Judgement ORDER :- Natesan was a workman, a driver of a motor bus, in the industrial establishment of the Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., Kumbakonam branch. It was alleged that he was involved in an accident when driving his bus on 16-4-1953. On 20-4-1953 he submitted his resignation to the District Manager of the Kumbakonam branch, but that was not accepted. Charges were framed against him the next day by the management, and he was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. He submitted his explanation, two days later. The Works Committee of the establishment, constituted under S. 3(1), Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), recommended his dismissal on 29-4-1953, and Natesan was dismissed the same day by the District Manager. 2. The petitioner claimed that most of the 600 workmen employed in the industrial establishment of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., Kumbakonam branch, were members of the Welfare Union, a registered trade Union. That Union approved of the dismissal of Natesan by the management. It was also alleged by the petitioner that Natesan was also a member of this Union. 3. The industrial establishment at Kumbakonam is a branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., which has its head office at Madras. The Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union, Madras, is also a registered Trade Union. It should be more convenient to refer to this Union as the Madras Union in the rest of this order. The Madras Union claimed that 40 of the workmen of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., were on its rolls as members, and that Natesan was one of them. The Madras Union espoused the case of Natesan. Reinstatement of Natesan was one of the demands the Madras Union presented on 28-7-1953 to the Director of the Amalgamations Ltd., Madras. 4. Even before the Madras Union demanded of the Director of the Amalgamations Ltd., that Natesan should be reinstated, and independent of that demand, the Madras Union moved the Government of Madras, to take the necessary steps under the Industrial Disputes Act. Conciliation proceedings were commenced on 30-5-1953, in which Natesan, the Madras Union and Mr. Arogyaswami on behalf of the management participated. These proceedings failed, and that failure was reported to the Government in due course. Under S. 12(5) of the Act, the Government decided not to refer the dispute for adjudication. Conciliation proceedings were commenced on 30-5-1953, in which Natesan, the Madras Union and Mr. Arogyaswami on behalf of the management participated. These proceedings failed, and that failure was reported to the Government in due course. Under S. 12(5) of the Act, the Government decided not to refer the dispute for adjudication. On 27-3-1953 the Government ordered. "The Government consider that the dismissal of Sri Natesan Pillai is not a fit case for adjudication as the local welfare union supports the management and as the Works Committee has recommended his dismissal." It was on 28-7-1953, it should be remembered that the Madras Union presented its demands to the Director of the Amalgamations Ltd., one of which was the reinstatement of Natesan. 5. On 4-9-1953, the Government of Madras referred to Mack, J., as Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Act, a number of disputes between the workers and the management of the Amalgamations Ltd. The S.R.V.S. Ltd. and its branches in the Madras State constituted one of the eleven concerns included in the Amalgamations Ltd. The Welfare Union of the Workers of the Kumbakonam Branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., applied to the Tribunal to withdraw the disputes of the workers of the Kumbakonam branch from the scope of the adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal; and on 1-2-1954, Mack, J. ordered : "This is an application by the Sri Rama Vilas Ltd., Welfare Union, Kumbakonam, for permission to withdraw from this adjudication and deal with the management directly in respect of any problems regarding salaries, allowances etc. A counter has been filed by the Simpson and Group Companies Workers and Staff Unions, Madras, who claim a right to agitate for the same facilities for the members of the Kumbakonam branch as for all other branches. The Madras Unions do not represent the Kumbakonam employees, who, through their own separate Unions, have asked for permission to withdraw from this adjudication. This application by the Kumbakonam Welfare Union, which is not, in view of the amicable settlement, arrived at between the management and labour in Madras, opposed, is allowed." In the subsequent award Mack, J. passed on 12-2-1954 he observed : "....... Simpson and Group Companies Workers and Staff Unions ..... really constitute a comprehensive Trade Union Association to which nearly all the employees in these concerns numbering about 5000 belonged. Simpson and Group Companies Workers and Staff Unions ..... really constitute a comprehensive Trade Union Association to which nearly all the employees in these concerns numbering about 5000 belonged. There were two exceptions (1) the Kumbakonam branch of Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., employing nearly 600 workers, who had their own separate Welfare Union ......" It should thus be clear that the dismissal and the claim for reinstatement of Natesan was not one of the disputes the Industrial Tribunal presided over by Mack, J. was called upon to adjudicate. 