JUDGMENT M.L. Chadurvedi, J. - This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner was recorded as a tenant of the plots in suit sometime in 1347F. The settlement operations in the Tehsil started in 1348F and continued till 1351F. A survey of the village in which the plots in suit are situate, was made in 1348F and the petitioner's name was recorded as a tenant of the plots. In 1349F., a suit was brought u/s 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, by the Zamindar for the ejectment of the petitioner from the plots in dispute. The suit was decreed in 1350F and it appears that in 1351F. the petitioner was ejected as a result of the decree and a note was made in the settlement khatauni that a decree for ejectment had been passed. The khatauni for the period 1348-51F was one and the same. After the petitioner's ejectment the zamindar let out the land in suit to the respondents Nos. 2 to 42 or their predecessors in-interest. These tenants continued in possession and in the year 1947, the U. P. Tenancy Act No. X of 1947 was passed. u/s 27 of this Act, a provision was made for reinstatement of certain tenants, who had been ejected under decrees of the Revenue Courts. The provision applicable to the present case is contained in Section 27 (1) (c) and, it is to the effect that if on or after the 1st January, 1940, any person was ejected from his holding or any part thereof u/s (sic)80 of the U.P. Tenancy Act notwithstanding his having been recorded as an occupant after the 1st day of January, 1938, in a record revised under Chapter IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, or corrected by an officer specially appointed by the Government for the correction of annual registers in any tract, he may apply to the court which passed the decree of ejectment for his reinstatement to the holdings or part thereof. In pursuance of this provision, the petitioner filed two applications for his reinstatement, in the court of the Assistant Collector first class. The two applications appear to have been consolidated and were disposed of by one judgment. In pursuance of this provision, the petitioner filed two applications for his reinstatement, in the court of the Assistant Collector first class. The two applications appear to have been consolidated and were disposed of by one judgment. The petitioner's case was that he was recorded as an occupant in the Settlement Operations in 1348F., and he had been ejected from the plots in dispute after the 1st day of January, 1940, and he was thus entitled to be reinstated or restored to possession. The zamindars contested these applications alleging that the petitioner was not recorded an occupant in the last Settlement. The Assistant Collector dismissed the applications on the 19th August, 1949, mainly on the ground that though the petitioner was recorded as an occupant of the plots in the khatauni of 1348F but in the remarks column of the same khatauni, there was an entry that the zamindars had ejected the petitioner in 1943 A.D. by means of a decree of court, and had taken possession of the plots. He consequently held that the petitioner was not recorded as an occupant in the Settlement Khatauni. The petitioner then went up in appeal to the Collector of Azamgarh, who allowed the appeal on the 28th March, 1951, and directed the reinstatement of the petitioner to the plots. The Collector was of opinion that the petitioner was recorded as an occupant in the record of rights revised under Chapter IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. The respondents then applied to the Commissioner in revision, and the learned Commissioner recommended to the Board of Revenue for setting aside the order of the Collector. The Board then heard the reference and Mr. S. N. Mitra, a learned judicial member of the Board expressed the opinion that on the facts which had been proved, the petitioner could not be called a person who had been recorded as an occupant of the plots in dispute during the Settlement Operations. The case then was referred to another member. Mr. Mitra was of the opinion that the revision should be allowed. The other judicial member, Mr. V. C. Sharma, did not agree with the opinion of Mr. The case then was referred to another member. Mr. Mitra was of the opinion that the revision should be allowed. The other judicial member, Mr. V. C. Sharma, did not agree with the opinion of Mr. Mitra that the petitioner was not recorded as an occupant in the settlement proceedings but he was of the opinion that the revision should be allowed on the ground that the petitioner was not in actual possession of the plots in dispute. He could be restored to possession only if he was recorded as an occupant and was also in actual possession of the plots. For this view he relied upon a decision of the Board of Revenue in the case of Ganga Ram and others v. Bijleshwari 1954 A. W. R. (Rev.) 13. That decision was on similar words used in Sec. 