Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.-This is an appeal by one P.E. Warne, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 153 of 1949, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ootacamund, against the judgment and decree therein. The facts were briefly these:The plaintiff had brought the suit for recovering Rs. 64,844-7-9 as damages for his wrongful dismissal by the defendants, the Ouchterlony Valley Estates Ltd., with their registered office at Calicut. His case was this: The defendants were badly in need of the services of an experienced planter like him. As a result of negotiations between him and the defendants, he was entertained as the Manager of the New Hope Estates, under the defendants, as per the terms contained in Exhibit A-7 the defendant’s letter dated 23rd August, 1947, accepted by the plaintiff by the letter, Exhibit B-10, dated 25th September, 1947. The terms of service, as per Exhibit A-7, were shortly these: The plaintiff was to be paid at Rs. 900 per mensem for a probationary period of six months. When the probationary period was satisfactorily completed, he was to be confirmed and paid at Rs. 950 per mensem for the first year, and at Rs. 1,000 per mensem for the second, third and fourth years, besides a dearness allowance of Rs. 350 per mensem. On confirmation, he was given the right to his share in the 5 per cent, of the net profits set apart for paying commission to the staff, the defendants’ board to allocate the commission for each manager. The plaintiff was to be given free medical aid on the estate, and leave in India for one month, exclusive of the casual leave, and leave outside India for six months, within a period of four years, after confirmation, on full pay, and passage allowance at Bibby rates. He was to be given a cooly allowance to defray the cost of three coolies to serve under him. He was to contribute com-pulsorily Rs. 100 per month towards his provident fund, and the defendants were to contribute an equal amount. He was to be paid Rs. 100 per month to maintain a suitable horse for going round the estate and supervising. In case he kept a car, he was to be paid an extra allowance of Rs. 10 per month. He was not to undertake any outside work without the special sanction of the defendants’ board. He was to be paid Rs. 100 per month to maintain a suitable horse for going round the estate and supervising. In case he kept a car, he was to be paid an extra allowance of Rs. 10 per month. He was not to undertake any outside work without the special sanction of the defendants’ board. The contract of service could be terminated by giving three calendar months’ notice in writing on either side. The plaintiff entered the service of the defendants on the 3rd of October, 1947. He completed his probation satisfactorily. About the 15th August, 1948, he purchased a car, and the defendants lent him Rs. 6,000 for that purpose, by a letter dated 17th August, 1948, and he was to repay the loan at not less than Rs. 200 per month to be deducted from his salary, and the loan amount was to be credited with full amount of any commission he might be entitled to, and was in any case to be fully repaid before 17th August, 1950, the loan being interest free. The plaintiff continued to discharge his service to the satisfaction of the defendants and drew his increments, as contemplated in Exhibit A-7, and was drawing Rs. 1,000 per month from 1st April, 1949. But his efficient services and improvement of the estate, and the satisfaction he gave to the employers created jealousy and ill-will in one Mr. J.H. Wilkes, the General Manager of the defendant-company, residing in an estate near the New Hope Estate. Mr. Wilkes sent confidential reports of a malicious and false nature against the plaintiff, and created animosity towards him on the part of the defendants. No charges were framed against him, nor was any explanation demanded from him about any of the charges made by Mr. Wilkes in his confidential reports. Suddenly, on 31st May, 1949, Messrs. Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., the Managing Agents and Secretaries of the defendant-company, purporting to act on behalf of the defendants, wrote a letter, Exhibit A-13, to the plaintiff, terminating his services as and from 30th June, 1949, as they were no longer required and enclosed a cheque for a miserable sum of Rs. Suddenly, on 31st May, 1949, Messrs. Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd., the Managing Agents and Secretaries of the defendant-company, purporting to act on behalf of the defendants, wrote a letter, Exhibit A-13, to the plaintiff, terminating his services as and from 30th June, 1949, as they were no longer required and enclosed a cheque for a miserable sum of Rs. 350 alleged to be in full settlement of his claim which was stated to amount only to the salary for three calendar months from 11th July, 1947 and dearness allowance, and the company’s contribution to the provident fund for three months, in lieu of notice, deducting from the amount, so arrived at, Rs. 4,000, the balance due on the car loan, though this amount had not fallen due and could only be deducted at Rs. 200 per month as per the agreement between the parties. He was also asked to hand over charge of the estate to his successor who would arrive on or before 25th June, 1949, and to leave the rent free bungalow he had been given. He informed the defendants through his letter dated 13th June, 1949, Exhibit A-14, that he was returning the cheque for Rs. 350, as it could not be considered to be in full settlement of his claims against the defendant company, that he believed that there was a pre-arranged plot to get rid of him after making full use of his skill and services, and that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the remaining period of thirty three months covered by the contract of service, and that, in any event, the deduction of Rs. 4000, the balance of the car allowance, was unwarranted, as it had not fallen due, and that he was also entitled to his commission, which, according to what he had been told by Mr. Thorne, before he was entertained in service, would amount to some Rs. 6000 per year, and could not in any case be less than Rs. 5,000 and that he was also entitled to the passage expenses of himself and his wife to England at Bibby rates, i.e., at Rs. 1,050 each, besides the provident fund contributions by the defendants for the remaining period out of the four years. 