JUDGMENT The suit which has given rise to this appeal (suit No. 44 of 1953) was brought by the plaintiff-respondent for recovery of Rs. 1400/- plus interest thereon total Rs. 1736/- from the defendants-appellants on the allegation that Jabbar Mia appellant 1 and Abdul Mia husband of Toyai Bibi, and father of appellants 3 to 7 had. executed a sale deed regarding two plots of land under Patta No. 93/134 Kh for Rs. 1400/- on 5-6-1949; but Abdul Mia died before the deed could be registered. This sale-deed was presented by the plaintiff-respondent before the Sub-Registrar for registration, but the appellants 2 to 8 filed objections and so registration was refused on 25-5-1951. As against this order of the Sub-Registrar there was an appeal No. 23 of 1951 before the District Registrar, Manipur, but this appeal was also dismissed on 5-10-1951. The plaintiff-respondent then brought the suit No. 153 of 1951 under S. 77, Indian Registration Act. But this suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation, and the appeal No. 40 of 1952 against that decision was rejected by this Court on 27-5-1953. The plaintiff-respondent then brought the suit which has given rise to this appeal for refund of his purchase money along with interest, and it was alleged that although the sale deed was executed on 5-6-1949, the plaintiff had been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding both in a Court of first instance as well as in a Court of appeal against the defendants and so he claimed benefit of S. 14, Indian Limitation Act. 2. The suit was contested by the present appellants on the ground that the sale-deed dated 5-6-1949 was not validly executed and no consideration was paid for it and as it was not a registered document it was inadmissible in evidence and the alleged sale deed was void ab initio because Babu Mia the original owner of five sangams of land of this patta had already given away one sangam to his wife in lieu of dower and only the remaining 4 sangams of land had been inherited by his 2 sons and 7 daughters, and so the two sons could not legally sell away the entire patta land to the plaintiff. The learned Sub-Judge repelled the contentions of the defendants and decreed the suit, and so the defendants have come to this Court in appeal. 3. The learned Sub-Judge repelled the contentions of the defendants and decreed the suit, and so the defendants have come to this Court in appeal. 3. There is no doubt that the execution of the deed dated 5-6-1949 was denied by the appellants 2 to 7, and it was contended before me by the learned counsel for the appellants that both the thumb-marks on this deed were of one and the same person. I have carefully examined the thumb-marks on this deed and after this examination the learned counsel for the appellants also agreed that they were of two different executants. There is evidence on this record of Hodam Kunjabihari Singh, Waikhom Gourhari Singh and Saugaiam Ningthemjao Singh witness, which establishes beyond doubt that both the executants made their thumb-marks on the deed in question and they received consideration money to the extent of Rs. 1400/-. Jabbar Mia appellant 1 had to admit in cross-examination that he had no grudge against Hodam Kunjabihari Singh and Waikhom Gourhari Singh witnesses, and so there seems to be absolutely no good ground for disbelieving their evidence. Srimati Toyai Bibi D.W. 1 does not know anything about the sale deed in question and so her statement is of no value. The deed Ex. P-A has been duly proved by the evidence of the scribe as well as the marginal witness and the judgment in suit No. 153 of 1951 Ex. A-1 also shows that this deed was held by the Court to be validly executed by Jabbar Mia and his brother, who admitted therein that the consideration had been fully paid to them. After going through the entire evidence on the record I agree with the learned Sub Judge in holding that the deed Ex. P-1 was duly executed by Jabbar Mia and Abdul Mia and the consideration money of Rs. 1400/- was also paid to him. 4. It has been next contended that the document Ex. P-A is not admissible in evidence in this case because it has not been registered. If the plaintiff-respondent were to bring suit for possession on the basis of this deed, then it could very well be urged that this document was not admissible in evidence under S. 49, Indian Registration Act, as it did not confer any title on the plaintiff regarding the property mentioned in the deed, because the deed was not registered. If the plaintiff-respondent were to bring suit for possession on the basis of this deed, then it could very well be urged that this document was not admissible in evidence under S. 49, Indian Registration Act, as it did not confer any title on the plaintiff regarding the property mentioned in the deed, because the deed was not registered. But in this case the plaintiffs suit is for recovery of his purchase money. It has been held in - Sri Mahabirji v. Ramnath Kasarwani, AIR 1936 Pat 634 (A) that an unregistered document affecting immovable property may be received an evidence of a collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. As the fact that the payment of Rs. 1400/- to the defendants by the plaintiff was not required! by law to be mentioned only in a registered instrument, the document Ex. P-A would be admissible in evidence for this collateral purpose. 5. The last and the most important point which has to be examined in this appeal is whether the present plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of S. 14, Indian Limitation Act. S. 14, Indian Limitation Act runs as follows :- "14(1). In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from detect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. In order that the plaintiff may claim benefit of S. 14, Indian Limitation Act, it must be shown (1) that the plaintiff had been prosecuting some proceeding either in Court of first instance or in Court of appeal against the defendants i.e. the parties must be same; (2) the plaintiff has been prosecuting it with due diligence and in good faith; (3) the former suit or proceeding must be a civil proceeding; (4) it must be founded upon the same cause of action; and (5) the court in which the former proceeding was pending was unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction of other cause of a like nature. 6. 6. It has not been disputed before me that the suit No. 153 of 1951 under S. 77, Indian Registration Act was between the same parties and it was based on the tame cause of action i.e. regarding the execution of the sale deed dated 5-6-1949 by Jabbar Mia appellant 1 and his brother Abdul Mia predecessor of appellants 2 to 8, and the latters repudiation of the sale deed. The contention that the sale deed was void ab initio is obviously of no force for it cannot possibly be urged that Abdul Mia and Jabbar Mia had absolutely no share in the land which was mentioned in the deed dated 5-6-1949. The judgment in suit No. 153 of 1951 Ex. A-1 as well as the deed Ex. P-A clearly show that the executants did receive the sale consideration, but the suit under S. 77, Indian Registration Act was dismissed because it was held, to be time barred by a few days. The plaintiff respondent has new brought the present suit No. 44 of 1953 for refund of his purchase money and this suit is also on the same cause of action even though the relief is different. The fact that the plaintiff prosecuted the former case diligently and in good faith has not been seriously challenged as he fought out that matter up to the highest Court of this State, and the former suit was dismissed on cause of like naure as defect of jurisdiction (limitation), and so I am definitely of opinion that the present respondent was entitled to the benefit of S. 14, Indian Limitation Act. 7. It has not been disputed before me that if the periods taken in the disposal of the suit No. 153 of 1951 and the appeal No. 40 of 1952 are excluded, the present suit would be within three years of the execution of the deed Ex. P-A and so the suit was clearly within time under Art. 115, Indian Limitation Act, vide - Khetter Mohan Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shah, 10 Cal 265 (B). 8. No other point has been raised in the memorandum of appeal and as no other point has been pressed at the time of arguments, I see no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs to the respondent. Appeal dismissed.