JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order of a learned single Judge dated the 8th February, 1955, dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The circumstances in which that petition was filed are these: The first Respondent had sold two plots of land to the Appellant and a dispute arose between them as to the balance of the purchase-price payable by the Appellant to the first Respondent. The first Respondent claimed Rs. 1,700/- and interest, whereas the Appellant admitted liability only in the sum of Rs. 340. 2. On the 23rd September, 1949, the Appellant and the first Respondent agreed to refer the dispute to the Panchayati Adalat of Bat hari, the third Respondent, for decision. The Panchayati Adalat appears to have heard the evidence of both parties, and on the 12th March, 1950, it passed a decree in favour of the first Respondent for the sum of Rs. 2,077. The Appellant made an application in revision to the Munsif but that was dismissed on the 20th July, 1950. He then filed an application in revision in this Court u/s 115 of the CPC but that also was dismissed on the 16th July, 1953. He thereupon filed the petition out of which this appeal arises. 3. The sole point we have to consider is the meaning and effect of Section 82 of the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, as it stood immediately prior to its amendment by Act II of 1955. Section 82 then read as follows: Special jurisdiction in matters compromised etc. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, it shall be lawful for a Panchayati Adalat to decide any civil or revenue dispute arising in its local area and not pending in any court in accordance with any settlement, compromise or oath agreed upon by the parties and likewise decide a case if compoundable. 4. The case for the Appellant is that under this section the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat was restricted to passing a decree, in so far as it could legally do so, in accordance with such settlement, compromise or agreement as had already been reached by the parties. 4. The case for the Appellant is that under this section the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Adalat was restricted to passing a decree, in so far as it could legally do so, in accordance with such settlement, compromise or agreement as had already been reached by the parties. This view did not however commend itself to the learned single Judge who was of opinion that this was too narrow an interpretation to be placed upon the language of the section which in his opinion conferred upon a Panchayati Adalat jurisdiction to decide upon the merits any dispute of the nature referred to in Section 82 which might be referred to it by the parties. 5. Now Section 65 of the Act provided that-- Parties to a suit may, by a written agreement, refer any suit of the nature mentioned in Section 82 to a Panchayati Adalat for decision by it irrespective of the value of the suit, and the Panchayati Adalat shall, subject to the rules prescribed, determine and dispose of such suit under this Act. 6. This section has no application in the present case as there was no suit pending between the Appellant and the first Respondent, but the section does, in our opinion, throw light on the construction to be placed on Section 82. 7. There is a noticeable difference between the two sections. u/s 65 the Panchayati Adalat is to determine and dispose of the suit in accordance with prescribed rules, and it clearly contemplates that there shall be what we may describe as a regular hearing before the Panchayati Adalat. Section 82 on the other hand enacts that the Panchayati Adalat is to decide a dispute referred to it in a different manner, namely "in accordance with any settlement, compromise or oath agreed upon by the parties." This section makes no provisions, as does Section 65, for the procedure which is to be followed in such cases by the Panchayati Adalat. 8. 8. Sri Janki Prasad, who appears for the first Respondent, has contended that u/s 82 the Panchayati Adalat had a jurisdiction which is similar in all respects to that exercised by it u/s 65, provided that there is no suit between the parties pending in any court at the time the reference is made; but we think that this submission is not well founded, for had it been the intention of the legislature that the Panchayati Adalat should have a general jurisdiction to decide a suit of the nature referred to in Section 82, irrespective of the value of the suit, and irrespective of the fact whether a suit between the parties was pending in a court or not, there would appear to have been no reason for having two separate sections. It would have been a simple matter so to word Section 65 as to cover both classes of case. 9. In our judgment the words "in accordance with any settlement, compromise or oath agreed upon by the parties" have a more restricted meaning than "if the parties so agree". The ordinary meaning of a settlement or compromise is that the parties have come to an agreement as to the terms upon which a dispute between them is to be ended and we think that it is in that sense that these words have been used in Section 82. In our opinion the jurisdiction conferred upon the Panchayati Adalat by Section 82 does not empower it to hear and determine any dispute of the nature referred to therein which the parties may agree to refer to it. There must, in our opinion, be something more than a mere agreement to refer; there must be something which can reasonably be construed as a settlement compromise or oath agreed upon. 10. As such is not the case in the matter now before us we think hat this appeal must be allowed. We accordingly set aside the order of this Court dated the 8th February, 1955, and direct the issue of a writ quashing the judgment of the Panchayati Adalat and the order of the learnec Munsif of Ballia, dated respectively the 12th March, and 20th July, 1950. 11. The Appellant is entitled to his costs in both courts.