Judgement JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal preferred against the order made by the Court of Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation Madras, in W.C.C. No. 147 of 1950. 2. The facts are : The appellant Sitharama Reddiar is a petty ryot of North Arcot District owning 4 acres of dry lands. There was a small well in his field. On account of the failure of monsoon for 4 years in succession, the well had got dried up. Therefore, he deepened it with a band of diggers of whom the respondent Ayyaswami Goundar was one. The digging operations started in February 1948. The appellant or his father supervised the work. They paid the diggers advance at 12 annas plus 1½ measures of rice every day and supplied them with gun powder for dynamiting the rocks. On 26-3-1949 when dynamite was urged for digging operations it resulted in explosion. The respondent was injured. He was taken to the hospital and his right arm was amputated upto his elbow and he lost three fingers in his left hand. Thereupon this respondent preferred an application before the Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation which was summarily rejected on the ground that the respondent was not a workman as defined in S. 2(1)(n), Workmens Compensation Act. There was an appeal to the High Court and Mack, J. in A.A.O. No. 642 of 1950 set aside the order and remanded it for fresh disposal according to law. 3. The learned Commissioner who heard this remanded application came to the conclusion that the respondent was a workman as defined in S. 2(1)(n) of the Act and awarded him the specified compensation of Rs. 1077-4-10. The defeated employer appeals. 4. The short point for determination is whether the respondent is a person who has to be excluded from the definition of the expression "workman" under Sub-S. (1), Cl. (n), S. 2, Workmens Compensation Act, 8 of 1923. 5. In order that a person may be excluded from the definition of the expression "workman", the following conditions must concur : (a) his employment must have been of a casual nature; and (b) He must have been employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employers trade or business. (n), S. 2, Workmens Compensation Act, 8 of 1923. 5. In order that a person may be excluded from the definition of the expression "workman", the following conditions must concur : (a) his employment must have been of a casual nature; and (b) He must have been employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employers trade or business. A person to be excluded from the definition of "workman" as defined in this clause must not only be one "whose employment is of a casual mature" but also one "who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employers trade or business. Both these qualifications must be satisfied in order to exclude a person from the category of Workman under the Act Periyakkal v. Agent, S.I. Rly. Co. Ltd., Trichinopoly, AIR 1935 Mad 721 (A); - Vinayaka Mudaliar v. Mundala Pottiamma, AIR 1953 Mad 432 (B); - Bachia Mistri v. Shanti, AIR 1946 All 473 (C); - Arumugham v. Nagammal. AIR 1949 Mad 462 (D). See also the H. of L. decision - Manton v. Cantwell, (1920) AC 781 (E). Thus, if a man is employed for the purpose of a trade or business, the employer is liable even if the employment is of a casual nature - Abdul Hussain v. Secy. of State, AIR 1933 Rang 244 (F); - K.A.K. Master v. Ramdhari, AIR 1936 Rang 493 (G). 6. The question whether the employment of a workman is of a casual nature depends on the evidence as to the nature of the employment. The onus in such cases would be on the employer to prove the condition which is necessary for the purpose of excluding a person from the category of a workman, and it has to be shown that the workmans employment was of a casual nature : - Ebrahim Haji Jusab v. Jainibi Anuddin. AIR 1933 Bom 270 (H); - Stacker v. Wortham, (1919) 1 KB 499 (I). The word casual as used in this Act is not a term of precision, and is incapable of being exactly defined. It is used here not as a term of precision but as a colloquial term : - Knight v. Bucknill, (1913) 57 Sol Jo 245 (J). It seems to imply something midway between the regular employment of a workman and an engagement for a single day : See Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 34, Para. 1144. It is used here not as a term of precision but as a colloquial term : - Knight v. Bucknill, (1913) 57 Sol Jo 245 (J). It seems to imply something midway between the regular employment of a workman and an engagement for a single day : See Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 34, Para. 1144. Whether an employment is of a casual nature or not is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of the particular case. 7. The English law on the subject is the same as in India because the section is only a reproduction of the English Workmens Compensation Act, 1906. Rueggs Workmens Compensation Act, 1906 defines employment of a casual nature as follows : (Page 22) "The question of casual labour under the Act is a difficult one, and has several times been the subject of judicial decisions. Casual employment is employment necessitated by chance circumstances. The expression is not used in contradistinction to permanent or constant employment. The dictionary definitions of the word casual all suggest the same idea : Depending on chance; depending on or produced by chance; occurring or coming at uncertain times; not to be calculated on; unsettled; coming without design or premeditation; casual labourer; one who does casual or occasional jobs. - (Murray). Happening to come without being foreseen; coming without regularity -(Webster). Happening without design on the part of the agent, or as a mere coincidence; coming at uncertain times or without regularity; a labourer or artizan employed only irregularly. -(Century). Arising