Judgment Choudhary, J. 1. This appeal by the defendants first party is directed against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge of Darbhanga reversing those of the Munsif, second court, Samastipur, and arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff for a declaration of his title to and confirmation of possession, or, in the alternative, for recovery of possession, over 2 bighas 7 kathas and 121/2 dhurs of land, which admittedly belonged to one Ramrekha Singh. The plaintiff and defendant 4 are the sons of the said Ramrekha Singh. In the year 1937 the defendants first party instituted a suit for rent against Ramrekha Singh and obtained an ex parte decree against him. Later on, Ramrekha Singh died in the year 1940. After his death, the defendants first party started execution of the ex parte decree in Execution Case No. 711 of 1941 against defendant 4, and in execution purchased 4 bighas 15 kathas 5 dhurs out of the holding of Ramrekha Singh, a moiety of which is the subject-matter of dispute in the present case. It appears that the defendants first party obtained delivery of possession on 8-6-1942. The case of the plaintiff, however, is that the delivery of possession was only a paper transaction and the defendants first party never got actual possession over the land. His further case is that he not being a party to the execution case, his interest was not at all affected by the auction sale, and he, therefore, instituted the suit for the reliefs as stated above. The defendants first party contested the suit on the grounds, so far as are relevant for the purpose of the present appeal, that the land in question was the self-acquired property of Ramrekha Singh and that the plaintiff had separated from his father who lived joint with defendant 4 and, therefore, after the death of Ramrekha Singh, defendant 4 inherited this self acquired property of his father. Their further defence was that, in any event, defendant 4 was the recorded tenant in their sarishta and he represented the holding in the execution case. 2. Their further defence was that, in any event, defendant 4 was the recorded tenant in their sarishta and he represented the holding in the execution case. 2. The trial court accepted all the contentions raised by the defendants first party and held that the land in question was the self-acquired property of Ramrekha Singh, that the plaintiff had separated from him in his life-time and he (Ramrekha Singh) lived joint with defendant 4 and that on his death, therefore, defendant 4 alone inherited the land in question to the exclusion of the plaintiff. It also held that, in any event, defendant 4 represented the holding in the execution case. On these findings the suit was dismissed by the trial Court. On appeal the lower, appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court so far as the land in question was held to be the self-acquired property of Ramrekha Singh and the plaintiff was held to have separated from him who lived joint with defendant 4 till his death, but it held that the self-acquired property of Ramrekha Singh devolved upon both the sons, though the plaintiff lived separate from him. It also held that defendant 4 did not represent the holding in the execution case. As a result of these findings, it came to the conclusion that the title of the plaintiff with respect to the disputed land was not at all affected by the auction sale and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. Against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court the defendants first party have come up to this Court in second appeal. 3. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has put forward two contentions. His first contention is that, on the concurrent findings of the courts below that the disputed land was the self-acquired property of Ramrekha Singh and that the plaintiff had separated from Kirn in his life-time who lived joint with defendant 4, the suit of the plaintiff should have been dismissed on the simple ground that on the death of the father leaving self-acquired property an undivided son takes it to the exclusion of the divided son. His second contention is that, in any event, the appellants proceeded bona fide against defendant 4 as being the legal representative of Ramrekha Singh in the execution case and he, therefore, represented the holding as well as other legal representatives of Ramrekha Singh, if there were any, and by the execution sale the right, title and interest of the plaintiff, if he had any, also passed to the appellants. Both these contentions, in my opinion, seem to be well founded. 