JUDGMENT Brij Mohan Lall, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by one Badri Prasad. He purchased a certain building consisting of a residential portion and two shops, from one Govind Ram. The shops are in the occupation of tenants. There is no dispute about them in this case and they may be left out of account. Govind Ram was himself in possession of residential portion and the agreement between him and the Petitioner was that actual possession of the said portion would be handed over to the Petitioner. The sale deed was executed on the 25th of August, 1953 and the consideration was paid to the vendor on that very day, but it became apparent to both parties on that day that the vendor would not be in a position to hand over actual vacant possession of the residential portion to the Petitioner. He, therefore, deposited a sum of Rs. 1,000 with the Petitioner in order to assure him that he intended in good faith to actually carry out his promise of giving vacant possession. On the deposit being made the Petitioner permitted him to continue in possession. It was not till as late as the 5th of August 1954 i.e., almost one year after the sale, that actual possession was surrendered by the vendor to the Petitioner. Thereupon the Petitioner returned the deposit of Rs. 1,000/- . 2. The Petitioner's version is that he took actual possession, that his nephew Chaturbhuj Das began to Jive in the disputed portion of the house and started its repairs. On the 7th of August 1954 Pabbar Ram, opposite party No. 3, arrived on the scene and forcibly entered the house, claiming that the house had been allotted to him by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. There was some row and information reached the police authorities who appeared on the scene and put their own lock on the house, dispossessing both parties. On the 8th of August 1954, i.e., the very next day the police authorities removed their own lock and handed over possession to opposite party No. 3. 3. There was some row and information reached the police authorities who appeared on the scene and put their own lock on the house, dispossessing both parties. On the 8th of August 1954, i.e., the very next day the police authorities removed their own lock and handed over possession to opposite party No. 3. 3. The Petitioner has come up to this Court and he prays that (a) a writ in the nature of certiorari may issue to quash the Allotment Order No. A/41/ 54, dated 7th August, 1954; and (b) a writ in the nature of mandamus may issue commanding the opposite parties Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to restore status quo ante by dispossessing the opposite party No. 3 and placing the applicant in possession over House No. .94, Saidwara, Ghazipur. 4. The first question that arises for decision is whether the allotment order was valid or not. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner on the authority of a Division Bench case of this Court, reported in Sri Lachhman Das v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Bareilly 1953 A.W.R. (H.C.) 125, that where a vendor sells the property and hands over possession to the vendee, the accomodation does not fall vacant and the Rent Control and Eviction authorities have no jurisdiction to allot it to anyone. I have gone through this ruling and I am of the opinion that it has not laid down any proposition in such general terms. What had happened in that case was that the vendor had sold the house and given immediate possession to the vendee. In those circumstances the Bench held that the accommodation had not fallen vacant. What has happened in the present case is that the vendor expressed his inability to hand over immediate possession and the Petitioner was reconciled to the vendor continuing in possession of the property sold. He submitted to this state of affairs for almost a year. During this period the vendor was a licensee from the Petitioner and was continuing as such. 5. He submitted to this state of affairs for almost a year. During this period the vendor was a licensee from the Petitioner and was continuing as such. 5. If the Petitioner had obtained actual possession, put a licensee in possession, and allowed him to continue for one year and if that licensee had surrendered possession after one year, it could not be seriously contended by the Petitioner that he was not bound to give information to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, and the said officer was not competent to make an allotment of the house. Section 7(1) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act is wide enough to cover the case of a licensee relinquishing possession of the accommodation. It says: Every landlord shall, within 7 days after an accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it or in any other manner whatsoever, give notice of the vacancy in writing to the District Magistrate. 6. By Sub-section (2) of the said, section, the District Magistrate has been given the power to issue a general or special order requiring the landlord to let, or not to let any accommodation which has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. On the premises being vacated by the vendor, who was a licensee for one year, an obligation arose on the part of the vendor (vendee ?) to give intimation of the vacancy to the District Magistrate, and the District Magistrate acquired jurisdiction to allot it to any one. It is true that the Petitioner had the seven days' period to give the intimation, but this did not mean that the District Magistrate could not make the allotment until he had received the intimation from the Petitioner. The District Magistrate's jurisdiction to allot the house arose as soon as the accommodation fell vacant. The landlord cannot insist that the District Magistrate should have refrained from exercising his power so long as he did not give intimation of the vacancy of the accommodation to him, The giving of information is a matter of duty. It does not give rise to any right in favour of the landlord. 7. The position, therefore, was that the licensee who was in occupation of the accommodation, had vacated it, and the District Magistrate had acquired jurisdiction u/s 7(2) of the Act to allot it to any person. It does not give rise to any right in favour of the landlord. 