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Mr. Sharma was also of the opinion that the revision should be allowed but his ground was a different one. 3. The present petition was filed on the 25th April, 1955, and the prayer contained in the petition is that the judgment of the Board of Revenue be quashed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that there is a patent illegality in the Orders of both the learned members. His case is that Mr. Mitra's decision is wrong in so far as it says that the petitioner was not recorded as an occupant of the plots in dispute during the settlement proceedings, and on this point he says that the order of Mr. Sharma is correct. As regards the latter part of the judgment of Mr. Sharma, the argument is that what the law requires is the record as an occupant during Settlement Operation and it makes no difference whether the person recorded was actually in possession of the land or not. All that is required is that the person should be recorded as an occupant and even if it be proved that he was not in possession, he was entitled to an order of reinstatement u/s 27 (1) (c). Learned counsel for the respondents has challenged this proposition of law and has further urged that the decision of Mr. Mitra is correct and the petitioner cannot be said to have been recorded as an occupant of the land in dispute, in the settlement proceenings. Learned counsel for the respondents has challenged this proposition of law and has further urged that the decision of Mr. Mitra is correct and the petitioner cannot be said to have been recorded as an occupant of the land in dispute, in the settlement proceenings. He has also argued that the error, if any, cannot be corrected in a Writ of Certiorari, that the setting aside the decision of the Board of Revenue would work hardship on the respondents, and in the interest of justice this Court should refuse to interfere in its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution; and that there is another equally efficacious remedy open to the petitioner inasmuch as he can file an application for the grant of special leave to appeal, to the Supreme Court. After hearing learned counsel at some length I have come to the conclusion that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct and that this petition should be allowed. 5. The relevant words of Section 27 (1) (c) of Act No. X of 1947 are as follows: If any person was ejected from his holding u/s 180 of the said Act notwithstanding his having been recorded as an accupant after the 1st day of January, 1938 in a record revised under Chapter IV of the U.P. Land Revenue Act he may apply for reinstatement to such holding 6. The important words in the quotation are "as having been recorded as an occupant in a record revised under Chapter IV." The' first question that arises in this case is whether the petitioner's name was recorded in the record revised Chapter IV of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The ecord operations began in 1348F and it also appears from the judgment of Mr. Sharma, that 1348F was the year of record. He says "It is also accepted that 1348F was the year of record." I think this means that it was accepted by the parties to the case that 1348F was the year of record. It is well known that the record operations continue for a number of years. It appears that the lands of this village were surveyed in 1348F and entries were accordingly made in the village papers of that year. It is well known that the record operations continue for a number of years. It appears that the lands of this village were surveyed in 1348F and entries were accordingly made in the village papers of that year. After the survey operations, no fresh khatauni was prepared for 1349, 50 or even 1351F, and it was in the same khatauni that a note was made in 1351F that the petitioner had been ejected. Mr. Sharma relied upon the case of Mata Bux v. Bishwanath Singh 1952 A. W. R. (Rev.) 43. as an authority for the proposition that an entry in the khatauni of the year of verification is the record of possession and this would be considered to be the khatauni containing the record revised under Chapter IV of the Land Revenue Act. The view fully supports Mr. Sharma's decision, which is also supported to some extent by an explanation appended to Section 55 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, before its amendment by the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The explanation says that for the purpose of the section the year for which register is prepared shall be taken as a complete year. The record was prepared for 1348F, and, therefore, the record should be taken to be as of the whole year 1348F. I agree with the view of the Board of Revenue that: it is the year of verification which is the crucial year and if the verification of the entries of the particular village has been made in 1348F, 1348F is the year in which the record of right of the settlement for the village has been prepared. The record of right of the village in which the plots in dispute are situate was prepared in 1348F during which year verification appears to have taken place and the entries in 1348F should be taken as the entries, made as a result of the Settlement operations in this village. Mr. Mitra has not gone into detail into this question, and after reading both the judgments I agree with the view taken by Mr. Sharma. It further appears that before him it was 'accepted' presumably