6000 per year, and could not in any case be less than Rs. 5,000 and that he was also entitled to the passage expenses of himself and his wife to England at Bibby rates, i.e., at Rs. 1,050 each, besides the provident fund contributions by the defendants for the remaining period out of the four years. He continued to stay on in the estate bungalow, but the defendant-company made it hot for him by fixing the rental value of the bungalow at Rs. 500 a month. Finally, therefore he vacated the bungalow on 6th October, 1949, having occupied it rent-free till then. He filed this suit for recovering Rs. 64,844-7-9, his pay and allowances for the unexpired period of thirty three months of contract, including therein Rs. 20,000 as commission or bonus, at Rs. 5000 per year, Rs. 2,100 as passage expenses for himself and his wife at Bibby rates, Rs. 3,300 as his contribution to the provident fund and Rs. 3,300 as the company’s contribution, but deducting therefrom Rs. 4,000 due by him as balance of car loan, evidently because that amount could be deducted or set off against the commission as per the agreement. The defendants strenuously contested the suit contending that they were entitled to pay him the three months’ salary, and the allowances really due to him, in lieu of the three months’ notice contemplated in Exhibit A-7, that the cheque for Rs. 350 sent to him was the correct amount due to him, that he was not entitled to continue for thirty three months more, as there was no certain period of four years’ employment guaranteed to him either by the contract or by custom or usage, or by reason of any representation said to have been made to him by Mr. Jackson or any other person, in variation of the terms under Exhibit A-7, and that such a representation, if any, could not also be proved in variance of the written terms of the contract, Exhibit A-7, under the Indian Evidence Act. Jackson or any other person, in variation of the terms under Exhibit A-7, and that such a representation, if any, could not also be proved in variance of the written terms of the contract, Exhibit A-7, under the Indian Evidence Act. They also contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to any commission, as none had been allowed to him for the year 1948-1949, when alone there was profit, and that it was in the absolute discretion of the defendants’ Board to allot any amount of commission, or no commission at all, to any manager or employee as they liked, and that the claim of the plaintiff to the pay and D.A. for thirty three months, or to the passage allowance, when he had not applied for leave abroad or been granted it, and for the company’s contribution towards the provident fund for thirty three months were too extravagant and fantastic to be ever entertained. The learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues: (1). Do the written terms of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants entitle the plaintiff to a four year certain period of employment? (2) If not, is the plaintiff entitled to set up usage and custom in support of his contention? (3) Is there any custom or usage by which European planters recruited to service are appointed on agreement providing for a term of 3 to 5 years and are their services, if satisfactory, considered permanent? (4) Is the plaintiff entitled to set up an oral representation that the clause regarding the three month’s period of notice was only intended for the benefit of the employee? (5) If so, is such oral representation true and binding on the defendants ? (6) Whether defendants are entitled to terminate plaintiff’s service by a three month’s notice? (7) Is the notice terminating plaintiff’s service invalid for any of the reasons mentioned in paragraph 15 of the plaint? (8) To what compensation, if any, is he entitled for the termination of his services ? (9) What is the amount to which he is entitled as Provident Fund? (10) To what relief, if any, is plaintiff entitled? The plaintiff examined two witnesses on his behalf, including himself. The defendants examined only one witness on their behalf, an Assistant Manager. The plaintiff filed Exhibits A-1 to A-29 and the defendants Exhibits B-1 to B-24. (9) What is the amount to which he is entitled as Provident Fund? (10) To what relief, if any, is plaintiff entitled? The plaintiff examined two witnesses on his behalf, including himself. The defendants examined only one witness on their behalf, an Assistant Manager. The plaintiff filed Exhibits A-1 to A-29 and the defendants Exhibits B-1 to B-24. After discussing the entire evidence, the learned subordinate Judge found, on. issues 1 and 6, that the written terms of the agreement embodied in Exhibit A-7 did not entitle the plaintiff to four year’s certain term of employment but enabled the employer and employee to terminate the services on three months’ calendar notice in writing on either side. On issues 2 and 3, he found that the plaintiff could not rely on any usage or custom in support of his contention either that he, as a European manager or planter, was entitled to permanent employment under the defendants, so long as he continued fit for service, or that he was entitled to employment for at least a term of four years certain. On issue 4, he found that section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act would preclude the plaintiff from setting up any oral representation made to him by Mr. Jackson or any other person, that the clause regarding the three months’ notice in Exhibit A-7 was only intended for the benefit of the employees. On issue 5, he found that what Mr. Jackson would have intended by what he said was only to assure the plaintiff that in the practical working of the notice clause it was the employee rather than the employer who benefited, and that, even if it meant otherwise, it would not avail the plaintiff as being contrary