SARJOO PROSAD C. J. : This is a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta, under S. 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, at the instance of the assessee. (2) The assessee claims to be a firm which admittedly had been carrying on business since March, 1946. The firm was registered with the Registrar of Firms, Assam, in March, 1949. .It appears that an instrument of partnership was drawn up on 20-6-1949 and the statement of the case makes reference to another deed of partner­ship also, which is dated 16-2-51. It is suggested in the statement submitted to us that the Tribunal felt reasons to doubt whether the partnership deed dated 28-6-49 was really prepared on that date or was drawn up much later and ante-dated on some old stamp papers. On the basis of the deed in question, an appli­cation was made by the assessee for registration of the firm under S. 29A of Income-tax Act but this application was refused by the Income-tax Officer and the order of that officer was affirmed on ap­peal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Income-tax Tribunal did not go into the question of the genuineness or otherwise of the partnership deed or some of the other defects pointed out in their orders by the officers of the department. It decided the appeal simply on the ground that the firm which came into existence and had been doing business since 1946 was not constituted under the "Instrument of Partnership" dated 20-6-49, within the meaning of those words occurring in S. 26A of the Act. It may be added that the registration sought for was for the accounting year 1949-50 and for the assessment year 1950-51. The Tribunal has accordingly on the above facts submitted the follow­ing question of law for our decision : "Whether the assessee firm which is alleged to have come into existence by verbal agreement on 14-3-1946 is entitled to be registered under S. 26A of the Income-tax Act, 1922, for the pur­pose of the assessment for 1950-51 where the in­strument of partnership was alleged to have been drawn up on 20-6-1949, during the relevant pre­vious year." (3) Mr. Ghose on behalf of the department has raised a preliminary question which affects the competence of the reference itself. Ghose on behalf of the department has raised a preliminary question which affects the competence of the reference itself. He refers to the observation made by the members of the Tri­bunal in the statement of case which shows that the Tribunal did not give a finding on the ques­tion of the genuineness of the partnership deed dated 20-6-49 and remarked that if the assessee was successful before the High Court on the point of law, there would be time enough for the Tri­bunal to go into further questions of fact above indicated and give its finding thereon. Mr. Ghose submits that this clearly shows that the Tribunal has not completely disposed of the matter and it would be fruitless for this Court to tender any advise on the question of law un­less the whole matter is disposed of by the Tribunal itself. He contends in other words that if the Tribu­nal decades in agreement with the other officers of the department that the partnership deed in ques­tion was not a genuine deed and that there were other vital defects in the application for registra­tion, the decision of the question of law now sub­mitted to this Court would be entirely redundant. He relies upon the dictum of the Judicial Committee in -'Rajendra Narayan Bhajja Deo v. Commissioner of Income-tax, B. & O.', AIR 1940 PC 158 (A), and also upon the decision in 'Khemji Walji and Co. v. Commissioner of In­come-tax, B. & O.', (1945) 13 ITR 421 (Pat) (B). These decisions undoubtedly lay down the principle that where the question framed for die decision of the High Court has merely an academicals value and did not necessarily arise for decision in order to give relief to the parties, this Court should refuse to answer such a question. The Judicial Committee condemned the practice of invoking the advisory jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of deciding hypothetical or speculative questions of law, save where such questions were necessary for the purpose of adjudicating on the facts of a particular case and deciding 011 the principle of assessment. It was pointed out that S. 61(1) of the Act is advisory only and is confined to considering and answering the actual question referred to it, provid­ed the question does arise, in the facts and circum­stances of the case, and is necessary to the deci­sion of the matter. It was pointed out that S. 61(1) of the Act is advisory only and is confined to considering and answering the actual question referred to it, provid­ed the question does arise, in the facts and circum­stances of the case, and is necessary to the deci­sion of the matter. With these propositions, it is impossible for the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee to contend, but he submits that in this case, the appeal itself had been disposed of by the Income-tax Tribunal on the question of law submitted for the decision of this Court. The Tri­bunal would have undoubtedly done well to dis­pose of all the points which arose in the case, before invoking the advisory jurisdiction of this Court on any question of law. But the Tribunal chose not to adopt this whole-, some procedure and was content to dispose of the appeal on that preliminary ground alone. The result of the decision is that now the assessee will have no remedy left if we refuse to decide the question under reference; and judged in that light, the question, in my opinion, assumes importance and does necessarily