6. On 23-4-1954, the Madras Union made further representations to the Chief Minister and the Minister for Labour, Madras, to refer for adjudication as an industrial dispute their claim for the reinstatement of Natesan. On 13-7-1954 the Government ordered : "Whereas the Government are of opinion that an industrial dispute has arisen between the workers and the management of Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., Kumbakonam branch, in respect of matters mentioned in the annexure to this order : And whereas in the opinion of the Governor of Madras it is necessary to refer the said dispute for adjudication; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 10(1)(c), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), the Governor of Madras hereby directs that the said dispute be referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, haying its place of sitting at Madurai." That dispute was described in the annexure of the order : "Whether the dismissal of the worker Sri S. Natesan Pillai is justified, if not, to what relief he is entitled." The petitioner, representing the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ to restrain the Industrial Tribunal, Madurai, from proceeding with the adjudication of the dispute referred to it. The main contention of the petitioner was that there was no industrial dispute as defined by S. 2(k) of the Act, and that despite the reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act, which the petitioner alleged was invalid, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the adjudication of what was not an industrial dispute at all. Neither the Madras Union nor the Welfare Union, Kumbakonam was made a party to these proceedings under Art. 226. Neither the Madras Union nor the Welfare Union, Kumbakonam was made a party to these proceedings under Art. 226. On 15-7-1955, I ordered : "In view of the contentions in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner and the Government, first respondent, I think it is desirable that notice should issue to (1) The Secretary, Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd.. Welfare Union, Kumbakonam, and (2) the Secretary, Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union, Madras, so that there could be an effective adjudication of the real question at issue in the presence of the parties vitally interested in those questions." Both the Unions appeared in response to this notice. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner attacked the validity of the reference under S. 10(1)(c) on the following grounds : (1) there was no dispute at all, much less an industrial dispute, between the workers and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., which was a separate industrial establishment. The dispute, if any, was only between Natesan, an individual workman, on the one hand, and the employer on the other, and that did not constitute an industrial dispute as defined by S. 2(k) of the Act; (2) even if the Madras Union could take up the cause of Natesan, there was no dispute as such even between the Madras Union and the employer, because there was no demand made on the employer by that Union, and there was therefore no occasion for any refusal of such a demand; (3) there was no material placed before the Government on which it could be satisfied on 13-7-1954 that there was an industrial dispute; and (4) the Government had no jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 27-8-1953. 8. The last of these contentions is easiest to be disposed of. In -Radhakrishna Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1956 Mad 113 (A), I referred to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in - State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathi, AIR 1953 SC 53 (B), that a writ of certiorari could not issue to set aside a reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the issue of such a reference was an administrative act performed by the Government. The Supreme Court held that the issue of such a reference was an administrative act performed by the Government. In my decision in that case I pointed out that, if there was an industrial dispute, the factual existence of which could not really be in dispute, a determination afresh by the Government of the question of the expediency of referring such a dispute for adjudication under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act did not amount to a review of any question judicially determined previously, and that a prior order of the Government under S. 12(5), which refused to refer for adjudication a given dispute, did not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to exercise the statutory power conferred upon it by S. 10(1)(c) of the Act on any subsequent occasion. I have therefore to negative the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order of the Government dated 27-8-1953 barred the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the Government by S. 10(1)(c) of the Act, which it exercised on 13-7-1954. 9. In my judgment, in AIR 1956 Mad 113 (A), I pointed out further that, though a writ of certiorari could not be issued to set aside an administrative act of the Government, the validity of a reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act could be canvassed and decided, if the relief asked for is the issue of a writ of prohibition to restrain the Industrial Tribunal from taking cognizance of a dispute which is not an industrial dispute as defined by S. 2(k) of the Act. It is the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal that has been questioned in these proceedings, and the determination of that issue depends on the answer to the question postulated by the petitioner, whether the dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal is an industrial dispute at all. 10. The reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act ordered by the Government on 13-7-1954 set out clearly that the parties to the dispute are the workers on the one hand and the management on the other of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., Kumbakonam