to the written terms of the contract and the variation was not a subsequent one entered into by the defendants or on their behalf. On issue 7, he found that the defendants could not, under the terms of Exhibit A-7, validly terminate the plaintiff’s contract of service by paying three months’ salary and allowance in lieu of notice, and that, as a matter of fact -even the three months’ salary and allowance due to the plaintiff had not been covered by the cheque for Rs. 350 sent to him, as the cooly allowance had not been included therein and the motor car loan balance of Rs. 350 sent to him, as the cooly allowance had not been included therein and the motor car loan balance of Rs. 3,400 not yet fallen due, had been deducted from them contrary to the terms of the agreement governing the advance for the purchase of the car. But he held that the notice terminating his employment,. Exhibit A-13, would not be vitiated merely because charges were not framed against the plaintiff, or reasons assigned for terminating his services, or his explanation taken. So he held, on that issue, that Exhibit A-13 would not amount to a valid notice under Exhibit A-7, as it was not a notice terminating the employment of the plaintiff at the end of the three months, but was a notice terminating his employment, against the terms of Exhibit A-7, on 30th June, 1946, itself, without the three month’ notice required under Exhibit A-7. He held that, in the absence of a clause that three months’ pay and allowances could be paid in lieu of the three months’ notice, the defendants were not entitled to make such a payment in lieu of notice. On issue, 8,he held that the plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to be paid full pay and allowances for thirty-three months the balance of the four years’ terms of service, was not tenable, nor his contention that, as the temination of his service under Exhibit A-13 was not valid, there was no notice at all to him as contemplated in Exhibit A-7 and he should, therefore, be paid his full pay and allowances for the balance of the four years period viz-, the thirty-three months. He relied on the rulings in Municipal Borough of Dhulia v. Ramachandra Bapuji1 , and Gukak Municipality v. Rajaram Shridhar2 , and held that the plaintiff was only entitled to the three months’ pay and allowances, in lieu of the term in Exhibit A-7 for termination of the contract of service by three months’ calendar notice on either side, which was at their absolute discretion and pleasure, and not confined, to valid reasons, like misconduct of the employee or employer, etc. He held further that, under the ruling in Bimalacharan Batabyal v. Trustees of the Indian Museum3 , even if there was no term fixed for the notice, an employee like the plaintiff was only entitled to a reasonable notice which, in that case, was held to be a notice for three months, but that, in this case, the period of the notice having been fixed already in Exhibit A-7. there was no need for the Court to fix any reasonable period of notice. He was of the opinion that the decision in High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lal4 , relied on by the plaintiff’s counsel, would not be applicable to this case, as that was a case of permanent employment of a civil servant, terminable only on misconduct, etc., and that the order of dismissal was held to be void and inoperative, as it was not in accordance with the statutory provisions contained in section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, and that the decision, therefore could not be applied to a case like this of a private contract of service entered into between the parties with an express clause for terminating the contract by three months calendar notice on either side. Finally, he held that the plaintiff would be entitled only to damages calculated on his pay and allowances for the three months’ notice period, subject to his having tried his best to mitigate the damages by seeking similar employment during that period. He held that in the present case the plaintiff had proved by his evidence that he had tried for and failed to get a suitable employment during the period of three months’ notice and was, therefore, entitled to the full pay and allowances and benefits of every kind during the period of three months’ notice he was entitled to under Exhibit A-7. He considered the claim of the plaintiff to Rs. 64,844-7-9 to be wholly unjustifiable. He considered that the was only entitled to his salary of Rs. 3, 000 for the three months, dearness allowance of Rs. 1050 at Rs. 350 a month, another Rs. 300 as the company’s contribution towards the provident fuad for those three months, and to cooly allowance of Rs. 270 for the three months at Rs. 90 per month, or, in all, to Rs. 4620 and that the defendants were not entitled to deduct more than Rs. 1050 at Rs. 350 a month, another Rs. 300 as the company’s contribution towards the provident fuad for those three months, and to cooly allowance of Rs. 270 for the three months at Rs. 90 per month, or, in all, to Rs. 4620 and that the defendants were not entitled to deduct more than Rs. 600 towards the car advance at Rs. 200 per month, and that the balance of Rs. 3400 which fell due later, could only be sued for and recovered separately, and that even the defendants had in Exhibit A-19, dated 27th June, 1949, intimated to the plaintiff that the balance of the car loan due by him could be dealt with separately and sued for if necessary. On issue 9, he found that the amount due to the plaintiff under the head "provident fund" as on 30th June, 1949, was admittedly Rs. 2,936-15-9, as agreed to by both sides, and that this amount had remained unpaid to him as he had failed to reply to the defendants’ query as to how he wanted it to be paid to him, and had also failed to send a receipt for the amount, as requested by them, but that the entire amount had been paid to him through his advocate since the filing of the suit and so the question had been fully settled. As a result of his findings he gave a decree to the plaintiff for Rs. 4020, adding only Rs. 270 the cooly allowance for the three months, to the calculation of the