JUDGMENT Randhir Singh, J. - This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for arrears of rent and for possession of a house. 2. It appears that the Defendant was alternate of the Plaintiff in occupation of a part of a house on payment of a monthly rent of Rs. 18. On the 10th October, 1949, the Plaintiff served the Defendant with a notice requiring him to vacate the premises by the end of October and to pay up the rent upto the end of October, 1949. The Defendant did not pay the arrears or vacate the premises and the Plaintiff then instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal for possession and for arrears of rent. 3. The suit was contested by the Defendant on the ground that the rent for the period 1st September, 1946 to 31st March, 1947 was not in arrears and had been paid up and that the rent for the period after the 1st April, 1947, had been sent to the Plaintiff regularly by moneyorders but he refused to accept them. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the Defendant that the Plaintiff was not entitled to eject the Defendant. A number of issues were framed by the trial court. The trial court, however, found that the Defendant's contention that the rent upto the 31st March, 1947, had been paid up was correct, but as the Defendant had not paid up the arrears within one month after the notice had been served the default in payment would be wilful within the meaning of law. The suit for possession and for arrears of rent was ultimately decreed by the trial court. 4. The Defendant then went up in appeal. The lower appellate court, however, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit for ejectment but maintained the decree for arrears of rent. The Plaintiffs have now come up in second appeal. 5. The facts of this case are rather peculiar. It is in evidence that the Defendant has been sending rent by moneyorder to the Plaintiff either from month to month or after a few months, but every time the money-order was refused by the Plaintiff without there being any indication on his part as to why the rent was being refused. The facts of this case are rather peculiar. It is in evidence that the Defendant has been sending rent by moneyorder to the Plaintiff either from month to month or after a few months, but every time the money-order was refused by the Plaintiff without there being any indication on his part as to why the rent was being refused. The Defendant filed all the moneyorder despatch receipts and the coupons which he received when the moneyorders were refused and they are Exs. A 3 to A 30 and also Exs. A 42 and A 46. The Plaintiff served the last notice of demand on the 10th October 1949, which was served on the Defendant on the 15th October, 1949. On the 12th October, 1949, the Defendant had already despatched a moneyorder for Rs. 71 for rent for the months of July, 1949 to October, 1949 so that the rent demanded for the months of September and October had also been remitted to the Plaintiff before the receipt of the notice but after the Plaintiff had sent the notice. This moneyorder was also refused by the Plaintiff. 6. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellant that although the money-orders were refused by the Plaintiff from time to time it was the duty of the Defendant to have made a tender of the arrears of rent once again after the notice dated the 10th October, 1949, had been served on him and in support of this contention a ruling of this Court, viz. Chotey Lal v. L. Chhakilal alias Hari Shankar 1952 A.W.R. (H.C.) 642 has been cited. In this reported case a tenant used to send rent by moneyorder which the landlord refused. He ultimately filed a suit for arrears of rent and on the Defendant's contention that the rent had been wrongly refused by the landlord, the court granted a decree for arrears of rent but refused to allow costs. After the decree for arrears of rent had been passed the landlord served a notice on the Defendant in that suit demanding arrears of rent including the arrears decreed. The tenant, however, sent only the amount which had fallen due on account of rent after the decree had been passed but did not send the amount of arrears which had taken the shape of a decree. The tenant, however, sent only the amount which had fallen due on account of rent after the decree had been passed but did not send the amount of arrears which had taken the shape of a decree. Under these circumstances it was held by Desai, J. that the default was wilful within the meaning of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The facts of the present case, are, however, very different. In the present case the Defendant had tendered the amount of rent from month to month or, at, any rate, for the entire period not only upto the date of the notice but even for the month of October for which rent had not fallen into arrears on the day when the notice was served. There were, therefore, no arrears, so to say, which had not been tendered to the Plaintiff upto the date of the notice or which were about to fall due within one month of the notice. I am unable to agree with the contention that even under these circumstances the non-payment of rent by the Defendant should be deemed to be wilful. The Defendant took all possible care to send the money by moneyorder presumably on account of strained relations between the parries but the Plaintiff refused the moneyorders and never indicated to the Defendant as to why he refused the rent. No mention of the reason for refusing the rent was made even in the plaint. It was for the first time in his statement made in court that the Plaintiff stated that the Defendant had deducted money-order commission from the amount of the rent and it was, therefore not in full payment of the rent and consequently he refused to accept it. It was always open to the Plaintiff to have accepted the rent in part payment and to have asked the Defendant to pay the moneyorder commission which he had deducted if he was not entitled to deduct it. I am unable, therefore, to hold that the default in the payment of rent was wilful. The learned Civil Judge has, however, given a very brief judgment and has not discussed the reasons for holding that the default was not wilful, although the conclusion arrived at by him has been found to be correct on this point. 7. No other point has been pressed in arguments. 8. The learned Civil Judge has, however, given a very brief judgment and has not discussed the reasons for holding that the default was not wilful, although the conclusion arrived at by him has been found to be correct on this point. 7. No other point has been pressed in arguments. 8. As a result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to the Respondents. 9. Leave for special appeal is asked for and is refused.