JUDGMENT Brij Mohan Lall, J. - This is a second appeal by the Plaintiff against a decree of the learned Addl. Civil Judge of Moradabad affirming the decree of the learned Munsif of that place. The latter had dismissed the suit with costs. 2. It appears that one Kadir Bux owned a house. He transferred it to his two wives, Srimati Ismat-un-nissa and Srimati Nasiran in equal shares. By subsequent transfers the share alotted to Srimati Ismat-un-nissa became vested again in Kadir Bux. Thereafter, there was a partition between Kadir Bux and Smt. Nasiran. In this partition the western portion was alotted to Kadir Bux and the eastern to Smt. Nasiran. Kadir Bux transferred the western portion to Aziz-ullah, who executed a simple mortgage thereof in favour of the Appellant on 2-5-1916. The Appellant obtained a decree on the basis of this mortgage in 1928, put it in execution and himself purchased the western portion of the house on 9-3-1931. On 23-8-31 he executed a Dakhalnama purporting to obtain delivery of possession through Court. 3. The suit which has given rise to this second appeal was instituted on 26-2-43 by the Appellant for possession of the said western portion and for mesne profits. It was alleged by him that he was in possession of the said portion but was dispossessed in September, 1931 by the Respondents, who are the legal representatives of Smt. Nasiran. There was a claim for mesne profits also but it has been dismissed by the courts below and has not been pressed before me. I am, therefore, concerned in this appeal with the claim in so far as it relates to question of title to the house. 4. Various pleas were taken in defence, but all of them are not material for the purposes of this appeal. Two pleas only need be mentioned as they are relevant for our present purposes. It was alleged that the Respondents had been in adverse possession of the house in question for over twelve years and, therefore the suit was time-barred. It was further contended that the claim was barred by estoppel. These pleas have found favour with both the courts below. Both the courts below have held that the contesting Respondents have been in adverse possession of the house in question since 1928. The suit, as already stated, was instituted in 1943. It was further contended that the claim was barred by estoppel. These pleas have found favour with both the courts below. Both the courts below have held that the contesting Respondents have been in adverse possession of the house in question since 1928. The suit, as already stated, was instituted in 1943. The question for decision is whether the suit was time barred. 5. In order to decide the question of limitation, it is necessary first to determine as to which Article of the 1st Schedule of the Limitation Act will govern this case. Article 137 relates to a suit by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree for possession of an immovable property when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of sale. It prescribes a limitation of twelve years from the date when the judgment-debtor is first entitled to possession. Since the judgment-debtor, on the findings recorded by the court below, was out of possession since 1928, the claim would be time barred if it is governed by this Article. But this Article is confined to suits where the Plaintiff by an auction-purchase acquires the judgment-debtor's rights only. In a sale held in execution of a simple mortgage decree, the auction purchaser acquires not only the mortgagor's right, but also the rights which he himself possessed as a mortgagee. A suit by such a purchaser is, therefore, not covered by Article 137. There is ample authority in support of this view. In Aditya Kumar v. Dhirendra Nath 1952 Cal. 92, it was held that Article 137 contemplates an auction-purchaser who has by his purchase acquired just the interest which the judgment-debtor had in the property at the date of the sale and no higher, and who stands in precisely the same position as the judgment-debtor had in relation to third parties in respect of that property. The purchaser at a sale in execution of a mortgage decree, however, becomes clothed not merely with the equity of redemption but also the mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged property and, therefore, Article 137 cannot apply to such a purchaser. 6. To the same effect are the decisions in Tanjore Palace Estate v. Thiyagarja Pillai AIR 1923 Mad. 160 (2) and Bhawani Din v. Mst. Jhamman and Ors. AIR 1916 Oud. 221. 6. To the same effect are the decisions in Tanjore Palace Estate v. Thiyagarja Pillai AIR 1923 Mad. 160 (2) and Bhawani Din v. Mst. Jhamman and Ors. AIR 1916 Oud. 221. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the present case is not governed by Article 137. 7. According to the findings of fact recorded by the courts below, the Appellant never entered into actual possession as a result of the delivery of possession effected in his favour. The proceedings for delivery of possession were a mere paper transaction. In fact there was no break in the possession of contesting Respondents who had been in possession since 1928. The Appellant never came into possession and was therefore never dispossessed. On the facts found, Article 142 does not apply. The suit falls within Article 144 which is the residuary article for a suit for possession. This article provides a period of 12 years from the point of time when the Defendants' possession becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. 