JUDGMENT : NEVASKAK, J. 1. Petitioner Mangalsingh s/o Gayadin was employed ay a head-constable at Afzalpur police station, District Mandsaur. A complaint was made against him to the District Superintendent of Police by one Shivsingh Rajput of village Lodh that he had ill-treated the complainant and had demanded a bribe from him. 2. The District Superintendent of Police after making an enquiry found the allegations to be well-founded and was of the opinion that his dismissal from service was an appropriate punishment. He however took into consideration his length of service and directed his reduction in rank to the position of a constable for a period of two years. The petitioner preferred appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police who dismissed the same. On a further petition for revision to the Inspector General of Police the latter rejected the petition but at the same time directed the Deputy Inspector General of Police of that division to use his revisional powers in enhancing his punishment to that of dismissal from service after giving him reasonable opportunity to show cause why he should not be dismissed. 3. Notice was accordingly issued from the office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Central Range, calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service for his conduct in connection with Shivsingh Rajput referred to above. The petitioner appeared in answer to the notice and prayed for clemency on the ground of his long service extending over a period of 24 years. The Dy. Inspector-General of Police however ordered his dismissal from service by his order dated 17-1-1952. His appeal to the Inspector General of Police proved unsuccessful. A further appeal to the Government was not entertained. 4. The present petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was filed on behalf of the petitioner mainly on two grounds which alone were pressed before us. Firstly, it was contended that the petitioner was appointed as a head-constable under the orders of the Inspector General of Police, Gwalior, prior to the integration of Gwalior State into the Madhya Bharat. His dismissal under the orders of the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Madhya Bharat, was therefore contrary to Art. 311(1) of the Constitution. Second ground of contention was that there was no proper compliance with the requirements of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. His dismissal under the orders of the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Madhya Bharat, was therefore contrary to Art. 311(1) of the Constitution. Second ground of contention was that there was no proper compliance with the requirements of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner was not explained the charges against him and he was not given adequate opportunity to meet the same. It was also urged that there was no proper compliance with Rule No. 8 of Madhya Bharat Civil Service Punishment Rules 1950. In the return filed on behalf of the respondent it was contended that the charges were duly framed against the petitioner with respect to his conduct in connection with Shivsingh Rajput, and an enquiry into the allegations of said Shivsingh Rajput was made. It was further averred that a notice (Copy annesxure-B) was given by the Dy. Inspector General of Police on 24-12-1951 to show cause why he should not be dismissed. In response to this notice, it is said, the petitioner did not show any cause on merits, but pleaded for mercy on the ground of his long service and likely hardship to himself and his family. 5. From these respective contentions the first question which arises for consideration is whether the Dy. Inspector General Madhya Bharat is an authority subordinate in rank to that by which the petitioner was appointed as head-constable or In other words whether the order of dismissal is vitiated on account of the provisions of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution. In this respect the petitioner has made no averments as to whether the Dy. Inspector General of Police Madhya Bharat can on any consideration be said to be an authority subordinate to the appointing authority viz., Inspector General of Police, Gwalior. Nor is it stated that on integration he was re-appointed by the Inspector General of Police, Madhya Bharat, or any such authority. It is difficult under these circumstances to make any presumptions as regards the rank of an authority in the former merged State in comparison with that of any existing authority in the absence of definite materials with respect to the same. Nor is it possible to presume that in the integrated set up authority of a particular rank appointed the petitioner and that the dismissing authority is subordinate to that authority. Mr. Nor is it possible to presume that in the integrated set up authority of a particular rank appointed the petitioner and that the dismissing authority is subordinate to that authority. Mr. Oza for the petitioner states that Head-constables at present are appointed by the Superintendent of Police. In view of this admission it cannot be said that Art. 311(1) was not complied with in the present case. Mr. Oza in this connection cited the case reported in Sobhagmal v. State, AIR 1954 Raj 207 (A). In that case, Wanchoo, C.J., has held as follows : "Where however as in the case of Rajasthan, there has been a merger of a number of former States to form the present State of Rajasthan, the position is different. In these circumstances, it must not be seen what was the authority which appointed in a former State which has been merged in the State of Rajasthan. What has to be seen is the authority which appointed the applicant in the State of Rajasthan after it was created...." He, however, was unable to refer to any averment in the petition as to by whom the petitioner was, if at all, appointed in the integrated set up in the State of Madhya Bharat. 