JUDGEMENT : SAMVATSAR, J. This is a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner filed two suits against his tenants one Ahmad Ali S/o Gulamhusen and Abde Ali s/o Gulamhusen and obtained two separate decrees for Rs.490/7/- and Rs.48/- respectively. He applied for execution of these decrees before the Tehsildar, Badnagar. The relief sought was by way of ejectment of the tenants from the agricultural holdings. 3. The judgment-debtors objected to the execution contending that they had in fact paid the decretal amount and that there was no valid reason to eject them. The Tehsildar overruled the objection by his order dated 7-6-1953 and ordered the judgment-debtor to be ejected and dispossessed. The judgment-debtors went up in appeal but their appeal was dismissed for default by the Suba. The judgment-debtors then approached the Bench Appeal Mal, Gwalior State in revision but that too was rejected on 12-2-1934. The judgment-debtors then approached the Appeals Department Darbar Gwalior, which set aside the order of the Suba and remanded the case on 24-4-1936 for decision on merits. 4. After remand the judgment-debtors produced a receipt showing that they had paid all the arrears for which the decree was passed to the decree-holder subsequent to the decree and prayed for an opportunity to prove it. The Suba by his order dated 13-3-1942, granted the prayer. The decree-holder preferred a revision against this order of the Suba but it was dismissed by the Bench Appeal Mal on 25-9-1953. The petitioner (decree-holder) thereafter approached the Appeals Department but there too met with no success. 5. The judgment-debtors produced their evidence and tried to prove the receipt. At this stage the petitioner again objected to the receipt being proved contending that the prayer for certification of the payment was time barred. The Suba overruled this objection. The petitioner again filed a revision to the Bench Appeal Mal. The revision was allowed by the Bench on 17-3-1943 and the judgment-debtors preferred a revision application to the Appeals Department. This revision application was summarily dismissed on 26-6-1944. 6. When the case was taken up again by the Suba, the judgment-debtors contended that though the receipt could not be proved by them, they could adduce evidence aliunde to establish the fact of payment. The Suba however did not accept this contention and overruled it. This revision application was summarily dismissed on 26-6-1944. 6. When the case was taken up again by the Suba, the judgment-debtors contended that though the receipt could not be proved by them, they could adduce evidence aliunde to establish the fact of payment. The Suba however did not accept this contention and overruled it. The judgment-debtors thereupon applied in revision to the Bench Appeals Mal but the revision application was dismissed on 21-12-1944. The judgment-debtors preferred a further revision application to the Appeals Department but this; too was rejected as that tribunal was of the opinion that the judgment-debtors had already been dispossessed during the interval. The judgment-debtors thereupon preferred a further revision application to the Judicial Committee. This revision application was admitted but was dismissed for default on 19-3-1948. 7. The judgment-debtors then applied to have the case restored and the application was allowed on payment of Rs.50/- as costs on 26-9-1950. The revision application pending before the Judicial Committee was thereafter transferred to the Revenue Board. It was heard by a single Member of the Board who being of the opinion that it deserved to be allowed, referred the case for concurrence of the other Member. On 29-4-1952 the Senior Member of the Board concurred with the view taken by the Member who had heard it and the revision application was allowed. The Revenue Board came to the conclusion that the judgment-debtors had not been dispossessed and were still legally in possession of then-agricultural holdings. The Board therefore remanded the case to the Suba with instructions to record evidence which the judgment-debtors might adduce to prove the payment of the arrears as alleged by them. 8. It appears that during the pendency of these proceedings there was an amendment to S.236 of the Kanoon Mal Gwalior and with a view to take advantage of this amendment the judgment debtors had paid the decretal amount over again. The Revenue Board did not decide what effect of this further payment had, but left it to the Suba to consider its effect in case he found that the judgment-debtors had failed to prove the earlier payment. 9. On 27-8-1952 the decree-holder petitioner presented this petition under Art.227 of the Constitution to have the aforesaid order of the Revenue Board quashed as being illegal and against the principles of natural justice. 10. The first ground raised by Mr. 9. On 27-8-1952 the decree-holder petitioner presented this petition under Art.227 of the Constitution to have the aforesaid order of the Revenue Board quashed as being illegal and against the principles of natural justice. 10. The first ground raised by Mr. Pande learned counsel for the petitioner was that the concurring member had given his concurrence without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. He submitted that this was against the principles of natural justice and was illegal and the order of the Revenue Board was therefore void and had no effect. 11. The Revenue Board was constituted under the provisions of Madhya Bharat Revenue Board Ordinance of 1949. It was later on continued under the provisions of Act No.66 of 1950 known as the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The jurisdiction of the Revenue Board and the powers of the Members to hear the cases are dealt with in Chapter III of this Act. Section 18 of Act No.66 of 1950 which is material for this petition is as follows: "18. The powers of the Board shall be exercised by a single member or a Bench of the two members as may be prescribed in the rules: Provided that no decisions or orders in cases of judicial nature or connected with settlement shall be altered or reversed without the concurrent judgment of two members of the Board." 12. So far as the language of the section is concerned it does not provide for a hearing before the concurring member and on a plain reading of S.18 there is no room for an argument that the concurrence of a senior member was ineffective and invalid because he had not, before giving his concurrence, heard the party against whom the decision was given. 13. The Government have framed rules to regulate how the powers of the Board shall be exercised Rule 10 provides that the powers of the Board shall be exercised by a single member subject to the provision that no decision or order in a judicial proceedings or in a matter connected with settlement coming for the consideration of the Board in appeal or in revision shall be altered or reversed without the concurrent judgment of two members of the Board. Rule 11 lays down that when a member sitting alone considers it necessary to alter or reverse any decision, he shall send the case with his opinion or decision to the other member who shall dispose of the case finally after hearing it, if he considers it necessary. 