Judgement ORDER :- The petitioner is a resident of Ayyapadi within the jurisdiction of TiruKalachari Panchayat. On 5-8-1954 the petitioner applied to the Panchayat Board for a licence under S. 92, Madras Act 10 of 1950 for constructing a rice and flour mill in R.S. No. 108/17. On 14-11-1954, the District Health Officer informed the Panchayat Board that the site was a suitable one from the public health point of view for the installation of the electric motor for a rice mill and flour hullers. Representations were made to the President of the Panchayat by the residents of the locality objecting to the grant of the licence asked for by the petitioner. On 23-1-1955, the District Panchachayat Officer, who was consulted by the Panchayat Board pointed out the objections to be considered before the grant of the licence asked for by the petitioner, and he left it to the Panchayat Board to decide the question. On 18-2-1955 the Panchayat by its resolution rejected the application preferred to it by the petitioner. 2. The petitioner applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the resolution of the Panchayat dated 18-2-1955. After the presentation of this application, the petitioner moved the Government to exercise its revisional powers under Madras Act 10 of 1950. It was subsequently reported that the Government declined to interfere, thereby confirming the resolution of the Panchayat rejecting the petitioners request for a licence. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner attacked the validity of the resolution of the Panchayat Board dated 18-2-1955 on two grounds, (1) S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 was invalid and unenforceable, and; (2) even if S. 92 was valid and conferred a jurisdiction on the Panchayat Board to refuse the licence, exercise of that jurisdiction in this case was male fide. 4. Since the validity of the statutory provision, S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950, was challenged, I directed issue of notice to the Advocate General. The State subsequently obtained permission to be impleaded as a party respondent to these proceedings. 5. 4. Since the validity of the statutory provision, S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950, was challenged, I directed issue of notice to the Advocate General. The State subsequently obtained permission to be impleaded as a party respondent to these proceedings. 5. The reasons given by the Panchayat Board in its resolution dated 18-2-1955 for the refusal to grant the licence asked for by the petitioner were; (1) as there is a Posts and Telegraph office within 30 feet distance, it will be a disturbance to run the rice mill, (2) as under the National Extension Scheme it is settled to construct a hospital near the site, running of a rice mill will greatly affect the health of the patients; and (3) it is not desirable to run a rice mill, as it is settled to construct the panchayat office about 75 feet distance east, near the rice mill. 6. As the learned Advocate General pointed out, none of these could be said to be an irrelevant consideration, when the Panchayat Board Was called upon to decide whether the licence prescribed by S. 92 of the Act could be granted to the petitioner or not. Section 92 is in Chapter V of Act 10 of 1950 which deals with measures for ensuring public safety, convenience and health. The reasons set out by the Panchayat Board were certainly reasons correlated to public convenience and public health of the locality in which the petitioner wanted to install the factory. 7. It is easier to dispose of the contention of the petitioner that the exercise of the statutory-power vested by S. 92 in the Panchayat Board was mala fide. The petitioner alleged that it was in consultation with the President of the Panchayat Board that the petitioner applied for the licence, and he had the assurance of the President that the licence would be granted. The petitioner further contended that the District Health Officer, who informed the Panchayat Board that in his opinion there could be to objection from the point of view of public health to the installation of a factory as proposed by the petitioner, also informed the petitioner of what the District Health Officer had communicated to the Panchayat Board. The petitioner further contended that the District Health Officer, who informed the Panchayat Board that in his opinion there could be to objection from the point of view of public health to the installation of a factory as proposed by the petitioner, also informed the petitioner of what the District Health Officer had communicated to the Panchayat Board. The petitioner alleged further that acting on the assurances of the President of the Panchayat Board and the District Health Officer, the petitioner completed construction of the building at a considerable cost. The further allegation of the petitioner was that subsequent to that differences arose between him and the President of the Panchayat and the ultimate refusal of the licence was due to that enmity. The licensing authority was net the President but the Panchayet. There was certainly no allegation that the Panchayat as a whole was actuated by any enmity towards the petitioner. Neither the allegation that the President approved of the idea nor this fact that the District Health officer approved of the site is proof that the rejection of the petitioners application by the Panchayat was mala fide. 8. Yet another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Panchayat Board did not wait for the further views of the District Health Officer before it refused the licence. Refusal of the licence was on 18-2-1955. It was subsequent to that on 22-2-1955 that the District Health Officer informed the President of the Panchayat Board that be would arrange for a further inspection of the site, and forward a further report. It should be remembered that the earlier report of the District Health Officer, as well as the report of the District Panchayat Officer, were both before the Panchayat Board when it resolved to refuse the licence asked for by the petitioner. 