass alone. We may refer in this connection to the decision of the Privy Council in Ramanathan Chetty v. Meera Saibo,1931 P.C. 28, where also the distinction between action of trespass and malicious abuse of process of the court was clearly pointed out by Their Lordships. They say: "that a distinction must always be drawn between acts done without judicial sanction and acts done under judicial sanction improperly obtained. If goods are seized under a writ of warrant which authorised the seizure, the seizure is lawful and no action will lie in respect of the seizure unless the person complaining can establish a remedy by some such action as for malicious prosecution. If, however, the writ of warrant did not authorize the seizure of the goods seized an action would lie for damages occasioned by wrongful seizure without proof of malice". 7. If, however, the writ of warrant did not authorize the seizure of the goods seized an action would lie for damages occasioned by wrongful seizure without proof of malice". 7. Our conclusion therefore is that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this suit and the judgment of the court below is correct. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. The Cross Appeal by the 4th defendant regarding costs is also dismissed, but without costs. Dismissed.