defendant, but disallowing the deduction of Rs. 3400 the balance of car loan. He also allowed the plaintiff’s suit regarding the provident fund amount paid after the filing of the suit. He dismissed the rest of the plaintiff’s suit, and granted his claim only to the extent of Rs. 6956-15-9 (Rs. 4020 plus Rs. 2936-15-9). He gave the plaintiff’s costs on Rs. 6,956-15-9. In view of the plaintiff’s having claimed far in excess of his dues, he directed him to pay the defendants the costs of the amount disallowed. The net result of his order of costs was that the plaintiff got Rs. 365-13-0 as costs from the defendants, and was directed to pay the defendants Rs. 2463-12-0 as costs. The plaintiff has appealed. The defendants have not filed any appeal or memorandum of cross-objections. The net result of his order of costs was that the plaintiff got Rs. 365-13-0 as costs from the defendants, and was directed to pay the defendants Rs. 2463-12-0 as costs. The plaintiff has appealed. The defendants have not filed any appeal or memorandum of cross-objections. We have perused the entire records and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Dr. John, for the plaintiff appellant, raised four main contentions. The first was that though the lower Court might have been right in holding that under Exhibit A-7 the plaintiff was not entitled to permanent employment till he became unfit or committed misconduct, and though such permanent employment or even a term employment for four years was not proved by custom or usage, still under the terms of Exhibit A-7, which was a contract of employment for a period of four years certain, determinable only by three months’ valid notice, even if Mr. Jackson’s assurance to the plaintiff would not take away the effect of the clause regarding the notice itself by estopping the defendants from issuing a notice in view of the fact that the lower Court itself held that Exhibit A-13 would not be a valid notice under the terms of Exhibit A-7, the plaintiff should have been granted his full pay and allownces for the entire unexpired period out of the four years certain, viz., thirty-three months as claimed by him in the plaint. Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar, the learned counsel for the defendants, contended that Exhibit A-7 did not constitute a contract of service for four years, and that it was a contract of service without any term certain, determinable at three months’ notice on either side, and that the payment of the pay and allowances for the period of three months’ notice would validly take the place of notice itself. We are of opinion that both contentions are wrong. A simple glance at Exhibit A-7 would show that it was a contract of service for four years determinable by three months’ calendar notice on either side, and was neither a contract of service for four years certain without the right to determine it by three months’ notice on either side, nor was it a kind of contract for service from year to year or month to month, like a year to year or month to month lease, as contended by Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar. O.T.G. Nambiar. Clause 3 of Exhibit A-7 runs as follows: "Salary when confirmed: First year .. Rs. 950 per mensem. Second year .. Rs. 1,000 per mensem. Third year .. Rs. 1,000 per mensem. Fourth year .. Rs. 1,000 per mensem. Clause 8 says "six months leave ex India, within the period of four years.". It is idle to contend in view of these clauses that the contract of service was not for a period of four years determinable as provided by clause 11 by three calendar months’ notice on either side. Dr. John’s contention that Mr. Jackson’s assuring the plaintiff that clause 11 was more intended for the benefit of the employee than the employer would mean that the employer could not terminate the services of the employee by a three months’ notice within the four years period is untenable. Such variation of the written terms of the contract by an alleged oral representation by an employee of the defendants, and not authorised by the defendants, will be neither provable under the Indian Evidence Act nor valid even otherwise. Indeed, Mr. Jackson’s alleged assurance to the plaintiff was itself not at all a variation of the terms regarding the notice in Exhibit A-7, but as observed by the lower Court, was merely a commentary on that term as intended more for the benefit of the employee than for the employer, and would not amount to anything more than his view or pious hope or opinion. So, we agree with the lower Court that the contract of service was one for four years determinable on three months’ notice by either side. We cannot agree with Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar’s contention that payment of salary and allowance for the period of notice can, even in the absence of such provision in the contract of service, take the place of three months’ notice. Of course, people are free to enter into any valid terms in a contract, provided that they are not illegal, or immoral or opposed to public policy, and it was open to the parties to agree that, in lieu of three months’ notice the employer was at liberty to pay three months’ pay and allowances. Such a clause is often found in contracts of service, as few employers would like to keep employees in service after such notice. Such a clause is often found in contracts of service, as few employers would like to keep employees in service after such notice. But the question in whether in the absence of an express clause in the contract of service, entitling the employer to pay the salary and allowances in lieu of notice, he is entitled to do so. Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar asked what reasonable objection could there be to doing so, as the employee will be getting his salary without doing any work and will be benefitting thereby. We are afraid that this is too simple to be accepted. There are employees who want to work, and learn work, instead of receiving merely a salary and doing no work. The alleged freedom to roam about during the period of notice and secure other suitable employment at least by the end of the period of the notice, instead of working in office all day long with no such liberty to roam about and seek a new job was urged by Mr. Nambiar to be an advantage to the employee, by allowing this kind of substitute for notice. But it is obvious that it is for the employee to choose and not for the employer to dictate to him. As pointed out by Dr. John, the learned counsel for the appellant, it is settled law now that in the absence of an express term in the contract, or usage to that effect, an employee cannot be dismissed without notice by paying his wages for the notice period in lieu of notice (See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 22, paragraph 280, page 167). Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar did not pursue this argument after his attention was drawn to that passage and to the authorities cited therein. He had also to concede that even the pay and allowances during the three months’ period, really due to the plaintiff, had not been paid to him under Exhibit A-13, the cooly allowance not having been included, as it should have been, and an amount of Rs. 3400, of the car advance, having been improperly deducted. We are satisfied that Mr. 3400, of the car advance, having been improperly deducted. We are satisfied that Mr. Nambiar’s argument in this respect cannot stand, and that where there is no express clause in the contract of service for payment of salary and allowances for the notice period in lieu of notice, or usage to that effect, (no such usage has been proved in this case,) the defendants were not entitled to pay the plaintiff the salary and allowances for the three months’ period of notice in lieu of notice, and that they did not also pay the actual amount of pay and allowances due. We are also satisfied that Dr. John is right in his contention that in the circumstances of this case the termination of the plaintiff’s services under Exhibit A-13 would amount to wrongful dismissal, because his services were terminated as and from 30th June, 1949, the beginning of the three months’ period, as contemplated in Exhibit A-7, and the plaintiff had been asked to hand over charge to his successor on 25th June, itself even before the period of three month’s notice commenced. The rulings in Addis v. Gramophone Company Ltd.1 , Rubel Bronze and Metal Company and Vos, In re2, and Connaught Properties Ltd. v. Regional Properties Ltd3 , make this clear beyond all reasonable doubt, and Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar could not cite any ruling to the contrary. But the question still remains whether, even if it amounted to wrongful dismissal, the plaintiff could claim more than the pay and allowances for the three months’ period of notice contemplated in Exhibit A-7. Dr. John contended that in a case like this, where the services had been terminated by an invalid letter like Exhibit A-13, and not by a proper notice as contemplated in Exhibit A-7, and where no valid three months’ no’:ice was given by the defendants, the lower Court should have decreed the pay and allowances for the entire unexpired period of thirty-three months out of the four years’ period of service contracted for under Exhibit A-7, as it was a case of wrongful dismissal. He relied on some observations in paragraph 169 of Vol. 10, and in paragraph 280 of Vol. He relied on some observations in paragraph 169 of Vol. 10, and in paragraph 280 of Vol. 22 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, where it has been observed that in actions for wrongful dismissal, the plaintiff may recover the wages for the whole unexpired period of service, including wages due on the date of dismissal, but that if he has obtained, or has not made a reasonable effort for obtaining other similar occupation, this has to be taken into account, though he could not recover damages for the manner of his dismissal or for his injured feelings, or for the loss he may sustain from the fact that his dismissal of itself may make it difficult for him to obtain fresh employment, or, in the absence of very special circumstances, for the loss of prestige or publicity which he would have otherwise got by having remained in the employer’s service, or because there has been delay in the payment of his wages on the termination of his employment, and that he would also be entitled to any commission under the terms of the contract till the valid termination of the contract. But there is also the observation, in paragraph 280 of Vol. 22, that the measure of damages may, in some cases, be the amount of wages for the period of notice which might be regarded as liquidated damages fixed by the parties. We have no doubt whatever that, under the law as it stands what the plaintiff would be entitled, in the case of such a wrongful dismissal as this, under a contract of employment, which provides for terminating the employment by three months’ notice on either side, at the perfect discretion of either party, would be only the pay and allowances due for the period of notice, and nothing more. That was what was held in Addis v. Gramophone Company Limited1 , where too the circumstances were very similar to this, as the plaintiff, a manager of a business in Calcutta, had been wrongfully dismissed by giving him a notice not in accordance with the six months’ notice provided for in the contract of service and had been superseded within the period of notice, which had been given only in October, 1905, by one Mr. Gilpin who was appointed as his successor, and steps were taken forthwith to prevent the plaintiff from acting as manager any longer. Gilpin who was appointed as his successor, and steps were taken forthwith to prevent the plaintiff from acting as manager any longer. Only his salary from October, 1905 to April, 1906, for the period of six months’ notice, was allowed by the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor and four learned Lords Justices concurring. Even earlier, the principle had been laid down by the Queen’s Bench in Hartley v. Harman2 , where the reason underlying the principle was give by Patterson, J., who remarked, “What is there wrongful in the dismissal except that there was not a month’s notice?” This