from chance; not certain, -(Johnson). Coming at times; without regularity, -(Imperial). A person who is employed one or more days in each week to do work which must be done, or which it is known it will be advisable to do at these times, is not casually employed. Indeed, whenever the same person is under a contract with an employer to do work at recurring times which must, or which it is known beforehand it will be convenient to do at such recurring times, the employment of such a person is not of a casual nature. Indeed, whenever the same person is under a contract with an employer to do work at recurring times which must, or which it is known beforehand it will be convenient to do at such recurring times, the employment of such a person is not of a casual nature. On the other hand, although the work must be done at recurring times, if different persons are employed to do such work, it is most probable that such persons are not within the Act, for it must be noticed that it is the employment of the "person" which is to be of a casual nature, and not the "work" which is to be of a casual nature, (See - Thaver Bros. v. Muthu Mariammal, AIR 1933 Rang 208 (K) ). The decisions which have to be pronounced by the Court of Appeal on the question whether employment is of "a casual nature" are so far as they go in accord generally with the views expressed above." 8. These well-known decisions denning the employment of a "casual nature" are to the effect that it is a chance employment based on no contract to employ, even though there be a reasonable expectation of being employed, e.g., that of a window-cleaner who is only employed at irregular intervals when the lady of the house may think the windows need cleaning : - Hilll v. Begg, (1908) 2 KB 802 (L), if there be an arrangement that he is to come regularly once a month and keep the windows clean except when the family is away and the house is accordingly shut up; - Be Cozens and Rutherford, (1909) 52 SJ 700 (M), so a washerwoman who habitually goes to a private house to wash clothes every Friday and on alternate Tuesdays is not engaged in casual employment, for it is stable as well as being periodical : - Dewhurst v. Mather, (1908) 2 KB 754 (N). The employment of a temporary cook in a private house while the regular cook was on a holiday was held to be employment of a casual nature, and the temporary cook was accordingly held not to be a workman within the section : (1919) 1 KB 499 (I). The employment of a temporary cook in a private house while the regular cook was on a holiday was held to be employment of a casual nature, and the temporary cook was accordingly held not to be a workman within the section : (1919) 1 KB 499 (I). To these may be added - Hughes v. Walker, (1926) 19 BW CC 79 (O), in which a person was employed to build a was round the garden of a house and was paid 1s. 6d. per hour. The employer found all materials and the work lasted for a few days. It was held that the work was regular and not casual. 9. The Indian case-law on the subject is sparse. In - Nadirsha Hormusji v. Krishnabai, AIR 1936 Bom 199 (P), Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) has stated thus at p. 200 : "We have been referred to various decisions on the English Act in which the language is similar. I think that the rule adopted in England is this, that it is impossible to define what casual employment is. There are some cases in which the employment is obviously not casual, and other cases in which the employment is obviously casual. There are a number of debatable cases between those two extremes and the Courts have held that in those debatable cases the decision of the County Court Judge must prevail. In other words, the rule seems to me to come to this that where there is any evidence to support the finding of the County Court Judge, or in India the Commissioner, that the employment either is, or is not, casual, then the finding must be treated as a finding of fact, and is not subject to appeal. The present case is clearly within the debatable area, and the Commissioner having come to the conclusion that the employment is not casual, and there being evidence to support that finding. I think we are bound by it, and that it is not necessary to consider whether we should ourselves have taken the same view or not." In - Varadarajulu Naidu v. Masaya Boyan, AIR 1954 Mad 1113 (Q), a Bench of this Court, where the employer was a contractor for the formation of a road, that the deceased was employed as a cooly mistri under him on Rs. 2-8-0 per day, that the deceased brought four coolies with him and along with them was engaged in breaking stones, and that the deceased was being paid a lump sum of money every fortnight and that he was a regular and continuous worker and not a casual labourer, held that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of the Act. In - Popatlal v. Bai Lakhu, AIR 1952 Sau 74 (R), an agriculturist who raised irrigated crops found the old well did not supply an adequate quantity of water and so boring operations were carried on by him and the deceased person was employed by him as a labourer. While the operations were in progress and the labourer was working inside the well a pipe fell on him and he died in a few hours. The widow of the deceased claimed compensation under the Act which was decreed. It was held in appeal in the High Court that where the agriculturist engaged the person for the purpose of deepening an old well to have a sufficient supply of water for irrigation, the person so engaged is a casual worker but he was employed for the purpose of his employers business and is a workman coming under the definition of 7 Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. In AIR 1953 Mad 432 (B), Mack, J., held that an employer cannot escape his liability to compensate the workman engaged