branch. The dispute itself was "Whether the dismissal of the worker Sri Natesan Pillai is justified. If not, to what relief he is entitled ?" The Welfare Union as such was not a party to the dispute. The dispute itself was "Whether the dismissal of the worker Sri Natesan Pillai is justified. If not, to what relief he is entitled ?" The Welfare Union as such was not a party to the dispute. It could not be, as it protested all along that there was no dispute between it and the management. Even on 19-7-1954, that is, even a few days after the reference under S. 10(1)(c) the Welfare Union made a representation to the Government that there was no dispute between it and the management. The Government, it should be noticed, did not even inform the Welfare Union that it had ordered a reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. Despite the attitude taken by the Welfare Union, the question still remains, was there a dispute between the workers and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. I have referred to this aspect at this stage only to emphasise that the Government treated the dispute not as an individual dispute between Natesan, the dismissed workman, and the management, but as a collective dispute between the workers of the Kumbakonam branch on the one hand and the management of that branch on the other. 11. In the dispute referred under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act as an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Madurai, whether Natesan was entitled to be reinstated was not expressly referred to. That question would obviously arise for adjudication by the Tribunal, if it decided that the dismissal of Natesan was not justified. The Tribunal would have to decide as one of the points specifically referred to it, to what relief Natesan was entitled ? The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that Natesan himself never claimed reinstatement. He wanted to resign. The management would not permit it and it dismissed him. As Natesan himself pointed out in his reply to the charges, dismissal or resignation was bound to affect his provident fund and other benefits. But the specific claim preferred by the Madras Union on 27-8-1953 was that Natesan should be reinstated. That was a claim which Natesan himself never appears to have put forward. It should, however, be clear that Natesan all through challenged the correctness of his dismissal, and that constituted a dispute between him and the management. 12. But the specific claim preferred by the Madras Union on 27-8-1953 was that Natesan should be reinstated. That was a claim which Natesan himself never appears to have put forward. It should, however, be clear that Natesan all through challenged the correctness of his dismissal, and that constituted a dispute between him and the management. 12. What was referred as an industrial dispute under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act had its origin in an individual dispute between Natesan and the management. That dispute was not whether Natesan was entitled to reinstatement; that dispute was whether Natesan should be permitted to resign or whether he was liable to be dismissed. 13. Whatever be the scope of the dispute between Natesan on the one hand and the management of the Kumbakonam branch on the other, had that dispute been only between an individual workman Natesan and his employer, I would have to hold on the basis of the definition of an industrial dispute in S. 2(k) of the Act, as it has been explained by the decisions of this Court, that it was not an industrial dispute. I have already pointed out that that was not the position taken by the Government when it directed a reference. It treated the dispute as a collective dispute between the workers and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. But I have to deal with this aspect, whether an individual dispute is an industrial dispute as denned by S. 2(k) of the Act. 14. The learned counsel for the Madras Union contended that, even if the dispute was only between Natesan on the one hand and the management on the other, it was an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act. That contention I am bound to negative on the authority of - Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (1). AIR 1951 Mad 616 (C) and the later decision in - United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Labour Commissioner, Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 141 (D). 15. Section 2(k) runs : "Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person." 16. 15. Section 2(k) runs : "Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person." 16. In AIR 1951 Mad 616 (C), Rajamannar, C.J. pointed out : "I must confess that the language of the definition of industrial dispute is so wide that .giving the words their ordinary meaning, even a dispute between an employer and one of the workmen or between one workman and another workman which is connected with one or other of the matters mentioned therein would fall within the definition." The learned Chief Justice observed further : "The provisions of S. 18 do provide food for thought. The award is declared to be binding not only on all parties to the industrial dispute, but where a party is composed of workmen, on all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently became employed in that establishment or part. This undoubtedly suggests that something more than an individual dispute between a worker or a few workers and the employer is meant by an industrial dispute. It suggests that it must be a collective dispute, i.e., a dispute between the employer on the one hand and the entire establishment or a part of the establishment on the other hand in which case it is reasonable to presume that at least a substantial number of the employees in the establishment as a whole or in the concerned part of the establishment should he at dispute." 