will meet Dr. John’s argument that a man like the plaintiff, made a victim of a wrong, should be restored to his rights, the wrong being ignored, When there was perfect liberty on the part of the defendants to terminate the plain-tiff’s services by a three months’ notice, and they had committed wrong in terminating his services even before the three months expired, he would be restored to his, rights, and the wrong rectified, if he is given the advantage of the three months’ notice stipulated for under the contract of service. In French v. Brookes and mother3 , the same principle was accepted; only in that case the expense of the return passage from South America to England in consequence of such dismissal was also given, as there was an agreement under the contract of service to. pay for such expense of return to England. In Municipal Borough of Dhulia v. Rama-chandra Bapuji4 , relied on by the lower Court, a Bench consisting of Broomfield and Wassoodew, JJ., has held that where a person’s service was not a case of service during good behaviour but a service terminable at will in the manner expressed in the contract of service, the person would only be entitled to damages, in case of a wrongful dismissal, measured by the wages for the period of notice, and nothing more. In Gokak Municipality v. Rajaram Shridhar1 , also relied on by the lower Court, a Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of Broomfield and Divatia, JJ., referred to the same principle with approval. Dr. In Gokak Municipality v. Rajaram Shridhar1 , also relied on by the lower Court, a Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of Broomfield and Divatia, JJ., referred to the same principle with approval. Dr. John relied on the observations of a Bench of this Court, consisting of Rame-sam and Cornish, JJ., in Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Anantharama Ayyar2 , and urged on the basis of those observations, that the plaintiff is entitled to his pay and allowances for the entire unexpired period of the four years, viz., for thirty-three months. We cannot agree. The learned Judges merely observed in that case that the measure of damages for the breach of promise is obtained by considering what is the usual rate of wages for the employment contracted for and what time would be lost before a similar employment could be obtained, and that the Court should see in each particular case what time may reasonably be expected to lapse before a person wrongfully dismissed can secure a similar employment. But that was not a case where there was a provision in the contract of service for determining the service by three months’ notice on either side, at its absolute discretion, as here. So, a reasonable period had to be fixed by the Court, which is not necessary here, in view of the three months’ notice fixed in the contract of service itself. No doubt, Dr. John may be right in stating that the plaintiff was not able to obtain a similar employment during the entire remaining period of thirty-three months, and that even afterwards he has remained unemployed, and that it is very unlikely that, at this old age, he would secure further employment, though the lower Court has confined its finding quite rightly to the fact that he was not able to find a suitable employment during the three months’ period of notice, which alone was relevant in this case, the fact of his finding no employment even after the three months is irrelevant. Suppose he had been given a valid notice of three months, he might still have been unable to find any suitable employment. So this hardship would come within the scope of the observations of the House of Lords in Addis v. Gramophone Company Ltd.3, that compensation could not be given for irrelevant factors, like this, having no bearing on the wrongful dismissal. Dr. So this hardship would come within the scope of the observations of the House of Lords in Addis v. Gramophone Company Ltd.3, that compensation could not be given for irrelevant factors, like this, having no bearing on the wrongful dismissal. Dr. John then relied on the ruling in Connaught Properties v. Regional Properties Limited4 . But, there, it was a case of the defendant-company not exercising their right to terminate the contract on the only occasion they were entitled to do it, viz., when one Ley ceased to be a director of the plaintiff-company for a reason other than death. But, here the defendant-company’s right to terminate the contract by three month’s notice was not confined to one occasion, or one event, but continued right through the four years. Nor will the ruling in Rubel Bronze and Metal Co., and Vos., In re5 , help the plaintiff against the operation of the above ruling, as urged by Dr. John. It is only authority for holding that the termination of the service of this plaintiff in this case would be a wrongful dismissal, as the conduct of the employer amounted here also to a basic refusal to continue the service on the agreed terms of employment, and that dismissal may be effected by conduct as well as words. There is nothing in that ruling to give greater damages for such wrongful dismissal in a case like this where there was a provision in the contract of service itself to terminate the employment by giving three months’ notice. Of course, that ruling will help the plaintiff to claim the commission till the date on which a valid notice, if given on the date of the wrongful dismissal, would have terminated, if otherwise due. Nor will the ruling in Salt v. Power Plant Co., Ltd.6, help the plaintiff in this case to get greater damages. There too the six months’ notice which could have been given for terminating the employment, was not given at the only period that it could have been given, and, in its absence, it was held that the plaintiff’s employment was to be for life, and it was on the basis of his losing a life appointment that damages were awarded. Obviously, that ruling will have no application to the facts of this case. Obviously, that ruling will have no application to the facts of this case. Nor will the ruling of a Bench of this Court in Lakshminarasimacharyulu v. M.H. School, Cocanada1 , help the plaintiff in this case to get greater damages. There was no provision there too for terminating the services on a notice given by either side for there months, at its absolute discretion, as here. Then Dr. John urged that, even so, the lower Court has not granted all the allowances due to the plaintiff till the end of the three months’ period. The first item he claimed was a sum of Rs. 5000 as commission for each of the two years,. 