Judgment This Revision Petition arises out of an application under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The petitioner is the landlord, whose petition for eviction was allowed by the House Rent Controller, Pollachi and confirmed in appeal by the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, but eventually dismissed in revision by the learned District Judge, Coimbatore. The ground on which the learned District Judge found that the landlord was not entitled to possession was that a previous application for possession on the same grounds having been dismissed, the present petition under the Rent Control Act, out of which this revision arises, was not maintainable under section 10 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord filed R.C.P.No.136 of 1949 before the House Rent Controller, Pollachi, for the eviction of the tenants on two grounds, viz., that they had allowed the rent to fall in arrears and that the premises were sublet, the subletting having been to one Govindaswami. When that petition came up before the Rent Controller on the 3rd., February, 1950, the landlord, the petitioner did not press the petition and it was dismissed. The present petition R.C.P.N0.106 of 1950, was instituted in September, 1950, eviction being sought on two grounds, viz., that the tenants had committed waste on the property and that they had sublet the premises to Govindaswami. The learned District Judge while holding that there was subletting to Govindaswami which would entitle the petitioner for an order of eviction, dismissed the petition on the ground of the bar under section 10 of the Act. The learned District Judge, relying on the decision of Subba Rao, J., in Gudivada Jagannadham v. A. S. Krishna &38; Co. Ltd., Guntur1, upheld the contention of the respondents as to the bar of the petition under the provisions of section 10 of the Act. The learned District Judge, relying on the decision of Subba Rao, J., in Gudivada Jagannadham v. A. S. Krishna &38; Co. Ltd., Guntur1, upheld the contention of the respondents as to the bar of the petition under the provisions of section 10 of the Act. Section 10 says: “The Controller shall summarily reject any application under sub-section (2) or under subsection (3) of section 7 which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, substantially the same issues as have been finally decided or as purport to have been finally decided, in a former proceeding......” The meaning of the words “finally disposed of” has been the subject of consideration in two Bench decisions of this Court, to one of which I was myself a party, viz., Ranganatham v. Sankarlal Davey2 and Revathi v. Venkataraman3. In the former case, a previous application by a landlord was dismissed for default of appearance and it was held that the dismissal did not act as a bar against a second application for eviction being filed, the view taken being that the words “finally decided” in the section clearly implied that the prior application should have been decided on merits and that without an adjudication on the merits, the issues could not be said to have been finally decided. In the latter decision, a previous application for eviction was withdrawn and the withdrawal was with liberty to file a fresh petition, and it was held that where an application for eviction was withdrawn and dismissed, it cannot be said that the petition was finally disposed of to bar a fresh application for eviction, the view taken being that there should be a decision on merits so that it may be a bar for further proceedings for eviction. It was observed that when an application for eviction was dismissed for default of appearance or for non-prosecution, a subsequent application was not liable to be rejected under section 10 of the Act. It is not suggested in this case that either of the grounds on which the previous petition was filed was gone into and that there was an adjudication on the merits. And it is common ground that the petition was withdrawn as not pressed. It is not suggested in this case that either of the grounds on which the previous petition was filed was gone into and that there was an adjudication on the merits. And it is common ground that the petition was withdrawn as not pressed. It is, therefore, obvious that there could not have been a decision on merits of either of the issues that arose in that petition. The decision of Subba Rao, J., relied on by the learned District Judge, proceeds on a different set of facts. In that case, the petitioner applied for eviction on four grounds, and he obtained an order for eviction on a decision on merits of all the four grounds. But in appeal by the respondent, he gave up two of the grounds and in respect of the other two grounds, the Subordinate Judge found against him. Subsequently, he filed another petition on the two grounds which were not pressed in the appellate Court. The objection of a bar under section 10 was taken and the view of the learned Judge was that when an application with specific grounds was filed and if some of the grounds are not pressed, an order of the Court dismissing the application on that basis is a final adjudication on the questions raised but not pressed. With great respect to the learned Judge, while it could be said that there was a final adjudication of the petition, it is, however, difficult to say that there was a final adjudication on the questions raised but not pressed. The language of section 10 is clear and what is required to be established is not that the previous petition was finally disposed of but that the issues that were raised between the same parties in the previous petition had been finally decided. In my view, even if one of the issues has not been finally decided in the previous petition, it will be open for the petitioner to file a subsequent eviction petition on the ground on which there had been no final adjudication on merits. That question, however, does not arise in the present case, as it could not be pretended that there has been any decision on any of the issues on merits in R.C.P.No.136 of 1949. That question, however, does not arise in the present case, as it could not be pretended that there has been any decision on any of the issues on merits in R.C.P.No.136 of 1949. The fact that the petitioner did not press the previous petition could not be held, within the meaning of the language of section 10, as a bar for a subsequent eviction petition, as the issues raised in the previous petition had not been finally decided, as only a decision on merits would amount to a final decision. In whatever manner the previous petition was disposed of, whether it was dismissed for default of appearance, or it was withdrawn with liberty or without liberty to file a fresh application, or was not pressed and dismissed, or in any other manner disposed of, short of adjudication on merits, the requirements of section 10 could not be held to have been complied with, as it is only a decision on merits that would justify the view that a subsequent application is barred by virtue of section 10 of the Act. The learned District Judge has failed to appreciate the scope of the present petition and erred in relying on the decision quoted in Gudivada Jagannadham v. A.S.Krishna &38; Co., Ltd., Guntur1, the facts of which are entirely different from t In the result, the petition is allowed with costs here and in the Court below. Time for delivery of possession one month. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.