Judgment :- 1. The short point for determination in this second appeal preferred by the judgment-debtors is whether the execution of the decree in question was hit by the twelve years' rule enacted by S.48, Civil Procedure Code. The decree under execution is one passed by the Trichur District Munsiff's Court on 19.2.1113. The execution application wherefrom the second appeal arises was filed on 8.12.1125. It is common ground that this application was made within three years of the dismissal of the one that immediately preceded it, but it was made beyond twelve years from the date of decree. The decree-holder, however, depended on three grounds to show that it was not hit by the limit prescribed by S.48. 2. The first ground was that there was no judicial disposal of the prior application and that therefore, the application made on 8.2.1125 was only one to revive the earlier one. The second ground was that by virtue of an amendment of the decree under S.24 of the Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act XVIII of 1114), made on 3.8.1115 a new decree had come into being and that the decree-holder was therefore entitled to a fresh period of twelve years from the said date. The third and the last ground was that even if the amendment did not produce a fresh decree and a consequent fresh lease of life for twelve years, the order amending the decree would amount to a'subsequent order' within the meaning of S.48(1)(b) and that it gave a fresh period of twelve years from the date when the judgment-debtors committed default in paying the first instalment under the scaled down decree, namely, the last day of Makaram 1115. The learned District Munsiff repelled all these grounds and held that the application was barred under the twelve years' rule. On appeal by the decree-holder, the learned Additional District Judge of Trichur accepted the decree-holder's contentions under all the three heads and in reversal of the order of the execution court, held that there was no bar of limitation for the execution application. The judgment-debtors have come up to this court in second appeal against the learned judge's decision. 3. On appeal by the decree-holder, the learned Additional District Judge of Trichur accepted the decree-holder's contentions under all the three heads and in reversal of the order of the execution court, held that there was no bar of limitation for the execution application. The judgment-debtors have come up to this court in second appeal against the learned judge's decision. 3. In our opinion, whether the lower appellate court's decision on the first and the second grounds be good or not, the order appealed against has to be upheld on the third ground that the order amending the decree under S.24 of the Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act amounted to a'subsequent order' within the meaning of S.48(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. S.24 of the Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act provided inter alia that in the case of a decree passed before the commencement of the Act, the court that passed the decree shall amend it according to the provisions of the Act, if and when an application in that behalf is made within ninety days of the Act coming into force by a judgment-debtor who is an agriculturist. S.7(3) of the Act provided that the debt scaled down under the Act shall be payable in two equal instalments falling on the last day of Makaram and Karkadagam 1115 and that if default is made in any instalment the whole or the balance, as the case may be, of the debt as scaled down with interest as specified in S.13 from the date of default shall become immediately payable. The provision in S.48(1)(b), Civil Procedure Code, so far as relevant is to the effect that where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree shall be the starting point for the application of the twelve years' rule. Cl. (a) of Sub-s. 1, S.48, provides the normal starting point and that is the date of the decree. Admittedly the amendment made on 3.8.1115 was in terms of S.7(3) of the Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act. To our minds it is difficult to understand why such an order made by the court which passed the decree should not be treated as a'subsequent order' within the meaning of S.48(1)(b). Admittedly the amendment made on 3.8.1115 was in terms of S.7(3) of the Cochin Agriculturists' Relief Act. To our minds it is difficult to understand why such an order made by the court which passed the decree should not be treated as a'subsequent order' within the meaning of S.48(1)(b). The order for amendment as also the decree as amended and the provision in S.48(1)(b) well go together and the order has to be treated as a'subsequent order' within the meaning of the section. We therefore uphold the lower appellate court's order that the execution is not hit by the twelve years' rule. 4. If authority is needed for the position, it is to be found in a decision of Ghulam Hasan,J. (as he then was) reported as Mangdoo Singh v. Bindeshri A.I.R. 1943 Oudh 412. There, the decree under execution was passed on 29.7.1924, but the execution application which gave rise to the Civil Revision Petition before the learned judged was made only on 2.12.1937, after lapse of twelve years from the date of the decree. Meanwhile on 23.11.1935, there was an amendment of the decree under the provisions of S.5 U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and by the amended decree the debt was payable in six monthly instalments and in default of any of the three instalments the entire decretal amount was to become due. The execution court repelled the judgment-debtor's contention that the execution application made beyond twelve years from the date of the decree was hit by S.48, Civil Procedure Code. In upholding that decision, after referring to the decision in O.C. Bank v. Bind Basni Kuer A.I.R. 1939 Privy Council 80 and to an Allahabad decision which followed it and after quoting the relevant portion of S.48, the learned judge said: "It may be mentioned that the order amending the decree in 1935 was passed by the Court passing the decree. This order amending the decree, although not passed on the basis of any compromise or agreement of parties, was one passed under the provisions of a statutory enactment, namely the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The fact that it was made in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the provisions of the statute is no ground for holding that it should not be treated as a subsequent order directing the payment of money at a certain date or at recurring periods, as mentioned in S.48(1)(b). The fact that it was made in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by the provisions of the statute is no ground for holding that it should not be treated as a subsequent order directing the payment of money at a certain date or at recurring periods, as mentioned in S.48(1)(b). I hold, therefore, that the limitation should be computed from the date of the subsequent order passed in 1935. The view taken by the Court below is therefore quite correct". 5. These observations apply with equal force to the present case and we adopted them to reinforce our conclusion. The consistent view of the Madras High Court has been that an amendment of the decree under the corresponding provision of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938 (S. 19) did not furnish a fresh starting point for the purpose of S.48. See Jagannadham v. Venkatappanna A.I.R. 1943 Madras 765 and Manickam v. Ramaswamy A.I.R. 1945 Madras 70. This view however is bottomed on the ground that the amendment under S.19 did not bring into existence a new decree. Under the scheme of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act there was no scope for the argument that the order for amendment will amount to a'subsequent order' within the meaning of S.48(1)(b). For a proper appreciation of the Madras decisions holding that an amendment of the decree under S.19 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act did not mark the commencement of a fresh period of twelve years for the purpose of S.48. Civil Procedure Code it has to be borne in mind that S.7 of the Madras Act, which like S.7 of the Cochin Act provided for scaling down of debts, makes no provision for payment of the scaled down debt in instalments. No amendment of the decree made under the Madras Act can, therefore, satisfy the requirements of S.48(1)(b) to furnish a fresh starting point different from the date of the decree. The Oudh case cited above shows that the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act provides for payment of a debt as per a decree amended under the Act in instalments. 6. In view of the fact that the order appealed against can be sustained on the ground we have dealt with above it is unnecessary to discuss the other two grounds depended upon by the decree-holder. The second appeal fails in the result and we dismiss it with costs.