17. In the next case, AIR 1951 Mad 141 (D), the learned Chief Justice referred to what he had laid down earlier in the Kandan Textile case (C) and emphasised the distinction between an individual dispute and a collective dispute. The learned Chief Justice held that it was only a collective dispute that would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k). The learned Chief Justice held that it was only a collective dispute that would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k). The learned Chief Justice observed : "It may be that the dismissal of even one workman can become the subject of an industrial dispute, but then it is no longer an individual dispute between the dismissed workman and the employer only; it becomes a dispute between the workmen on the one hand and the employment on the other. Such a dispute, it may be called a collective dispute ..... would have to be referred to a Tribunal or other authority under S. 10, Industrial Disputes Act. In AIR, 1951 Mad 616 (C), it was held by a Bench of this Court that something more than an individual dispute between a worker and the employer is required to make the dispute an industrial dispute. It was pointed out in that case that a dispute which in its origin might be an individual dispute may at a later stage develop into a collective dispute which could be properly called an industrial dispute. We have not been referred to any authority which holds to the contrary." Viswanatha Sastri, J. observed : "The distinction between an individual dispute and an industrial dispute is, if I may respectfully say so, well brought out in the judgment of my Lord in AIR 1951 Mad 616 (C) ..... A dismissed employee might question the propriety of his dismissal even though the other employees either approve of such dismissal or are indifferent to it. In such a case it must be held that the dispute is only an individual dispute between the employer and the employee affected by the dismissal and not an industrial dispute under Act 14 of 1947. If, however, the dismissal of an employee is the result of victimisation, if the employees in service or a substantial section of such employees threaten to strike work, or having struck work refuse to resume work, unless the person dismissed is reinstated, in other words, if the resuming workmen or a substantial body of them or a union of workmen takes up the cause of the victimised employee and demands his reinstatement, there is an industrial dispute ...... It is also possible that a dispute which originates as an individual dispute might develop into a collective dispute or an industrial dispute in its later stages, as pointed out in the judgment of my Lord already cited." 18. The learned counsel who appeared for the Madras Union adopted as part of his argument the reasoning of a Bench of five members of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India reported in - Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their workmen, 1953-1 Lab LJ 757 (Cal) (E). All the five members were unanimous in their conclusion, that an individual dispute between a workman and his employer was also within the scope of S. 2(k) of the Act. The learned counsel for the Madras Union also referred to a decision of a single Judge, Bhargava, J. in - Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. The State, AIR 1954 All 516 (P) I do not feel called upon to examine the soundness or otherwise of these decisions, which expressly dissented from the views of two Division Benches of this Court in Kandan Textile case (C) and U.C. Bank case (D). I am bound to follow the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court, even apart from the fact, that I find myself in respectful agreement with the principles laid down by the learned Chief Justice and Viswanatha Sastri, J. 19. Though that may not affect my decision, I may point out that the interpretation placed on S. 2(k) of the Act by the learned Chief Justice in Kandan Textile case (C) was followed by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in - New Indian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, AIR 1953 Pat 321 (G). 20. I do not therefore feel called upon to embark upon an independent examination of the provisions of the Act to decide whether an individual dispute between a dismissed workman and his employer would fall within the scope of an industrial dispute as defined by S. 2(k) of the Act. 21. The learned counsel for the Madras Union pointed out that the learned Judges of this Court who decided the Kandan Textile case (C) and the U.C. Bank case (D) had no occasion to refer to the provisions of S. 33A of the Act. 21. The learned counsel for the Madras Union pointed out that the learned Judges of this Court who decided the Kandan Textile case (C) and the U.C. Bank case (D) had no occasion to refer to the provisions of S. 33A of the Act. Section 33A runs : "Where an employer contravenes the provisions of S. 