7. The position, therefore, was that the licensee who was in occupation of the accommodation, had vacated it, and the District Magistrate had acquired jurisdiction u/s 7(2) of the Act to allot it to any person. There was an application before him by opposite party No. 3. Till then no application had been made by the Petitioner for alloting that accommodation to him nor was any such application made by anyone else. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to hold that the District Magistrate was without jurisdiction in making the allotment. The allotment order cannot, therefore, be challenged. The first relief is, therefore, disallowed. 8. The next question that arises for decision is whether the Petitioner was wrongfully evicted from the premises that were in his occupation. In this connection it may be pointed out that the opposite parties have disputed even the factum of the Petitioner's possession. I have, therefore, to consider whether the Petitioner was in possession, whether the possession was lawful and whether he was unlawfully evicted. 9. While the opposite parties have denied the factum of the Petitioner's possession they have not suggested as to who else was in possession. On the other hand it is conceded by the opposite parties also that the Petitioner's nephew Chaturbhuj Das was present in the house when opposite party No. 3 went there and that he was getting repairs done to the house. Normally possession follows title. Since title was vested in the Petitioner and since the person who was in actual possession had surrendered possession to the Petitioner the possession reverted to the Petitioner. He has sworn an affidavit that he was in possession and that his nephew was actually residing in that house. As already pointed out, the presence of his nephew in the said house is admitted even by the opposite parties and it is further admitted that he was getting repairs done to the house. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in believing that the Petitioner was actually in possession through his nephew. 10. The next question for decision is whether the Petitioner's possession was lawful. On that point also my finding is in favour of the Petitioner. As soon as the accommodation falls vacant the owner thereof has a right to occupy it. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in believing that the Petitioner was actually in possession through his nephew. 10. The next question for decision is whether the Petitioner's possession was lawful. On that point also my finding is in favour of the Petitioner. As soon as the accommodation falls vacant the owner thereof has a right to occupy it. This right is subject to this limitation that he has to report to the District Magistrate the fact that the accommodation has fallen vacant and has to surrender possession to the person to whom it is allotted by the District Magistrate. There is no provision of law which prevents him from occupying his own property during the interval between the date of actual vacancy and the date of allotment. I find nothing in the Rent Control and Eviction Act which takes away this right of the owner of the property. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Petitioner's possession of the house was perfectly legal. The period of seven days had not expired and it cannot be contended that the Petitioner had done anything wrong in not sending information about the house having fallen vacant to the District Magistrate till then. 11. This brings me to the main point whether the Petitioner was unlawfully evicted. An owner who lawfully enters into possession of his own property when it is vacated by the person in actual possession has to surrender possession to the person to whom it is allotted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but a procedure is provided for that also. After allotment a notice has to be served u/s 7-A(1) of the Act requiring the owner in possession to show cause why should he not be evicted from the premises. If he shows cause and if his objection is overruled a second notice is to be issued to him specifying the period during which possession must be surrendered. If he again makes default it is open to the District Magistrate to use force for his eviction. 12. What has happened in the present case is that none of these two notices was ever issued. No opportunity was ever given to the Petitioner to show cause against the order directing him to surrender possession to the allottee. Nor was any period prescribed within which he was to hand over possession to the allottee. 12. What has happened in the present case is that none of these two notices was ever issued. No opportunity was ever given to the Petitioner to show cause against the order directing him to surrender possession to the allottee. Nor was any period prescribed within which he was to hand over possession to the allottee. Resort was at once had to the use of police force and the Petitioner was forcibly ejected. This was done, without performing the statutory duties imposed by Section 7A(1) and (2) of the Act. The district authorities had no justification to use police force for the eviction of the Petitioner from his property in this manner. The action of the authorities was high handed and unwarranted by law. All proceedings that have been gone through must therefore be brushed aside and the status quo ante restored. 13. It is, therefore, ordered that the petition be allowed in part. The relief re: quashing the allotment order dated the 7th of August 1954 is disallowed. But the second relief about the restoration of status quo ante by dispossessing opposite party No. 3 is allowed. A writ of mandamus shall issue directing opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 to restore possession to the Petitioner. If they want possession to be delivered to opposite party No. 3 they should proceed u/s 7A after issuing proper notices to the Petitioner and after giving him opportunity to show cause against such notices. No such notice shall be issued to the Petitioner unless possession is first delivered to him. In view of the divided success of the petition I direct that they should bear their own costs.