arise for adjudication at pre­sent. We therefore cannot shirk our responsibility of deciding the question which has now been sub­mitted to us and which in the circumstances of the present case makes the reference competent. (4) I shall therefore now proceed to deal with the question itself. The question as framed ap­pears to be a little cumbrous but I do not consider it necessary to modify it, in view of what I shall presently indicate. It is gratifying to note 'that the members of the Tribunal have brought to bear upon their consideration of the point a great deal of forensic learning, but I regret that I do not consider it relevant to examine the various lines of reasoning which appear to have found favour with them. I agree with them that the answer to the ques­tion depends upon the language of S. 26A itself; and particularly upon the meaning of the words "any firm constituted under the instrument of, partnership". I agree with them that the answer to the ques­tion depends upon the language of S. 26A itself; and particularly upon the meaning of the words "any firm constituted under the instrument of, partnership". In my opinion, these words should bear their plain and natural meaning and no forced or restricted interpretation should be placed upon, them so as to narrow their scope and unduly limit the advantage or even defeat the advantage which S 26A purports to concede to assessee firms.' The term "partnership" has been defined in S. 4 of the Partnership Act. It says : Partnership is a relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually "partners" and collectively "a firm" and the name under which their business is carried on is called the "firm name'. Similarly, under the Income-tax Act, S. 2(6-B), it has been stated that 'firm', 'partner' and 'partner­ship' have the same meanings respectively as in the Partnership Act, 1932 (Act 9 of 1932): pro­vided that the expression 'partner' includes any person who being a minor has been admitted to the benefits of partnership. Now, if the question is put as to how was the partnership constituted at the date of the application for registration under S. 26A of the Income-tax Act, the obvious answer would be, in my opin­ion, that the partnership was constituted on that date, at any rate, under the terms of the partner­ship instrument; in other words, the relations of the persons who agreed to share the profits of the business carried on by them was to be regulated by the terms of that instrument. Therefore, there can be no other answer ex­cept this that on the date of the application, the partnership was constituted under the instrument of partnership specifying the shares of the partners and the manner in which they were to distribute amongst themselves the profits of the partnership. As to now they were carrying on business previously is immaterial. Therefore, there can be no other answer ex­cept this that on the date of the application, the partnership was constituted under the instrument of partnership specifying the shares of the partners and the manner in which they were to distribute amongst themselves the profits of the partnership. As to now they were carrying on business previously is immaterial. In my opinion, the word "under" as used with reference to the instrument of partner­ship occurring in S. 26A of die Income-tax Act has no other significance in the context, except to show that the rights and liabilities of the partners were to be regulated by the instrument which had come into being and by which the parties chose to be governed. (5) If the interpretation sought to be put upon the section by the members of the Tribunal is adopted, it would lead to the anomalous position that the firms which had been already operating at the time when S. 26A was brought on the statute book and had no particular instrument of partnership governing them would be altogether deprived of the privilege which the section intended to confer upon firms in general, provided those firms also came to be constituted under instruments of partnership. I agree that the law of Income-tax is not always logical; but then it must be assumed that in framing taxation legislations, the Legislature takes into account and I should think primarily takes into account existing sources of taxation in preference to mere possibilities or potential sources of revenue. I cannot therefore conceive that in enacting section 26A of the Act, the Legislature had in mind only firms which came into existence in future and to deprive firms which had been already paying taxes to the exchequer of this pri­vilege under S. 26A, even where they later con­formed to the condition laid down in the section: namely, that they determined the shares of the partners and regulated their rights and obligations by a regular deed of partnership. When, therefore, the partnership deed has come into existence within the period of account­ing, 1 see no reason why the privilege of getting registration under S. 26A of the Act for the ac­counting period should be denied to the assessee; I have said so with reference to the accounting period and I think that unless some difficulty is presented to the department on account of the terms of the document itself or on account of some circumstances disclosed in the accounts of the registered assessee firms, the principle inculcated in S. 26A of the Act for assessing on the individual profits of the partners should be adopted. In such cases, the registration of the firm should not be refused under section 26A of the Act. The course suggested by me will not mean that the document is given any retrospective operation