JUDGMENT This is an application in revision on behalf of the petitioner Pukhrambam Tamphajao Singh against the order of the learned Munsiff, Manipur dated 16-6-1954 by which the Title Suit No. 251 of 1952 was restored to its original number under O. 9, R. 13, Civil P. C. even though it had been decreed ex parte on 29-7-1953. Title Suit No. 251 of 1952 was instituted on 18-9-1952 and the defendant Sm. Manjuri Devi was served with summons on 30-11-1952. She attended the Court uptil 27-2-1953, and later on she fell ill on account of rheumatism and so on 9-4-1953 she sent one Gosai Singh who is the husband of the sister of the plaintiff-petitioner and this Gosai Singh, on return, informed her that summons would be issued to her for the next date. She naturally believed this version and waited for the summons but later on she came to know about the ex parte decree from an officer of the Bishenpur Tehsil when the present petitioner applied for a partition on the basis of this ex parte decree. She then made enquiries in the Munsiffs Court and applied for a copy of the ex parte order and within three days of getting of the order she filed the restoration application in Court on 24-11-1953. This application was contested by the present petitioner on the ground that it was time barred and Sm. Manjuri Devi had knowledge of the date of hearing i.e. 29-7-1953. The learned Munsiff allowed the restoration application on 16-6-1954 and so the plaintiff petitioner has come to this Court in revision. 2. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that S. 5, Limitation Act will not help the opposite parties nor can S. 151, Civil P. C. be availed of by them and reliance has been placed in this connection on Pundlik Vithoba v. Ganpat, AIR 1934 Nag 43 (A), in which it has been laid down that where S. 5, Limitation Act has not been extended by any rule under S. 122, Civil P. C. to applications for setting aside ex parte decrees, the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 164 and bring an otherwise time barred application for setting aside ex parte decree in time. 3. Reliance has also been placed on Ajodhya Mahton v. Mt. 3. Reliance has also been placed on Ajodhya Mahton v. Mt. Phul Kuer, AIR 1922 Pat 479 (B), where it has been held that a Court cannot set aside an ex parte decree in exercise of its inherent power under S. 151, Civil P. C. 4. In Chinnappa Naidu v. Deenadayalu Naidu, AIR 1948 Mad 480 (C), also, it has been held that the Court has no inherent jurisdiction to extend time under S. 5, Limitation Act, under Art. 163 for an application under O. 9, R. 9 to set aside an order of dismissal for default under O. 9, R. 13, Civil P. C. 5. The opposite parties have proved in this case by the evidence of Sm. Manjuri Devi and Konthoujam Muhari Singh that Gosai Singh mis-informed the lady and he practised fraud on her and so the opposite parlies should be allowed the period of 30 days from the time when they came to know about this fraud. The statements of Sm. Manjuri Debi and K. Muhari Singh show that the present petitioner did not put any question to them regarding the alleged fraud and so it must be held that fraud was practised on this lady by Goswai Singh who happens to be a near relation of the plaintiff-petitioner. It is also clear from the evidence of the defendant that she brought the present restoration application within three days of her obtaining copies and so she was not negligent in any manner. 6. Article 164, Limitation Act provides as follows : 7. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that as the summons was duly served on the defendant in this case on 30-11-1952 she could not get more than 30 days from the date of the ex parte decree, under this article, for filing a restoration application under O. 9, R. 13, Civil P. C. I have carefully considered this argument and I think it has no force. There is no doubt that S. 5, Limitation Act or S. 151, Civil P. C. would not help the opposite parties, but S. 18, Limitation Act surely helps them. Section 18, Limitation Act runs as follows : "18. There is no doubt that S. 5, Limitation Act or S. 151, Civil P. C. would not help the opposite parties, but S. 18, Limitation Act surely helps them. Section 18, Limitation Act runs as follows : "18. Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded, or where any document necessary to establish such right has been fraudulently concealed from him, the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application - (a) against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, or (b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production. 8. It is settled law that S. 18 can be availed of by an applicant to set aside an ex parte decree where he had been kept by fraud from the knowledge of his right to apply. There must not only have been fraud but the person injured by it must have been kept from knowledge of his right to institute a suit or making an application by means of such fraud. In Mt. Lal Devi v. Amar Nath, AIR 1920 Lah 261 (D), it was observed by Chevis, J. : "In order to take the benefit of S. 18, Limitation Act in an application to set aside an ex parte decree, it must be proved not that the ex parte decree was obtained by fraud but that the defendant was kept from knowledge of the decree having been passed by fraud." 9. Similarly in Ramanathan Chettyar v. Baldeo Singh, AIR 1933 Rang 110 (E), it was held that S. 5 does not apply to applications for reopening an ex parte decree, but S. 18, Indian Limitation Act can apply and fraud only affects limitation when that fraud prevents a person from knowing of his right or the title on which his right is founded. 10. 10. In M.B. Kinkhede v. Mohanya, AIR 1926 Nag 388 (F), it was held that the fraud which can be relevant to be considered for the purpose of Art. 164 is not only fraud with reference to the service of notice but it covers any fraud and S. 18 can be applied. 11. As the opposite parties have proved in this case that fraud was practised on them by a near relation of the petitioner and they were therefore precluded from filing an application for restoration, they would be clearly entitled to have the period during which they were defrauded, excluded under S. 18, Limitation Act. The restoration application filed by them was, therefore, legally within time and the learned Munsiff was right in allowing it. 12. I, therefore, see no force in this application in revision and I dismiss it with costs to the opposite parties. Revision dismissed.