8. The next question that arises for decision is whether the Respondents, who have been in unauthorised possession since 1928 and whose possession is undoubtedly adverse to the Appellant from the date of purchase, i.e., 9-3-1931, can tack the period of adverse possession prior to the date of purchase to the period subsequent to such date. In this connection it may be pointed out that the Appellant was a simple mortgagee and as such had no right to possession. His right to possession accrued from the date of his auction purchase. If any person was in possession of the property prior to the date of the possession was adverse to the mortgagor, but not adverse to the mortgagee, who, as already stated, had at that stage no right to remain in possession. The period prior to the purchase cannot, therefore, be tacked to the period subsequent to this date. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Nandan Singh v. Jumman and Ors. 10 A.L.J.R. 278. This case supports the view taken above provided adverse possession commenced after the execution of the mortgage deed. If the adverse possess on had begun from before the date of the mortgage, it would operate against the mortgagee also, but that is not the case here. This view is further supported by the case of Tanjor Palace Estate v. Thiyagarja Pillai AIR 1923 Mad. If the adverse possess on had begun from before the date of the mortgage, it would operate against the mortgagee also, but that is not the case here. This view is further supported by the case of Tanjor Palace Estate v. Thiyagarja Pillai AIR 1923 Mad. 160 (2). 9. If, as already stated above, the mortgagees Respondents cannot tack the period of their adverse possession prior to the date of auction purchase to the period subsequent to that date, their defence must fail. The period subsequent to the date of the purchase falls short of twelve years. Hence, they have not matured their title against the Appellant auction-purchaser. His suit, as instituted, which was within twelve years from the date of the auction purchase, was well within time and should have been decreed. 10. Next comes the question of estoppel. Both the courts below have held that the Respondents made pucca shops on the land in question, but the Appellant or his agent did not object. This conduct, according to both the courts below, estops the Appellant from enforcing his right. The rule of estoppel is contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act. It says that When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing. 11. In other words, the rule of estoppel comes into play while a party has been misled by some act, declaration or omission of another. If the actual facts are known to the party concerned, there can be no estoppel whatsoever. The contesting Respondents who are the legal representatives of Nasiran were living in the adjoining portion of the house which is their own and they knew all about the title of the parties. On their own showing, they have entered into adverse possession which implies that they knew that the house had been purchased by the Appellant and they were keeping him out. They have not pointed out what wrong belief they were led to entertain by any action of the Appellant or his agent. The rule of estoppel has, therefore, no application to a case like this. 12. They have not pointed out what wrong belief they were led to entertain by any action of the Appellant or his agent. The rule of estoppel has, therefore, no application to a case like this. 12. It might have been possible, in an appropriate case, to rely on the doctrine of acquiescence provided there existed the necessary elements laid down in Willmott v. Barber 1880 15 Ch. D. 96 and Jai Narain Vs. Jafar Beg and Another, AIR 1926 All 324 . To bring the doctrine of acquiescence into play, it is necessary to prove, inter alia, that the Respondents were labouring under a certain mistaken belief about their right, that the Appellant was aware of the existence of that mistaken belief on the part of the Respondents and he stood by. There is nothing to show what mistaken belief the Respondents in the present case entertained. Still less is there anything to prove that the Appellant was aware of that mistaken belief on the part of the Respondents. Therefore the doctrine of acquiescence also has no application to the facts of this case. 13. The next question that arises for decision is whether the Respondents are entitled to any compensation for the shops constructed by them. Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act creates certain rights in favour of a transferee of immovable property who makes any improvement on the property believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto and who is subsequently evicted therefrom by any person having a better title. This section cannot be availed of by the Respondents who are mere trespassors. They are neither transferees nor did they believe in good faith that they were absolutely entitled to the property in question. Therefore, no compensation can be given to them in respect of the shops erected by them. 14. Section 63A also does not apply because it relates to improvements effected on the property while the said property is in the possession of the mortgagee. Section 63 which provides for the accession to the mortgaged property while it is in the possession of the mortgagee is also equally inapplicable. 15. This means that no compensation is to be paid to the Respondents for the shops constructed by them. Section 63 which provides for the accession to the mortgaged property while it is in the possession of the mortgagee is also equally inapplicable. 15. This means that no compensation is to be paid to the Respondents for the shops constructed by them. But they shall be at liberty to remove the shops within a period of six months failing which possession should be delivered to the Appellant with the shops. 16. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The Appellant's suit for possession is decreed with proportionate costs in all the courts. It shall be open to the Respondents to remove the shops constructed by them within six months of today, failing which the Appellant shall be entitled to obtain possession to the property in dispute together with the shops.