by both parties, that 1348F was the year of record. The petitioner was recorded as a tenant of these plots in 1348F and he was ejected subsequently under Sec. 180 of the U.P. T. Act. Sharma. It further appears that before him it was 'accepted' presumably by both parties, that 1348F was the year of record. The petitioner was recorded as a tenant of these plots in 1348F and he was ejected subsequently under Sec. 180 of the U.P. T. Act. The subsequent entry of his ejectment in 1351F would not alter the position because the year of settlement being 1348 F this entry in 1348F gives the petitioner a right and any subsequent entry would not invalidate that right, even though the settlement operations formally came to an end in 1351F. The second reason is that the subsequent entry was to the effect that the petitioner had been ejected from the land but it did not purport to remove the name of the petitioner as the tenant of the plots in dispute, and the petitioner's name still continued recorded as a tenant of the plots in dispute even in 1351F. So as far as the first question is concerned, I think it must be answered against the respondents and it should be held that the petitioner was recorded as an occupant after the 1st January, 1938 in the record revised under Chapter IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. 7. This takes me to the second point as to whether a record of entry is enough or it must further be shown that the petitioner was in actual occupation of the plots in dispute. The view of Mr. Sharma on this point is that the applicant u/s 27 of U. P. Act No. X of 1947, must be in actual occupation of the land besides being recorded as an occupant. For this decision he relied on a case of the Board of Revenue reported in Gangaram v. Bijleshwar 1954 A. W. R. (Rev.) 13 This point has arisen before the Board of Revenue on a number of occasions. After Act No. X of 1947 came into force, the Board was called upon to decide it and the Board held that it was not necessary that the applicant should have been in actual possession of the plots, if he was able to show that his name had been recorded as an occupant in the revised record. After Act No. X of 1947 came into force, the Board was called upon to decide it and the Board held that it was not necessary that the applicant should have been in actual possession of the plots, if he was able to show that his name had been recorded as an occupant in the revised record. This was, I am told, the view taken by the Board in many cases but I propose to refer to two of these cases both reported in 1948 R. D. 268 and at page 302. This was the view taken while interpreting Section 27 (1) (c) of U. P. Act X of 1947. Subsequently a question arose as regards the interpretation of the same words in Section 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Board of Revenue in the beginning followed the view taken in the interpretation of the words as used in Section 27 but subsequently there was a change of opinion among the members of the Board, and the Board took the view that the person claiming to have certain rights as an occupant must not only be recorded as an occupant in 1356F but should also be in actual occupation of the land. This view, expressed in the case of Ganga Ram v. Bijleshwari 1954 A. W. R. (Rev.) 13 has been accepted by Mr. Sharma. Afterwards, the point came up for consideration (sic) fore this Court, and a Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member held in the case of Lala Nanak Chand v. The Board of Revenue 1955 A. W. R. (H. C.) 371 that in order to obtain the rights conferred by Section 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abulition and Land Reforms Act, a person need only prove that he was recorded as an occupant in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F, and that it was not necessary for him to further prove that he was in actual occupation of the land. The Bench relied on the wordings of the section and also on some other provisions of the Act for taking the view that it was not necessary for a person claiming the benefit of Section 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to prove the fact that he was also in actual occupation of the land. The Bench relied on the wordings of the section and also on some other provisions of the Act for taking the view that it was not necessary for a person claiming the benefit of Section 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to prove the fact that he was also in actual occupation of the land. After the decision of this Court, the Board of Revenue has followed the view of this Court. The decision on the point is in the case of Mahadeo v. Babu Dan Bahadur Singh. 