JUDGMENT Shri Rabindra Kumar Purakayastha, son of late Rajendra Kumar Purakayastha, residing at Maxwell Bazar, Imphal has brought this petition against the Forest Officer, Government of Manipur, the State of Manipur and the Union of India as State Government for this part C State for obtaining a Writ of Mandamus calling upon the opposite parties to recall and cancel the letter dated 26-3-1955 and forbear from giving any effect to it and allow the petitioner to carry out the teak wood operation in the contracted forest situated in the Manipur Burma boundary outside the present forest reserve area of Yangowpokpi Loochao in the Burma border forest, in accordance with the agreement dated 29/30-12-1954 and the lease dated 24-2-1955. The opposite parties have further been asked to forbear from interfering with the petitioners light to carry out the said teak operation and it has been prayed that they should be ordered to forthwith cancel and recall the tender notice No.43 dated 28-3-1955 and forbear from giving any effect whatsoever to the said tender notice and also to forbear from allowing any other person apart from the petitioner the said teak operation in the said contracted forest for a period of 3 years with effect from 1-3-1955. 2. According to the petitioner on or about 29/30-12-1954 respondent 1 acting on behalf of the Government of Manipur and/or respondent 2 acting through the respondent 1 agreed to allow the petitioner to kill and fell trees in the forest situated in the Manipur Burma boundary outside the present reserve forest area of Yangowpokpl Locchao in the Burma border forest for a period of 3 years on conditions that a formal lease in respect of the said teak operation would be issued in favour of the petitioner by respondent 1 and/or respondent 2 on production of the Treasury Chalan showing the deposit by the petitioner of a sum of Rs.1000/- as caution money pledged in the name of respondent 1 which was to be refunded to the petitioner after the expiry of the said period of 3 years without any interest. The petitioner was to pay to the respondent 1 and/or 2 for the said teak operation royalty at the rate to be fixed by the respondents from time to time as well as a monopoly fee at the rate of annas -/2/- per rupee on the amount of the said royalty, and a letter dated 30-12-1954 Annexture A was issued by the respondent 1 acting for and on behalf of the respondent 2 in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner deposited the said sum of Rs.1000/- in Imphal Treasury as caution money in the name of respondent 1 oh 22-2-1955 and forwarded the treasury chalan to the respondent 1 toy a letter dated 22-2-1955 Annexture B. Subsequently on 24-2-1955 on production of the said chalan by the petitioner-respondent 1 and/or 2 duly executed a lease in favour of the petitioner in respect of the said teak operation. In part performance of the aforesaid agreement of lease, respondent 1 caused 3628 trees in the contracted forest to be marked to enable the petitioner to kill and fell the same and he actually killed 3559 trees and fell another G9 trees in the said contracted forest. But on his return to Imphal from the said forest on 30-3-1955 he received the letter dated 28-3-1955 to the following effect: "Office of the Forest Officer, Manipur Government. Memo. No.17-R.F./5256. Imphal, the 26th March 1955, Shri Rabindra Kumar Purakayastha, C/o Narendra Kishore Kar and Gyanendra Kishore Kar. Maxwell Bazar, Imphal. Subject: Teak Operation. It has been informed by a Govt. order to settle Burniah border forest for teak operation by caning tenders. Thereiore the caution money deposited by you will be refunded and the said forest area will be settled by calling tenders from intending workers; until and unless, the said forest be settled with any contractor, nobody can enter the forest for teak operation. Sd/- Illegible. 25-3-55 Forest Officer, Government of Manipur. Imphal, the March, 55. Copy to:- Forester, Pallel for information, causing service to Kaoindra Kumar Purakayastha and necessary action. Sd/- R.K.B.C. Singh. Forest Officer Government of Manipur". 3. The petitioner immediately sent the letter dated 31-3-1956 to the respondent 1 in reply and it is to the following effect: "To The Forest Officer, Government of Manipur, Imphal. Dated Imphal, the 31st March 1955. Copy to:- Forester, Pallel for information, causing service to Kaoindra Kumar Purakayastha and necessary action. Sd/- R.K.B.C. Singh. Forest Officer Government of Manipur". 3. The petitioner immediately sent the letter dated 31-3-1956 to the respondent 1 in reply and it is to the following effect: "To The Forest Officer, Government of Manipur, Imphal. Dated Imphal, the 31st March 1955. Subject: Operation of teak out of Manipur Forest lying by the whole of the Manipur Burma border except that of Moreh reserve. Sir, With reference to your Memo. No.17 R. F/5256 of 26-3-1955, I beg to state that I arrived Imphal from the forest on the 29th March night and have received your above quoted Memo on 30-3-1955. The causes for calling a fresh tender, when it has once been allotted to me with the approval of the Government, is not understood. I, therefore, respectfully pray to you to give me a copy of the Government order to let me know my fault for which a question of calling for a fresh tender has arisen. