This is the unsuccessful plaintiffs appeal, whose suit for partition of an estate was decreed by the trial court, the first appellate court, modifying the same by making it conditional upon payment of some money. 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record as well. The facts of the case relevant for the purposes of the present appeal are not much in dispute. Basti Ram, Lekh Ram and Phusa Ram are the co-owners in this estate. Basti Rams share is one-half, and Lekh Ram and Phusa Ram have one-half each in the other moiety. The land was under mortgage with one Taru and it was subsequently redeem-med.Basti Ram paid one of the mortgage money, and is in possession of his share which is not in dispute in the present case. Phusa Ram brought a suit for partition of the other half against Lekh Raj and his brothers. Basti Ram, Jailal and Beerbal were also impleaded as defendants. Only Lekh Ram defendant contested the suit and his plea was that Phusa Ram had not paid his share of the mortgagee money paid by Lekh Ram to the mortgagee and as Lekh Ram stands subrogated in the possession of the mortgagee after redemption of the mortgage hence Phusa Ram is not eligible to sue for partition. The trial court held that the plea taken up by Lekh Ram was wrong on the point of fact as the money had been paid both by Pusa Ram and Lekh Ram. The suit was accordingly decreed. Lekh Ram went up in appeal before the learned Divisional Commissioner Bikaner who held that Pusa Ram had not paid his share of the mortgage money and hence he could not claim partition without the payment of that amount to Lekh Ram. Pusa Ram has come up in second appeal before us. 3. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that direction regarding payment of money as a condition precedent to the passing of the decree cannot be properly made in a suit for partition. 4. On behalf of the respondent A.I.R. 1949, East Punjab 254, has been cited as an answer to this contention. In that case the plaintiffs were granted a preliminary decree for possession by partition of the property in suit except the redeemed mortgagees rights against the defendants. 4. On behalf of the respondent A.I.R. 1949, East Punjab 254, has been cited as an answer to this contention. In that case the plaintiffs were granted a preliminary decree for possession by partition of the property in suit except the redeemed mortgagees rights against the defendants. The decree was conditional on payment of their proportionate share in the some of Rs.4,600/- which was determined to be the amount due to the defendant on the basis of the mortgage which was redeemed by him. This decree was eventually upheld and it can therefore, be safely inferred that the incorporation of such a condition in decree cannot be regarded as illegal improper. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the appellant could not institute a suit for partition without bringing a suit for redemption as Lekh Ram by redeeming the mortgage became the mortgagee himself by the doctrine of subrogation. A.I.R. 1943, Bombay 191, has been cited in this connection. Much need not be said on the point for this ruling was examined by their Lordships of the East Punjab High Court in the case referred to above (A.I.R. 1949, East Punjab, 254). It was laid down therein that "where one of the co-mortgagors redeems the entire mortgaged property and enters into the possession the other co-mortgagors can bring a suit for possession by partition of that property without bringing a suit for redemption in the first instance, provided the right of redemption is not barred by limitation at the date of the suit." The contention is, therefore, overruled. 5. Coming to the merits we find that the only reason advanced by the learned Commissioner for reversing the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court is that the oral evidence should not have been believed in preference to documentary one. This is hardly a correct proposition. It cannot be laid down as a general rule that a documentary evidence should always be believed as against the oral testimony. It is the intrinsic worth and probative value of each type of evidence that leads to acceptance of one and rejection of the other. Documents may be forged, unreliable or not proved legally in the case. Witnesses may be perfectly reliable and no suspicion or distrust can be attached to them. It is the intrinsic worth and probative value of each type of evidence that leads to acceptance of one and rejection of the other. Documents may be forged, unreliable or not proved legally in the case. Witnesses may be perfectly reliable and no suspicion or distrust can be attached to them. It is thus the careful probing into the worth of evidence that should decide about the credibility of evidence in a court of law. As a general rule the appreciation and assessment of oral evidence made out by a trial court should not be disturbed lightly by an appellate court which is denied those powers of observation of the demeanour and bearing of the witnesses which are available to a trial court. It does not and cannot mean the no appellate court can come to a finding different from the one arrived at by the trial court. There may be weighty reasons for such a course and in that case the appellate court is bound to adopt it. But in the absence of such forceful circumstances the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court should not be disturbed In the present case the documentary evidence relied on by the appellate court consist of an entry in a bahi produced by Narain who states to have advanced a sum of Rs. 1,000/- to Lekh Ram for payment to the mortgagee. The other document is a copy of the receipt alleged to have been granted by the mortgagee Lekh Ram. Narain is the person who states himself to be the attesting witness of this receipt as well. The original receipt was not shown to the mortgagee nor has it been proved by calling the scribe in the witness box. The mortgagee was examined as a witness by Pusa Ram and he has clearly stated that the money was paid to him both by Pusa Ram and Lekh Ram. It cannot be, therefore, said that the inference arrived at by the trial court is such as could not be drawn reasonably from the circumstances of the case. The documentary evidence relied on by the lower appellate court does not appear to be very convincing or cogent and the statement of the mortgagor himself does raise strong suspicion against its veracity. The documentary evidence relied on by the lower appellate court does not appear to be very convincing or cogent and the statement of the mortgagor himself does raise strong suspicion against its veracity. We are, therefore of the opinion that the first appellate court was not justified in reversing the findings of the trial Court. We would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court.