Judgment This is an Originating Summons taken out in regard to the interpretation of the Will of Manoharam Pillai. The facts are.-Manoharam Pillai who died in Kadiri, Anantapur District on 10th February, 1946, was survived by his second daughter Gajendravalli Ammal. and a grand-daughter minor Padmavathi Ammal, the plaintiff herein, by his predeceased daughter Sarasvathi Bai. The deceased had fallen out with his younger brother Dr. Thillainayagam Pillai and has cut him off from his Will and has explicitly stated so therein. This Thillainayagam Pillai seems to have become the guide, Philosopher and friend of this Gajendravalli Ammal and her power of attorney agent. In the last will and testament made by this Manoharam Pillai on 11th January 1941, he left two legacies to his grand-daughter by Padmavathi. The relevant passage is as follows: "It is my desire and intention that the amount of Rs. 2,350 which I have to get as Mutual Retirement Benefit Fund from M.S.M. Railway Ltd., and the amount of Rs. 2,650 which is deposited in Postal Savings Bank in my name should be given to my grand-daughter the said Padmavathi Ammal, my deceased daughter’s daughter. The amounts after they are withdrawn should be deposited in Mysore Bank at Bangalore in her name. The interest that is payable on these amounts should be spent for her necessaries and eduction and the same should be spent by my deceased daughter’s husband V. K. Venkatachalam Pillai. She is to enjoy these amounts absolutely after she attains her majority." Therefore, the two legacies that become payable to the plaintiff are (a) the moneys due from the Mutual Retirement Benefit Fund from M.S.M. Railway; and (b) the amount due from the Postal Savings Bank at Kadiri standing in the name of the deceased. Gajendravalli Ammal the aunt is contending that Padmavathi is entitled only to the sum of Rs. 2,650 and not the interest accrued due thereon and secondly, that in respect of the sum due from the Mutual Retirement Benefit Fund from M.S.M. Raliway, the deceased Manoharam Pillai having nominated Gajendravalli as the beneficiary and that nomination being subsisting Manoharam cannot dispose of the same by Will and the plaintiff is not entitled therefore to that bequest. The subsisting nominee in the Government Books at the time of the death of Manoharam Pillai was undoubtedly Gajendravalli. Hence this Originating Summons for interpretation of the Will on these two points. The subsisting nominee in the Government Books at the time of the death of Manoharam Pillai was undoubtedly Gajendravalli. Hence this Originating Summons for interpretation of the Will on these two points. Point 1.-What Manoharam Pillai bequeathed to Padmavathi was his Postal Savings Bank account and not the specific sum of Rs. 2,650. The language used is explicit and admits of no gross whatsoever. Therefore, this Padmavathi is entitled to the Postal Savings Bank account, viz., the entire amount of principal and interest accrued due under that account in the name of the deceased. This point is clarified accordingly and Padmavathi is found entitled to the entire Savings Bank account, viz., the sum of Rs. 2,650 plus the interest accrued due. Point 2.-Turning to the 2nd point, the question resolves itself into an interpretation of section 5 of the Provident Fund Act, 1926. There are two schools of judicial opinion which hold that the right to receive the amount deposited in the Provident Fund by the nominated person is nothing more nor less than to receive the amount and that the right to receive this sum is subject to the testamentary disposition of the subscriber or if he died interstate the personal law of that subscriber ; per contra that where the deceased has nominated a person to whom a certain sum lying to his credit in the Provident Fund is to be paid after his death, such sum does not form part of the estate of the deceased and it cannot be disposed of by the deceased in his will and that the nomination conferred an absolute right on the nominees to appropriate for themselves the amount of the Provident Fund and that the nomination operated as a will and was not controlled by the provisions of the personal law to which the subscriber was subject. The first school of judicial opinion is embodied in Hayatuddin v. Mt. Rahiman1; Mt. Amna Khatoon v. Abdul Karim2, and Noor Mahomed v. Sardar Khatun3. In Hayatuddin v. Mt. The first school of judicial opinion is embodied in Hayatuddin v. Mt. Rahiman1; Mt. Amna Khatoon v. Abdul Karim2, and Noor Mahomed v. Sardar Khatun3. In Hayatuddin v. Mt. Rahman1, it was held as follows: "Under the Sunni Law a bequest by a testator in favour of one of his heirs is not valid unless it is consented to by the other heirs after his death, and under the Shia Law, a bequest by a testator in favour of one of his heirs in excess of one-third of the estate of the testator is invalid unless it is likewise assented to by the other heirs after his death. The Provident Funds Act is not intended to affect the rights of the dependants of the subscriber or depositor to share the fund inter se in accordance with the personal law of the deceased, except to the extent expressly mentioned in S. 3, Cl.