Dave, J.—This is an application by the appellant Iftikhar Ahmad and others under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code for review of our order dated the 4th of October, 1955, whereby they were directed to pay Ad Valorem court-fee within fifteen days time. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that his clients do not contest the amount of the decree, but they are simply contesting their personal liability to pay the decretal amount, that the appeal is therefore governed by Schedule II, Art 17 and not by Schedule I, Art. 1 of the Court Fees Act. 3. We have given due consideration to the above noted argument. It may be observed that in the first instance, the review application is incompetent because it is not covered by Order XLVII, Rule l. An application under this rule can be made only if there is a discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner of could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or if there is some other sufficient reason. It is obvious that the petitioner has not alleged any discovery of any new and important matter or evidence. All that he wants to say is that the view which we have taken is incorrect because a different view has been taken by some other High Courts. It may be observed that simply because a different view on a question of law is taken by another High Court, it cannot be said that it is a mistake apparent on the face of the record, 4. Still we have looked into the cases relied upon by the petitioner in order to satisfy ourselves if the view taken by us is correct. The first case relied upon by the petitioner is Radhakishan vs. Mehtab Mian (1) In that case it was held that an appeal which does not attack the decree as a whole but only the manner in which the trial courts decree is to be enforced falls under clause (6) of Art 17 of the Court Fees Act and a court-fee stamp of Rs 10/- is sufficient. In that case the trial court had decreed the suit but added a direction that a receiver should be appointed in respect of the partnership property which was to be brought to the market for sale. The plaintiff was ordered to supply the necessary funds for bringing the timber, which was his personal property, to the market. The plaintiff went in appeal to the District Judge to have this direction removed. The District Judge held that the court-fee stamp of Rs.10/-paid by the plaintiff on the memorandum of appeal was insufficient. It was in those circumstances that the High Court held that the appellant was not attacking the decree but only the manner in which it was to be enforce-ed and for that reason Art. 17, clause 6 was held applicable. In the present case, it appears that there was a decree for the sale of mortgaged property. The mortgaged property was thereafter sold, but since the sale proceeds were found insufficient to satisfy the decretal amount,the decree-holder applied for personal decree against the present appellants. The learned District Judge has passed a personal decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 6 and it is against that decree that the present appeal has been filed. It cannot be said that the petitioners simply challenge the manner of the enforcement of the decree. The previous decree was only for the sale of the mortgaged property. It is now that a personal decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 6 has been passed by the District Judge. The appellants challenge their personal liability to pay up the decretal amount. The Court will have to look into the question whether there was a personal covenant by the petitioners to pay up the amount. The court will, therefore, have to decide a substantive question of law and it cannot be said, under the circumstances, that the applicants are simply challenging the manner in which the decree is to be enforced. The question of the manner of execution will come up when this personal decree is put into execution. A similar question had arisen in the case of Lakhi Narain Jagdeo vs. Krittibas Das(2). In that case, it was an order under sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act against which the appeal was filed. Order XXXIV, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code which now corresponds to old sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. A similar question had arisen in the case of Lakhi Narain Jagdeo vs. Krittibas Das(2). In that case, it was an order under sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act against which the appeal was filed. Order XXXIV, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code which now corresponds to old sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that an appeal from such an order was an appeal from a decree. It was observed that— "Sec. 90 describes the order as a decree, the order has all the characteristics of a decree, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure; it determines the personal liability of the mortgagor to pay to the mortgagee, the amount of the judgment-debt, not realised by the sale of the mortgaged properties; the order presupposes an adjudication by the Court, that such balance is legally recoverable from the defendants otherwise than out of the property sold. It is consequently incontrovertible, that the order is a decree, an appeal preferred against the order must be treated as an appeal from original decree and court-fees levied ad valorem upon the memorandum of appeal." 5. The same view was again reiterated by the Calcutta High Court in Kartikchandra Ray vs. Asharam Agrwala (3). 6. It may be pointed out that Order 34, Rule 6 now clearly provides for a decree and, therefore, there is all the more reason to say that it cannot be taken to be a mere order regarding the manner of execution in a previous decree. In the case of Tajammul Husain Khan vs. Muhammad Husain Khan (4) and Bindhiachal Rai vs. Sita ram Misir (5) the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court have also taken the view that an appeal from a decree passed under Order XXXIV, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is chargeable with ad valorem court fee. The same view has been taken by the Oudh Chief Court in Wasi Ali vs. Jang Bahadur Singh (5). 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not referred to a single case of any High Court in which a contrary opinion might have been held in an appeal from a decree under Order XXIV, Rule 6. He has referred to Madho Ray vs. Mst. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not referred to a single case of any High Court in which a contrary opinion might have been held in an appeal from a decree under Order XXIV, Rule 6. He has referred to Madho Ray vs. Mst. Bibi Mahbuwan Nisa (7), Jagannath Ravji vs. Laxmibai Anant (8), Sobha Ram Chela Ram vs. Firm Bhainsi Ram (9), Deputy Commissioner, Manager, Court of Wards, Mahewa Estate, Kheri vs. Raja Shanturanji Ji (10) and Balavenkatrama Chetiar vs. Maruthamuthu Chetty (11), but we do not propose to discuss these cases in detail because in none of them there was a decree under Order XXXIV.Rule 6 or under sec.90 of the old Transfer of Property Act. The view which we have taken is therefore correct and we see no reason to change it. 8. The application for review is therefore dismissed. We allow time up to 19-12-55 to make good the court fee. No further time will be allowed.