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to such Tribunal, and on receipt of such complaint, that Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." Certainly the learned counsel for the Madras Union is well founded in his contention that S. 33A specifically provides for individual disputes between the workman and the employer being adjudicated upon by a Tribunal. But that in no way really helps the determination of the question, whether S. 2(k) covers an individual dispute, and Whether an individual dispute comes within the scope of a reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. Section 33A introduces two fictions (1) a complaint by a workman is deemed to be a reference made by the Government under S. 10(1)(c), and (2) the complaint of the workman within the limits prescribed by S. 33 of the Act is deemed to be an industrial dispute, though the dispute is only between the complaining workman and the management. The provisions of S. 33A will have to be applied, even though the provisions of S. 10(1)(c) are not satisfied, and even though the test prescribed by S. 2(k) is not satisfied. Such an express provision cannot obviously control the scope of the definition of an industrial dispute in S. 2 (k) of the Act. The principles laid down in Kandan Textile case (C) and the Manager, U.C. Bank case (D) therefore remain unaffected by S. 33A of the Act. 22. As I have already stated, there was certainly a dispute between an individual workman Natesan on the one hand and his employer on the other. The principles laid down in Kandan Textile case (C) and the Manager, U.C. Bank case (D) therefore remain unaffected by S. 33A of the Act. 22. As I have already stated, there was certainly a dispute between an individual workman Natesan on the one hand and his employer on the other. There was no dispute between the management and the Welfare Union, which fully approved of the dismissal of Natesan by the management, both before and after the date of the dismissal, 29-4-1953. There was, however, a dispute between the Amalgamations Ltd., and the Madras Union oil the Question, whether Natesan should be reinstated, which, of course, implied the dispute whether the management of the Kumbakonam branch was justified in dismissing Natesan. The Madras Union claimed that about 40 of the workers of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., were members of the Madras Union. That claim was not conceded by the petitioner. From the averments in para 10 of the affidavit filed by the first respondent in these proceedings it is clear that the Government acted on the assumption, that the claim of the Madras Union was true. It is not for me to determine in these proceedings as a question of fact, whether the 40 workmen of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. are members of the Madras Union, or even the other disputed fact whether Natesan himself was a member of the Madras Union. 23. If none of the workmen of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. was a member of the Madras Union, obviously a dispute between the Madras Union and the management of the industrial concern, S.R.V.S. Ltd., one of the branches of which was the one at Kumbakonam, would not be a dispute between the workers and the management of the industrial establishment, that is, the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. Whether an officer of the Madras Union could or could not represent the workers of the industrial establishment at Kumbakonam under the provisions of S. 36 of the Act, a right to represent a party to a dispute would not make the Madras Union itself a party to that dispute. 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to - Narendra Kumar v. All India Industrial Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1953 Bom 325 (H). 24. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to - Narendra Kumar v. All India Industrial Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1953 Bom 325 (H). After pointing out that Divisional Heads and Foremen in the factory did not come within the definition of "Workmen" in the Act, Chagla, C.J. observed : "They (workmen) may strongly feel about the rights of these employees, they may have strong sympathies for their claims, they may even be oppressed by a sense of injustice, but these are all considerations foreign to the object of the Act. It is only primarily in their own employment, in their own terms of employment, in their own conditions of labour that workmen are interested and it is with regard to these that they are entitled to agitate by means of raising an industrial dispute and getting it referred to a Tribunal by the Government under S. 10." So whatever be the extent of the interest evinced in Natesan by the Madras Union, and whatever be the justice of the cause that the Madras Union espoused, a dispute between the Madras Union and the management of the Madras office would not amount to a dispute between the workers of the industrial establishment, the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., and its management. 25. The next question is, if 40 of the workmen of the industrial establishment at Kumbakonam were members of the Madras Union as was claimed, would the dispute between the Madras Union and the management of the Amalgamations Ltd., amount to a dispute between the workers and the employer in the industrial establishment in question, the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., which, it should be remembered, was the dispute referred as an industrial dispute under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act by the order of reference dated 13-7-1954. 26. In para 10 of its affidavit the first respondent Government averred : "The dispute is for all intents and purposes an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Sri Natesan Pillai is a member of the Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union. 40 of whom Natesan Pillai is one, out of about 400 workers are said to be members of the Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union. The dispute had developed into a collective dispute between the Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union and the management of Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., Kumbakonam branch. 40 of whom Natesan Pillai is one, out of about 400 workers are said to be members of the Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union. The dispute had developed into a collective dispute between the Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union and the management of Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., Kumbakonam branch. The particular branch of the company need not be separately treated in this connection. Sri Natesan Pillai is represented by the Simpson, and Group Companies Workers Union, and his cause has been taken up by that Union. That Union was not convinced that the dismissal of Natesan Pillai was justified and represented to the Government that the dispute may be referred for adjudication. The Simpson and Group Companies Workers Union had demanded adjudication on the issue even in the first instance and their agitation on the issue continued even after Government declined to refer it in August 1953." A reasonable construction of these averments would appear to be that the Government treated as parties to the dispute they referred for adjudication the Madras Union on the one hand and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., on the other. Thus according to the Government, the collective dispute was between the Madras Union and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. Even if we take the demand made by the Madras Union on the Amalgamations Ltd., Madras, for the reinstatement of Natesan, as a demand made on the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., a dispute between the Madras Union and the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., would not by itself amount to a dispute between, the workers and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., unless it is established that the dispute was between the workers or at least an appreciable number of them and the management of the industrial establishment at Kumbakonam; it would not amount to a collective dispute; unless it is a collective dispute it would not be an industrial dispute as denned by S. 2(k) of the Act. 27. In AIR 1953 Pat 321 (G), to which I have already referred, the cause of the dismissed employee was espoused by the Insurance Employees Association. The learned Judge did not specifically go into the question, whether that would make it a dispute between the workers and the management of the industrial establishment concerned. 27. In AIR 1953 Pat 321 (G), to which I have already referred, the cause of the dismissed employee was espoused by the Insurance Employees Association. The learned Judge did not specifically go into the question, whether that would make it a dispute between the workers and the management of the industrial establishment concerned. They pointed out that there had been no demand made on the management by the Insurance Employees Association, and that therefore there could not be said to be a dispute or an industrial dispute which the Government could refer for adjudication under S. 10(1)(c). 28. Though one of the grounds put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner was, that - no demand was made on the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., for the reinstatement of Natesan, that contention will have to be negatived. I have pointed out that the reinstatement of Natesan was one of the points specifically demanded of the Director of the Amalgamations Ltd., which included the S.R.V.S. Ltd., and its branches including the one at Kumbakonam. 29. The petitioner contended that there were 600 workmen employed in the industrial establishment at the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. That, it should be remembered was what Mack, J. accepted as correct. In para 10 of the affidavit filed by the Government in these proceedings they stated that there were 400 workmen in that industrial establishment. In either case, 40 is a numerically small number. In the proceedings before Mack, J., he held that the Madras Union did not represent the workmen employed in the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. That, of course, does not conclude the question at issue. But nothing was placed before me to show that even these 40 members, who the Madras Union claimed were member of their Union, made the dismissal of Natesan their dispute. The case would therefore appear to fall within the scope of the rule laid down by this Court in Kandan Textile case (C). In that case there were two rival Unions of the workmen. The Kandan Textiles Labour Union had on its rolls the majority of the workmen in those mills. The Kandan Weaving Workers Union, the rival union, had a numerically small membership, and the President of that Union itself was not a workman. In that case there were two rival Unions of the workmen. The Kandan Textiles Labour Union had on its rolls the majority of the workmen in those mills. The Kandan Weaving Workers Union, the rival union, had a numerically small membership, and the President of that Union itself was not a workman. At p. 620, the learned Chief Justice observed : "In the absence of any definite particulars as to the membership of this Union (Kandan Weaving Workers Union) and its representative character, and in the absence of anything to show that it was decided by the workmen members of this Union by resolution or otherwise to take up the cause of the aggrieved workmen and in the absence of evidence to show that the aggrieved workmen put forward the President of this Union as their representative and spokesman, it is impossible to hold in law that an industrial dispute existed between the employer and the workmen to enable the Government to make an order under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act ...... In our opinion, it was incumbent on the Union by production of the relevant records to positively establish the fact that the Union is entitled, to represent, and that it is as a matter of fact, represented these 36 aggrieved workers." Certainly no material appears to have been placed before the Government that even the 40 workmen employed in the industrial establishment at Kumbakonam authorised the Madras Union to represent those 40 workmen, to raise as an industrial dispute the collective dispute of these 40 workmen, the question whether the management, of the Kumbakonam branch was justified in dismissing Natesan. No such claim was made in the affidavit filed by the Government, that these 40 workmen, alleged to be members of the Madras Union, took up the cause of the dismissed workman Natesan. That the Madras Union itself with its membership of 5000 took up the cause would not make it a cause of the 40 workmen employed in the industrial establishment at Kumbakonam, if they themselves had nothing to do with it. On the material placed before me, I have to hold that there was no basis on which the Government could hold that there was a dispute between the workers of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., and its management. On the material placed before me, I have to hold that there was no basis on which the Government could hold that there was a dispute between the workers of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., and its management. Once again I may point out that the position taken by the Government in para 10 of its affidavit virtually was that the dispute was between the Madras Union and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., and that is not enough to make that dispute an industrial dispute, a collective dispute, between the workers of the Kumbakonam branch or even an appreciable number of them on the one hand and the management on the other. 30. The learned counsel for the Madras Union urged that it was enough to show that there was a dispute between the workers of the Amalgamations Ltd., Madras and the management of those allied co-industrial concerns of which the S.R.V.S. Ltd., with all its branches including the one at Kumbakonam was one. That, however, is not the real question before me. The Government themselves did not treat the dispute as one between the management of the Amalgamations Ltd., Madras and the workmen employed in all those industrial concerns. The Government themselves specifically recorded in their order of reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act that it was a dispute between the workers and the management of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. The Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., is certainly an industrial establishment by itself, though it is a branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. with its head-office at Madras. The scheme of the Act certainly provides for the adjudication of an industrial dispute between the workers and the employer in a given industrial establishment. Section 10(5) of the Act is an enabling provision to extend the scope of reference for adjudication of an industrial dispute, which by itself affects only a given industrial establishment. But the conditions prescribed by S. 10(5) of the Act are not present in this case. It cannot be said that the dispute in this case, whether the dismissal of Natesan was justified, was of such a nature that any other establishment, group or class of establishments of similar nature is likely to be interested in or affected by such a dispute, within the meaning of S. 10(5) of the Act. 31. It cannot be said that the dispute in this case, whether the dismissal of Natesan was justified, was of such a nature that any other establishment, group or class of establishments of similar nature is likely to be interested in or affected by such a dispute, within the meaning of S. 10(5) of the Act. 31. The learned counsel for the Madras Union urged that the whole S.R.V.S. Ltd., with its head office at Madras should be treated as one industrial establishment, and that the dispute between the Madras Union and the S.R.V.S. Ltd., as an industrial concern should be treated as an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act. Once again I have to point out that that was not what the Government purported to refer as an industrial dispute. The referred only a dispute between the workers and the management of one industrial establishment, the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. I find it a little difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Madras Union, that the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., is not an industrial establishment as that expression has been used in the several sections of the Act. It is not necessary to refer to all the sections in which that expression has been used. The industrial establishment as such has not been defined by the Act. But there should be little difficulty in determining the scope of that expression. I need refer only to S. 3 of the Act to negative the contention of the learned counsel for the Madras Union, the S.R.V.S. Ltd,, with all its branches should be taken as one industrial establishment. The S.R.V.S. Ltd. is not a concern whose operations are limited to the Madras State alone. It has a branch at Bangalore as Mack, J. pointed out. One of the allied concerns, Amalgamations Ltd., had its branch in Vijayavada in the Andhra State. If the contention of the learned counsel for the Madras Union has to be accepted, the works committee contemplated by S. 3(1) of the Act should be a Works Committee for the industrial concern of S.R.V.S. Ltd., as a whole, wherever its branches may be situated, either within this State or without the State. Such a construction I am unable to place on S. 3(1) of the Act. Such a construction I am unable to place on S. 3(1) of the Act. It certainly provides for a separate Works Committee for each industrial establishment, though that establishment might only be a branch of the industrial concern which has branches not only within this State but outside the State as well. Besides, there is