4. I will, first deal with the first contention. The argument put forward is that when a father dies leaving an undivided son and a separated son, his self-acquired property devolves only on the undivided son and the separated son is excluded from getting the same; in other words, the undivided son excludes the separated son from receiving the fathers self-acquired property. In order to test the correctness of this argument, it may, perhaps, be necessary, first, to consider as to the mode of devolution of such property. Does the self-acquired property of the father devolve on Ms son by survivorship or does it go to him by inheritance? Suppose the father dies leaving two sons who were joint with him. The question is whether they will get his self-acquired property by survivorship or by inheritance. The solution of this question is not free from difficulty, and the text-writers have not directly dealt with this point. There are, however, indications in the texts which, in my opinion lend support to the view that the self-acquired property of the father devolves on his sons by right of survivorship and not by inheritance. 5. It is undisputed that in ancestral property the sons acquire an equal right by birth. It is also undisputed that self-acquired property of the father is taken by his sons as being their joint family property with right of survivorship inter se. It further appears that even during the life-time of the Father the sons have a certain right or interest by birth in his self-acquired property. In placitum 27 of Sec.1 in Chap. It is also undisputed that self-acquired property of the father is taken by his sons as being their joint family property with right of survivorship inter se. It further appears that even during the life-time of the Father the sons have a certain right or interest by birth in his self-acquired property. In placitum 27 of Sec.1 in Chap. 1 of Part 2 of Macnaghten and Colebrooks Mitakshara, relating to inheritance, the law on the subject is stated as given below: "Therefore, it is a settled point that property in the paternal or ancestral estate is by birth, although the father has independent power in the disposal of effects, other than immovables, for indispensable acts of duty and for purposes prescribed by texts of law, as gifts through affection, support of the family, relief from distress and so forth, but he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest in regard to the immovable estate, whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other predecessor." The above passage clearly indicates that even in the self-acquired property of the father the sons have got by birth the right of control over the power of disposal of the father. Placita 9 and 10 of Sec. 5 of the same Chapter bring out somewhat apparent conflict with the above view. These placita run as follows: "9. So likewise the grandson has a right of prohibition, if his unseparated father is making a donation or a sale of effects inherited from that grandfather, but he has no right of interference if the effects were acquired by the father. On the contrary he must acquiesce because he is dependent. 10. Consequently, the difference is this: Although he has a right by birth in his fathers and in his grandfathers property, still, since he is dependent on his father in regard to the paternal estate and since the father has a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must acquiesce in the fathers disposal of his own acquired property, but since both have indiscriminately a right in the grandfathers estate, the son has a power of inter-diction if the father be dissipating the property." 6. Thus, there appears to be contradiction between placitum 27 of Sec.1 on the one hand and placita 9 and 10 of Sec. 5 on the other. Thus, there appears to be contradiction between placitum 27 of Sec.1 on the one hand and placita 9 and 10 of Sec. 5 on the other. A reconciliation of the above conflict, in my view, is to be found in Smriti Chandrika. Although the doctrines of this commentary are not recognised in Northern India, they can, by way of analogy, be applied to explain the dubious or indeterminate phrase or terms of the Mitakshara (vide -- Buddah Singh V/s. Laltu Singh, AIR 1915 PC 70 (A)). Paragraph 21 of Chap. VIII of this commentary states: "It would seem from the above construction that in the case of the fathers property, the ownership of the father and son is unequal (equality of ownership having been specifically ordained in the case of grandfathers property alone). But this gives rise to the question, how could there exist such inequality while one possesses a right by birth in both bis grandfathers and fathers property? The reply, however, is that in the case of the grandfathers property, the ownership (Swatwam) and also independent power (SwatantryamJ are both equal in the father and son. Whereas in the case of fathers property, while he is alive and free from defect, he (father) alone possesses independent power (Swatantryam) and not the son. Hence alone arose the stated difference." Setlur, 1911 at pp. 255-6). The above quoted passage makes the position perfectly clear. Though a son has got by his birth a right in his fathers property, both ancestral and self-acquired, he possesses both Swatwam (the ownership) and Swatantryam (independent power) in the ancestral property, whereas he possesses only Swatwam (the ownership) and not the Swatantryam (independent power) in his self-acquired property. That being the position, the only way of devolution of such property on the son, in my opinion, is by survivorship. Any other view of the matter will make the existence of any interest by birth in the fathers self-acquired property absolutely meaningless. 