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Rabindra Kumar Purakayastha, Contractor." 4. Thereafter on 1-4-1955, respondent 1 delivered to the petitioner a copy of the alleged tender notice No.43 dated 28-3-1955 purporting to invite offers for the exclusive right to carry out teak operation at the contracted forest vide Annexure C, when the petitioner sent the following letter to respondent 1: "To Letter No. F/32 The Forest Officer, Government of Manipur, Imphal. Dated Imphal, the 2nd April 1955. Subject: Operation of Teak wood from the forest by the Burma Border. _____________ Sir, With reference to your Memo. No.17 BG/5256 dated 26-3-1955, I beg to say that I have already addressed you a letter vide my letter No. F/29 dated 31-3-1955 to let me know the reasons for calling a fresh tender in regard to the operation of teak wood out of Manipur forest lying by the Burma Border, but to my surprise I find that without showing any reason you have already called the tender vide your No.O/N-F-3/2-7 dated 1-4-1955. I fail to understand how a tender can be called for the above mentioned work in the face of the agreement entered into between the State and myself and under such agreement I have fulfilled my part of the contract by taking up the work and have also spent a lot of money and business commitments on that account. I fail to understand how a tender can be called for the above mentioned work in the face of the agreement entered into between the State and myself and under such agreement I have fulfilled my part of the contract by taking up the work and have also spent a lot of money and business commitments on that account. In this connection I beg to state that under the provisions of law you are not entitled to call any tender and allot the forest to any other persons during the period of the said agreement. I regret to inform you that the illegal action of the Government may complicate the matter. In the above context, I would request you to revise the Government decision and withhold the tender called for. Yours faithfully, Rabindra Kumar Purakayastha, Contractor. 2nd April 1955". 5. This letter was in the nature of a demand for justice by the petitioner from the respondents. As respondent 1 and/or 2 according to the petitioner, had no power, authority or jurisdiction either to address the letter dated 26-3-1955 to the petitioner or to call for any fresh tenders from others for the exclusive right to carry out the said teak operation in the said contracted forest and as such the respondents did not forbear from resorting to illegal acts in spite of demand for justice, the present application for a writ of mandamus under Art.226, Constitution of India has been instituted in this Court. 6. The opposite parties have by means of an affidavit contended that the present application is misconceived and is not maintainable as no legal document purporting to be a lease was ever executed in favour of the petitioner and as the terms and conditions mentioned in the permit dated 24-2-1955 were not ratified by a Secretary on behalf of the Manipur Government, the petitioner cannot claim to have acquired any right in the forest situated in Manipur Burma boundary. It has further been contended that the Government have every right to call for tenders as by simply calling tenders the petitioners rights, if any, are not adversely effected at all, and so the present petition, according to the opposite parties, cannot succeed. It has further been contended that the Government have every right to call for tenders as by simply calling tenders the petitioners rights, if any, are not adversely effected at all, and so the present petition, according to the opposite parties, cannot succeed. Lastly, it has been contended that there has been no infringement of any fundamental rights of the petitioner as no deprivation of any property has been caused to him, and then the petitioners proper remedy, if any, lies in the civil court by means of a regular suit. 7. It has practically been admitted that the petitioner secured a lease from the Government of Manipur through respondent 1 regarding Burma Border Forest Boundary from Posts Nos.1 to 34 except the reserved area of Yangowpokpi Locchao for the period from 1-3-1955 to 28-2-1958 after depositing Rs.1000/- as security money on which he was not to receive any interest after securing the lease dated 24-2-1955. It has also not been disputed that the petitioner acting on this contract agreed to pay royalty as well as monopoly fee as stated in the agreement and he got 3628 trees in contracted forest marked by respondent 1 and the petitioner actually killed 3559 and fell another 69 trees in the said forest at huge cost. The petitioner made certain business commitments also, for supplying timbers to various big firms in other States relying on the contract dated 24-2-1955 referred to above. 8. The Forest Officer, respondent 1 by means of letter dated 26-3-1955 without levelling any charge against the petitioner prohibited him and his men from entering the forest and carrying on the teak operation on the ground that a Government order had been received to settle the Burma Border Forest for teak operation by calling tenders and the new tenders were to be invited for the period from 1-5-1955. The petitioner by means of his letter dated 31-3-1955 asked respondent 1 to mention the causes which led to the decision against him, but no reply to that letter appears to have been given and on 1-4-1955 the alleged tender notice No.43 dated 28-3-1955 was delivered to the petitioner, the petitioner then formally made a demand for justice and after it was ignored the present petition for writ of mandamus has been instituted. 9. 9. In Halsburys Laws of England, Volume 9, (2nd Edn.) page 744, the nature of the writ of mandamus has been described as follows: "The writ of mandamus is a high prerogative writ of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing from the High Court, of Justice, directed to any person corporation, or inferior court, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to supply defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing such right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet such mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual." 10. - In re, Jatindra Mohan Sen, AIR 1925 Cal 48 (A), C.C. Ghosh J., of the Calcutta. High Court traced the history of this writ and described the principles applicable to it as follows: "The writ is of very ancient origin, dating back, at any rate, to the time of Edward II. In Bacons Abridgement, it is said to be founded on Magna Carta, by which the Crown was bound neither to deny justice to anybody nor to delay anybody in obtaining justice. It seems originally, according to Mr. High (see High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies), to have been one of that large class of writs or mandates, by which the Sovereign of England directed the performance of any desired act by his subjects, the word mandamus in such writs, letters or missives or mandates having given rise to the present name of the writ. These letters, missives or mandates to which the generic term, mandamus was applied, were in no sense judicial writs being merely a command issuing directly from the Sovereign to the subjects, without the intervention of the Courts, and they have long become entirely obsolete. "The term mandamus seems gradually to have been confined in its application to the judicial writ issued by the Kings Bench, which has by steady growth developed into the writ of mandamus. It is a high prerogative writ and is no specific legal remedy. "The term mandamus seems gradually to have been confined in its application to the judicial writ issued by the Kings Bench, which has by steady growth developed into the writ of mandamus. It is a high prerogative writ and is no specific legal remedy. And it has been said that the Court, in the exercise of this authority to grant the writ of mandamus, will render it as far as it can be the supplementary means of substantial justice in every case where there is no other specific legal remedy for a legal right, and will provide as effectively as it can that others exercise their duty wherever the subject matter is properly within its control." "The writ of mandamus, being a high prerogative writ, it follows that it cannot be demanded ex debito justitiae but that it issues only in the discretion of the Court: (See the observations. of Cockburn C.J., in - R. v. Garland, (1870) 5 QB 269 at p. (273) (B) and also of Lord Chelmsford in - R. v. All Saints Wigan, (1876) 1 AC 611 (C). It follows from the discretionary character of the process that the rights to be enforced must be of a public nature, affcting the public at large, and also those which although of a public nature, specially affect the rights of individuals. The person applying must show that he has a real and special interest in the subject-matter and a specific legal right to enforce (see - R. v. Lewisham Union, (1897) 1 QB 498 at p. (500) (D). In addition to these conditions precedent to the issue of the writ, it has been laid down from very early times that there must be a sufficient demand to perform the act sought to be enforced and a refusal to perform it. It is not indeed necessary that the word refuse or any equivalent to it should be used, but that there should be enough to show that the party withholds compliance and distinctly determines not to do what is required of him. There must also be the possibility of effective enforcement of the writ and the writ will not issue if alternative remedies or remedy are or is open to the applicant." 