9. On the material placed before me I am unable to hold that there was anything mala fide in the exercise of the statutory power vested in the Panchayat by S. 92 of the Act. 10. The next question is, is the petitioner well founded in his contention, that S. 92 offends Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and is therefore void and unenforceable ? 11. 10. The next question is, is the petitioner well founded in his contention, that S. 92 offends Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and is therefore void and unenforceable ? 11. Sections 91, 92 and 93 of Madras Act 10 1950 are under the sub-head Industries and Factories in Chapter V of the Act, which contains the statutory provisions relating to public safety, convenience and health in Panchayat areas. Section 91 : "The Panchayat may, with the previous approval of the prescribed authority notify that no place within the limits of the village shall be used for any of the purposes specified in the rules made in this behalf, being purposes, which, in the opinion of the Government, are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property, without a licence issued by the executive authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such licence; provided that no such notification shall take effect until sixty days from the date of its publication." Section 92 : "No person shall, without the permission of the Panchayat and except in accordance with the conditions specified in such permission : (a) construct or establish any factory, workshop or work-place in which it is proposed to employ steam power water power, or other mechanical power, or electrical power, or (b) install in any premises any machinery or manufacturing plant driven by any power as aforesaid, not being machinery or manufacturing plant exempted by the rules." Section 93 : (1) The Government may make rules : (a) prohibiting, or regulating the grant or renewal of licences under S. 91 and the period for which such licences shall be valid; (b) as to the time within which applications for such licences, or renewals thereof shall be made; and (c) prohibiting or regulating the grant of permission under S. 92. (2) Rules made under clause (c) of Sub-S. (1) may empower the panchayat to set apart specified areas in the village for industrial purposes and provide for the refusal of permission under S. 92 in respect of any factory workshop, workplace or premises outside such areas, adn also, subject to the sanction of the prescribed authority, for the removal to such areas, of any factory, workshop or workplace which has been already established at any place or any machinery which has already been installed in any premises, situated outside such areas. (Proviso omitted). (Proviso omitted). (3) The Government may, either generally or in any particular case, make such order or give such directions as they may deem fit in respect of any action taken or omitted to be taken under S. 91 or S. 92". 12. It was not under S. 91, but only under S. 92 that the petitioner could ask for and did ask for a licence. It was conceded by the Government that no rules had been framed by the Government under S. 93(1)(c) of the Act to prohibit or regulate the grant of permission under S. 92. 13. Though S. 92 does not in express terms provide for the refusal of the licence by the Panchayat Board, the power of refusal was in my opinion conferred upon the Panchayat by necessary intendment. In form, S. 92 prescribes that no factory shall be constructed and no machinery installed without the permission, i.e., the licence, granted by the Panchayat. That, in my opinion, conferred on the Panchayat a power to grant permission or refuse permission. S. 93(1)(c) authorised the Government to frame rules to regulate refusal of licences under S. 92. Unless S. 92 itself conferred jurisdiction to refuse the licence, a rule made under S. 93(1)(c) cannot by itself confer jurisdiction. Section 93(1)(c) makes clear what was implied by S. 92 - the Panchayat had jurisdiction to grant or to refuse a licence. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that if the power of refusal was unrestricted and uncontrolled by any provision in the statute itself, that would fall outside the scope of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution and would therefore offend the provisions of Art. 19(1)(g). In - Dwarka Prasad L. Narayan v. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 224 (A), Mukherjea, J. observed at page 227 : "The licencing authority has been given absolute power to grant or refuse to grant, renew or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke, cancel or modify any licence under this Order (U.P. Coal Control Order, 1953) and the only thing he has to do is to record reasons for the action he takes. Not only so. The power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller may choose to delegate the same, and the choice can be made in favour of any and every person. Not only so. The power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller may choose to delegate the same, and the choice can be made in favour of any and every person. It seems to us that such provision cannot be held to be reasonable. No rules have been framed and no directions given on these matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the licensing officer. Practically, the order commits to the un-restrained will of a single individual the power to grant, withhold or cancel licences in any way he chooses, and there is nothing in the order which could ensure a proper execution of the power or operate as a check upon injustice that might result from improper execution of the same". The Supreme Court held that the impugned clause of the U.P. Coal Control Order was void, as imposing an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom of trade and. business guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and not coming within the protection afforded by clause 6 of the Article. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the unreported judgment of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. in - Mahmed Khassim and Bros. v. Municipal Council Ootacamand, AIR 1956 Mad 181 (B) where the learned Judge held that S. 249 (3) of the District Municipalities Act was void. Section 249(3) ran : "The executive authority may, by an order, and under such restrictions and regulations as he thinks fit grant, or refuse to grant such licence". 16. Commenting upon this statutory provision, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. observed : "It will be seen that under Sub-S. (3), the executive authority is given an absolute power of refusing to grant the licence as also the power of imposing such restrictions and conditions as he might think fit. As the petitioners have under the Constitution a fundamental right to carry on their business subject to such reasonable restrictions, as might be imposed, the question to whether the vesting of such an absolute power as would be involved in Sub-S. 3 in an executive authority without any guidance by the legislature as to the relevant conditions and restrictions would be a reasonable restriction within Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. In my opinion, the Sub-Section in its present form is in contravention of Art. 19(6) and has to be struck down as violating the fundamental lights guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g)." The principle enunciated by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. is certainly a well settled one and it is the same principle that the Supreme Court applied in AIR 1954 SC 224 (A). It Should however be noticed that S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 is analogous to S. 250 of the District Municipalities Act which deals with licences for construction of factories and installation of machinery. Section 91 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 is analogous to S. 249 of the District Municipalities Act. The language of S. 249(3) of the District Municipalities Act is not identical with any of the provisions of S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950. Still the question remains, does S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 clothe the statutory authority, the Panchayat Board, with unrestricted and uncontrolled power to refuse the licence prescribed by that section ? 17. Before dealing with that question, I shall examine the scope of another unreported judgment of this court to which reference was made during the arguments before me. In W.A. No. 21 of 1953 With which W.P. No. 185 of 1953 (Mad) (C) waft heard, the learned Judges had to consider the validity of an order of the Government cancelling the grant of a licence and the validity of a subsequent order of the Panchayat Board refusing to grant a licence. The licence which was cancelled was granted by the Panchayat Board under the provisions of S. 194(3), Madras Local Boards Act, 1920. When ultimately the question of cancellation of that by the Government came up, and when the Panchayat Board had to consider afresh the question of granting or refusing the licence, Madras Act 10 of 1950 bad come into force. In W.A. No. 21 of 1953 (Mad) (C) the validity of S. 92 of Act 10 of 1950 was not put in issue or canvassed. Section 194(3), Madras Local Boards Act, 1920 as it stood before it was amended ran : "The Panchayat shall as soon as may after the receipt of the application (a).......... In W.A. No. 21 of 1953 (Mad) (C) the validity of S. 92 of Act 10 of 1950 was not put in issue or canvassed. Section 194(3), Madras Local Boards Act, 1920 as it stood before it was amended ran : "The Panchayat shall as soon as may after the receipt of the application (a).......... (b) refuse permission, if it is of opinion that such construction, establishment or installation is objectionable by reason of the density of the population in the neighbourhood or that it is likely to cause a nuisance." The difference between the language of this statutory provision and that of S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 should be obvious. 18. As I have already pointed out, S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 confers by necessary intendment the power to refuse the licence prescribed by S. 92. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that it was an unrestricted and uncontrolled power vested in the statutory authority, and that it did not satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. No doubt in S. 92 itself no express provision is made for the considerations that would be relevant to justify the refusal of the prescribed licence. But that by itself is not enough to sustain the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that it was an uncontrolled and unrestricted power to grant or to refuse licence that was conferred on the Panchayat Board by S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950. 