JUDGMENT B. Upadhya, J. - This is a decree-holder's appeal arising out of a dispute between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor in execution of a decree for eviction of the judgment-debtor from certain premises. It appears that on the 13th of July, 1945, the decree-holder who had let out the premises to the Respondent sent a notice claiming Rs. 428/- as arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 12/- a month and asking the Respondent to vacate the premises and deliver possession on the termination of the tenancy as mentioned in the notice. This notice was served on the 14th July, 1945 on the Respondent. Nothing was paid nor was the premises vacated and a suit was filed on the 1st October, 1946 which was decreed after contest, both for arrears of rent and for ejectment. The Defendant had pleaded that the property belonged to another person and that rent had been paid to him. This was disbelieved. This decree was passed on the 8th of April, ly46. 2. When the decree was in execution U.P. Act III of 1947 came into existence and it was made applicable as from the 1st October, 1946. An objection was taken by the judgment-debtor Respondent that having regard to the provisions of Section 14 read with Section 3 of the said Act, the decree could not be executed. The trial court over-ruled the judgment-debtor's objection but in appeal the lower appellate court allowed the objection of the judgment-debtor so far as it relates to eviction. In this appeal Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that all the requirements of Section 14 of Act III of 1947 are satisfied and the lower appellate court has erred in upholding the objections of the judgment debtor as valid. 3. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows: 14. No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned Section 3: Provided that the tenant agrees to pay to the land lord reasonable annual rent or the rent payble by him before the passing of the decree, whichever is higher. Among the grounds mentioned in Section 3, reliance was placed by the Decree holder on two grounds (a) and (f), which read as follows: (a) that the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand from the landlord. (f) that the tenant has renounced his character as such or denied the title of the landlord and the latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant. 4. The trial Court had held that in view of the fact that notice for arrears of rent had been served on the Respondent in July, 1945 and the rent had remained unpaid till the 1st of October, 1945, it was evident that he had failed to pay the arrears of rent in spite of the notice. That he had done so wilfully was evident from the circumstance that he had not paid the rent in spite of the notice and the suit and that he pleaded payment to another person. The trial court held that the decree holder had not succeeded in establishing that the facts required under ground (f) had been proved against the objector. The lower appellate court took the view that the facts consisting ground (a) should have come into existence after the passing of the decree. The learned District Judge upset the decision of the trial court on two grounds. He held that in order to entitle a decree holder to eject a tenant it was necessary for him to establish not only that there was a default in the payment of rent but that the default was wilful. Finding that there was no evidence led by the decree holder on this point, the learned Judge held that it could not be said that the judgment-debtor had "wilfully failed to make payment." within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the Act. The other reason for which he allowed the appeal was that in his opinion "the breach contemplated in Section 14 referred only to such breach as are made after the passing of the decree, or, at any rate after the suit had been instituted." As he found that no such breach had been alleged or proved he held that the decree could not be executed. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that this view of the law taken by the lower appellate court is not correct. It was abundantly proved from the material on the record that the judgment-debtor Respondent was in heavy arrears at the time when the suit had been filed. The notice for rent and terminating his tenancy had been served on 14th of July, 1945. This notice no doubt required him to pay the rent within ten days, but the suit was filed not earlier than the 1st of October, 1945. He had, therefore, more than two and half months after the receipt of the notice of demand to pay rent before the suit was filed. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Jagnandan Lal, has argued that the notice did not allow one month's time and this should have been done according to Section 3(a) of the Act. What Section 3(a) says is that the tenant should have wilfully failed to make payment of the arrears within one month of the service upon him of the notice of demand. It does not require that the notice itself must say that one month's time is allowed for payment. The notice would be valid as a "demand" even if it requires payment within a shorter period. What is essential is that the default should have continued for a period of full one month at least. In this case it did continue for more than two months. As observed by the trial court, it is evident from the facts on the record that the default was nothing but wilful. The tenant had not paid the arrears and the reason put forward for non-payment was not any inability or helplessness but that the Plaintiff was not entitled to get it and that the rent had been paid to another person. It being found that the defence was false and that the Defendant was the Plaintiff's tenant and that the Plaintiff was entitled to the rent, I do not think it can be legitimately contended on behalf of the Respondent that the default was anything but wilful. 6. In Chhotey Lal v. L. Chkakki Lal 1952 A.W.R. (H.C.) 642, Desai, J. has dealt with the subject of wilful default in Section 3(a) at some length. 6. In Chhotey Lal v. L. Chkakki Lal 1952 A.W.R. (H.C.) 642, Desai, J. has dealt with the subject of wilful default in Section 3(a) at some length. He held that "if there is a default and that default is committed intentionally or deliberately, it is wilful default, regardless of the reason why the default was intended." If a default is not occasioned by any accident or any circumstance beyond the control of the tenant and if it is intentionally made as in this case it cannot be held to be anything but wilful. In Lala Munshi Lal v. Thakur Balmakund Singh 1952 A.W.R. (H.C.) 203, another learned Judge of this Court has taken the view that if a tenant makes default in paying the rent and even goes to the extent of making a wrong allegation that he has paid it, he is guilty of wilful default in payment of arrears of rent. 7. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the lower appellate court and hold that the Respondent had wilfully failed to make payment of the arrears of rent demanded from him and was liable to ejectment on the ground of Section 3(a) of Act III of 1947. 8. The other reason given by the lower appellate court that the breaches which would make the judgment debtor liable to eviction should have occurred after the passing of the decree or at any rate after the institution of the suit does not, to my mind, appear to be correct. Section 14 of the Act puts a limitation on the execution of decrees for eviction passed before the date of commencement of the Act, but provides that they may be executed on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. In fact the grounds mentioned in Section 3 are the grounds which may be considered to be such as would show that the tenant was not entitled to the special protection that was afforded by the Act in respect of accommodations. Section 3 mentions that suits for eviction may be filed with the permission of the District Magistrate or on any of the grounds mentioned in the section. Section 3 mentions that suits for eviction may be filed with the permission of the District Magistrate or on any of the grounds mentioned in the section. One of the grounds relates to a tenant who has been wilfully in default of payment in respect of arrears of rent and the conditions laid down are that he should have been served with a notice of a demand and that he should have failed to pay the arrears even after such notice within one month. Such a tenant the law refuses to protect; and when Section 14 puts a bar to the execution of decrees for eviction it lays down that this bar will not work in the case of such delinquent tenants. I find it difficult to appreciate how the lower appellate court thought that the grounds mentioned in Section 3 should have come into existence only after the passing of the decree or after the institution of the suit. Section 3(a) refers to nonpayment of arrears of rent. When the arrears of rent have been sued for and a decree has been passed, they cease to be arrears and the amount of the decree is substituted in their place. There could not possibly be any default in respect of the payment of arrears of rent at least so far as the arrears sought for are concerned, the only default that may be alleged would be that of not paying the decretal amount. The other defaults mentioned in Section 3 also seem to indicate unmistakably that the defaults should be such as had existed prior to the passing of the decree or even before the institution of the suit. In Lala Munshi Lal v. Thakur Balmakund Singh 1952 A.W.R. (H.C.) 203, V. Bhargava, J. held as follows: What Section 14 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act requires is the existence of one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of the Act and this existence must relate back to the time when the decree was passed. 9. I respectfully agree with this view and hold that Section 14 of the Act did not bar the execution of the decree in the present case. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs. Leave to appeal is refused.