JUDGMENT Brij Mohan Lall, J. - The suit which has given rise to this Second Appeal was instituted by the Respondents against the Appellants for ejectment from certain land and for damages. It was alleged that the Respondents were the tenants of the land in question, that the Appellants had previously claimed that land as their tenancy but their claim had been negatived by the revenue court, and that after the decision of the revenue court the Appellants had again taken forcible possession of this land. Hence the suit for ejectment and damages. 2. Various pleas were taken in defence by the Appellants, one of which was that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This plea has been over-ruled by both the courts below but it has been reiterated before me. 3. While the Agra Tenancy Act (III of 1926) was in force, the view held by this Court was that if a person was unlawfully ejected from the land which was in his possession he had the option to sue a trespasser either in a civil court or in a revenue court. It was held in the Full Bench case of Mohd. Muslim and Ors. v. Mahrania and Ors. 25 A.L.J.R. 545 that Section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act (III of 1926) barred the jurisdiction of the civil courts in those cases only where adequate relief could be given by a revenue court. It was pointed out that Section 44 of that Act, which was the section corresponding to the present Section 180, restricted the jurisdiction of the revenue court in the matter of allowing damages to four times the rental value of the land. It was because of this limitation on the court's power that the Full Bench took the view that adequate relief could not be given by the revenue court. It was therefore held that if the Plaintiff was content with the smaller amount of damages which could be awarded u/s 44 he could take resort to the speedy remedy provided by Section 44 of the Act, otherwise he had the option to pursue his remedy in the civil court. 4. In the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939) the word 'adequate' was omitted from Section 242, which was the section corresponding to Section 230 of the former Act. 4. In the U.P. Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939) the word 'adequate' was omitted from Section 242, which was the section corresponding to Section 230 of the former Act. A question arose whether in view of this amendment in the language of the statute, the aforesaid Full Bench decision continued to be good law. This question came up for decision before a Division Bench of this Court and it held in Parmeshwari Das and Ors. v. Angan Lal 1944 A.W.R. (H.C.) 56 that the aforesaid change in the language of the statute had brought about no alteration in law and the Full Bench decision in Mohd. Muslim and Ors. v. Mahrania and Ors. 25 A.L.J.R. 545 continued to be good law. This decision was subsequently considered by a Full Bench of this Court in D.N. Rege v. Kazi Mohammad Haider 1946 A.W.R. (H.C.) 403. The Full Bench over-ruled the decision reported in Parmeshwari Das and Ors. v. Anganlal 1944 A.W.R. (H.C.) 56 and held that a change in law had been brought about as a result of the omission of the word 'adequate' in Section 242 of the new Act. Further it held that the decision reported in Mohd. Muslim and Ors. v. Mahrania and Ors. 25 A.L.J.R. 545 had ceased to be good law, that the revenue and civil courts did not exercise concurrent jurisdiction, and that their jurisdictions had become mutually exclusive. 5. Another point decided by this Full Bench was that if the Defendants were claiming as tenants the proper forum was the revenue court but where they were claiming as proprietors the civil court could try the suit. It may, however, be pointed out that in this Full Bench case the Plaintiff was claiming as a proprietor and not as a tenant. The question whether a tenant could maintain a suit for the dispossession of the trespass u/s 180 of the Act did not arise for decision before the Full Bench. 6. This question was, however, considered by a Full Bench of the erstwhile Chief Court of Oudh in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi 1947 A.W.R. (C.C.) 7. The view taken by the said Court was that a suit u/s 180 could be brought by a proprietor only and not by a tenant. 6. This question was, however, considered by a Full Bench of the erstwhile Chief Court of Oudh in Ori Lal v. Ganeshi 1947 A.W.R. (C.C.) 7. The view taken by the said Court was that a suit u/s 180 could be brought by a proprietor only and not by a tenant. This view is inconsistent with the decision of the Board of Revenue in the case of Min-dhai v. Bhajan 1932 R.D. 184 wherein it was held that a tenant who had been ejected, could maintain a suit u/s 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act. Emphasis was laid on the fact that a person who could maintain the suit should be a "land-holder" and not necessarily the "landlord". It was pointed out that since a tenant could admit a trespasser as a subtenant and could receive rent from him, he could become a landholder qua him. In other words he could let out the land to the person who was holding it against his wishes and could treat him as a sub-tenant. Therefore he was a land-holder who could maintain the suit. In Duiji Kunwar v. Baila Kunwar and Ors. 1932 A.L.J.R. 521 this Court also took the view that a tenant could maintain a suit in the revenue court. 7. After 1947 an amendment has been made in Section 180 of the Act, and an Explanation has been added to the effect that a tenant can maintain a suit u/s 180. Therefore there can be no doubt about the competence of the revenue court to entertain suits u/s 180 at the instance of tenants after 1947. But the present suit was instituted in 1946, and it will be governed by the law as it then stood. But it must be borne in mind that the amendment has been made by adding an Explanation. In other words, the legislature has intervened to clarify the position by removing an ambiguity. It has not altered the law but has explained what the law was. Had the amendment been made by adding a new paragraph in the form of an exception it could be argued that the amendment came into force from the date of its enactment. But in the present circumstances the true import of the amendment is that the law was so even before and the Explanation purports only to clarify the position. 8. But in the present circumstances the true import of the amendment is that the law was so even before and the Explanation purports only to clarify the position. 8. It may also be pointed out that the definition of the term "tenant" includes a "sub-tenant" except when the contrary intention appears. In view of what has been pointed out above it is no longer possible to contend that there is any contrary intention. Even on the date of the suit it was open to the Plaintiffs-Respondents to admit the Appellants as sub-tenants of the land in question. If that was so, Section 180 applied and the suit for ejectment could lie in the revenue court. 9. I am therefore of the opinion that the suit lay in revenue court and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaint will have, therefore, to be returned for presentation to the proper court. 10. It was pointed out to me that after the coming into force of the Z.A. and L.R. Act (I of 1951) the suit will again become cognizable by the civil court, and no useful purpose will be served by returning the plaint. This argument has no force. In view of Section 2 of the U.P. Land Tenures (Legal Proceedings) (Removal of Difficulties) Order 1952, passed u/s 342 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, this suit will be cognizable by the revenue court, because the cause of action had arisen in 1946. 11. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The decrees of the courts below are set aside. The plaint shall be returned to the Respondents for presentation to proper court. The Appellants shall get their costs throughout. 12. Leave to appeal to a Division Bench is refused.