(2) of the Act, that is to say, to protect the fund from assignment by the subscriber and from attachment by creditors who have advanced money to him or to his dependants during his lifetime. Hence where the subscriber is a Mahomedan, a nominee of his, though as such has an absolute right to receive the money does not thereby become the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it is rather unfortunate that a Mahomedan should not be able to give directions that the fund should after his death be distributed amongst his dependants in a manner inconsistent with the Mahomedan Law of intestate succession, although a non-Mahomedan may do so by signing a nomination paper made out in a form which amounts to a valid will according to the personal law applicable to him. But this is a point for the Legislature to consider. It must always be presumed that the Legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares either in express terms or by necessary implication or in other words beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matters beyond the law remains undisturbed. “ Amiaj Shewakshaw v. Awaki Dhany Shah1, followed and Hindley v. Joynarain2, Ref. to. In Mt. Amna Khatoon v. Abdul Karim3, Sulaiman, C.J., stated. In all general matters beyond the law remains undisturbed. “ Amiaj Shewakshaw v. Awaki Dhany Shah1, followed and Hindley v. Joynarain2, Ref. to. In Mt. Amna Khatoon v. Abdul Karim3, Sulaiman, C.J., stated. "It accordingly follows that section 5 refers merely to the persons who are nominated to receive the provident fund from the authority in question and the right to receive such fund on the death of subscriber is absolute and cannot be questioned by such authority. But this nomination is itself subject to any disposition, testamentary or otherwise, which might have been made by the subscriber. It follows accordingly that the mere fact that a certain person has been declared to be the nominee under section 5 for the purpose of receiving the provident fund is not necessarily the sole person entitled to appropriate the amount as the owner, legatee or heir. The question of the distribution of the amount after it has been drawn by the nominee as among those who may be entitled to it either under the personal law or by the testamentary disposition is not covered by this section.“ He also stated: "The mother was, therefore, a person who was authorised under the rules to receive payment being a dependant of the deceased. It follows that under section 3 (2) the amount vested in her absolutely free from any debt or other liability incurred by the deceased or incurred by the dependant before the death of the subscriber or depositor, because the sum was payable under the rules of the fund to this dependant of the depositor. “ [Amiaj v. Awaki1;Hardial v. Janaki4; Harmat Bibi v. Kail Banu5, Followed] In Moor Mohomed v. Sardar Khatum6, it was held as follows: "In every case the right conferred by the Act upon the nominee, whether the nominee be a dependant or not, is the ‘right to receive’ the amount deposited in the Provident Fund by the subscriber, nothing more and nothing less, although it is enacted that the nomination shall be deemed to confer such right absolutely, notwithstanding anything contained in any law or any disposition made by the subscriber. The use of the word ‘absolutely’ has the effect of conferring on the nominee a title to the exclusive ownership of the deposit. The use of the word ‘absolutely’ has the effect of conferring on the nominee a title to the exclusive ownership of the deposit. The words ‘notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or any disposition whether testamentary or otherwise’ constitute a protective provision, having the effect of protecting the specified right conferred, viz., the right to receiving the sum, and of making it indefeasible by enacting that no one else shall be in a position to challenge the right of the nominee to receive the sum, even though he may be able to show that he had a better or superior title to the sum under the law or by reason of a disposition made by the subscriber. But the right to receive is subject to the rights of others under the law or arising out of any disposition made by the subscriber. Where a nomination has once been duly made the Act is not concerned with the question who is ultimately entitled to the sum, but only designates the person to whom the payment ha to be made. As to who is entitled to the sum which the nominee receives, one has to take into consideration not only the Provident Fund Act but also other relevant law applicable to the ease. ‘Right to receive ‘is not equivalent to right to receive beneficially: Shewaksha v. Awaki Dhany1 ;Hayatuddin v. Mt. Rahiman7; Mt Latifambai v. Mt. Sakinabai8;followed; Hindley v. Joynarain2;Haridial v. Janki4: Mt. Amna Khatoon v. Ahdul Karim3;Relied on; Harmat Bibi v. Kaz Banu5;Thaj Mahomed v. Balaji Singh9; Ahmed Abdul Razaak v. Jamala Bint Mehdi10;M. Main v. Mt. Nunimuanissa11;Dissented; In the goods of Stanley Martin12;Kashab Lal v. Ivarani Rudra13;referred. Vesting in relation to property means the acquisition of the legal right of immediate possession and dominion over property. It means nothing more. The words ‘the sum shall vest in the