JUDGMENT D.N. Roy, J. - This is an application in revision by Bihari who has been convicted u/s 380 I.P.C. or in the alternative u/s 411 I.P.C., and has been sentenced to six month's rigorous imprisonment. 2. On the night between 29th and 30th of June 1953, a theft took place at the shop of one Lok Nath in the town of Bindki. The case for the prosecution against the applicant was that when he was arrested on the 30th of June, (sic), he made a statement to the police and he led to the recovery of certain items of stolen property from his house in village Mohan-ka-Purwa which was at a distance of about one mile from Bindki. In support of that charge reliance was placed upon the evidence of three of the recovery witnesses, namely Shri Krishna, Badri and Manbodhan, and also upon the statement of Sub-Inspector Bhagwati Singh who investigated the case. Reliance was further placed upon the statement Ex. P-6 alleged to have been made by Bihari at Bindki when he was brought under arrest and also upon his further statement recorded in Ex P-2 which is said to have been made at his house in village Mohan-ka-Purwa. Ex. P-2 further contains a statement of fact as to what articles had been recovered from his house from a locked box kept in the southern dalan of the house, the key of which had been furnished by the applicant with which the applicant opened the box and made over the alleged offending articles to the police in the presence of the witnesses. The applicant had denied that he had made the statement or that any recovery had been made at his instance. His plea was that he had been falsely implicated. Two of the recovery witnesses, namely, Sri Krishna and Badri, were residents of Bindki, and the third recovery witness, Manbodhan, was a resident of a place known as Marhara within police circle Kalyanpur. No respectable witness of the locality, where the alleged search was made, was made to witness the search or was produced in the case. Two of the recovery witnesses, namely, Sri Krishna and Badri, were residents of Bindki, and the third recovery witness, Manbodhan, was a resident of a place known as Marhara within police circle Kalyanpur. No respectable witness of the locality, where the alleged search was made, was made to witness the search or was produced in the case. Although Sub-Inspector Bhagwati Singh tried to impress upon the court by (sic) in cross-examination that at the time of the alleged recovery no witness of village Mohan-ka-Purwa was present thereby suggesting an explanation for his failure to obtain any respectable witness of that locality to witness the search it was proved by P.W. 6, Manbodhan that at the time of the alleged search the residents of that village were present outside the house of the accused. It is therefore not clear why the Sub-Inspector did not avail of the services of those respectable persons of that locality to witness the search. It is not an uncommon practice for police officers to disregard the provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court had had occasion to emphasise the necessity of the compliance with that section as was pointed out by this Court in Sadlu Vs. Emperor, AIR 1934 All 374 . Where resptectable persons can be found in the neighbourhood, and the police officer making a search takes with him persons whose respectability is questionable or who come from a distant locality inference is that he was prompted by a desire to have such witnesses as would be easily persuaded to support any story which he might put forward. 3. In this case that desire is evident from the fact that the Sub-Inspector made an attempt in his evidence to conceal the fact that respectable persons of that locality were available at the time when the search is said to have been conducted. Consequently the inference is that he was prompted by a desire to have such witnesses as would be easily persuaded to support any story which he might put forward. Apart from that aspect of the matter the recovery memo Ex. P-2 states that the recovery had been made from out of a locked box which was found in the southern dalan of the house. Apart from that aspect of the matter the recovery memo Ex. P-2 states that the recovery had been made from out of a locked box which was found in the southern dalan of the house. Prosecution witness, Shri Krishna, on the other hand, stated that the recovery was made from the western portion of the building in the house. This discrepancy went unexplained on the side of the prosecution. 4. The decision in Sadlu Vs. Emperor, AIR 1934 All 374 was relied upon on behalf of the accused at the time of the trial before the Magistrate. The Magistrate was of the opinion that that decision is not applicable to the present case, and the reason assigned by him was this. The present case, according to the Magistrate, hinges upon two things namely, (1) the statement Ex. P-6 and (2) the search. Ex. P-6 was recorded at a distance of about a mile from Bihari's house. The witnesses who were present at that time and at that place must also be present at the time of the actual search; for otherwise the statements of the prosecution witnesses would be quite disconnected. I have not been able to understand what the learned Magistrate had in view when he said "otherwise the statements of the prosecution witnesses would be quite disconnected." If the learned Magistrate was of the view that only the witnesses in whose presence at a distant locality an accused person makes a statement to the police in furtherance of which a search is conducted at the house of the accused at a different place can figure as search witnesses and the provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure need not be strictly enforced namely that two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate should be asked to attend