Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal arises from an order in execution of a decree for recovery of possession of a plot of land and buildings from the defendant-lessee. He objected to recovery of possession on two ground viz., that the decree-holder had to obtain an order for eviction from the Rent Controller before seeking recovery of possession and that he was not liable to be evicted in view of the provisions of the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act VIII of 1950. The first ground of objection does not appear to have been pressed in the court of first instance. The defendant's objections were over-ruled and the decree-holder was allowed to recover possession. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the order of the learned Munsiff was confirmed and he has preferred this Second Appeal from the concurrent decisions against him. 2. The objection under the Rent Control Order not having been pressed in the first court, the only point arising for decision is whether Act VIII of 1950 applies to this case. S.4 of the Act provides as follows: "Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, proceedings in execution of a decree in a suit for the recovery of possession of a holding shall, so far as they relate to the delivery of possession of the holding, be stayed for a period of one year from the date of commencement of this Act: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall preclude the Court - (a) from ordering the delivery of possession of the holding to the decree-holder if the court is satisfied either that the lessee has committed intentional and wilful acts of waste or that he has failed to pay the rent of the holding which has accrued due after the commencement of this Act; or (b) from granting any other appropriate relief to which the decree-holder may be entitled". 3. S. 2 defines the term 'holding" and S. (3) enumerates leases to which the Act does not apply. Lands or buildings or both given on lease for industrial or commercial purposes fall in the category of cases excluded from the operation of the Act. It is the case of both sides that the property in question was given on lease for carrying on a trade in bamboos. Lands or buildings or both given on lease for industrial or commercial purposes fall in the category of cases excluded from the operation of the Act. It is the case of both sides that the property in question was given on lease for carrying on a trade in bamboos. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the word "Commercial" in S. 3, Clause.(d) should be given the more restricted interpretation given in judicial Dictionaries i.e., dealings with foreign Nations or States. According to Stroud's Judicial dictionary "Commerce" is: "Traffic, trade, or merchandize in buying and selling of goods. There is a distinction between commerce and trade; the former relate to our dealings with foreign nations or our colonies, etc., abroad - the other to our mutual traffic and dealings among ourselves at home" (Jacob; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 15; see also Merchant). But this distinction may be questioned". Wharton's Law Lexicon defines the terms as: "The intercourse of nations in each other's procedure and manufactures, in which the superfluities of one are given for those of another, and then re-exchanged with other nations for mutual wants. Commerce relates to our dealings with foreign nations, colonies, etc., trade, to mutual dealings at home". 4. The question is whether "Commercial purposes" mentioned in S.3 Clause.(d) of the Act applies only to such dealings as are referred to above or to buying and selling transactions as ordinarily understood. Broadly speaking, there are two rules for the construction of terms and expressions in a Statute. The first is that general statutes will prima facie be presumed to use the words in their popular sense. This rule was stated by Lord Tenderden in Attorney General v. Winstanley ((1831) 2 D & Clause.302, 310) as follows: "The words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art" are to be construed "as they are understood in common language". 5. The second rule is that when the Statute is one passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used therein which everybody conversant with the trade, business or transaction knows and understands to have a particular meaning, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning which may differ from the ordinary or popular meaning. These rules have been stated thus in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes: "In dealing with matters relating to the general public, statutes are presumed to use words in their popular sense; uti loquitur vulgus But when dealing with particular business or transactions, words are presumed to be used with the particular meaning in which they are used and understood in particular business in question, that meaning being rejected, however, as soon as the judicial mind is satisfied that another is more agreeable to the object or intention (10th Edition, page 54)". 6. Unlike the General Sales Tax Act, this Act is not one specifically dealing with trade or commerce or where the distinction between inter-State trade and trade within the State is intended to be stressed. Several cases in which English Courts have construed terms in Statutes according to the popular sense are given in Craies on Statute Law and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. The meaning of the term 'commerce' as given in the Oxford Dictionary is "Exchange between men of the products of nature and art; buying and selling together; exchange of merchandize, especially on a large scale between countries or Districts". Act VIII of 1950 was a temporary measure originally intended to be in operation for one year only. General Legislation for giving fixity of tenure was in contemplation at that time and the operation of the Act was being extended from time to time. The Legislature could not have intended to make any substantial alteration in the law beyond what was explicitly declared in express terms or by clear implication in Act VIII of 1950. General law allows recovery of leased properties from tenants and the departure from the same was restricted to leases of particular types. By excluding leases for industrial or commercial purposes, the intention appears to have been to restrict the benefit of the Act to agricultural leases other than leases for large scale plantations. Clause. (c) of S. 3 is consistent with this view. Buildings rented out, including houses, shops or warehouses with the sites thereof, together with the gardens or lands appertaining thereto are excluded by the said Clause. Similarly Clause. (e) excluded from the scope of the Act, lands transferred for felling timber, for fugitive cultivation or for planting tea, coffee, rubber etc. (c) of S. 3 is consistent with this view. Buildings rented out, including houses, shops or warehouses with the sites thereof, together with the gardens or lands appertaining thereto are excluded by the said Clause. Similarly Clause. (e) excluded from the scope of the Act, lands transferred for felling timber, for fugitive cultivation or for planting tea, coffee, rubber etc. It is difficult to ascribe to the Legislature the intention to excluded only places given on lease for trade with other countries, States or Districts. Even buildings including houses and shops are excluded. The other purpose referred to in the same clause viz., "Industrial" would lend support to the view that the terms "Commerce" was intended only to denote trade as understood in the popular sense. 7. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in upholding the concurrent decisions of the courts below that the trade carried on by the defendant in the property comes within the expression "Commercial purpose" in S. 3 Clause. (d) of Act VIII of 1950. The Second Appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.