11. There must also be the possibility of effective enforcement of the writ and the writ will not issue if alternative remedies or remedy are or is open to the applicant." 11. It follows from what has been stated above that there must be a legal and specific right in the applicant which can be enforced and there must be a deprivation of that right and ordinarily this writ will not be issued where there exists an alternative remedy equally efficient and adequate. There must also be the possibility of effective enforcement of the writ and a sufficient demand to perform the act sought to be enforced, and non-compliance thereof should also be proved before a prayer for writ of mandamus can be entertained. 12. Sinha, J. in - Rakhaldas Mukherjee v. S.P. Ghose, AIR 1952 Cal 171 (E), summarised the law on the subject as follows: "(a) The writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition and for matter of that all high prerogative writs, are ordinarily not issued where there exists an alternative remedy equally efficient and adequate. (b) But there is no inflexible rule that such writs cannot be issued where the Court thinks it just and convenient to do so. The fact that it ordinarily does not do so is a question not of want of jurisdiction but of expediency. (c) Whether the alternative remedy is equally efficacious or adequate is a question of fact to be decided in each case. (d) Where a complaint is made against any act done or purported to be done under any statutory provision, the fact that there exists in the Statute itself a possible remedy, is an important fact to be taken into consideration. Where such provisions exist, the Court will be extremely reluctant to interfere by way of high prerogative writs and especially so if the applicant has actually taken recourse to his remedy under the Statute. (e) But the fact that there exists a remedy under the Statute does not take away the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue the writs in appropriate cases. (e) But the fact that there exists a remedy under the Statute does not take away the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue the writs in appropriate cases. (f) In the following cases it has been held that a writ will be issued notwithstanding an alternative remedy, whether under a statutory provision or otherwise: (i) Where an inferior tribunal assumes jurisdiction and the want of jurisdiction is patent on the face of it; (ii) where the proceedings complained of are against the principles of natural justice; and (iii) where the alternative remedy is too costly or ineffective or entails such delay that the applicant would be irreparably prejudiced or the remedy might prove valueless." 13. Applying these principles to the present case I find that the petitioner has proved by means of the lease dated 26-2-1955 that the Forest Omcer, Manlpur, on behalf of the Government of Manipur, allowed the petitioner to carry on teak operation in contracted forest on certain specific conditions. It is obvious that the present petitioner would have earned sufficient profits if he had been allowed to retain the contract. But without giving him any opportunity of hearing and without any fault of his being pointed out to him the contract was virtually terminated by the respondents with the result that the petitioner suffered financial loss in the shape of interest in the security money and also on account of investment on labour utilised for the purpose of killing and felling huge number of trees in the contracted forest. And then the petitioner is incurring the risk of failure to keep up his contracts with the big timber merchants of other places which means possible future financial losses in the form of damages. 14. It has been contended that the petitioner cannot seek any relief under Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution for his property right has not been infringed at all. The argument is that the lease dated 24-2-1955, is not a completed contract and it is only a permit and so the petitioner did not acquire any property through it. I think this contention of the respondents has no force. The argument is that the lease dated 24-2-1955, is not a completed contract and it is only a permit and so the petitioner did not acquire any property through it. I think this contention of the respondents has no force. The word property has been explained in Corpus Juris, Volume 73, p.136, as follows: "In legal usage property is perhaps the most comprehensive word which can be employed and it may signify either the subject matter in which interest exists or it may signify valuable rights and interests protected by law or it may signify both. It is generally recognised that property includes certain rights such as the right of acquisition, possession, use, enjoyment and disposition. In legal usage the word property is a generic term. According to the authorities on this question it is a term of broad and extensive application and it is also a term of large import with the very broadest and most extensive signification. It is a very comprehensive word having