because, in any case, effect is not being given to the document beyond the accounting period during which the document came into being and that also is limited by the conditions which I have indicat­ed above. (6) My view on the point is to a large extent confirmed by the rules framed by the department for the purpose of allowing registration of such firms. The intention of the rules obviously is not to put limitations upon the right of the assessee to get registration within a particular period pro­vided he can do so before the assessment is closed. In other words, at any stage of the assessment, if the firm is registered under S. 26A of the Act, the assessee firm or the partners thereof get the bene­fit of assessment upon the individual income of the partners. Under the rules as they applied to this case, there is no prescribed period within which such an application for registration had to be made. Even under the present amended rules, a period of six months has been conceded to the firm from the date of the partnership deed to get itself regis­tered under S. 26A of the Act. These factors lead me to hold that the mere fact that the instrument of partnership, if genuine; came into being a few| months alter the commencement of the accounting year, does not affect the legal position and its right to be registered under the Income-tax Act. These factors lead me to hold that the mere fact that the instrument of partnership, if genuine; came into being a few| months alter the commencement of the accounting year, does not affect the legal position and its right to be registered under the Income-tax Act. (7) On the main point, I find myself largely in agreement with a very recent judgment of Falshaw, T- with which Bhandari C. J. agreed In - 'Padam Parshad Rattan Chand v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi', AIR 1954 Punj 188 (C). The question there formulated was in these terms: "Whether a firm which comes into existence by oral agreement is entitled to be registered under section 2o'A, if on the date of the application for registration the terms and conditions of the partner­ship have been reduced to writing and the appli­cation for registration is accompanied by such an instrument." In answering the question, the learned Judge there observed : "On the other hand, the intention of the law is clear that when partners do draw up an agree­ment by which their shares in the partnership profits are specified, they are entitled to have the partnership registered under the Act, and thus to have the individual shares of the partners assessed for income-tax, and it seems to me to be an un­duly harsh interpretation of the law to say that because the partners say they have been partners previously, they should not be entitled to have the partnership registered even when they have emdied its terms in a deed. I am accordingly of the opinion that when a deed or instrument of partnership is presented for registration under S. 26A, even where the partnership is alleged in the deed to have exist­ed previously on the same terms, this should not be a bar to the registration of the firm, and it should be treated as constituted under the instru­ment as from the date of the instrument." It is somewhat a curious coincidence that this case also arose on a reference from the judgment of an Income-tax Tribunal presided over by the pre­sent judicial Member thereof, Mr. Rajagopal Sastri; and the judgment of the Tribunal as reproduced in the report shows that it is couched almost in identical language, except for a few immaterial variations, as the judgment in the present case. Rajagopal Sastri; and the judgment of the Tribunal as reproduced in the report shows that it is couched almost in identical language, except for a few immaterial variations, as the judgment in the present case. It should be, however, noticed that this decision of the Punjab High Court was not available to the members of the Tribunal when they pronounced the decision in the present case. (8) I should therefore think that the answer to the question referred to us should be in the affirmative subject to the conditions given above. But as I pointed out, it would be for the Tri­bunal to consider whether the document is or is not genuine, whether the application made by the assessee was a proper application as required by S. 26A of the Act and whether in the circumstances of this case, although the document came into being two and half months after the commence­ment of the accounting year, the assessee was none- the less, entitled to the benefit of registration under S. 26A of the Act for the entire period, - in other words, whether the partners should be assess­ed on their individual shares for the entire account­ing period. Indeed, this last contingency would only arise alter the question of registration has been settled. (9) The decision of the Tribunal shows that during the last three decades, the department had been following the practice of allowing registra­tion iu cases of the nature contemplated by the question under reference. I should think that there was sound and substantial reason for adher­ing to that practice instead of permitting a de­parture from it. As it appears that the reference in the present case was due entirely to the somewhat irregular procedure adopted by the Tribunal itself in decid­ing the appeal only on the question of law with­out considering the other aspects of die case, I do not think that it would be fair to award any costs against the department. The reference is accord­ingly accepted and the question answered as above. (10) DEKA J. : I agree. Reference answered.