Modi, J.—These are two revisions by the plaintiffs Nandlal and another against the judgments of the Civil Judge, Ratangarh, dated the 18th December, 1951, in two suits for the recovery of price of certain cloth sold. The suits were decided by the learned Judge as small cause court suits. As they raise identical questions of law going to the very root of the trial in either case, I propose to decide them by a single judgment. 2. The plaintiffs are dealers in cloth and carry on business at Sujangarh. The defendants were hawkers and also dealt in cloth. The plaintiffs case was that the defendants purchased certain cloth from the former and failed to pay the price thereof. The plaintiffs therefore, filed a suit against Puran for a sum of Rs. 200/- including a sum of Rs. 44/1/-as interest the rest being the price of the goods sold— and against Chandra for a sum of Rs. 125/-out of which the pride of goods sold was Rs. 97/1/3 and interest Rs. 27/14/9. The defendant in either case completely denied the plaintiffs suit and pleaded that he had no dealings whatsoever with the plaintiffs. The learned Civil Judge held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the suit transactions and, therefore, dismissed both suits. These revisions have been filed from the aforesaid judgments. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised a number of grounds before this Court. I do not consider it necessary, however, to deal with all of them as the cases can be satisfactorily disposed of on certain legal grounds with which I propose to deal immediately, as those grounds go to the root of the trial. 4. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the learned Civil Judge did not record evidence in the two cases himself but asked his clerk to record the same and that the latter had done this without the hearing of the learned judge. It is contended that this was a grave violation of procedure and completely vitiated the trial. It is contended that this was a grave violation of procedure and completely vitiated the trial. In support of this connection an affidavit was filed by the plaintiff Durga-dutta in which he deposed that his own statement and that of defendant Pooran in the one case and that of Chandra in the other case had been recorded by the sarishtedar of the Civil Judge, Ratangarh, and that when the sarishtedar was recording the statements, he was seated on the floor towards the back side of the Judge. He further deposed that when the sarishtedar was taking down the statements, the Civil Judge was sitting in his chair disposing of other work and took no part in the proceedings at the time. This affidavit has been sought to be answered by a counter-affidavit by defendant Pooran in either case. Pooran admits that the statements were recorded by the sarishtedar but he adds that the latter recorded the statements under the instructions of the Civil Judge and under his supervision and that the Civil Judge was doing no other work at the time. He further deposes that the clerk was sitting down on the floor at the side of the Civil Judge and that, at that time the Judge was giving directions the clerk in the recording of the depositions. As the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was of very great importance for a proper disposal of this case, a report was called for from the learned Civil Judge (Mr. Shikhar Chand) himself. The latter in his report dated the 2nd February, 1953, states that the"the statements of the parties were recorded by the reader within my presence, hearing with may full attention and according to my instructions, and with the consent of the parties as well as their pleaders." He further observed that the petitioners had no objection to the recording of the statements by the clerk and that the allegations made by them were entirely false and were nothing but an after-throught. I am constrained to observe before proceeding further that the reply of the Civil Judge is vague and half-hearted. Although he has stated that the statements of the parties were recorded within his presence and hearing and he was fully attentive when they were being recorded. It is significant that he has not dared to deny that he was doing any other work at the time. Although he has stated that the statements of the parties were recorded within his presence and hearing and he was fully attentive when they were being recorded. It is significant that he has not dared to deny that he was doing any other work at the time. It does not appear to me to be a farfetched or illegitimate inference from manner in which he has submitted his report that very probably he was engaged in some other work while the sarishtedar was recording the statements. If the learned Judged was doing no other work at the and was fully attentive to the recording of the depositions by the clerk, I should have expected the former categorically to state that he was in point of fact engaged in no other business and that the clerk was recording the depositions under his immediate supervision and to his dictation. It, therefore, follows that the entire evidence in these two cases had been recorded by the clerk while the presiding Judge was engaged in some other work at the same time. The question in these circumstances arises whether such a trial should be accepted as proper. Learned counsel for the opposite parties vehemently argued that even assuming that the learned Civil Judge was otherwise occupied, this was a matter of no great importance because the depositions had been signed by the witnesses and it had not been shown that they were incorrect in any particulars and that any prejudice had been occasioned by the manner of such recording to petitioners. The contention in short was that the irregularity committed by the Civil Judge if any, was curable and should not be given effect to witnesses proof of prejudice. I have given this matter my very anxious and careful consideration and have come to the conclusion that the contention raised on behalf of the opposite parties must be repelled. O. XVIII rules 13 and 14 C.P.C. have a bearing on the decision of the point raised before me. Rule 13 lays down the procedure for recording evidence in non-appealable cases. O. XVIII rules 13 and 14 C.P.C. have a bearing on the decision of the point raised before me. Rule 13 lays down the procedure