broad and comprehensive and exceedingly complex meanings and is perhaps the most comprehensive of all the terms that can be used. The word property includes both real and personal property and ordinarily will construe as meaning both real and personal property (P.137). It includes both intangible rights and physical things (P.138). In the strict legal sense the word property signifies valuable rights or interests protected by law and this is the primary appropriate and broader signification of the term. In modern legal system property includes practically all valuable rights, the term being indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which a person can have in any and every thing that is the subject of ownership by man and including every valuable interest, it can be enjoyed as property and recognised as such equitable interests as well as legal interests and extending to every species of valuable rights or interests in either real or personal property or in easements, franchises, and incorporal hereditaments. The term comprises also all rights which are incidental to the use, enjoyment and disposition of intangible things, the bare possession with colour or right of anything of value, the right to be protected in ones possession of a thing or in ones privileges belonging to him as an individual or secured to him as a Member of the Commonwealth including the right to contest judicially any invasion of that which one possesses or owns. (pp.139-140). The property may reasonably be construed to include obligation rights and other intangible and physical things and thus the word property means not only the thing possessed that is physical corporeal thing but also rights in the physical and corporeal thing which are created and sanctioned by law. (p.140). It is generally recognised that property includes the right of acquisition, the right of dominion, the right of possession, the right of use and enjoyment, the right of exclusion and the right of disposition. (p.143). 15. In Basus Constitution of India (2nd ed p 133 property has been defined as follows: "Whatever a man produces by the labour of his hand or his brain, whatever he obtains in exchange for something of his own, and whatever is given to him, the law will protect him in the use, enjoyment, and disposition of." 16. Being used generically, the word includes all kinds of property, and all that a person may have dominion over and every possible interest over it. Thus the right to institute a suit in a Court of law regarding ones claim to property is itself a property, vide - Mahbub Begum v. Hyderabad State, AIR 1951 Hyd 1 (FB) at p.4(P). Similarly a decree of Court is a property. So far a franchise to erect a bridge, to construct a road or to keep a ferry and to collect tolls upon them, granted by the State; patents, copyrights, choses in action, and every other thing of an exchangeable value which one may have. (See Corpus Juris, Volume 73, pp.152-153). "It is well-known that the word property is the most comprehensive of all the terms that can be used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have" - Jones v. Skinner, (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87 at p.90(G), per Lord Longdale M.R. and - Corporation of Calcutta v. Governors of St. "It is well-known that the word property is the most comprehensive of all the terms that can be used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have" - Jones v. Skinner, (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87 at p.90(G), per Lord Longdale M.R. and - Corporation of Calcutta v. Governors of St. Thomas School, Calcutta, AIR 1949 PC 121 (H). In - Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119 (I), it was held at p.139 by Gulani Hasan J. that the word property used in Art.31 of the Constitution must be construed in the widest sense as connoting a bundle of rights exercisable by owner in respect thereof and embracing within its purview both corporeal and incorporeal rights. The word property is not defined in the Constitution and there is no good reason to restrict its meaning. 17. It thus becomes clear that the rights acquired by the petitioner in the deed dated 24-2-1955 would constitute property in the legal sense as a completed contract in favour of this party which gave him specified legal rights would by itself constitute property. In - Bhagwanji Morarji Goculdas v. Alembic Chemical Works Com. Ltd., AIR 1943 Bom 385 (J) Chagla J. (now C.J.) held that unliquidated damages for breach of contract is property within S.69(3)(a), Partnership Act, 1932. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner did acquire property in the legal sense when the contract dated 24-2-1955 was completed in his favour. 18. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that the permission dated 24-2-1955 would not amount to a completed contract unless it is raffled by a Secretary to the Government of Manipur, but no rule or law was cited before me in support of this contention nor a was any prior case referred to in which this alleged practice might have been followed. The petitioner was allowed to enter the forest, trees were marked by respondent 1 for being felled by the petitioner, and the petitioner actually killed and fell a large number of trees. The petitioner was allowed to enter the forest, trees were marked by respondent 1 for being felled by the petitioner, and the petitioner actually killed and fell a large number of trees. It has been held in - Chaturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, AIR 1954 SC 236 (K), that it is only right that an innocent contracting party should not surfer because a contract on behalf of the Government is entered into by an officer of the Government and if there is no other defect or objection, Government will always accept the responsibility. As such, I think, this contention of the respondents cannot be accepted as correct. 19. The petitioner has alleged that he has actually been ousted from the contracted forest and so he is suffering irreparable loss and the fact that the petitioner has not entered the forest after he was ordered not to enter it, has not been denied. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that there has been no deprivation of property in this case, because the petitioner has not actually gone to the spot and he was not physically stopped from entering the forest. It is to be seen in every case whether there has been deprivation in substance vide AIR 1954 SC 119 (I) para 78, in which it has been laid down: "Whether the facts in a given case amount to deprivation of property within the meaning of Art.31 will depend upon the circumstances of each case and it is not possible, in the nature of things, to lay down any inflexible test which may be universally applicable. When it can be shown that the Statute substantially interferes with the right of enjoyment of property, it will be hit by Art.31(2) and declared void, unless compensation is provided." In the present case the petitioner has not been allowed to work in the contracted forest and he has been completely ousted from the forest and so it must be held that there has been deprivation in the present case. The contention that the letter dated 26-3-1955 by itself did not give any right to the petitioner to come to this Court and the present petition is premature cannot therefore be accepted. The contention that the letter dated 26-3-1955 by itself did not give any right to the petitioner to come to this Court and the present petition is premature cannot therefore be accepted. The learned Government Advocate was not prepared to give any undertaking to the effect that there would be no physical restraint, if the present petitioner were to go to the contracted forest and so the ruling reported in - Hira Singh Bam v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 Him P 57 (L) in which deprivation was deemed to be established under similar circumstances, is applicable to this case. 20. It has not been contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner has been ousted from the contracted forest for some public purposes and it has also not been suggested that he has been or is to be paid any compensation. Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution provides that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and Art.31(1) provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, and cl.(2) provides that no property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired........................ . As the action of the respondents in ousting the petitioner from the contracted forest deprives him of his valuable property without any compensation, it becomes clear that the petitioners fundamental rights under the aforesaid Articles of the Constitution have been infringed, (vide - Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, (1897) 166 US 685 at p.690 (M) and - Lynch v. United States, (1934) 292 US 571 at p.579 (N). In cases of invasion of fundamental rights it is not merely a power but a duty of the High Court to grant relief by the issue of prerogative writs under Art.226 of the Constitution. The High Court will exercise the utmost restraint in interfering with the acts of the executive. In cases of invasion of fundamental rights it is not merely a power but a duty of the High Court to grant relief by the issue of prerogative writs under Art.226 of the Constitution. The High Court will exercise the utmost restraint in interfering with the acts of the executive. But where the High Court is satisfied that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution have been violated by any act or order of the executive it is the sacred duty of the High Court to set it aside. The High Court has power to do this under Art.226 by issuing a writ or any appropriate order so that a wrong done by the order of the Government may be remedied, vide AIR 1953 Him P 57 (L) and - Kistareddy v. Commr. of City Police, Hyderabad, AIR 1952 Hyd 38 (O). 21. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that the present petition should not be allowed as the petitioner can obtain relief by enforcing his alleged contract in a Court of law. Reliance has been placed on - Mahboob Khan v. Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, AIR 1953 Assam 145 (P), in which it has been held that no writ of mandamus should issue unless the circumstances are such that referring the petitioner to seek remedy in civil Court would almost make the result nugatory, or the relief delayed beyond measure. Breach of contractual obligations would always give a chance to the party to seek relief in civil Courts and a petition under Art.228 is not a fit vehicle for seeking redress; vide also - Laxman Singh v. Raj Pramukh of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1953 Madh-B 54 (Q); - Chattar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 Punj 239 (R) and - Ex parte, R. Gilbert, 16 Bom 398 (S). But in the present case the question is not of a breach of contract, it is a question of an infringement on fundamental rights of the petitioner who has engaged a large number of labourers from the hills, and who has invested huge amounts on these operations besides business commitments and if relief is delayed or denied to him he is bound to suffer irretrievable loss. The rulings referred to above, therefore, have no application to the present case. 22. The rulings referred to above, therefore, have no application to the present case. 22. The last point on behalf of the respondents is that the present petition should be dismissed on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the petitioner and it was not availed of by the petitioner. The learned Government Advocate has relied on - Qazi Muniruddin v. Chairman, Town Area Committee, Mau Aima, AIR 1953 All 109 (T), in which it was held that application under Art.226 of the Constitution would be entertained in those cases where the rights of a person had been seriously infringed and he had no other adequate and specific remedy available to him. Hence, where the applicant is not able to satisfy the Court that the remedy by way of suit which is open to him is not equally efficacious or adequate, the application will not be entertained; vide also - Carlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. H.M. Jagtiani, AIR 1952 Cal 315 (U); - Dubar Goaia v. union of India, AIR 1952 Cal 490 (V); - Ranvijai Singh v. Divisional Forest Officer, AIR 1953 Him P 33 (W); - Dost Mohammad v. Hyderabad Government, AIR 1953 Hyd 222 (X); - Mrs. Lilawati Mutatkar v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1952 Madh-B 105 at p. 113 (Y); - Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Fat 194 (Z); - Piari Lal v. Jitindar Nath, AIR 1952 Pepsu 106 (Z1) and V.N. Wanchoo v. Collector of Delhi, AIR 1952 Punj 268 (Z2). In majority of these cases the remedy was provided by way of appeal etc. in the Statute itself. In the present case it has been admitted that no relief by way of appeal was available to the petitioner. If the petitioner does not get speedy relief he is likely to be ruined for absolutely no fault of his own, and when he has been ousted from the contracted forest without being given any opportunity of showing cause. It has been held in - Buddhu v. Municipal Board, Allahabad, AIR 1952 All 753 (FB) (Z3) that where speedy decision is desirable petition can be entertained even though there is another remedy by way of suit. It has been held in - Buddhu v. Municipal Board, Allahabad, AIR 1952 All 753 (FB) (Z3) that where speedy decision is desirable petition can be entertained even though there is another remedy by way of suit. Similarly in AIR 1952 Cal 171 (E) already referred to above, it has been held that where an alternative is too costly or ineffective or entails such delay that the applicant would be irreparably prejudiced or remedy might prove valueless, a writ of mandamus should be issued. 23. In - Sobhagmal v. The State, AIR 1954 Raj 207 (Z4), it has been held that where the facts were not in dispute and the remedy by way of a suit could not have been equally beneficial, effective and convenient, the application for a writ of mandamus was maintainable; In - Abdul Gam v. Settlement Officer, Nowgong, AIR 1955 Assam 45 (Z5) it has been held that Rule 2 of the Settlement Rules framed under the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, therefore, has got to be interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with the provisions of the Regulation itself and the words general or special orders, though somewhat broad in their import, cannot mean that at any stage, the Government can interfere with the settlements effected by the Deputy Commissioner. These general or special orders would relate to a stage when the Deputy Commissioner has not already created rights in favour of third parties. In the present case also the Government of Manipur could invite tenders before contract in favour of the petitioner had been completed. It has also been held in this ruling that the fact that the petitioners