JUDGMENT Kh. Atolchow Singh has brought this petition for obtaining a writ of Mandamus or any other writ of a like nature or an order directing the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to show cause why should they not be compelled to perform their statutory obligations under Rule 96 of the Defence of India Rules and why should their order of refusal to pay compensation to the petitioners be not set aside. 2. According to the petitioner during the last World War (II), the allied Military Forces in the course of their duty, purporting to act under Rule 78 of the Defence of India Rules, demolished certain properties, rendered useless some other properties and removed some other properties situated in or over the land or attached to the land under patta No. 30/588 I. W. T. also known as Sekmai Rice Mill which belonged to the petitioner, as in the opinion of these forces it was necessary and/or expedient so to do, for securing the British India, the public safety, maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of the war by placing certain machineries in or over the land. The lists of properties belonging to the petitioner thus removed, destroyed and rendered useless have been given in the schedule A annexed to the present petition. The petitioner had to leave the place by the end of 1942 A.D. after forcible occupation by the Allied Military Forces. The petitioner filed an application for compensation under Rule 96 of the Defence of India Rules 011 30-1-1946 and the Claims Officer, Manipur sanctioned only Rs. 3392/- out of Appellant sum of Rs. 2,15,212/4/-. The petitioner received the said sum of Rs. 3392/- under protest and he filed an application on 15-1-1949 to the then Chief Minister, Manipur State Council, complaining against the enquiry Officer for his wilful negligence in making proper assessment of the damage suffered. The Chief Commissioner, Manipur forwarded the petition dated 15-1-1949 under his Memo. No. 1137/ Claim dated 18-1-1949 to the Special Compensation Officer for disposal and the petitioner filed another petition on 6-2-1949 before that Officer giving complete details regarding compensation money amounting to Rs. 2,15,212/14/- on account of damages. The Special Compensation Officer inspected the place by the Middle of March 1949 and assessed the valuation of the damages at Rs. No. 1137/ Claim dated 18-1-1949 to the Special Compensation Officer for disposal and the petitioner filed another petition on 6-2-1949 before that Officer giving complete details regarding compensation money amounting to Rs. 2,15,212/14/- on account of damages. The Special Compensation Officer inspected the place by the Middle of March 1949 and assessed the valuation of the damages at Rs. 50,000/- only and he recommended to the Authorities for payment of this sum to the petitioner, but the Authorities have not paid this amount uptil now, even though the petitioner moved the Ministry of Defence by his representation dated 26-10-1954 which was forwarded to the Chief Commissioner, Manipur by means of the letter dated 23-11-1954 for disposal. The petitioner has alleged that in spite of the above-mentioned order by the Government of India the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to take into consideration the petitions dated 15-1-1949 and 6-2 1949 as well as the report of the Special Compensation Officer, who had recommended that the petitioner should be paid Rs. 50,000/- as compensation and as no specific, adequate and legal remedy by way of appeal is available to the petitioner he is obliged to seek relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. The respondents have by means of an affidavit in reply contended that there is no scope for interference under Art. 226 of he Constitution in this matter as the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under this Article is not meant to replace ordinary procedure of law or other Statutes under which an obligation is created against the State. It has further been contended that it is a matter of evidence to prove that the petitioner was the owner of the properties specified in the list given in schedule A and so this Court cannot decide what is the pecuniary claim of the applicant nor can it determine the amount. A sum of Rs. 3392/- is stated to have been paid to the petitioner as ex gratia without admission of any obligation. It has been denied that the Special Compensation Officer was clothed with any appellate powers or was competent to re-assess the compensation and order payment thereto and his recommendations are stated to have no validity or binding character so far as the respondents are concerned. The recommendations of the Special Compensation Officer regarding payment of Rs. It has been denied that the Special Compensation Officer was clothed with any appellate powers or was competent to re-assess the compensation and order payment thereto and his recommendations are stated to have no validity or binding character so far as the respondents are concerned. The recommendations of the Special Compensation Officer regarding payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioner as compensation was, according to the respondents, not accepted by any competent authority and no order was passed thereon. Lastly, it has been contended that the climbing down of the applicant from his previous claim of Rs. 2,15,212/4/- to the reduced sum of Rs. 50,000/- and his eagerness to accept the same by relinquishing such a huge amount on some pretext combined with his attempt to secure his object through the cheap and effortless remedy of a writ petition without venturing to file a suit in the normal manner was clear indication that his claim was fictitious, speculative and imaginary. The petitioners remedy, if any, is said to lie in civil Court by means of a regular suit. As the petitioners claim is contended to have been finally disposed of, there remains nothing further for further consideration. 