14. It is clear from the language of R.11 that when a case is sent to the other member for concurrence by a single member who had heard it, with his opinion or decision it is left to the discretion of the concurring member to give a hearing or not before his concurrence is given. These rules are framed under the statutory powers vested in the Government and have therefore the force of law. Their validity or vires is not challenged before us and the simple question for consideration is if in exercise of the powers vested under R.11, the other member of the Board concurs with the opinion or decision given by the single member, without hearing the party against whom the decisions given, it can be treated as void as opposed to the principles of natural justice. 15. The words 'natural justice' have nowhere been defined. But Lord Wright in - 'General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United Kingdom v. Spackman', (1943) 2 All E.R.337 (A), has discussed the implications of these words at p.343. The learned Judge has observed: "Natural justice" seems to be used in contrast with any formal or technical rule of law or procedure. Some light on what it connotes may be got from the authorities, to certain of which I now refer. Thus - 'Spackman v. Plumstead Board of Works', (1885) 10 AC 229 (B), was a case of administrative decision in a matter of local Government. Under the relevant Act an architect's certificate was made conclusive for fixing a general line for buildings. The Earl of Selborne, at p.240 made some general observations and said: "No doubt in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice that he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There could be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice." 16. In the same case Viscount Simon L.C. observed at p.340 as follows : "Unless Parliament otherwise enacts, the duty of considering the defence of a party accused, before pronouncing the accused to be rightly adjudged guilty, rests upon any tribunal, whether strictly judicial or not, which is given the duty of investigating his behaviour and taking disciplinary action against him." This was a case in which the respondent, a registered medical practitioner was found to have committed adultery with a married woman, by a Court of law in a divorce case. The General Medical Council found that he stood in a professional relationship to the married woman at all material time and adjudged him guilty of infamous conducts in professional respect. The Council thereupon removed his name from the register of medical practitioners. In accordance with the Council's standing orders the respondent! was invited to state his case and produce evidence in support of it before the decision to remove his name was taken. The respondent sought to negative the Court's finding of adultery by tendering evidence which, though available, was not called in the divorce proceedings. The Council refused to hear fresh evidence on the subject and treating the judgment as conclusive, directed the erasure of the respondent's name from the register. The respondent thereupon applied to the Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Medical Council. It was held that inasmuch as the Legislature had not made a decree of the divorce Court conclusive on the question of adulterous conduct, in the same way as it had made a conviction of felony or misdemeanour, it was incumbent on the Medical Council to give the respondent an opportunity to state his case and to produce his evidence. It was held that inasmuch as the Legislature had not made a decree of the divorce Court conclusive on the question of adulterous conduct, in the same way as it had made a conviction of felony or misdemeanour, it was incumbent on the Medical Council to give the respondent an opportunity to state his case and to produce his evidence. This not having been done, the writ prayed for was granted. 17. In the present case, it is left by the rules to the discretion of the concurring member to give his concurrence after hearing or without it. The question of natural justice therefore does not arise. 18. There is a similar provision in the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of criminal appeals. Section 429 of the Code provides for a reference being made to a third Judge when there is difference of opinion between the Judges constituting a Division Bench to hear a criminal appeal. The third Judge to whom the reference is made is empowered to decide the appeal and it is left to him under this Section to do so either after hearing or without it. The validity of S.429, Criminal P.C. has not been challenged anywhere so far. 19. In the present case it cannot be said that no hearing was given to the party before the Revenue Board. The Single member who wrote the principal judgment had heard the petitioner and had thereafter sent the record of the case along with own views to the other member for his concurrence. The other member did not think it necessary to give a further hearing to the petitioner and the matter ended there. Under the circumstances I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Pande that the decision of the Revenue' Board was against natural justice because further opportunity was not given to the petitioner to argue his case. 20. Mr. Pende next contended that the Board was wrong in holding that the bar of limitation contained in Art.174, Limitation Act did not apply to this case. It was also urged that the Board had acted illegally in applying the provisions of the, amendment to S.236 of the Kanoon Mal Gwalior to the present case. 21. 20. Mr. Pende next contended that the Board was wrong in holding that the bar of limitation contained in Art.174, Limitation Act did not apply to this case. It was also urged that the Board had acted illegally in applying the provisions of the, amendment to S.236 of the Kanoon Mal Gwalior to the present case. 21. The Board had not expressed any final opinion on the second point and had left it to the Subha in case he found that the judgment-debtors had failed to prove their main case, to consider the effect of the second payment. The contention of Mr. Pande that the Board had expressed final opinion in the matter is not borne out by the judgment of the Board which is before us. 22. As regards the judgment on the question of limitation all that can be argued is that the view taken by the Board is wrong. The Board has obviously not refused to apply the law of limitation but may have committed a mistake of law in applying it in which case there could be no interference with the order passed by the Board by this Court. 23. Article 227 confers powers of supervision on this Court which are intended to be used to prevent substantial injustice and to keep the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority. In this case it is not possible to argue that the Revenue Board could not interpret the law nor can it be said that substantial injustice was caused to the decree-holder by the Board. 24. There is no force in this petition and the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's costs will be taxed at Rs.30/-. 25. NEVASKAR, J.: I agree. Petition dismissed.