7. Dealing with this subject the law stated in Maynes Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn. p. 311, is to the following effect: "While the family remained undivided, he (the acquirer) would be entitled to the exclusive use of his separate gains. If he dies undivided, they would probably fall into the common stock. 7. Dealing with this subject the law stated in Maynes Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn. p. 311, is to the following effect: "While the family remained undivided, he (the acquirer) would be entitled to the exclusive use of his separate gains. If he dies undivided, they would probably fall into the common stock. Probably he was only allowed to alienate, where such alienation was the proper mode of enjoying the use of the property. This would account for the distinction which is drawn between self-acquired movables and immovables. The right to alienate the former is universally admitted by the commentators, but the Mitakshara cites with approval a text, which states: Though immovables or bipeds have been acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made without convening all the sons." At p. 318 it is further stated: "Therefore, it is a settled point that property in the paternal or ancestral estate is by birth, although the father has independent power in the disposal of effects other than immovables for indispensable acts of duty, and for purposes prescribed by texts of law, as gifts through affection, support of the family, relief from distress, and so forth; but he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest in regard to the immovable estate, whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other predecessor; since it is ordained, though immovables or bipeds have been acquired by a man himself, a gift or sale of them should not be made without convening all the sons. They who are born, and they who are yet unbegotten, and they who are still in the womb, require the means of support. No gift or sale should, therefore, be made." After reviewing the authorities the learned author at p. 336 of the same book states as follows; "The result therefore is that while the son has a right by birth both in his fathers and his grandfathers property, a distinction under a special text makes the right of the son and the father equal in the property of the grand father. The text is the ownership of the father and the son is the same in land, a corrody or wealth received from the grandfather." But in the case of fathers property, the ownership of the son is unequal, for the father has an independent power over it, or a predominant interest. The sons right by birth does not therefore extend to his enforcing a partition or interdicting an alienation of his fathers property. The right however, remains a real birth right, though dormant and enables the son to succeed to the property by survivorship or as a apratibandhadaya". The above passage was quoted with approval and followed in -- Shyam Behari Singh V/s. Rameshwar Prasad, AIR 1942 Pat 213 (B). In . Gopalchandra Sarkars Hindu Law, 7th Edn., p. 363, the rule of law on this point is given as follows: "A male descendant in the male line, however low in descent acquires, a right by birth to both ancestral and self-acquired property of a paternal ancestor. Suppose A holds ancestral property and a son B is born to him, then B and A are cosharers with co-equal rights, a son C is born to B and acquires interest in the property in the same way as another son of A; similarly a son D of C would be a coparcener; and likewise Ds son E would acquire a similar interest and on the same principle, and so on. If the three intermediate descendants were to the during the lifetime of A, Es rights would not be in the least affected by that circumstance. The same rules apply also to the self-acquired property of a paternal ancestor, to which right arises by birth." At p. 367 it is further stated: "*. * * according to the Mitakshara a son acquires a right by birth to the fathers self-acquired property in the same way as to the ancestral property. But the father is competent to alienate the same, and the son has no right to oppose as in the case of the ancestral property ** *. It should, however, be borne in mind that such property (self acquired property), if undisposed of by the father, is taken by the sons and the like by survivorship and not by descent". 8. The views of the different High Courts in India are divergent on the subject. It should, however, be borne in mind that such property (self acquired property), if undisposed of by the father, is taken by the sons and the like by survivorship and not by descent". 