4. The petitioner has in counter affidavit urged that no assessment of compensation has been made regarding machinery, fruit trees, etc. and also regarding the building damage, and assessment was made only for a portion of the building which was kutcha and a portion of a brick wall and as the authorities failed to discharge their statutory obligations, a writ of Mandamus can be issued in this case. It was further contended that the Government did not supply copies of the documents to the petitioners and the version given by the respondents in their affidavit to the contrary is incorrect. 5. The opposite parties have in para 5 of their affidavit stated that the statements ontained in para 1 of the petition are not denied. It has been mentioned in para 1 of the petition that during the last world war the Allied Military Forces in the course of their duty purporting to act under Rule 78 of the Defence of India Rule, demolished certain properties, rendered useless some other properties and removed some properties from the land under patta No. 30/588 I.W.T : 6. It has been mentioned in para 1 of the petition that during the last world war the Allied Military Forces in the course of their duty purporting to act under Rule 78 of the Defence of India Rule, demolished certain properties, rendered useless some other properties and removed some properties from the land under patta No. 30/588 I.W.T : 6. Order 8, R. 3, C.P.C. lays downs that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with such allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages. Rule 4 further lays down that where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient, to deny it along with these circumstances. Rule 5 clearly lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability : The respondents evasive denial in para 5 of their affidavit will thus be legally deemed to mean that the Allied Military Forces in the course of their duty acted under Rule 78 of the Defence of India Rules. The implications of this admission is that the parties would be governed by the provisions of the Defence of India Act 1939 and the Defence of India Rules and the argument advanced on behalf of the respondents that the land in question did not form part of re-questioned area and so the Defence of India Act and Rules have no application in the present case cannot be accepted as correct. 7. 7. Paras 2 and 3 of the petition state that the properties mentioned in schedule A were rendered useless on account of various acts of the Allied Military Forces in the course of their duty and the petitioner had to leave the place on this account by the end of 1942. The allegations contained in these paragraphs have not been, specifically denied in paras. 6 and 7 of the affidavit filed by the respondents and it has been vaguely stated that it is a matter to prove that the petitioner was the owner of the properties specified in schedule A and that the respondents have no knowledge of the fact mentioned in para 3 of the petition. It has been argued by the learned Government Advocate on behalf of the respondents that the present petitioner cannot be allowed any relief in this case because he seeks to secure a decree for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- without attempting to prove that his properties worth that amount were damaged, destroyed, removed or rendered useless. It has thus been contended that the present petitioner should seek his remedy by means of a regular suit in a civil Court where he can get ample opportunity of proving by means of cogent evidence the details regarding damages. Reliance has been placed on - Dinesh Charan v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1953 Madh-B 165 (A), in which it has been laid down that the object of Art. 226 being the enforcement of fundamental rights and other statutory rights and not the establishment of a legal right, the right of a petitioner to the performance of a, suitable duty must be clear and complete. If the High Court finds itself unable to decide on the rights of the parties and thinks they could be investigated more properly in a civil suit, no direction under Art. 226 can be issued. Reliance has also been placed on - Mohd. Karrar Ali v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 All 753 (B), in which it has been held that where the petitioner would have a right under the general law to go to the appropriate Court for relief, who would be in a better position to decide all questions of facts in dispute, it is not necessary for the High Court in a writ petition to give relief. The ruling reported in - Mohammed Ibrahim v. Asansol Iron and Steel Workers Union, AIR 1955 Cal 189 (C), in which it has been held that in an application under Art. 226, the Court does not (except in an exceptional circumstances) go into disputed questions of fact. Where the matter involves disputed questions of fact, a suit would be the proper remedy, vide also - Abdul Rashid v. Deputy Commr. Darrang, AIR 1954 Assam 74 (D), - Muniruddin v. Chairman, Town Area Committee, Mau Aima, AIR 1953 All 109 (E) and - A.C. Gilbert v. Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, AIR 1953 All 678 (F). The argument appears to be based on a misapprehension as to the exact relief which has been prayed for in the present petition. The respondents seem to believe that the petitioner is asking this Court to grant him a decree for Rs. 50,000/-, but this is not correct. All that the petitioner wants in this case is that the respondents should be made to discharge their statutory obligations and they should consider the claims of the petitioner for compensation on the merits. The matter has been hanging on from 1946 A. D., but nothing appears to have been done so far. The respondents purported to act under Rules 49, 75A and 78 of the Defence of India Rules and so under Rule 96 the present petitioner was entitled to compensation and a statutory duty was imposed on the respondents to have the claims for compensation decided on the merits vide - Thokchom Khonoo Singh v. Extra Asst. Commr., (Claims) Manipur, AIR 1956 Manipur 1 (G). 8. Section 16 of the Defence of India Act lays down that no order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any Court, and so the jurisdiction, of ordinary civil Court appears to have been taken away in cases like the present. As such there is no force in the respondents contention that an equally efficacious and adequate remedy was available to the present petitioner and the present petition should be rejected. The respondents have admitted that a sum of Rs. 3392/- was allowed to the petitioner as ex gratia payment, but no documentary evidence has been produced on their behalf to substantiate this allegation. The respondents have admitted that a sum of Rs. 3392/- was allowed to the petitioner as ex gratia payment, but no documentary evidence has been produced on their behalf to substantiate this allegation. In para 4 of the petition it has been specifically alleged that a claim was filed by the petitioner on 30-1-1946 well within time and the Claims Officer sanction. Rs. 3392/- out of the sum of Rs. 2,15,212/4/- shown in schedule A in September 1948, and in para. 1 of the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner it has been stated that the above-mentioned amount of compensation had been given regarding a portion of a kutcha building and a brick wall, but no other items had been considered. The respondents did not pray for amendment of their affidavit in any manner, and as a copy of the order by which this ex gratia payment is alleged to have been made, has not been produced in this Court, I think the present petitioners contention that his claim regarding machinery etc. has never been considered at all on the merits so far should be deemed to be correct. It has been laid down in - Shiv Dutt v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 Him-P 95 (H), that proceeding under Art. 226 being of a summary nature no writ will issue, where the right to it depends on a number of complicated questions of fact which are not capable of establishment in such proceedings. But where the disputed questions of fact are easily provable, as for example, by the filing of originals or certified copies of incontrovertible documents, relief will not be disallowed in such proceedings on the mere ground of facts stated by the petitioner being disputed by the opposite party. With great respect I fully agree with the principle laid down in this ruling. The petitioner has contended by means of an affidavit that certified copies were not granted to him but this fact has been controverted by the respondents. The respondents contention in this, case is that the payment of Rs. 3392/- was ex gratia and this could very easily un established by producing the original order by which this payment was made, but this has not been done. The respondents contention in this, case is that the payment of Rs. 3392/- was ex gratia and this could very easily un established by producing the original order by which this payment was made, but this has not been done. Under these circumstances inferences must be drawn against the respondents and the allegation of the petitioner that this sum was paid as compensation and it was received by him under protest, has to be accepted as correct. The petitioner did not stop at this stage, he approached the then Chief Minister Manipur State Council, who directed the Special Compensation Officer to dispose of the applicants petition and also the supplementary petition dated 6-2-1949. In para. 9 of the affidavit filed by the respondents in reply, it has been stated that with reference to para 5 of the petition that the filing of petition or submission of any estimate of any alleged damage did not give any right to the petitioner, but it has not been stated that the petitioner did not file any such petition dated 6-2-1949. Regarding para. 6 of the petition in which it has been stated that the Special Compensation Officer inspected the place by the middle of March 1949 and assessed the valuation of the damages, to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- only, and it has been, mentioned in para. 10 of the respondents affidavit that the Special Compensation Officer was not clothed with any appellate power nor was he competent to re-assess the compensation and order payment thereto. It has not been denied as a fact that the Special Compensation Officer who inspected the place estimated the amount of compensation at Rs. 50,000/-. The petitioner had never contended that the Special Compensation Officer was to exercise any appellate power or that he was competent to pass a decree for the above-mentioned sum; all that the petitioner stated was that the report of the Special Compensation Officer which was given after inspecting the place, was entitled to great weight and as the respondents failed to adjudicate on this matter in spite of the lapse of such a long period, an appropriate writ should be issued against them. As the respondents should have proved by filing the necessary papers which are in their possession that a sum of Rs. As the respondents should have proved by filing the necessary papers which are in their possession that a sum of Rs. 3392/- had been paid regarding entire damage caused to the petitioner, or that it was an ex gratia payment, but they have not chosen to do so, and as the Chief Minister directed the Special Compensation Officer, after the petitioner had received Rs. 3392/- under protest, to dispose of the petitioners claim and his other petition dated 6-2-1949, the contention that the payment of Rs. 3392/- was ex gratia becomes wholly untenable. 9. The fact that the Defence of India lapsed on 30-9-1948 will not defeat the petitioners right which accrued to him when the aforesaid Act was in force as this right was expressly saved by S. 3 of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1947 (Act II of 1948) vide also S. 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897. The principle that the Government has no power during war to take the property of a subject for administrative purposes without paying compensation is well recognised and established vide - Attorney General v. De. Eeysers Royal Hotel Ltd., 1920 AC 508, at p. 576 (I). 10. Although Mandamus cannot-lie against an Authority to compel it to take certain action which it has refused to take after considering, pros and cons of the issue involved, where the Authority has improperly refused to consider Appellant matter at all or in other words, refuses to exercise its statutory powers, discharge its statutory duty, Mandamus will lie to compel it to carry out its statutory duties to take up the matter and decide it according to law vide R. v. Health Minister, 1925-2 KB 363 (J) at p. 373 and - Ken-dell v. United States, (1838) 12 Pet 524 at p. 610 (K.) and Chitaleys Constitution of India, Volume 2, page 1806. 11. The petitioner has been awaiting from 1946 uptill now and his claim for compensation regarding machinery, trees etc. does not appear to have been considered on the merits by the Authorities so far. In view of the above-mentioned circumstances the remedy by way of regular suit, even if available, would not have been equally efficacious and prompt and so, I think a writ of Mandamus should be issued in this case against the respondents. 12. does not appear to have been considered on the merits by the Authorities so far. In view of the above-mentioned circumstances the remedy by way of regular suit, even if available, would not have been equally efficacious and prompt and so, I think a writ of Mandamus should be issued in this case against the respondents. 12. Before parting with this case I must mention that in para 11 of the affidavit filed in reply by the respondents it has been mentioned that the petitioner has attempted to secure his object through a cheap and fruitless remedy of a writ petition.......... 13. Matters to which affidavit shall confine have been mentioned in O. 19 R. 3, C.P.C. which runs as follows : "3(1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own known knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted : provided that the grounds thereof are stated :" 14. Affidavits should be filed to prove any, particular fact or facts, but any attempt to decry any legal remedy or any party in an affidavit does not come within, the four corners of O. 19 Rr. 1 to 3, C.P.C. and insertion of such matters in an affidavit must be held to be objectionable. 15. For reasons given above the present writ petition is allowed in so far the order of refusal to consider the petitioners claim regarding compensation on the merits is set aside and the petitioners claim will now be considered on the merits according to law. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.