1955 A. W. R. (Rev.) 169 The position, therefore, now is clear as far as the interpretation of similar words in Section 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is concerned, that it must be taken that a mere recording as an occupant is sufficient to confer the rights and it is not necessary to prove that the person was also' in actual possession of the land. The words used in Sec. 27(1)(c) of U. P. Act No. X of 1947 are the same as in Section 20. The relevant words of Section 20 are "every person who was recorded as an occupant in the khasra or khatauni of 1356F", and of Section 27 are "his having been recorded as an occupant after the 1st day of January, 1938". Like Section 20 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, what has been emphasised in Section 27 (1) (c) of Act No. X of 1947, is the record as an occupant, and not the actual possession over the disputed plots. I, therefore, find myself unable to agree with the view of Mr. Sharma on this point. I think a mere entry of a person as an occupant in a record revised under Chapter IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, is sufficient to confer the rights granted by Section 27 of Act No. X of 1947, even though it may be proved that the person was not in actual possession of the land. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that in the case before me some sub-tenants were in actual possession of the land and the petitioner's name was merely recorded as a tenant of the plots. It may be so, but the mere of the entry in the record is sufficient to confer rights on the petitioner. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that in the case before me some sub-tenants were in actual possession of the land and the petitioner's name was merely recorded as a tenant of the plots. It may be so, but the mere of the entry in the record is sufficient to confer rights on the petitioner. There were a number of cases before the Board of Revenue, and the Board of Revenue held that the word "occupant" included not only persons recorded as tenants but also persons recorded as trespassers. They held that the word "occupant" would cover both classes of persons though it could not cover the case of subtenants because under the proviso to Sub-Section 3 of Section 27 of Act X of 1947, it is the persons who were subsequently admitted to tenancy by the land-holders, who became subtenants for a period of three years. As the rights of the sub-tenants did not include any right of indefinite occupation of the land, the previous subtenants could not be reinstated under the provisions of Section 27 because of the reasons mentioned above. I think it is sufficient to mention one of the cases decided by the Board of Revenue in 1948, and I may refer to the case of Radha Krishna v. Smt. Indrani Kunwar 1948 A. W. R. (Rev.) 121 9. The decision, in my opinion, of both the learned members of the Board of Revenue is patently erroneous. One member made a mistake as to the interpretation of the entry and the other member did not agree with that interpretation. The other member held that actual possession was essential before the provisions of Section 27(1)(c) could apply, and that is against the view of this Court. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents then argued that this was a mere error of law and it could not be corrected in proceedings for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari. I think it is too late in the day to urge this point and the Supreme Court has now clearly said that a patent error of law can be corrected in the proceedings for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari. I think it is too late in the day to urge this point and the Supreme Court has now clearly said that a patent error of law can be corrected in the proceedings for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari. In the Division Bench case of Lala Nanak Chand referred to above, this Court quashed the judgment of the Board of Revenue on the ground that it disclosed a patent error of law, and the same is the position in the case before me. 11. It was then argued that the setting aside of the order of the Board of Revenue would work very harshly on the respondents, because they have been in possession of this land from 1942 or 1943 and they were let into possession by the zamindars. I do not think I can give effect to this argument because it is the legislature which has granted certain rights to occupants, and it is not possible for Courts to say that the law of the land should not be followed because the same acts harshly or unjustly on certain individuals. 12. The last point argued was in the nature of a preliminary objection, and the argument is that the petitioner could have filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India against the decision and there being another remedy open to the petioner, the writ petition should not be entertained. It is true that it is open to the Supreme Court to grant Special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Board of Revenue but it cannot be said that the petitioner has any right in himself to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. The right to grant leave is the right of the Supreme Court and not of the petitioner. It cannot be said that any other equally efficacious remedy was open to the petitioner. 13. The result is that this petition is allowed; and a Writ of Certiorari shall issue quashing the orders of the Board of Re venue dated the 31st of January, 1955, and the 28th of February, 1955, allowing the revisions against the order of the Collector. 14. In view of the special circumstance of this case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs