Dave, J.—This is an application in revision by the plaintiffs Chhagan Mal and his two sons Misrilal and Bachhraj against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Balotra, dated 23.3.55, dismissing their money suit in appeal. 2. The petitioners had filed a suit for Rs. 375/- against Mst. Heer Bai widow of Kumbh Singh and her minor nephew Vijai Singh on the basis of two bonds Ex.P.1 and P.2, which, according to the plaintiffs, were executed by deceased Kumbh Singh. The defendants denied the execution of the documents by Kumbh Singh and also pleaded want of consideration] Defendant Vijai Singh further denied his liability on the ground that he had not inherited any property from the deceased (Kumbh Singh). The trial court found it proved that both the documents were executed by Kumbh Singh and it decreed the suit with costs against Mst. Heer Bai to the extent of the assets of the deceased in her hand. The suit against defendant No. 2 Vijai Singh was, however, dismissed. Aggrieved by that decree dated 30.7.54, Mst. Heer Bai went, in appeal which was heard by the learned District Judge, Balotra. It was urged on behalf of Heer Bai in the appellate court that the trial courts finding about execution and consideration of the said two documents was not correct. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court with regard to the execution of the documents, but as regards consideration, it was observed that the burden of proving it lay on the plaintiffs and since they had failed to discharge that onus, the trial courts decree could not be maintained. The learned District Judge relied on the view expressed by learned Judge of the Chief Court of the former Jodhpur State in Anop Singh vs. Lal Singh (1). It was mainly on account of this view that he allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs claim with costs. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the appellate court has committed material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the burden of proving the consideration lay on the plaintiffs, even though the execution of the documents was proved by them. It is urged that the law is very well settled that when the execution of a document by the defendant is proved, the burden shifts on him to prove want of consideration. It is urged that the law is very well settled that when the execution of a document by the defendant is proved, the burden shifts on him to prove want of consideration. It is further contended that the said burden continues even on the legal representatives of the deceased debtor and it does not shift back on the plaintiff simply because the original debtor is no more alive. In support of his contention, learned counsel has referred to Mst. Bhoori vs. Thakur Gulab Singh (2). Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has, on the other hand, tried to support the view taken by the appellate court. 4. I have given due consideration to the arguments raised by learned counsel on either side, and I entirely agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge of this Court in Mst. Bhooris case (2). In that case also a money suit was filed against the heir of the deceased debtor. It was urged before the learned Judge that while proof about the execution of a document by the debtor might throw the burden of proving want of consideration on the debtor, the same could not be said when the suit was filed against an heir of the executant. Adverting to this argument, it was observed by the learned Judge that there was no force in the argument, because an heir of the deceased executant was in no better position than the executant himself. The learned Judge referred to an observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in M. Intishan Ali vs. Jamna Prasad{3) and also that of Ramesam, J. of the Madras High Court in S.K. Raghavendra Rao vs. Venkatasami Naickan (4) in support of his view. I respectfully endorse the view expressed by the learned Judge that the position of an heir of the deceased executant does not improve because of the death of the executant and if the burden of proving want of consideration was on the deceased executant, it would certainly continue to rest with his heir. It is well settled by a string of decisions, which need not be mentioned here, that once the execution of a document by a debtor is proved by the creditor-plaintiff, the burden of proving want of consideration shifts on the executant. It is well settled by a string of decisions, which need not be mentioned here, that once the execution of a document by a debtor is proved by the creditor-plaintiff, the burden of proving want of consideration shifts on the executant. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has tried to cast a doubt on the correctness of the above view by referring to Neki Ram vs. Khushi Ram (5) and Rulia Singh vs. Tunia Mal (6). In Rulia Singhs case(6) it was no doubt held that while in case of a formally registered document in which the receipt of consideration is recited, the onus of proving want of consideration lay on the executant the same did not apply in the case of suits based on un-registered bonds or account-books. According to the learned Judges, who decided Rulia Singhs case(6), if consideration was denied in suits based on un-registered bonds or account-books, the onus for proving consideration still lay on the plaintiff. It would suffice to say that the view taken in the above two cases was not considered to be sound by the Full Bench of the same High Court in Ram Chand vs. Chhunun Mal (7) In that case, the following question was referred to the Full Bench: — "Where an unregistered document, such as a bond, a receipt or an entry in an account book, the execution of which is admitted or proved, contains an admission or recital of the payment of the consideration, does the onus lie on the person executing the document to prove that. he did not receive the consideration, or on the opposite party to prove the payment of the consideration" It was answered with an observation that under the circumstances referred to in the question the burden of proof lies on the person executing the document to prove that he did not receive the consideration. Both the cases (5) and (6) cited by learned counsel for the non-petitioner were referred in Ram Chands case (7) and it was held that they did not lay down the correct law. There is thus no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the non-petitioner. 5. Both the cases (5) and (6) cited by learned counsel for the non-petitioner were referred in Ram Chands case (7) and it was held that they did not lay down the correct law. There is thus no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the non-petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has next urged that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision, because the view taken by the appellate court is based on Anop Singhs case (1) and there was no decision to the contrary by this Court by the time the appeal was decided. I have given due consideration to this argument and, in my opinion, this objection also is not tenable. It may be that an occasion may not have arisen for this Court to express its opinion on the question whether the burden of proving want of consideration does or does not continue after the death of a debtor, but as pointed out in Mst. Bhooris case (2) other Courts had pronounced definite and clear opinion on that point. It appears from the decision in Anoop Singhs case (1) that reliance was placed on Sukhanand vs. Mst. Ship Devi(8). In Sukhanands case (8) it was observed that "it is true that as between parties to a document the admission or proof of execution would shift the onus on to the party denying consideration ; but in this case we have to determine the question of the liability of a third party, that is, Mst. Shiv Devi and I am of opinion that Mst. Shiv Devi cannot be held liable on these receipts unless there is evidence to prove that the money was actually paid". It may be pointed out that the facts of Sukhanands case (8) were very different; that case arose out of a suit for partition of certain house property situated in Amritsar City. Mst. Shiv Devi, who was daughter of Mohanlal deceased, had instituted the suit. It was contested by other members of the family including Sukhanand, brother of Mohan Lal. A preliminary decree was given in favour of Mst. Shiv Devi for partition, but at the same time it was held that Sukhanand was entitled to recover from her as a condition precedent to the partition a sum of about Rs. It was contested by other members of the family including Sukhanand, brother of Mohan Lal. A preliminary decree was given in favour of Mst. Shiv Devi for partition, but at the same time it was held that Sukhanand was entitled to recover from her as a condition precedent to the partition a sum of about Rs. 2000/- repaying the latters share of the cost and repairs undertaken by him in respect of the property in dispute. It was in that connection that certain receipts which were signed by Mst. Shiv Devi were produced and that led the learned Judges to make the observation referred above. It is clear from what has been stated above that it was not a case of debt against an heir of a deceased debtor and the learned Judge who decided Anop Singhs case (1) was not justified in placing his reliance on the remarks made in Sukhanands case (8). If the appellate court had cared to read Sukhanands case (8), it would have appeared to it atonce that the view which it has taken palpably wrong. The view taken by the appellate court does not find support from any decision of this Court and other High Courts. It has certainly committed material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in dismissing the plaintiffs suit by taking an erroneous view about the burden of proof. This Court, therefore, has not only jurisdiction but also a duty to correct the mistake, and there is no force in the objection raised by learned counsel for the non-petitioner. 6. The revision application is, therefore, allowed. The decree of the appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The petitioners will receive their costs in this Court as also in the appellate court from the non-petitioner.