Both these appeals involve a common question of law and fact and hence will be disposed of by this judgment. 2. Put briefly the fact of the case are that Rampal Khatedar entered into two contracts of sale for his land for khasra No. 1001/85 and 99 measuring 37 bighas 5 biswas with Panna and Dhanna sons of Raghunath Dhakad and for khasra No. 89 measuring 35 bighas 2 biswas with Nathulal son of Ramchandra Dhakad. On Chait Sudi 7 Svt. 2007 (26th March,1950). This contract of sale was embodied in two documents (Ex. P. 1 in each case). Subsequently on 29-6-50 Rampal transferred by sale the entire land comprised in the above two contracts of sale in favour of one Jagannath. This Jagannath instituted two separate suits against both the parties, who had entered into a contract of sale with Rampal, in the court of the S.D.O. Chhabra for recovery of possession with the allegations that the plaintiffs acquired possession over the land in dispute on 19-4-50 through a registered sale deed (Ex. P.1 in each case), that on 26-7-50 he was wrongfully dispossessed by the defendants and as the defendants had no lawful authority to obtain possession they should be dispossessed, possession being restored to plaintiffs. The trial court decreed the suits* The defendants filed separate appeals before the lower appellate court—Divisional Commissioner, Kotah—who by his judgment dated 16-11-54 allowed the appeals and reversed the decrees of the trials. The plaintiff has filed these two separate appeals against the same. 3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have examined the records as well. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that an agreement to sell an immovable property does not create any interest in the said property unless a sale deed is executed conveying the said property. The vendor who has not transferred his interest in the property, though the entered into an agreement with another to sell the same can certainly confer title on a third party by executing a sale deed in his favour A.I.R. 1953 Madras 409 has been cited in support of this proposition. The ruling however has no much applicability to the present case. These considerations would certainly have been material if the plaintiff had claimed relief on the basis of his title alleged to have been acquired by him through a sale. The ruling however has no much applicability to the present case. These considerations would certainly have been material if the plaintiff had claimed relief on the basis of his title alleged to have been acquired by him through a sale. The present suit is not based on title but upon possession and subsequent wrongful disposse-ssion by the defendants. Thus the only question which we are called upon to decide in the case is as to whether the appellant was actually put in possession or not over the land in dispute. 4. The appellants contention is that possession was transferred to him in accordance. the conditions of the sale deed on 29-6-50, that a mutation was also granted in his favour on 1-7-50 and that thereafter on about 26-7-50 the defendants dispossessed him wrongfully. The contention of the respondents however is that they were put in possession of the land in dispute by Rampal on 26-3-50 when agreement to sell were entered into by them with him and that the plaintiff was never put in possession which all through continued uninterruptedly with them. The trial court, as is apparent from its judgment, was conscious of the, fact that only a solitary statement of P.W. 5 existed on the point. It however appears to have been influenced by the fact that as there was a registered sale deed in existence and as a mutation had been allowed by the revenue officers, and on these considerations it came to the finding that the possession should be deemed to have been with the plaintiffs. The learned Commis-sioner after examining the evidence reversed this finding and came to the conclusion that only (paper) possession passed in favour of the plaintiff. Ordinarily speaking a finding of fact should not be disturbed in second appeal. The appellants counsel however argued before us that as there has been a misreading of evidence, we deem it desirable to examine it thoroughly. 5. To begin with we would like to observe that the plaintiff did not choose to put himself in the witness box. As observed in AIR 1927 P.C. 230... The appellants counsel however argued before us that as there has been a misreading of evidence, we deem it desirable to examine it thoroughly. 5. To begin with we would like to observe that the plaintiff did not choose to put himself in the witness box. As observed in AIR 1927 P.C. 230... "The practice of not calling the party as witness with a view to force the other party to call him is a bad and degrading practice." Following this decision it was observed in A.I.R. 1929 Sind 7 that— "It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination. His non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance going to discredit the truth of his case." No satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why the plaintiff did not choose to examine himself. Similarly Rampal who is alleged to have transferred the land in favour of the plaintiff was not examined in the case. The sale deed mentions only about kabza malikana. The solitary statement of P.W. 5 has been examined by us and it is not at all clear therefrom how and when the plaintiff was put in actual possession of the land. Thus the conclusion is that the plaintiff failed to establish that he was in possession of the land in dispute and was dispossessed wrongfully by the defendants as alleged by him. On the other hand the evidence led by the defendants leaves no room to doubt that their possession originated from March 1950 and as they cannot be treated as trespasser. The decision of the learned commissioner therefore, is perfectly correct and calls for no interference. The appeal is hereby rejected.