6. In a petition under Art. 226 we cannot be asked to call upon the respondent at this stage to disclose whether the petitioner was re-appointed in the intergrated set up and if so what was the authority which appointed him. As regards the second ground of contention it is clear by reference to the copy of notice, annexure-B, filed on behalf of the respondent that after the department formed a definite conclusion that the conduct of the petitioner called for a punishment of dismissal from service a notice had been given to him affording him an opportunity to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The departmental enquiry had preceded that notice and initial punishment given to him was that of reduction in rank. Later, when the matter reached the Inspector General of Police he took the view that the punishment was not adequate. He, therefore, required the Dy. Inspector General of Police to exercise his revisional powers and after affording opportunity to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed passed an appropriate order. It was then that the Dy. Later, when the matter reached the Inspector General of Police he took the view that the punishment was not adequate. He, therefore, required the Dy. Inspector General of Police to exercise his revisional powers and after affording opportunity to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed passed an appropriate order. It was then that the Dy. Inspector General issued the aforesaid notice. The petitioner to response to the notice did not say anything about the merits of the charges against him nor did he complain that he did not know exactly what was alleged and found against him. All that he had pleaded was that the punishment was too severe having regard to the length of his service. 7. In face of these facts it cannot be said that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to her taken against him. Nor can it be said that there was no compliance with Art. 311(2). Mr. Oza tried to urge that at an earlier stage of departs mental enquiry he was not afforded adequate opportunity to show that he was innocent and that Rule S of Madhya Bharat Civil Service, Punishment and Appeals Rules were not complied with. 8. This contention too cannot be accepted. In the first place it has not been shown he was not given an opportunity to answer the allegations against him and how the rule was not complied with. In the second place where Provisions of Art. 311(2) are complied with, violation of any of the rules in regard to any antecedent enquiry made in a disciplinary action against a Government servant is not material. Vide Dr. Krishnamoorthy ? v. The State of Madras, 1951 Mad 882 (B). Joseph, John v. State of Trav-Co, AIR 1953 Trav Co 130 (FB) (O). In the case reported in High Commr. for India v. I.M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121 (D) Privy Council held that if a civil servant has been through a departmental enquiry it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out. In the case reported in High Commr. for India v. I.M. Lall, AIR 1948 PC 121 (D) Privy Council held that if a civil servant has been through a departmental enquiry it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out. This means that, if at the stage of departmental enquiry fundamental rules of judicial nature were not followed, it would be open for the civil servant to claim an opportunity to plead about the merits of the allegations and to show that the same are baseless even at a later stage when the department after an inquiry reached a tentative conclusion as regards the action proposed to be taken. If however he was given proper opportunity he himself would not plead again as to merits as it would be useless to do so. This in fact was what has happened in this case. There was an initial enquiry in which the petitioner appears to have taken part and said whatever he had to say. In the subsequent stage when notice was issued to show cause as regards the action proposed to be taken against him viz., his dismissal, he did not choose to plead as regards the merits of the allegations against him. If he had shown that at the stage of departmental enquiry that the same had not been duly carried out and wanted to plead as to merits but was prevented from doing so it would have been a different matter. As far as I can see the Constitution seems to have provided for an opportunity under Art. 311(2) for an aggrieved public servant to show cause why he should not be given the proposed punishment out of the three indicated therein and in showing this cause he was entitled to show cause as regards merits if at the stage of departmental enquiry fundamental principles of judicial procedure were not followed or the tentative conclusion on merits was otherwise vitiated and further to show cause why the particular punishment should not be given. It is not denied that this opportunity had been given to him. 9. In view of this it cannot be said that there is any violation of statutory provision which entitled the petitioner to claim relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 10. There is, therefore, no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. It is not denied that this opportunity had been given to him. 9. In view of this it cannot be said that there is any violation of statutory provision which entitled the petitioner to claim relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 10. There is, therefore, no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. 11. SAMVATSAR, J. :- I agree. Petition dismissed.