1947-1948 and 1948-1949. According to him, Exhibit A-7 expressly stated that the plaintiff would be entitled to his share in the commission, and the lower Court was wrong in holding that it was in the absolute discretion of the defendants’ Board to allot any commission or no commission to any manager or employee, as it liked, and that, as no commission had been in fact allotted to the plaintiff, no commission could be allowed to him and that the plaintiff had been given to understand before he was entertained that the commission of the previous manager in 1943-1944 might work out to Rs. 6,000 and thus led to expect that the commission for him also would be at least Rs. 5,000 per year. It was also pointed out by Dr. John that Mr. Minkley and Mr. Commin had been given commissions of Rs. 6,000 and Rs. 5,000, respectively for 1948-1949, and that the plaintiff’s claim for Rs. 5,000 for that year, though he had been allotted no commission by the defendants’ Board, would be fair, and that even in 1947-1948, when there was no net profit and no commission could be claimed strictly, the defendants had distributed Rs. 9,950, in lieu of commission to the managers, Mr. Minkley and Mr. Commin being paid Rs. 3,000 and Rs. 1,000, and that the New Hope Estate, of which the plaintiff was the manager, had not sustained any loss but had made gains which were wiped out by the losses of the other estates under the defendants and so the plaintiff could not be penalised and deprived of his commission for 1947-1948, and that this commission should be fixed at Rs. 5,000, for that year also. Mr. 5,000, for that year also. Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar urged two contentions to the contrary. ‘The first was that it was in the absolute discretion of the defendants’ Board to award any commission, or no commission, to any manager, as it liked without assignig any reasons, and, secondly, that, in any event, there was only loss and no profit for 1947-1948 and that the plaintiff had no right to claim commission simply because ex gratia payments, in lieu of commission, were made by the defendants’ Board toother managers for that year. We cannot agree with Mr. Nambiar that when there was profit, and 5 per cent, of it had to be set apart for giving commission to managers and employees, the defendants’ Board could, without assigning any reason, refuse a manager, like the plaintiff, any commission at all. Under Exhibit A-7, the defendants’ Board had only the discretion to allocate the commission between the managers. Perhaps it would have a right to award a higher commission to a more efficient manager and a lesser commission to a less efficient manager. But to award no-commission at all to a manager is not allocating commission to him and will be an abuse of the terms of Exhibit A-7. The plaintiff had also been led to expect that a commission in the region of Rs. 5,000 or Rs. 6,000 per year, in years of profits, could be earned by him, by the letter Exhibit A-5, written to him by Mr. Thorne, when he was being invited to join the defendant’s services. It is in that expectation that he entered that service. He was not warned that there was a right in the defendants’ Board to award no commission at all to any manager it chose. If he had been warned like that he might have thought twice before entering the defendants’ service. Of course, we agree with Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar that there is no question of the plaintiff’s claiming any commission in a year of loss, like 1947-1948, and that the loss must be taken to be the loss of the defendant-company as a whole, and not the loss of any particular estate like the New Hope Estate. We agree also that the plaintiff cannot claim any commission simply because some other managers were given ex gratia payments in lieu of commission. We agree also that the plaintiff cannot claim any commission simply because some other managers were given ex gratia payments in lieu of commission. Any payment made ex gratia will not form a legal basis for the plaintiff’s claiming any commission in a year of loss as of right. So, the plaintiff’s claim regarding commission for 1947-1948, a year of loss, is rejected. But his claim for commission for 1948-1949, a year of profit, during the eleven months of which he worked, is allowed. We fix that commission at Rs, 15, 000, the mean between the amounts allowed to Mr. Minkley and Mr.Commin who took his place, having regard also to the amount of Rs. 6,000, mentioned as the likely commission per year for the manager of that estate, in Exhibit A-5. We do not agree with the lower Court that this commission should be sued for separately. The rulings allow such payments to be adjusted even in this suit. For the same reason, we allow the Rs. 3,400, the balance of the car advance, to be deducted out of the commission amount of Rs. 5,000, without making the defendant company file a separate suit for recovering that amount. There is no need to multiply suits and proceedings in cases like this. It is also equitable that when the plaintiff is allowed to recover Rs. 5,000, commission in this very suit, he should also be made to repay in this very suit the Rs. 3,400, the balance of the car advance which has fallen due long ago. Indeed, in fairness to the plaintiff, even in his plaint he wanted to deduct Rs. 4,000 the entire balance of the car advance from the suit amount though in the expectation of getting the fabulous amount of Rs. 68,844-7-9, claimed by him as damages for wrongful dismissal. Dr. John then urged that the plaintiff would be entitled to at least his passage fare to England at Bibby rates, though not for his wife’s passage, which was not mentioned at all in Exhibit A-7. He put this fare at