nominee’ do not connote anything more than that in law the legal right to immediate possession of and dominion over the property shall pass from the trustees of the fund to the nominee and do not mean that the full rights of ownership, including the right to the beneficial enjoyment of the property, shall pais to the nominee. The nominee becomes entitled to possession of the sum without having to obtain letters of administration or a succession certificate. The nominee becomes entitled to possession of the sum without having to obtain letters of administration or a succession certificate. A property may vest in one person, and the beneficial right of enjoying the property as an owner may at the same time vest in another person. The effect of the provident fund vesting in the nominee, when the nominee is a dependant, is therefore quite clear. It confers on the nominee the immediate right to possession and dominion over the amount, without in any manner affecting the beneficial rights of the actual owners, whoever they may be, either as heirs or legatees. Of course, if the dependant nominee happens to be the only heir or legatee, and is therefore also entitled to the beneficial right in the sum, the entire rights of ownership would vest in him. When this is the case, the dependant’s rights are conferred on him not only by the Provident Funds Act, but by the entire law applicable to the case. The words ‘shal1 vest’ cannot be con trued as ‘shall vest as the properly of the dependant.'" We shall now turn to the cases including those of our own High Court in which a contrary view has been expressed. In Mt. Hurmat Bibi v. Mt. Kaz Banu1 , Aston, A.J.C. held: "The provisions of the Act relating to the right of nominees to receive the provident fund are, not to be read, as though they were controlled by, or subject to any other law for the time being in force or subject to any disposition whether testamentary or otherwise, by the subscriber or depositor. Unless the nomination is cancelled by the subscriber or varied by a nomination in favour of another person, the nominee, on the death of the subscriber must be regarded as having had conferred on him or her an absolute right to receive the Provident Fund. Unless the nomination is cancelled by the subscriber or varied by a nomination in favour of another person, the nominee, on the death of the subscriber must be regarded as having had conferred on him or her an absolute right to receive the Provident Fund. The fact that letters of administration or probate is granted to a different person does not prevent the nominee from claiming under the Act the full amount of the sum due on the death of a subscriber to the fund." In Thaj Mahomed Sahib v. Balaji Singh2 , decided by Sundaram Chetti and Pakenham Walsh, JJ., it was held: "A Provident Fund amount, which stood to the credit of a deceased Hindu at the time of his death and which was paid over to his son, as a dependant, under section 4(1)(a) of the Provident Fund Act (XIX of 1925) cannot be regarded as the assets of the deceased in the hands of his son, and is not liable to be proceeded against for the realisation of a decree debt due by the deceased. Section 3(2) of the Act vested the fund in the son, and consequently it became the property of the son." The other Madras decisions on the same lines are: Dharma Rao v. Venkata Mahalakshmamma3 , wherein it was held that where a valid nomination is subsisting a subscriber cannot by will deprive the nominee of the money in the event of his death before retirement and Subramania Somayajulu v. Lakshmi Soma Devi4 , Sitaramaswami Patnaick v. Venkatatrama Rao5 M. Monsingh v. Moti Bai6. The learned Judges who decided Thaj Mahomed Sahib v. Balaji Singh7 , have referred to the elaborate discussion as to the scheme of the Act in the judgment of Rankin, J., reported as Hindley v. Joynarain Marwari8 , wherein in respect of section 4(1) the learned Judge has observed thus at p. 909: "It ensures that money payable to a widow or child as such directly shall not, even in their hands, be treated as assets of the deceased’s estate." The Bench of this Court expressed entire agreement with that view and also with the opinion expressed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Mrs. Mary Murray9 , wherein the learned Judges stated that the widow was not bound to apply for letters of Administration to recover the Provident Fund amount as the money belonged to her on account of the statute providing that it would vest in her. The Bench of this Court expressed agreement with that decision also. In Ahmad Abdul Razaak v. Jamala Bint Medhi10 , it was held that the amount standing to the credit of the subscriber vests in the dependant and where the dependant is nominated by the subscriber as the person entitled to receive the fund on his death it vests in him absolutely free from any claim from the other heirs of the deceased subscriber. Makyway v. Mi Kay11 , relied on. In M. Nairn v. Mt. Nunimunnissa1, the facts were: a Mohamedan employee of the Rohilkhand and Kumaon Railway, and a depositor in the Provident Fund maintained for the employees of the Railway, made a declaration in accordance with rule 16 of the Rules governing the said Fund by executing two forms. In one form he declared that in the event of his death, his son should be entitled to receive payment of half his deposit in the Provident Fund and also appointed N as his executor in respect of the deposit. The other form similarly declared his other son M to be entitled to receive half of his deposit in the Provident Fund. It was held by the Full Bench: "That the two forms must be regarded as wills expressing the intention of the declarant, that in the event of his death the nominees were to take the fund half and half each and in the absence of any words to the contrary, as giving a beneficial interest to the legatees in the Provident Fund. The words ‘notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force ‘in section 5(1) have the effect of validating wills notwithstanding anything contained in the personal law of the depositor. The word ‘absolutely’ means that the recipient is to be deemed to be entitled to receive money free from any charge or attachment or liability enforceable by other heirs or by creditors. The nominee has the right to appropriate the deposit and not merely to realise it on behalf of the general body of heirs. The word ‘absolutely’ means that the recipient is to be deemed to be entitled to receive money free from any charge or attachment or liability enforceable by other heirs or by creditors. The nominee has the right to appropriate the deposit and not merely to realise it on behalf of the general body of heirs. A nomination made by a depositor in the Railway Provident Fund, therefore, confers an absolute right on the nominee to appropriate to themselves the amount of the Provident Fund. The nomination operates as will, which is not controlled by the personal law of the testator. That the nomination conferred an absolute right on the nominees to appropriate to themselves the amount of the Provident Fund. That the nomination operated as a will and was not controlled by the provisions of Mahomedan Law. Ma Kyway v. Ma Mi Kay2, ;Piare Lal v. Pampat3;Mt. Hurmat Bi v. Kal Banu4; Thaj Sahib v. Balaji5, Relied on. Per Srivatsava, J.-The Court has to interpret the provisions of a statute according to their plain meaning to administer the law as it has been enacted by the Legislature. It is not necessary for it to speculate as regards the reasons which influenced the Legislature in enacting the provisions of particular statute. Per King, C.J.-Quaere: It is doubtful, whether section 3, sub-section (2) applies to a case where the nomination is duly made and is subsisting. In such a case the money is payable to the nominees as such and is not payable to them as dependants, although they may happen to be dependants. In the Goods of Stanley Martin6, it was held that where the deceased has nominated certain person to whom certain sum lying to his credit in the Railway Provident Fund is to be paid alter his death, such sum does not form part of the estate of the deceased and it cannot be disposed of by the deceased in his will. In Keshab Lal v. Ivarani Rudra7, the facts were: J who was a subscriber of the Contributory Provident Fund (Bengal) had made a nomination in accordance with rule 5 of the Fund Rules whereby he appointed his wife as his sole nominee and conferred upon her the right to receive the amount which might stand at his credit in the fund in the event of his death. After this, J married a second wife and had two sons from the second wife. But no fresh nomination was made by him. After the death of J the sons claimed that they were entitled to three-fourths of the Provident Fund money standing to the credit of J while their] step-mother was entitled to a life estate in a one-fourth share: It was held: "That as the nomination was still subsisting at the time of J‘s death, under the rules the amount standing to his credit was payable to his first wife, the nominee and as, besides being the nominee, she was also the dependant of the subscriber J, the money vested in her absolutely in view of the clear language of section 3 Provident Funds Act. Even under section 5 of the Act she had an indefeasible right to demand immediate payment of the money, standing to the credit of J. The sons of 7 were not therefore entitled to the money." Nidhusudhan v. Bibhabat8, discussed and dissented from. See also Matadin v. Nathilal9, Komalsing v. Krishnabai10and Piare Lal v. Ganpat11, decided on the same lines. Thus the decision of our own High Court and the weight of judicial decisions and the persuasiveness of the reasoning put forward in the latter class of decisions which is in conformity with the letter and spirit of the enactment and especially section 5 of the Act are all in favour of our holding that when the nomination is subsisting it cannot be altered by will and the nominee is entitled to receive that amount absolutely and that it would not form part of the undisposed estate of the deceased. Therefore, Padmavathi in the case of the subsisting nomination in favour of Gajendravalli Ammal would not be entitled to receive the provident fund. This originating summons is disposed of accordingly and in the circumstances, costs of Rs. 100 will come out of the estate of Manoharam Pillai. P.R.N. ----- Order accordingly.