for recording evidence in non-appealable cases. It says that- "In cases in which an appeal is not allowed, it shall not be necessary to taken down the evidence of the witnesses in writing at length;but the Judge, as the examination of each witness proceeds, shall make a memorandum of the substance of what he deposes, and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Judge and shall form part of the record. Then follows Rule 14 which is in these terms— (1) "Where the Judge is unable to make a memorandum as required by this order. he shall cause the reason of such inability to be recorded, and shall cause the memorandum to be made in writing from his dictation in open Court." (2) Every memorandum so made shall from part of the record." It seems to me obvious from the plain language of these rules that primarily the Judge himself must in such cases make a memorandum of the substance of what a witness deposes. It is further provided, however, that where a Judge is, for some valid reason, unable to make a memorandum himself, he must do two things: first, he must cause the reason of his inability to be recorded and further the memorandum of evidence to be made in writing must be from his dictation in open court. The learned Civil Judge has not cared in the present cases to comply with the safeguards laid down by law; nor are these safeguards, in my opinion, mere formalities. The importance of recording depositions of witnesses with accuracy in any civilized system of administration of justice cannot be over-emphasized Upon this depends the final judgment. This requirement is of added importance in cases where the Legislature in its wisdom does not allow any further appeal from the judgment of the trial court. It is, to my mind therefore, of the greatest importance that the presiding officer in a case like this should carefully comply with the provisions of law and leave no loophole so that public confidence remains unimpaired in the administration of justice. It is, to my mind therefore, of the greatest importance that the presiding officer in a case like this should carefully comply with the provisions of law and leave no loophole so that public confidence remains unimpaired in the administration of justice. It will indeed be shocking if the trial Judges should get evidence recorded by their clerks while they are doing other work and judgments based on such evidence are allowed to stand. Such a mode of trial is not, most certainly, contemplated by the Code and is altogether illegal. I would draw the attention of the court below to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Subrahmania Ayyar vs. King Emperor (1), where their Lordships held that the disregard of an express provision of law as to mode of trial was not a mere irregularity. See also in the same connection Kottay vs. Emperor 2). The principle of these cases clearly applies to the situation before me, and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that where a trial has been conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code, the trial must be held to be bad and in such a case no question of prejudice really arises. 5. There is yet another grave irregularity which has been brought to my notice in connection with the trial of these two suits. It appears that these were registered as regular suits in the court of the Civil Judge Ratangarh, some time in October. 1950, who, at that time, did not exercise small cause court powers. Summonses were issued to the defendants and they were served and written statements were filed. Then on 8th November. 1951,the court ordered that these suits be tried as small cause court suit and further proceedings were taken accordingly. This was obviously done because in the meantime the Civil Judge came to be invested with small cause court powers. The law is well established that where the trial of a case has properly commenced as an ordinary suit, it much be continued as such and the trial of such a suit as a small cause court suit, because the trial Judge happened to be invested with small cause court powers subsequent to the filing of the suit, is improper. Reference may be made in support of this conclusion to sub-sec. Reference may be made in support of this conclusion to sub-sec. (2) of s.30 of the Rajasthan Small Cause Courts Ordinance (No. VIII) of 1850. It follows that the learned Civil Judge when he ordered the trial of the present suits as small cause court suits after they had been registered and their trial commenced as ordinary suits was wholly wrong and illegal. The trial of these suits must be held to be bad on this ground also. 6. It was contended by learned counsel on behalf of the opposite parties that even though the judgments and the decrees of the court below be erroneous in law or fact, this Court will not as a rule interfere with them except under very special circumstances, Learned counsel invited my attention to Rajeshwar vs. Dashrath (3), in support of the proposition put forward by him. This contention has no force in the circumstances of the present case. As I have already shown above, the trial in the present cases has taken place in a manner not contemplated by the Code and therefore, it is nothing more than a travesty of the trial. I am definitely of opinion that a judgment based on such a trial could in no manner be accepted as being according to law within the meaning of sec. 25 of the Small Causes Court Act. In fact, one of the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwars case(3) cited above. Niyogi J clearly observed that the phrase according to law" implied according to the forms of law prescribed for ensuring a fair trial. It is impossible to say, having regard to the mode of trial adopted in these cases, that the trial was at all a fair one or that it was according to the forms prescribed by the Code for ensuring a fair trial, I, therefore, over-rule this contention and hold that this court is perfectly competent to interfere in the present cases. 7. The result is that allow these revisions, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below in both cases and send them back to the Civil Judge, Ratangarh, who will try them as ordinary suits and decide them afresh according to law. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs in this court but further costs will abide the event.