Rajamannar, C.J. - This second appeal came on before Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., who suggested that the appeal might be heard by a Bench, as it involved an important question of law. It arises out of a suit filed by the respondents in the following circumstances. One Subramania Mudaliar, the husband of the 1st respondent and the father of the 2nd respondent filed a suit O.S.No.83 of 1940 in the Court of the District Munsif of Ranipet against the 2nd defendant and others. He applied for an order of attachment before judgment of the properties belonging to the 2nd defendant. The attachment was ordered and made absolute on 7th December, 1940. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit, which was for dissolution of a partnership and the taking of accounts, on 31st October, 1942. On 30th August, 1943, the suit was dismissed against the present 2nd defendant and another defendant. There was an appeal against this order of dismissal, which was allowed on 1st August, 1944, and the suit was remanded as against the 2nd defendant. It was during this interval, on 20th January, 1944, that the property in suit was purchased by the present 1st defendant from the 2nd defendant. Eventually, a revised final decree was passed on 24th October, 1945, which made the 2nd defendant also liable. A petition to execute this decree was filed in 1946, E.P.No.37 of 1946. That was dismissed on 27th April, 1946, because the decree-holder was dead. Subsequently, the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder, Subramania Mudaliar, namely, the present plaintiffs filed E.P.No.351 of 1946. The 1st defendant intervened with a claim petition, E.A.No.117 of 1947. His claim was based on the purchase he had made on 20th January, 1944. This petition was allowed on 17th July, 1947. On 16th July, 1948, the suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted. The relief prayed for was the setting aside of the order passed in E.A.No.117 of 1947. His claim was based on the purchase he had made on 20th January, 1944. This petition was allowed on 17th July, 1947. On 16th July, 1948, the suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted. The relief prayed for was the setting aside of the order passed in E.A.No.117 of 1947. The ground on which the plaintiffs attacked the order passed on the claim petition of the 1st defendant was that the original attachment which had been made absolute on 7th December, 1940, continued to be in force, because of the subsequent order passed by the appellate Court on 1st August, 1944, and that even if the original attachment ceased to be in effect when the suit was dismissed on 30th August, 1943, against the 2nd defendant, the attachment revived by the order of remand passed by the appellate Court. It was further alleged by the plaintiffs that the order dismissing E.P.No.37 of 1946 did not have the effect of terminating the attachment, particularly because at that time the decree-holder himself was dead and his legal representatives had not come on record. In addition to these allegations based upon the continuance of the attachment, the plaintiffs also alleged in paragraph 9 of the plaint that the sale in favour of the 1st defendant was not a bona fide but a fraudulent transaction nominally got up with a view to defraud the plaintiffs and their decree. In paragraph 12, the plaintiffs stated that they were filing the suit in a representative capacity on behalf of all the creditors under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, and in paragraph 13 that the alienation by the 2nd defendant was secretly to benefit himself and delay his creditors. When the suit came on for trial before the learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore, learned counsel for the plaintiffs gave up the case as put forward by the plaintiffs in the plaint that the alienation in favour of the 1st defendant fell within section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit thereafter was confined to an attack on the validity of the purchase made by the 1st defendant by reason of the subsistence of the attachment originally ordered on 7th December, 1940. The suit thereafter was confined to an attack on the validity of the purchase made by the 1st defendant by reason of the subsistence of the attachment originally ordered on 7th December, 1940. The 1st defendant inter alia contended that the suit itself was not maintainable because the remedy of the plaintiffs was by way of an appeal under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the 1st defendant should be regarded as the representative of the judgment-debtor, having purchased the property of the judgment-debtor pending the attachment. The learned District Munsif decreed the suit. He held that section 47 was no bar to the suit and by reason of the remand order, the attachment revived and the purchase by the 1st defendant would not avail as against the claim of the plaintiffs. There was an appeal by the 1st defendant to the District Court. The learned District Judge confirmed the decision of the District Munsif. He held in favour of the plaintiffs on all the contentions raised by the 1st defendant, namely, that the attachment was not subsisting and had come to an end with the dismissal of the suit on 30th August, 1943, and that the remedy of the decree-holder was to appeal under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not to file a separate suit. Hence this second appeal by the 1st defendant. In our opinion, the appeal must succeed on the ground that the suit was not maintainable. By virtue of his purchase from the judgment-debtor on 20th January, 1944, the 1st defendant must be held to be a representative of the judgment debtor. There is direct authority for this position in a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Seetharaman Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar1, followed by Satyanarayana Rao, J., in Subramanian Chettiar v. Official Receiver of Ramnad2. The learned District Judge distinguished that decision on what appears to us to be specious ground, viz., that in that case the purchase was at a Court sale, whereas in the present case the purchase was by private treaty. We are unable to see any difference in principle between the two kinds of sales and indeed, Mr.T.M.Krishnaswami Ayyar, learned- counsel for the respondent, did not wish to support the judgments of the Courts below on that ground. But Mr. We are unable to see any difference in principle between the two kinds of sales and indeed, Mr.T.M.Krishnaswami Ayyar, learned- counsel for the respondent, did not wish to support the judgments of the Courts below on that ground. But Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar sought to support the judgments of the Courts below on two other grounds. One was that the suit was a representative action, and therefore the bar under section 47, Civil Procedure Code would not apply to such a suit. We may mention that this point was not raised in either of the Courts below. The reason is not far to seek. Though originally there were allegations impeaching the validity of the sale as having been in fraud of creditors and also a statement that the suit was being filed in a representative capacity under section 53, Transfer of Property Act, the suit ceased to be such a suit at the trial. For all practical purposes, the suit was a suit under Order 21, rule 63, simpliciter. In fact, even after the above allegations regarding the validity of the sale had been made, the prayer was only to set aside the order passed on the claim petition. There was not even a prayer for a declaration that the alienation in favour of the 1st defendant was not binding on the creditors. We, therefore, see no substance in this contention. The second ground we have found it very difficult to follow. So far as we are able to gather, the argument is this: On 30th August, 1943, the attachment ceased, but when the appeal was allowed, there was a reimposition of the attachment with retrospective effect from the original date of attachment. Alongside with this position which Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar maintained, he also put forward another contention that in spite of this position, between 30th August, 1943 and 1st August, 1944, there was no attachment and therefore the first defendant by reason of his purchase on 20th January, 1944, during this period was not a purchaser of property under attachment and therefore he was not a representative of the judgment-debtor. We find it difficult to accept this inconsistent plea. We find it difficult to accept this inconsistent plea. If what the learned counsel meant was that for all purposes there was no attachment in force between 30th August, 1943, and 1st August, 1944, then obviously the purchase by the first defendant cannot be impugned on the ground that it was made during the subsistence of the attachment. If, on the other hand, the attachment must be deemed to have continued throughout by reason of the subsequent order of the appellate Court having retrospective effect, then it is obvious that the purchase was pen-ding an attachment and by reason of such a purchase the first defendant became a representative of the judgment-debtor. In either event, the respondents cannot succeed. We hold that the suit is not maintainable, as the only remedy which the plaintiffs had was by way of an appeal against the order dismissing their claim petition. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to deal with the other questions raised in this case. The second appeal is allowed, and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.