and witness the search, the Magistrate was far too wrong. The learned Sessions Judge also appears to me to have been labouring under a mistaken view of the provisions of Section 103. The learned Sessions Judge also appears to me to have been labouring under a mistaken view of the provisions of Section 103. To quote the words of the learned Sessions Judge: Three witnesses had seen the recovery and the learned Counsel for the Appellant has not been able to show anything against them with the exception of the fact that they are residents of Bindki while the recovery had been made a mile away at the house of the Appellant. In the first place provisions of Section 103 Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply to this recovery as no search had been effected of a house. The property was produced by the Appellant himself and the statement which he made and which had led to the recovery had been made at Bindki and naturally the witnesses present would be of the same town. 5. The learned Sessions Judge was completely wrong when he said that this was not a search within the meaning of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In fact the recovery memo itself states that it was a search u/s 103. The recovery memo further indicates that the officer conducting the search was pretending to observe the formality laid down in Section 103. The learned Sessions Judge's view that Section 103 did not apply to this recovery as no search had been effected of a house was therefore erroneous. 6. Ex. P-6 was relied upon on behalf of the prosecution as a statement made by Bihari before the police in furtherance of which the search was made and the recovery effected. Part of that statement was inadmissible, and the learned Magistrate only accepted that part of it which was admissible under the Evidence Act. That precaution was not observed by the Magistrate when he made the entire contents of Ex. P-2 admissible. Ex. P-2 can be divided into two portions, the first portion containing the statement of Bihari accused over again, and the second portion containing the statement of fact as to which articles were recovered at the instance of Bihari from out of the locked box in the Southern dalan of the house. In the first part of Ex. P-2 admissible. Ex. P-2 can be divided into two portions, the first portion containing the statement of Bihari accused over again, and the second portion containing the statement of fact as to which articles were recovered at the instance of Bihari from out of the locked box in the Southern dalan of the house. In the first part of Ex. P-2 containing the statement of the accused it was mentioned by the Sub-Inspector that the accused confessed his guilt and said that some of the articles of this theft were at his house and that one Gulwa had associated himself with him in the commission of this theft. These statements would not be admissible; and the question involves the construction of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. That section and the two preceding sections with which it must be read are in these terms: Section 25: No confession made to a Police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26: No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. 7. The explanation to this section is not relevant for our purposes. Section 27: Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. 8. Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence ; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. The statement to the effect that "Iqbal Jurm Karte Huye Kaha" or "Gulwa Chamar jo mere sath chori men raha hai" are statements which will not by any stretch of reasoning come within the four corners of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. These statements were wrongly admitted by the learned Magistrate and they were not even excluded by the learned Sessions Judge when he heard the appeal. 9. The position therefore is that in this case evidence had been admitted which ought not to have been admitted, and the duty of the court in such circumstances is stated in Section (sic) of the Evidence Act which provides: The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision. 10. It will therefore be the duty of the court to apply its mind to the question whether, after discarding the evidence improperly admitted, there is left sufficient evidence to justify the conviction. In the present case, as I have already said, the salutary principles enunciated in Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not followed giving rise to the presumption that the Sub-Inspector was prompted by a desire to have such witnesses as search witnesses as would be easily persuaded to support the story which he might put forward. In the present case, as I have already said, the salutary principles enunciated in Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not followed giving rise to the presumption that the Sub-Inspector was prompted by a desire to have such witnesses as search witnesses as would be easily persuaded to support the story which he might put forward. It is extremely doubtful whether a search was at all made of the house of the applicant, and whether any recovery had been made at his instance. Further more, if the inadmissible portion of the evidence contained in Ex. P2 excluded, there remains no evidence whatsoever on the record to sustain the charge against the applicant either under Section. 380 or u/s 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Consequently the conviction and sentence of the applicant cannot be sustained. 11. In the result the application revision is allowed and the conviction and the sentence of the applicant u/s 380, I.P.C. or alternatively u/s 411 I.P.C. are set aside. The applicant is on bail. His bail-bond is discharged and he need not surrender.