another difficulty in accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the Madras Union. As I said, it is certainly clear that the S.R.V.S. Ltd., with its head office at Madras, had its operations extending outside the Madras State. If the whole of the S.R.V.S. Ltd. is to be treated as one industrial establishment, and the disputes between the workers of the industrial concern as a whole and the management of that concern has to be treated as an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k), the Madras Government would not be the appropriate Government to refer such a dispute under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. As I have already stated, in my Opinion, the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., was a separate industrial establishment, though it was a branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., with its head office at Madras. The dispute was alleged to be between the workers and the management of that industrial establishment. I have pointed out that there was no proof that such a dispute between the workers and the management of that industrial establishment ever existed. On the material placed before me all that has been established is that there was a dispute between the Madras Union and the management. That was what the Government categorically stated in para 10 of its affidavit. That would not make it a dispute between the workers and the employer in the industrial establishment, that is, the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., even if the 40 workmen of that industrial establishment were members of the Madras Union, there was no evidence to show that even those 40 workmen espoused the cause of Natesan and made the dismissal of Natesan a collective dispute on their side against the management of that industrial establishment. The learned counsel for the Madras Union as well as the learned Government Pleader contended that it is not for this Court to go into disputed questions of fact, at any rate, at this stage. The learned counsel for the Madras Union as well as the learned Government Pleader contended that it is not for this Court to go into disputed questions of fact, at any rate, at this stage. The disputed questions of fact were whether Natesan was a member of the Made as Union and whether 40 of the workmen of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., were members of the Madras Union. Neither of these questions of fact have I jurisdiction to decide. Nor have I decided either of them. Even on the assumption that the contention is true, that 40 of the workmen employed in the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., are members of the Madras Union, I have pointed out that the case falls within the scope of the rule laid down by this Court in - Kandan Textile case (C). There is no material to show that these 40 workmen had in any way espoused that cause of Natesan and made it a collective dispute on their part with the management of the Kumbakonam branch. 32. One other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner remains for consideration. I have pointed out that on 1-2-1954 Mack, J. as the duly constituted Industrial Tribunal, permitted the Welfare Union of Kumbakonam to withdraw their disputes from the scope of the adjudication undertaken by Mack, J. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that even earlier, on 19-1-1954 there was a memorandum of agreement between the Madras Union and the management of the Amalgamations Ltd., which stated that all disputes between the management and the Madras Union had been settled. But the dismissal of Natesan was outside the scope of the adjudication Mack, J. undertook. Therefore, there is no real substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the demand for the reinstatement of Natesan Pillai made by the Madras Union was one of the disputes closed or given up by the Madras Union. Even if the Madras Union had waived adjudication of one of the items of dispute, that is, assuming that the dismissal of Natesan was one of the items which had to be adjudicated upon by Mack, J., there is really no question of estoppel, anything to estop the Madras Union from asking again for the adjudication of that dispute, provided, of course, it was an industrial dispute. 33. 33. There is one other feature of the case to which I have to advert. Assuming that 40 of the workmen of the Kumbakonam branch were members of the Madras Union, they certainly did not form an appreciable section of the 600 (or even 400) workmen employed in that industrial establishment. Nor is there anything to show that they formed an appreciable number of workmen employed in any given section of that industrial establishment, e.g., the drivers of buses. As I have already pointed out there is nothing at all to show that these forty at any time espoused Natesans cause and made his dismissal their collective dispute; even if they had espoused his case it would have made little difference in deciding the question, whether the dispute was a collective dispute between the workmen of the Kumbakonam branch on the one hand and the management on the other. 34. On my finding that there was no evidence at all to show that there was any dispute between the workmen or any appreciable section thereof of the Kumbakonam branch of the S.R.V.S. Ltd., and its management, I have to hold that the factual existence of an industrial dispute has not been, established. If there was no industrial dispute as defined by S. 2(k) of the Act, the Industrial tribunal could have no jurisdiction to take up the adjudication of the dispute, despite the reference to it under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. 35. The rule is made absolute. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Rule made absolute.