JUDGMENT : Mohapatra, J. - This is a Plaintiff's second appeal against the reversing judgment of the lower appellate Court arising out of a suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The Plaintiff is the Thakur Giridhari Jiu represented through its marfatdar and trustee who was appointed by the Endowments Commissioner on 4-9-47. The admitted circumstances are that in the Provincial Settlement record of rights one Luxman Das, the predecessor-in-interest of the present Defendants, was recorded as the tenure-holder under the deity. The record of rights was finally published in the year 1898. In the Revisional Settlement, near about the year 1911, Luxman's son and grandson (Brajaballav and Krishna) were recorded as tenure-holders in respect of the land in dispute. In the meantime, in the year 1919, Braja and Krushna transferred the holding in favour of one Krushnapriya and consequently Krushnapriya has been recorded as the tenure-holder in the year 1928, that is, in the last settlement record of rights. The present Defendants are the legal representatives of the said Krushnapriya. 2. The Plaintiff's version is that the land in dispute is debottor property, and the Defendants, the tenants, are liable to be evicted as the tenancy was created not for legal necessity or benefit of the deity. 3. The defence however is that the lease granted in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the Defendants was lost in antiquity but nevertheless it was granted by the then Marfatdar of the deity for legal necessity and as such it is binding on the present Plaintiff. The defence has further relied upon the plea of limitation. 4. The trial Court granted a decree in favour of the Plaintiff negativing both the pleas of the defence, But nevertheless the lower appellate has dismissed the Plaintiff's suit differing from the trial Court on each of its two findings, It is well settled that there is no absolute bar for the Manager of a religious institution to grant permanent lease in respect of a land but nevertheless the Manager or the trustee can alienate, only in very limited circumstances, on account of pressing legal necessity for the institution. In cases where the original creation of tenancy is,lost in antiquity and the tenant and his successor-in-interest have been in long and undisturbed possession and further when they have got their names recorded in the public papers without any interference by successive trustees, the presumption of legal necessity may be drawn. In such circumstances it has been held that the alienation must be binding as against the institution or the deity-Vide Pratap Mull Bagaria and Another Vs. Sree Sree Iswar Gopal Jiew Thakur represented by N.N. Rudra and Another. The lower appellate Court, therefore, has rightly concluded that in the present case in view of the circumstances that for the last 50 years the Defendants and their predecessors have been recorded in the record of rights as tenure-holders, and even though there had been successive charges in the trustees no objection had never been raised by any of them, the tenancy is to be held as binding against the Plaintiff. 5. On the point of limitation also, in my view, the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court is correct, Mr. Das, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, has relied upon a passage from the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1936 183 (Privy Council), Their Lordships have observed that a permanent lease of debottar property by a marfatdar is not void ab initio but is valid during the term of his office, and, it is within the power of each successive marfatdar to authorise, create or continue a new tenancy during the period of his office and as such the possession of the lessee can never become adverse to the Idol on whom the property is vested and not on the marfatdar. With great respect to the observations made, it cannot be a good law in the fact of the new Indian legislation, Article 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act which was introduced into the body of the Act in the year 1929. The suit out of which the appeal before third Lordships of the Privy Council arose was instituted in the year 1918 and was therefore governed by the provisions of limitation existing then in 1918. The suit out of which the appeal before third Lordships of the Privy Council arose was instituted in the year 1918 and was therefore governed by the provisions of limitation existing then in 1918. The language of Article 134-B is absolutely clear to the effect that the alienation has got to be avoided by the succeeding trustees or marfatdars within 12 years from the date of death resignation or removal of the transferor. As it appears the grant in the present case must have been prior to the year 1898. In the meantime, there have been, as I have indicated above, successive changes of trustees. It is not disputed that if the case comes within the language of Article 134-B it must be held that the suit was filed long after the lapse of 12 years from the date of death) resignation or removal of the transferor. Relying upon the above Calcutta decision of Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea (as he then was) it can safely be held that in the present case the suit is barred under the provisions of Article 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act. The suit therefore has been rightly dismissed by the lower appellate Court. 6. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed