Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the children of one Easwaran Padmanabhan and his wife Peruma Pillai. They had a daughter Chempakakutty and the 3rd plaintiff is her daughter. Besides these three, Easwaran Padmanabhan and Peruma Pillai had two sons Nilakantan and Easwaran. The 3rd defendant is the widow of Nilacantan and the other defendants are his lineal descendants. On the date of suit, the 1st plaintiff was the Karnavan of the sub-tarwad of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' case was that all the properties in the plaint schedules belonged to their sub-tarwad. Item No.1 in schedule A was alleged to be a property belonging to the sub-tarwad of the plaintiffs and the building in it was stated to have been put up by Easwaran Padmanabhan for his children. Item No. 2 in schedule A was stated to be the Makkathayam property of the plaintiffs. The other items were said to have been acquired by Padmanabhan Nilacantan for the benefit of the sub-tarwad. Padmanabhan Nilacantan died on 20.2.1113. His wife and children were living in the building in item No. 1. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants were obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of the properties by the plaintiffs and they sought recovery of possession of the properties with mesne profits on behalf of their sub-tarwad. Defendants 2 to 7 contested the suit. According to them all the properties belonged absolutely to Padmanabhan Nilacantan. Their case was upheld in respect of all the properties other than items 1 and 2 in schedule A. The plaintiffs were given a decree for recovery of items 1 and 2 in A schedule subject to payment of a sum of 3500 fanams which was due under a mortgage executed by Padmanabhan Nilacantan and which was redeemed by the defendants. The suit was dismissed in respect of the other items. Defendants 2 and 4 to 7 have preferred this appeal from the decree relating to items Nos.1 and 2. Though the respondents had entered appearance in this court they were neither present nor represented by counsel at the hearing of the appeal. 2. The appellant's case regarding item No.1 may be considered first. This item is a plot of land 4 cents in extent together with the buildings thereon. The defence case according to the written statement was that this item was obtained by Padmanabhan Nilacantan and his brothers under a partition deed Ext. 2. The appellant's case regarding item No.1 may be considered first. This item is a plot of land 4 cents in extent together with the buildings thereon. The defence case according to the written statement was that this item was obtained by Padmanabhan Nilacantan and his brothers under a partition deed Ext. IV, dated 15.10.1108 and that subsequently they divided the property by an oral arrangement whereby each party got the site on which he had put up a building. The building in item No.1 was stated to have been put up by Padmanabhan Nilacantan. The definite case pleaded in Para.5 of the written statement is that the oral division was effected after the date of Ext. IV. The court below found that the case of oral division was not proved. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that Padmanabhan Nilacantan and his brothers were in possession of specific plots even before the date of the partition deed and that such possession continued even after the date of the partition deed. As the main tarwad itself got divided only under Ext. IV, there could not have been any division among the members of the branch before that date. The evidence on record is insufficient to hold that there was an oral division as pleaded by the defendants. The appellants relied on Ext. V, a sale deed dated 27.9.1107, executed by Padmanabhan Easwaran, a brother of Padmanabhan Nilacantan to the 3rd plaintiff to substantiate their case that item No.1 belonged to Nilacantan. Ext. V shows that it was only the building that was conveyed by Easwaran and not the site. This shows that even though the building which was sold under Ext. V belonged to Padmanabhan Easwaran, he had no saleable interest over the site. The appellants must therefore fail in respect of the site comprised in item No.1 in A schedule. As regards the building, it was contended that it could be seen from Ext. IV that the building belonged to Padmanabhan Nilacantan. In describing the various plots allotted to the sharers under Ext. IV, the building purchased by the 3rd plaintiff was described as belonging to her. However, the other buildings were described as the buildings of parties 1 onwards. Ext. IV by itself cannot therefore lead to the conclusion that the building in item No.1 belonged to Nilacantan. In describing the various plots allotted to the sharers under Ext. IV, the building purchased by the 3rd plaintiff was described as belonging to her. However, the other buildings were described as the buildings of parties 1 onwards. Ext. IV by itself cannot therefore lead to the conclusion that the building in item No.1 belonged to Nilacantan. The 2nd defendant who was examined as Dw.1 had no direct information as to when and by whom the building was put up. All that he was able to say was that he was born in that building. This is not unlikely since Padmanabhan Nilacantan was living there with his wife and children. The building was erected on tarwad property and the evidence adduced by the defendants is too meagre to support the case that Padmanabhan Nilacantan put up the building. The conclusion reached by the lower court in respect of item No.1 in A schedule must therefore be upheld. 3. The case regarding item No. 2 stands on a different footing. The plaintiffs' case is that item No. 2 was conveyed by Easwaran Padmanabhan to his son Padmanabhan Nilacantan on behalf of the sub-tarwad while the defence is that Nilacantan got it from his father as his exclusive property and that the sub¬tarwad had no right over the same. Ext. A dated 22.9.1063 is the deed under which this item was conveyed by Easwaran Padmanabhan to his son Nilacantan. The latter was a minor on that date but he was however the prospective Karnavan of that sub-tarwad, being the eldest son. Thus Ext. A is a conveyance by a Marumakkathayee father to his eldest son long before the notion of private property of male members descending from father to children became known to the community. The question for decision is whether this should be deemed to be acquisition on behalf of the sub-tarwad of which Nilacantan was the Karnavan. Though Ext. A is styled as sale deed, it is clear from the deed that it was intended as a gift. From very early times, courts in Travancore have treated property obtained by gift or otherwise by the eldest son from the father as property belonging to the sub-tarwad of which the donee was the Karnavan. Narayanan Narayanan v. Parvathi Nangeli (5 TLR 116) is the earliest reported decision on the point. From very early times, courts in Travancore have treated property obtained by gift or otherwise by the eldest son from the father as property belonging to the sub-tarwad of which the donee was the Karnavan. Narayanan Narayanan v. Parvathi Nangeli (5 TLR 116) is the earliest reported decision on the point. It was held: "Gifts by the father known in Travancore as Makkathayam, and, in British Malabar, as Puthravakasom, are ordinarily intended to benefit all the children of the donor by the same mother, and the properties which form the subject of this gift, though usually registered or acquired in the name of the mother, are held by the mother and children in common under the management of the mother or of the next senior competent male or female among the donees. The manager of such property acts for the benefit, and as trustee, of all parties interested in the property, and is commonly allowed the same powers and privileges as the Karnavan of a Tarwad." 4. This was followed in Kunji Kaliyani v. Kunjupennu (11 TLR 139). In Mathevan Kunju Kunju v. Raman Krishnan and another (13 TLR 72) it was held: "The ordinary presumption arising from a Makkathayam gift made by a Marumakkathayam father is that the property given by him, is for the benefit of all his children, inclusive of those to be born thereafter. A man cannot revoke a gift once made, nor can he be expected to be able to make fresh grants as each child is born. The consequence of upholding the ruling of the judge below would be that the children born after a gift was made, would often be left without any provision for their maintenance. No father would certainly like such an unnatural effect to be given to his gift." Padmanabhan v. Kumaran (18 TLR 215) is another decision where the view stated above was affirmed. In Koshi Thoma and another v. Narayanan Krishnan and others (22 TLR 239) a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court held that a gift to the eldest or the only son or a purchase in his name, by his father, of immovable property whether that eldest or the only son be the eldest child of his mother, raised a strong presumption that the gift or purchase was for the benefit of the sub-tarwad of which the eldest or the only son was the karnavan. The nature of the rights obtained by two sisters under a gift from their brother was considered by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Chakky Karumby v. Kochittan Raman (26 TLR 11). Muthunayagom Pillai, J., quoted the following passage from the judgment of another Full Bench in AS 375 of 1082: "The presumption in such cases, is that the donor's views were what might be expected of him as a follower of the Marumakkathayam law and as affected by the ordinary sentiments and wishes of a member of the Malayalee community, and that the presumption therefore should be that he intended that his donees should take his properties as properties acquired by their branch as the exclusive properties of their own branch, with the usual incidents of tarwad property in accordance with Marumakkathaym usage which governed the donees." 5. It is therefore reasonable to infer that Ext. A was intended as a gift to all the children of Easwaran Padmanabhan, unless there is evidence to rebut this presumption. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the words "Santhathipravesame" in Ext. A was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the gift was one in favour of the sub-tarwad. The argument was that the said word referred to the lineal descendants of the donee. Though at first sight it might appear that there is some force in this argument we are unable to uphold the same, as the word cannot be given the restricted meaning of "lineal descendants". A similar question came up for decision before the Travancore High Court in Kumaran Raman v. Sankara Panicker (22 TLJ 585). The document which had to be construed in that case was a Will whereunder properties were bequeathed to a male member and two female members of a Nair tarwad. The male member mortgaged the property, treating it as his own. His nephews sought to set aside the mortgage on the ground that the property belonged to their branch. There was a clause in the Will which provided that after the death of the donees their "Santhanams" should enjoy the same. This word was relied on in support of the argument that the donees got an absolute estate. The argument was overruled holding that the word was used to denote his heirs and not children. There was a clause in the Will which provided that after the death of the donees their "Santhanams" should enjoy the same. This word was relied on in support of the argument that the donees got an absolute estate. The argument was overruled holding that the word was used to denote his heirs and not children. His heirs before the passing of the Nair Act being his nephews, they were found entitled to question the mortgage. In coming to this conclusion, the learned judges relied on four decisions of the Madras High Court. These decisions are Muppidathi Ammal v. Muthuswami Pillai and another (AIR 1928 Mad. 126); Pochiraju Kannamma v. Mannava Machamma (AIR 1928 Mad. 297); Rajah of Ran-mad v. Sundarpandiaswami Thevar (27 MLJ 694) and Gururajammah v. Rankaswami Mudali (AIR 1921 Mad. 518). The deed which came up for construction in 27 MLJ 694 was, as in this case, in Tamil and the expression used was Santhathiparamparamay. It was held that the expression meant heirs from generation to generation. The following passage from the judgment of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., is instructive: "The words used in Exts. Q2 and Q3 are that Sivaswami was entitled to enjoy the allowance, Santhathi Paramparayamay. These words convey a heritable estate from generation to generation. They are even stronger than the words Puthra Pouthra Paramparaya. No authority has been quoted for the proposition that the word "Santhathi" is to be restricted to the lineal descendants. It means the heirs in general." In our opinion, the expression "Santhathipravesame" in Ext. A means only heirs from generation to generation. The children of a Marumakkathayee male were not recognised at that time as his heirs even in respect of his self-acquired properties. There is no evidence in this case that Padmanabhan had made any other provision before the date of Ext. A for his wife and other children. It is too much to assume that he intended to benefit only his eldest son and not his wife and other children. The appellants also relied on the fact that at the time of revenue settlement Nilacantan applied for and obtained Patta for this property. This conduct is consistent with the case of a gift to the branch of which he was the Karanavan. The appellants also relied on the fact that at the time of revenue settlement Nilacantan applied for and obtained Patta for this property. This conduct is consistent with the case of a gift to the branch of which he was the Karanavan. Another circumstance relied on was that Nilacantan filed a suit for recovery of the property from Kumaran, a son of Easwaran Padmanabhan by another wife and that he did not describe himself as the Karnavan of his branch or state that he was suing on behalf of his branch. Ext. B is copy of the appellant judgment in that case. The plaint in that case was not produced in evidence. Even if he did not state that he was suing on behalf of the branch, such omission is not conclusive, as he could have instituted the suit without expressly describing himself as Karnavan. There was no controversy at that time between himself and the other members of his branch. The reasons relied on by the appellant are insufficient to rebut the presumption which has been recognised by a series of decisions. The finding and decree in respect of item No. 2 in Schedule A must therefore be confirmed. 6. In the result, the decree of the court below is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed without costs.