Rs. 1,050. Mr. 68,844-7-9, claimed by him as damages for wrongful dismissal. Dr. John then urged that the plaintiff would be entitled to at least his passage fare to England at Bibby rates, though not for his wife’s passage, which was not mentioned at all in Exhibit A-7. He put this fare at Rs. 1,050. Mr. O.T.G. Nambiar did not dispute the correctness of this figure, but urged that it was fantastic for the plaintiff to claim the passage money to England when he had not been granted leave or passage, and when the three months’ notice period had expired long before any such "application for leave or passage, and he had not really gone to England also and incurred the passage fare, and that the mere fact that in the company’s programme he was scheduled for leave in October, 1950, would not help him, when his services would terminate at least by 30th September, 1949. We agree with Mr. Nambiar and reject this claim as did the lower Court. Dr. John did not press for the company’s contribution to provident fund for the thirty-three months, or for house rent, in view of our decision regarding the damages being restricted in this case to the three months’ pay and allowances. But we may add that the plaintiff lived in the bungalow rent-free till the three months’ period had lapsed, and, indeed, for a few days more. So, the question of his being allowed any house rent, as part of the damages, does not arise. He has . been allowed the company’s contribution for the full three months of notice. So,, there is nothing to be allowed under that head also. Dr. John did not urge for any higher cooly allowance than that allowed by the lower Court, and we consider the cooly allowance allowed by the lower Court to be sufficient. The last contention of Dr. John was that the lower Court was not justified,, in the circumstances of this case, in directing the plaintiff to pay defendants their costs of Rs. 2,463-12-0, while he got from them only Rs. 365-13-0, and that this order practically took away with the left hand what the right hand gave. The last contention of Dr. John was that the lower Court was not justified,, in the circumstances of this case, in directing the plaintiff to pay defendants their costs of Rs. 2,463-12-0, while he got from them only Rs. 365-13-0, and that this order practically took away with the left hand what the right hand gave. He urged that, in cases like this, where the plaintiff files a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal, and is met with disingenuous and unsustainable defences, like termination of service by a valid notice, and denial of wrongful dismissal, denial of cooly allowance, and deduction of car advance balance not yet fallen due, and is denied his commission of atleast Rs. 5,000, and he is merely handed over a miserable cheque for Rs. 350 in full quit of his claims, Courts would not be justified in granting the defendants, any costs, especially when the suit amount had been calculated by the plaintiff relying on certain rulings, though held by the lower Court and by us, eventually, not to apply to the facts of this case. He said that the proper order should have been for the lower Court to give him his proportionate suit costs and to direct the defendants to bear their own proportionate costs. We agree that, in the circumstances, of this case, that would be the proper order. The plaintiff has got a decree in all for Rs. 11,956-15-9, including the Rs. 5,000 commission allowed by us in appeal, as against the Rs. 68,884-7-9 claimed by him, and he had claimed the higher amount relying on certain rulings, cited above, which would be applicable to cases of wrongful dismissal where there was no clause in the contract of employment providing for terminating the services by giving three months’ notice at its absolute discretion, by either side. The defendants had unnecessarily and unjustifibly denied the wrongful dismissal, set up a valid notice, denied the right to commission and coolly allowance, and deducted the balance of car advance not yet fallen due. So, we consider that the defendants should have been directed to bear their own suit costs, and that the plaintiff should have been given his suit costs calculated on the above sum of Rs. 11,956-15-9, and direct accordingly. So, we consider that the defendants should have been directed to bear their own suit costs, and that the plaintiff should have been given his suit costs calculated on the above sum of Rs. 11,956-15-9, and direct accordingly. In the end, therefore, the judgment and decree of the lower Court are modified by granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 5,620 (Rs. 11,956-15-9 minus Rs. 2.936-15-9, the provident fund amount already paid, and Rs. 3,400 the balance of car advance now deducted) and costs calculated on Rs. 11,956-15-9, the plaintiff being directed to bear the remaining costs himself, and the defendants being directed to bear their costs themselves. In this appeal, we direct all the parties to bear their own costs. The plaintiff cannot have in this appeal the indulgence we gave him in the suit, as he filed this appeal after the lower Court had clearly shown that he was not entitled to pay and allowances for the period of thirty-three months, but only for the period of three months, and the only modification we have made is regarding the commission of Rs. 5,000 and the deduction of the balance of car advance, and the plaintiff has established his claim in all only to Rs. 11, 956-15-9 as against the Rs. 68,844-7-9 claimed by him in the suit, and the utmost order he can ask for legitimately in this appeal is to direct both parties to bear their own costs. This Appeal having been set down this day 11th October, 1955) for being mentioned, the Court made the following Order:-The matter has come up for mention today. It is admitted now that Rs. 3,400, the balance of the car advance has been paid in 1951 though the matter -was not known to the advocates when they argued the appeal. In view of this, the decree granted in favour of the plaintiff in this appeal will be altered to one for Rs. 9,020 instead of Rs. 5,620. No other alteration is necessary. R.M. ----- Judgment and decree modified.