8. The views of the different High Courts in India are divergent on the subject. In -- Fakirappa V/s. Yellappa, 22 Bom 101 (C) a Bench of the Bombay High Court relying on West and Buhlers Hindu Law, 3rd Edn., at p. 68, held that the sons succeeded to the self-acquired property of the father by survivorship. The same view was taken by a Bench of the Madras High Court in -- Nana Tawker V/s. Ramachandra, 32 Mad 377 (D) in which, it was held that succession to the self acquired property of the father would, where there was an undivided son, by survivorship rather than by inheritance. This view was re-affirmed by the Madras High Court in a subsequent Bench decision in -- Venkateshwara Pattar V/s. Mankayammal, AIR 1935 Mad 775 (E) where Varadachariar J. (as he then was) held that even in respect of the fathers self acquired property the devolution is by survivorship according to the scheme of the Mitakshara. Relying on the Madras case in 32 Mad 377 (D) a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in --Raghubardayal V/s. Ramdulare, AIR .1928 Bang 206 (F) also took the view that succession to the self-acquired property of the father would be by survivorship. In -- Shamrao Bhaurao V/s. Krishnarao Bhaurao, AIR 1941 Nag 297 (G), Niyogi J. dealing with the law of the Mitakshara on the point observed as follows: "But in Chap. I, S. 5, paras. 9 and 10 the Mitakshara concedes that the father has a predominant interest in the property acquired by himself and that therefore the son must acquiesce in the fathers disposal of his own acquired property. Sarkar in his work on the Hindu Law at p. 367, relying on the aforesaid passages in the Mitakshara, propounds the law to be that a sons right to the fathers self-acquired property arises by birth and notes that the only difference in this right to the self acquired as opposed to ancestral property lies in the fathers power of disposition in regard to his self-acquired property. Thus it is evident that the son has the same interest (by birth) in either kind of property. Thus it is evident that the son has the same interest (by birth) in either kind of property. Consequently the fathers self-acquired property devolves by survivorship on his son and becomes ancestral in his hands. The self-acquired property of the father is thus in its nature a coparcenary property vis-a-vis his son, who therefore takes it on his fathers death as a surviving coparcener" A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in -- Mt. Ram Devi V/s. Mt. Gyarsi, AIR 1949 All 345 (FB) (H) has taken the same view on the subject. Kaul, J. in his well considered judgment (if I may respectfully say so), after having reviewed all the texts and case-laws on the subject, held that if the sons acquire an interest in their fathers self-acquired property by birth, it follows that on the fathers death, if such property is left undisposed of, the sons who form a joint family with him take it by right of survivorship, and the contrary view expressed in certain reported cases and text books must be taken to be not sound. 9. The view taken by the Madras High Court on this point in 32 Mad 377 (D), was, however not accepted in a later Full Bench decision of that court in -- Viravan Chettiar V/s. Srinivasachariar, AIR 1921 Mad 168 (FB) (I) and following that decision a Bench of the Madras High Court in -- Narasimha Rao V/s. Narsimham AIR 1932 Mad 361 (J) took the view that the self acquired property of the father devolves on his son by inheritance and not by survivorship. But as already stated, Varadachariar J. (as he then was) in the case of AIR 1935 Mad 775 (E) went back on the previous view and held the devolution of this kind of property to be by survivorship. The Bombay High Court, also in a later decision in -- Vastideo Ganesh V/s. Vishwanath Shripad, AIR 1948 Bom 313 (K) relying on the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1921 Mad 168 (FB) (I) and the decision of the Privy Council in -- Kattarna Naucher V/s. Rajah of Shivagungah, 9 Mop Ind App 539 (PC) (L) departed from the view taken in 22 Bom 101 (C) and held that the self-acquired property of the lather devolved on his son by succession. In a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court in -- Ganesh Prasad V/s. Hazari Lal, AIR 1942 All 201 (FB) (M), the question that fell to be determined was whether on the death of a Hindu leaving self-acquired property his undivided sons succeeded to it to the exclusion of his divided son under the Mitakshara law and in that connection the question as to the mode of devolution of such property came to be considered in that ease. On the main question Collister and Bajpai JJ. held in faveur of the undivided son, to which a reference will be made later on when I will deal with that question, but Hamilton J. took a contrary view on that point. With respect to the mode of devolution, however, though Bajpai J, held that the rule of survivorship applied, Collister and Hamilton JJ. took the view that the mode of devolution was by way of inheritance. Raghavachariar in his Hindu law, 2nd Edn. p. 256, has stated the law on the subject as follows: "The question whether the son takes an interest by birth in the self-acquisitions of his father has been answered in the negative by the Madras High Court (AIR 1921 Mad 168 (FB) (1)) overruling an earlier decision taking the contrary view (32 Mad 377 (D)), The observations of the Privy Council in -- Sartaj Kuari V/s. Deoraj Kuari, 15 Ind App 51 (PC) (N) that the property in the paternal or ancestial estate acquired by birth under the Mitakshara law is so connected with the right to partition that it does not exist where there is no right to it really answers the question in favour of the later view taken by the Madras High Court, since according to the ancient texts a son cannot question his fathers acts or claim partition in respect of the latters self-acquired property". 10. The observations of their Lordships of the judicial Committee referred to above in 15 Ind App 51 (PC) (N) as observed by Kaul, J. in the Full Bench decision of AIR 1949 All 545 (H) should not in view of subsequent decisions, be extended beyond the facts of that case. 10. The observations of their Lordships of the judicial Committee referred to above in 15 Ind App 51 (PC) (N) as observed by Kaul, J. in the Full Bench decision of AIR 1949 All 545 (H) should not in view of subsequent decisions, be extended beyond the facts of that case. In that case, the Raja who was the owner of an impartible estate subject to the rule of primogeniture, made a gift of certain villages, forming part of the estate to his younger wife, and the question that arose for consideration before their Lordships was whether the Raja could make the gift without the consent of his son. As observed by Kaul J. in that Full Bench decision, the observation referred to above which was with reference to an impartible estate has been explained in subsequent cases that the existence of survivorship is not inconsistent with the dominant interest possessed by the holder of an impartible estate and with the absence of a right to partition or to interdict an alienation on the part of the other members of the family. This case, therefore, is no authority for the proposition that a son does not take an interest in his fathers self-acquired property by birth. 11. In some of the cases which have taken the view of the devolution being by way of inheritance, reliance was placed on the following passage in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 9 Moo Ind App 539 (PC) (L): "But the law of partition shows that as to the separately acquired property of one member of a united family, the other members of that family have neither community of interest nor unity of possession. The foundation, therefore, of a right to take such property by survivorship fails, and there are no grounds of postponing the widows right to any superior right of the coparceners in the undivided property." The question which fails to be considered in the present case did not arise in that case and, therefore, the above observations have no bearing on the question under consideration in the present case; 12. Thus on a consideration of the authorities, both text books and decided cases, referred to above, I have arrived at the conclusion that the serf-acquired property of the father devolves on his son by survivorship and not by inheritance, 13. Thus on a consideration of the authorities, both text books and decided cases, referred to above, I have arrived at the conclusion that the serf-acquired property of the father devolves on his son by survivorship and not by inheritance, 13. Then remains the question as to the order of succession. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that in regard to the devolution of the self acquired property of the father an undivided son excludes separated sons and the latter succeeds only when there is no undivided soil. The fact that the devolution of such property has been held to be by survivorship lends full support to this contention. The idea of devolution of a property by survivorship to a separated member of a family, is in my opinion, foreign to the principle of Hindu Law governed by the Mitakshara. The moment a property is said to devolve by survivorship, the rule of law becomes perfectly clear that it must devolve on such members who were joint with the person on whose death the question of devolution arises. Thus on this principle itself the self acquired property of the lather which has to devolve on his sons by survivorship must devolve on those sons only who at the time of his death, were joint with him and the separated sons have to be excluded. Almost all the decided cases support this view with regard to the order of succession, though as already observed there have been conflicting views with respect to the mode or succession. The High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Allahabad have consistently held the devolution of such property to be in favour of the undivided son. 14. In 22 Bom 101 (C), it was held that as between united sons and a separated grandson, the succession on the grandfathers death to the property both ancestral and self acquired, left by him goes in preference according to Hindu law, to the united sons. In AIR 1948 Bom 313 (K), it was held that a separated son is not entitled to a share in the self acquired property left by the father at his death when at such time the father was in union with his other sons. In 32 Mad 377 (D) the same view has been taken. In AIR 1948 Bom 313 (K), it was held that a separated son is not entitled to a share in the self acquired property left by the father at his death when at such time the father was in union with his other sons. In 32 Mad 377 (D) the same view has been taken. It was held in that case that under the law of the Mitakshara on the death of a lather leaving self acquired property, an undivided son takes such property to the exclusion of a dividing son although the division took place after the acquisition of such property by the father. This case was considered by a Full Bench of that court in AIR 1921 Mad 168 (FB) (I) and, though their Lordships differed from the view taken in this case, as already observed, that the devolution of the self-acquired property of the father is by survivorship, they did not dissent from it on the point as to the exclusion of the separated son by the undivided son in regard to the devolution of the self-acquired property of the father. As regards the order of succession Old field, J. thought that the case of 32 Mad 377 (D), was correctly decided and the other two Judges did not dissent from him on that point. This view was reaffirmed in a subsequent Bench decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1932 Mad 361 (J) where it was held that Nana Tawkars case (D), was rightly decided as regards the order of succession with respect to the self-acquired property of the father and it was held that on the death of a Hindu leaving self-acquired property, his undivided sons succeed to such property to the exclusion of a divided son, 15. There are two Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad High Court having direct bearing on the question at issue in the present case. The first case is the case of AIR 1942 All 201 (FB) (M), and the question that was referred to the Full Bench was whether on the death of a Hindu father leaving self-acquired property the undivided sons succeed to such property to the exclusion of a divided son under the Mitakshara law. Collister, J. and Bajpai J. by separate judgments, on reviewing all the authorities on the point, answered the question in the affirmative in favour of the undivided sons. Collister, J. and Bajpai J. by separate judgments, on reviewing all the authorities on the point, answered the question in the affirmative in favour of the undivided sons. Hamilton, J. took a contrary view, but the majority judgment of the Full Bench was that the undivided sons would succeed to the self-acquired property of the father in preference to a divided son, whether such property was acquired before or after such separation and whether the divided son was or was not given a share in such property at the time of separation. This view was quoted with approval in the other Full Bench decision, namely, in the case of AIR 1949 AH 545 (FB) (H). 15a. In Maynes Hindu Law and Usage, 11th Edn., p. 631, the rule of law on this point has been stated as given below: "Subject to the operation of this Act (The Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act; 1937,), the following rules apply. If a man has become divided from his sons, subsequently has one or more sons born, he or they take his property exclusively. If he is undivided from his sons his property passes to the whole of his male issue, which term includes his legitimate sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons, If he is undivided only from some of them those who remain united with him take it with those subsequently born. This rule also applies to his self-acquired property even if the division took place only after he acquired such property". The same view has been taken in Mullas Hindu Law as will appear from a passage at p. 35 of the 11th Edn. of that book which runs as follows: "Where there are sons by different wives. It often happens that the sons by one wife take their share of the joint property from the father and separate from him, and the father continues joint with the sons by his other wife. Suppose now that the father dies leaving self-acquired property, some acquired before and some after partition. Who is entitled to the property? According to the Allahabad, Bombay and Madras rulings, the undivided sons and their branches succeed as heirs to the whole of such property to the exclusion of the divided sons and their branches. Suppose now that the father dies leaving self-acquired property, some acquired before and some after partition. Who is entitled to the property? According to the Allahabad, Bombay and Madras rulings, the undivided sons and their branches succeed as heirs to the whole of such property to the exclusion of the divided sons and their branches. * * * In Sarkars Hindu Law, 7th Edn., p. 494, the law on the subject has been stated as follows: "But on the death of the father having self-acquired property, an undivided son takes such property to the exclusion of a divided son, although the division takes place after the acquisition of such property by the father. It is said that, after obtaining on partition his share of all the divisible property, the separating sons loses all the rights which he had as a member of the coparcenary, and it was only as a member of the coparcenary that he had by birth an interest