had another remedy, is no bar to a petition under Art.226 where it is directed against the orders of the Government which have no jurisdiction in law and constitute an unauthorised attack on the petitioners right, and where it would be sheer harassment of the petitioners to be left to follow a long and tedious remedy by way of a suit. In the present case the petitioner is likely to be ruined if he is forced to follow the remedy of a suit. In - Mehar Singh v. Chairman, Municipality of Bally, AIR 1954 Cal 131 (Z6) it has been held that writ may be issued where alternative remedy is not equally efficacious. Similarly, in - Mukundrao Martandrao v. Addl. In the present case the petitioner is likely to be ruined if he is forced to follow the remedy of a suit. In - Mehar Singh v. Chairman, Municipality of Bally, AIR 1954 Cal 131 (Z6) it has been held that writ may be issued where alternative remedy is not equally efficacious. Similarly, in - Mukundrao Martandrao v. Addl. Settlement Commr., M.P., AIR 1954 Nag 205 (Z7), it was held that where a remedy of civil suit, even if available would not be equally efficacious and expedient, it cannot serve as a bar to the grant of an immediate relief under Art.226 in appropriate cases; vide also - Kudura Podhan v. Gangadhar Behera, AIR 1953 Orissa 238 (Z8). 24. In - Hazi Suleman Yusuf Bhai v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, AIR 1954 Madh-B 173 (Z9) it has been laid down that violation of a fundamental right is a continuing wrong and the petitioner is not in error in coming to the High Court on a consolidated petition challenging the order both on the ground that it violated the fundamental right and that it was in violation of fundamental principles of justice, even though he has a right of appeal against the order. 25. In - Valji Korji v. Collector of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 11 (Z10), it was held that Articles 31(1) and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India have to be read together. A person is entitled to hold property till he can be deprived of it in due course of law. What Art. 31(1) aims at is that no person shall be deprived of his property by any executive act or flat. It has further been held in this ruling that when an Executive Officer acts against the provisions of law, the Judicial Commissioners Court is entitled in a fit case to issue a writ under Art.226 for any other purpose even though fundamental rights under the Constitution are not violated; vide also - Elbridge Watson v. R.K. Das, AIR 1951 Cal 430 (Z11) and - Gopal Jairam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 Nag 181 (Z12). I am, therefore of opinion that the writ of mandamus prayed for should be issued in this case. 26. I am, therefore of opinion that the writ of mandamus prayed for should be issued in this case. 26. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that it shall not be of any use in this particular case if the petitioner is directed to go to the civil Court on the regular side because a number of constitutional questions are involved in this case, and the matter will ultimately have to be determined by this Court under the amended S.113, Civil P.C. which provides that where the Court is satisfied that case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court. Reliance has been placed on - Manohor Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1953 Raj 22 (Z13); - Bahadur Singh v. Jaswant Raj Mehta, AIR 1953 Raj 158 (Z14) and - Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 All 608 (Z15) in which it was held that High Court has power to grant appropriate reliefs including one of possession under Art.226 of the Constitution. In - Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 415 (Z16) it was ordered in a writ petition that seizure of goods from the possession of the petitioner amounted to an infringement of his fundamental rights and in -Virendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1854 SC 447 (Z17) it was ordered by the Honble Supreme Court that possession should be restored to the grantee if possession had been taken, vide also - Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, AIR 1953 SC 373 (Z18), in which also possession was restored to the petitioner. The petitioner should not therefore be deprived of possession in this case also. 27. The petitioner should not therefore be deprived of possession in this case also. 27. The petitioner has proved in the present case that he has no equally efficacious and adequate alternative remedy and if urgent steps are not taken he would be put to irretrievable loss simply because the respondents have chosen not to abide by terms of the lease dated 24th February 1953. I, therefore, hold that this is a fit case in which writ of mandamus should be issued against the respondents as prayed in cl.(a) of para 26 of the petition. Rule nisi is hereby made absolute. The petitioner will get Rs.500/- as costs from the respondents who will bear their own costs. Rule made absolute.