in a construction merely because construction of house was only his subsidiary business and his main business was something else, Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Ranjan, AIR 1933 Cal 63 (S); - Skates v. Jones and Co., (1910) 2 KB 903 (T) and - Rabia v. G.I.P. Rly., AIR 1929 Bom 179 (U), were distinguished. Similarly in AIR 1949 Mad 462 (D), decided by Mack, J., a contractor had a contract to unload wagons. He employed a maistry who worked under him and engaged coolies, whom he paid a fixed sum for unloading each wagon keeping a portion for himself for each wagon. One of the coolies so employed met with an accident while engaged in unloading a wagon and died. He employed a maistry who worked under him and engaged coolies, whom he paid a fixed sum for unloading each wagon keeping a portion for himself for each wagon. One of the coolies so employed met with an accident while engaged in unloading a wagon and died. On the question as to whether the cooly was a workman and the contractor was liable to pay compensation to the widow, held that the cooly was an employee for the purpose of unloading the wagon at the time of the accident which was the business of the contractor and it could not be said that the employment of the cooly by the maistry was not a contract of service as he was clearly engaged for a specified remuneration to help in the unloading a wagon of goods and there was no ground on which he could be excluded from the definition of Workman under the Act as such a contractor was liable to pay compensation. In fact as pointed out in a recent Calcutta decision in - Chillu Kahar v. Burn and Co. Ltd., AIR 1953 Cal 516 (V), with the progress of the times, the conception of the circumstances in which a workman is entitled to compensation has widened end become more and more liberal. The trend of decisions both in England and here in construing the phrase "whose employment is of a casual nature" is that it refers to kind of service done by the employees rather than to the duration of the service. 10. Turning to the second branch of Sub-Section (1) clause (n) "employers trade or business", "business" means anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man for the purposes of profit : - Smith v, Anderson, (1880) 15 Ch D 247 (W). It is wider than trade and may include having land and employing a manager to farm it; - Harris v. Amery, (1865) 1 CP 148 at 154 (X); - Commrs. of Inland Revenue v. Korean Syndicate, (1921) 3 KB 258 (Y). A person engaged under a contract of service may be a workman though his duties are connected with sports or amusement e.g., a professional football player: - Walker v. Crystal Palace Foot-ball Club Ltd., (1910) 1 KB 87 (Z). of Inland Revenue v. Korean Syndicate, (1921) 3 KB 258 (Y). A person engaged under a contract of service may be a workman though his duties are connected with sports or amusement e.g., a professional football player: - Walker v. Crystal Palace Foot-ball Club Ltd., (1910) 1 KB 87 (Z). The term implies all commercial transactions and is used in the sense in which a man of business would use that word : (ibid). The question whether a casual labourer is employed "for the purpose of the employers trade or business" so as to bring himself within the definition of "workman" in this clause depends Upon the facts of each particular case, and does not turn on the question whether the premises in respect of which the work is done are used solely for business purposes or are used for domestic purposes also : 1920 AC 781 (E); - Farleigh v. Parker and Lang; (1930) 23 BW CC 490 (Z1); - Bargewell v. Daniel (1908) 98 LT 257 (Z2). 11. The English law on the subject is set out in the following extract from Rueggs Workmens Compensation Act, 1906 at page 24 : "Whether the employment is for the purpose of trade or business must be considered with reference to the following interpretations : Whatever may have been in olden times the restrictive meaning attached to the expression trade it may now be defined as any traffic or commerce or barter of goods either for other goods or for money. Business was defined by Jessel, M.R. in the case of (1880) 15 Ch D 247 at p. 258 (W), as meaning anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit. In exceptional cases, a trade or business may be carried on although the purpose aimed at is not to secure profit, at all events direct profit. But it is thought that to constitute trade or business there must be an exchange or barter of goods or exercise of an employment for the purpose of securing an advantage which may be estimated in money or moneys worth, either for the person exercising the trade or business, or for others, and that in both cases it must be the occupation, or one of the occupations, in which the person is more or less permanently engaged. The cases of (1908) 98 LT 257 (Z2) and - Miles v. Dawe, (1915) 8 BW CC 225 (Z3), may be referred to on this question." 12. Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of the instant case reproduced already, there can be no doubt that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of Sub-Section (D) Clause (n) of S. 2 of the Act entitled to compensation. 13. The learned Additional Commissioner was also perfectly justified in pointing out that the respondent would be a workman subject to S. 2(1)(n) and subject to the provisions of that section under Schedule II, Cl. (15) viz., a person employed in any occupation involving blasting operations and Cl. (16) viz., a person employed in the making of any excavation in which on any one day of the preceding 12 months more than 50 persons have been employed, or explosives have been used or whose depth from its highest to the lowest point exceeds 20 feet. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and in the circumstances dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.