in his fathers self-acquisition." Raghavachariar m his Hindu Law, 2nd Edn., p. 444, states that where a father was joint at the time of his death with some only of his sons, the others having already separated from him, those who remained joint with him, whether -they were sons born before or after the partition, succeed to the whole property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, to the exclusion of the divided sons. 16. Relying on an earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in -- "Kunwar Bahadur V/s. Madho Prasad, AIR 1919 All 223(1) (O) the Chief Court of Oudh in -- Badri Nath V/s. Hardeo AIR 1930 Oudh 77 (P), took a contrary view and held that in the case of property acquired by a Hindu father after his separation from some of his sons, the sons who had separated from him will be entitled to share along with the sons who may be living jointly with him. In the Allahabad case, however, the question of an undivided son excluding a separated son from inheriting the fathers self-acquired property did not arise for consideration because in that case all the sons were found to have been joint with the father, AIR 1930 Oudh 77 (P), therefore, seems to have been decided on a wrong conception of the facts of the aforesaid Allahabad case. There are other decisions of the Chief Court of Oudh which have taken the same view as taken in AIR 1930 Oudh 77 (P), but it is not necessary to make any reference to those cases as all of them have been overruled by the Full Bench decision of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1949 All 545 (FB) (H). The case of. AIR 1930 Oudh 77 (P) also stands overruled by the same Full Bench decision. There is also a dissenting judgment of Hamilton J. in the other Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1042 All 201 (FB) (M) who has followed the case of AIR 1930 Oudh 77 (P). But, as already stated, the majority judgment of the Full Bench is that the undivided son excludes the separated son from inheriting his fathers self-acquired property. 17. It thus appears that for a period over fifty years the rule of law has been accepted to be that the self-acquired property of the father devolves on his undivided son to the exclusion of his separated son. The decisions referred to above have consistently held in favour of this view, and there is no authoritative decision to the contrary. On consideration of the authorities referred to above, my conclusion, is, and I hold, that the self-acquired property of the father devolves on his undivided son to the exclusion of his separated son and the latter inherits only when there is no undivided son at the tune of death of the father. 18. In face of the above view, it is not necessary to deal with the second contention raised by Mr. Lalnarain Sinha, appearing on behalf of the appellants, that, in any event, the holding was effectively represented in the execution case by, defendant 4. It is enough to say that this contention is equally valid as the previous one. The case of --Malkarjun V/s. Narhari, 25 Bom 337 (PC) (Q) lends ample support to this contention. There is a Bench decision ot the Madras High Court in --S. R. M. A. Ramaswami Chettiar V/s. Oppilamani Chetti, 33 Mad 6 (H) which has a direct bearing on this point. In that case the judgment-debtor having died, the decree-holder, started execution against one of two persons who appeared to have a better title at that time as his legal representative. In that case the judgment-debtor having died, the decree-holder, started execution against one of two persons who appeared to have a better title at that time as his legal representative. In that case it was held that the auction sale would bind the persons who were subsequently found to be the true legal representatives. In this connection the following passage from the judgment of their Lordships is very relevant: "The creditor must, if he is not to be liable to lose his money, be permitted to apply for execution against that one of the rival claimants whom he honestly and reasonably believes to be the legal representative; and if the person so nominated, though it may turn out afterwards that he is not the true legal representative, is yet competent in fact to represent the estate, if his interests in respect of the proceeding in question are identical with those of his rivals and if he acts without fraud or collusion this hard to see any reason why his representation should not be held to be sufficient" The above passage was qnoted with approval in a subsequent Bench decision of that Court in --"Chaturbhujadoss Kushaldoss & Sons V/s. Rajamanicka Mudali, AIR 1930 Mad 930 (S). 19. For the reasons given above, it is perfectly clear that the plaintiff could have no title to the subject-matter of dispute in the present case and his suit was bound to be dismissed. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court set aside and those of the trial court restored. The suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs throughout to the contesting defendants, namely, the appellants in the present case. Das, J. 21 I agree, and have nothing useful to add.