19. As the learned Advocate General pointed out, the relevant considerations that should weigh with the Panchayat Board in granting or refusing to grant the licence prescribed by S. 92 can be gathered from the context of S. 92 and from the scheme and policy underlying the provisions of Madras Act 10 of 1950, particularly those in Chapter V of that Act In which S. 92 finds a place. Considerations of public safety, convenience and health would certainly be relevant considerations in exercising the statutory power conferred by S. 92. Considerations of public safety, convenience and health would certainly be relevant considerations in exercising the statutory power conferred by S. 92. In - Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 690 at p. 696 (D) the learned Chief Justice quoted with approval a passage from Willis Constitutional law : "If a statute declares a definite policy, there is a sufficiently definite standard for the rule against the delegation of legislative power, and also for equality, if the standard is reasonable. If no standard is set up to avoid the violation of equality, those exercising the power must act as though they were administering a, valid standard. For this reason, there is need for a judicial review to see whether or not the power delegated has been exercised arbitrarily." 20. After referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned Chief Justice observed at page 698 : "The net result of these three decisions of the Supreme Court appears to me to be this. If the policy and object of the Act can be discovered within the four corners of that Act including the preamble, and discretion is vested in the Government to make a selection in furtherance of that policy and object for the application of the Act, then the provision conferring such power is not void as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. If such power is improperly exercised in any particular case, that is, not in furtherance of the policy and object of the Act but arbitrarily, then the court can strike down the exercise of such power on every occasion." 21. These principles, in my opinion, also apply in considering whether the test of reasonable restriction postulated by Art. 19(6) of the Constitution has been satisfied, when there is an apparent abridgment or infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g). 22. The policy of the Act, particularly, Chap. V thereof, being to provide for public safety, convenience and health in Panchayat areas, these considerations would certainly be relevant considerations, and those considerations certainly prescribe an ascertainable, definite and reasonable standard for the exercise of the power conferred by S. 92 on the Panchayat. No doubt, the provisions of S. 194(3) of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920, which were replaced by the provisions of S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950, were more explicit. No doubt, the provisions of S. 194(3) of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1920, which were replaced by the provisions of S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950, were more explicit. But that is not enough to deny a provision of an ascertainable and reasonable standard to control and regulate the exercise of the statutory power in S. 92 itself. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner next urged that in the absence of any rules framed under S. 93 of the Act, any exercise of power under S. 92 would be uncontrolled and unrestricted. I am unable to accept this contention. No doubt no rules have been framed. It is equally true that S. 93 provides that rules could be made for prohibiting or regulating the grant of permission under S. 92. But the existence of the rules for which provision is made in S. 93, is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Panchayat by S. 92 of the Act. In - Nemichand v. Secy. of State, 34 Cal 511 (E), a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in dealing with a similar contention, observed at page 514 : "It is contended that the Collector could not act until and unless the Governor General in Council had framed regulations under Sub-S. (2) of S. 19-A (of the Sea Customs Act) and, that no such regulations had been framed, as apparently is the case, when the goods were detained. We do not think that the enabling power given to the Governor General in Council to frame regulations can override the prohibiting language of S. 18 or the implied power of detention under S. 19-A." 24. It was the same principle that was laid down by a Bench of this Court in - Collector of Customs v. Gopikrisen Gokuldass, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 187 (F). Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. pointed out at pp. 197-198 : "Of course if regulations have been framed the detention and confiscation would have to be effected in conformity with them but it is not as if these regulations bring into operation the power to detain or to confiscate if there is a violation of an import control notification." 25. Section 93 is an enabling section.If rules are framed under S. 93 (1)(c), the Panchayat Board would have to conform to those rules. Section 93 is an enabling section.If rules are framed under S. 93 (1)(c), the Panchayat Board would have to conform to those rules. In the absence of such rules, the Panchayat Board would have to conform to the standards which could be gathered from the provisions of Madras Act 10 of 1950, that is standards with reference to public safety, convenience and health for which provision has been made in Chanter V of that Act. Failure on fie Dart of the Government to exercise the enabling Bower conferred upon it by S. 93 of the Act does not affect either the existence of the jurisdiction conferred by S. 92 of the Act on the Panchayat or the exercise of that jurisdiction. 26. In my opinion, S. 92 of Madras Act 10 of 1950 satisfies the requirements of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution and it does not therefore offend Arts. 19(1)(g) and 13 of the Constitution. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that S. 92 is void and unenforceable, fails. 27. This petition fails and is dismissed with the costs of the first respondent. Counsels fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.