Judgment :- 1. The third defendant is the revision petitioner. The revision petition is from an order refusing to accept the additional written statement of the third defendant. The plaintiff is a bank. The suit is for recovery of Rs. 2,86,292-11-11 from the defendants. The first defendant is the Cashew Products Corporation Ltd., Quilon, which is a limited company. The second defendant is one of the directors of the company. He is also the managing director of the General Agencies Ltd. which is the managing agent of the first defendant company. The third defendant is another director of the company. The suit is for balance amount due to the plaintiff under an over-draft account granted to the first defendant on the security of defendants 2 and 3 who executed in favour of the plaintiff anon demand' promissory note for Rs. 4,00,000/-. As further security for the amount the goods of the first defendant company were pledged with the bank under an open-loan arrangement. Some shares belonging to defendants 2 and 3 were also given as security. The transaction began in the year 1947 and was renewed in 1949. The suit was filed on 8.9.1950. 2. All the three defendants filed written statements in the case. The first defendant contended that when fresh documents were executed by the defendants in 1949 the plaintiff agreed to continue for a further period of three years the then existing credit facilities so that the company might be able to reduce its liability to the bank out of its business profits, that it was on the basis of this agreement that the defendants agreed to execute a fresh promissory note and to lodge with the plaintiff certain shares, that as a result of the breach of this agreement by the plaintiff the first defendant company was put to heavy loss, that the plaintiff was bound to make good the loss, that it should be set off against the amount claimed in the plaint, that the suit was premature and that, in any case, the defendants should be allowed to pay the debt in twelve quarterly instalments. The written statement of the second defendant also is to the same effect. 3. The written statement of the second defendant also is to the same effect. 3. Besides raising the above contentions the third defendant contended that he executed the promissory note only as a surety for the first defendant, that the plaintiff permitted the goods pledged by the first defendant to be sold at below cost price and thus allowed the security to be frittered away without his concurrence and that he was not liable under the promissory note. He, therefore, prayed that the suit might be dismissed with costs as against him. 4. Defendants 2 and 3 filed their written statements on 12.1.1951 and the first defendant filed written statement on 31.1.1951. Issues were raised in the case on 21.2.1951. The trial of the case was delayed to a great extent by reason of the pre-occupation of the court with sessions work. The second defendant was the first witness examined in the case. His examination began on 25.9.1951 and was completed only on 26.10.1953. The examination of the third defendant began on 3.11.1953 and is not yet over. No other evidence has been taken in the case. 5. On 1.12.1953 the third defendant presented a petition for permission to file additional written statement in the case. The proposed additional written statement was also filed along with the petition. It was alleged in the affidavit filed along with the petition that the business of the first defendant company was being conducted by the second defendant and that the third defendant was not in a position to state his contentions fully and clearly when the original written statement was filed, that it was only after he went through the transactions of the company fully that he was in a position to deal specifically with the allegations in the plaint. The proposed additional written statement is to the following effect: 1. The plaintiff has granted loans to the 1st defendant in other forms, such as out-agency loans, against goods which were security for the open loan. This was done in violation of the contract between the plaintiff and this defendant. 2. The plaintiff has freely made adjustments in the open loan account and in the clean draft account with 1st defendant by debiting and correspondingly crediting in other accounts without this, defendant's consent. The plaintiff has varied the contract thereby. 3. This was done in violation of the contract between the plaintiff and this defendant. 2. The plaintiff has freely made adjustments in the open loan account and in the clean draft account with 1st defendant by debiting and correspondingly crediting in other accounts without this, defendant's consent. The plaintiff has varied the contract thereby. 3. The plaintiff made mis-representation to this defendant regarding accommodation to the 1st defendant and this defendant acted on this mis-representation. 4. The plaintiff has committed fraud on an extensive scale by granting loans to the 1st defendant against goods covered by the open loan agreement. The contract between this defendant and plaintiff has been vitiated by fraud and violation of the terms of contract by the plaintiff. 5. Plaintiff has allowed the 1st defendant to overdraw freely in the clean overdraft and open loan accounts far beyond the limits agreed to by this defendant. 6. The plaintiff has converted secured loans into simple loans by releasing goods covered by bills of lading against Trust receipts and has thereby deliberately frittered away securities and committed breaches of contract against this defendant. 7. This defendant is fully discharged from liability for the plaint claim for the reasons stated in the above foregoing paragraphs". 6. The plaintiff opposed the petition. The court below rejected the petition for two reasons. One is that the contentions raised in the proposed additional written statement would change the nature of the defence put forward in the original written statement from one of admission of the plaintiff's claim to one of questioning the same; and the other is that the petition is belated. 7. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the counter-petitioner to the effect that the revision petition is not maintainable. It was contended that the case would not come within the scope of S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, and reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Keshar Deo v. Radha Kishan (1953 S.C. 23). In that case the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside an order of the subordinate court restoring to file an execution application which had been dismissed for default. In that case the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside an order of the subordinate court restoring to file an execution application which had been dismissed for default. The Supreme Court held that the order of the Subordinate Judge was one which he had jurisdiction to make, that in making that order he neither acted in excess of his jurisdiction nor assumed jurisdiction which he did not possess and that it could not also be said that in the exercise of his jurisdiction he acted illegally or with material irregularity. It was, therefore, held that the case did not come within the ambit of S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in revision with the order of the Subordinate Judge. Reference was made by Their Lordships to the decisions of the Privy Council in Rajah Amir Hassen Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (11 I.A. 237), Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (44 I.A. 261), Venkitagiri Ayyengar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (76 I.A. 67), and Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Choudhury (76 I.A. 131). Reference was also made to the observations of Bose, J. in his order of reference in Narayan Sonaji v. Shesharao Vithoba (1948 Nag. 258). The question for consideration is whether the present case will come within the scope of S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1953 S.C. 23. 8. It cannot be said that in rejecting the application of the third defendant the court below exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in it. Therefore, Cls. (a) and (b) of S. 115, C.P.C. cannot apply to the case. The only question is whether the court below acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it. The question was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Sourashtra High Court in Narshi Prasad v. Vidutray (1954 Sourashtra 66). That was a case in which a revision was filed before the High Court from an order of the trial court refusing permission to amend the plaint. The question was recently considered by a Full Bench of the Sourashtra High Court in Narshi Prasad v. Vidutray (1954 Sourashtra 66). That was a case in which a revision was filed before the High Court from an order of the trial court refusing permission to amend the plaint. A preliminary objection was raised as to the competency of the High Court to interfere in revision with the order of the trial court; and the matter was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench that heard the case consisted of Shah, C.J., Chhatpar and Baxi, JJ. After referring to the decisions of the Privy Council on the point, Shah, C.J. observed: "So far as the Cls. (a) and (b) of S. 115 are concerned there is no real difficulty in their application and the High Court will have the revisional jurisdiction where the subordinate court either assumes jurisdiction which it has not or fails to exercise a jurisdiction which it has, in either of which cases the question becomes one of the subordinate court's jurisdiction; or as has been put in Venkitagiri's case (76 I.A. 67) S. 115 empowers the High Court to satisfy itself (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction and (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction. Therefore where the court by a wrong and erroneous finding assumes jurisdiction which it has not or refuses to exercise a jurisdiction which it ought to exercise, then the matter becomes revisable by the High Court. The difficulty however arises when one comes to Clause.(c). There the court does have the jurisdiction and is exercising it, but in doing so it acts either illegally or with material irregularity. The question arises when can a court be said to be acting illegally as distinguished from committing an error of law and when again can it be said that the court has acted with material irregularity. As has been stated in Venkitagiri's case 'acting illegally' means acting in breach of some provision of law and'acting with material irregularity' means committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. As has been stated in Venkitagiri's case 'acting illegally' means acting in breach of some provision of law and'acting with material irregularity' means committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. So far as this latter is concerned, there is no real difficulty because it is purely a question of procedure, and if the error affects the ultimate decision it becomes a material irregularity and gives scope for the High Court's revisional powers". The learned Chief Justice then referred to Keshar Deo v. Radha Kishen (1953 S.C.23). In that case His Lordship Mahajan, J. (as he then was), referred, with apparent approval to the observations of Bose, J. in his order of reference in Narayan Sanoaji v. Shesharao Vithoba (1948 Nag. 258 F.B.) which were to the following effect: "The words 'illegally' and 'material irregularity' do not cover either errors of fact or of law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been fully complied with both in letter and in spirit. "These observations" said Shah, C.J. "lend themselves to the view that the defects or the errors are procedural and not of merits, either on points of fact or of law. So far as the word 'illegally' is concerned this view appears not to be in accord with the view of the Privy Council in Venkitagiri's case where 'illegally' is stated to mean'in breach of some provision of law' unless of course a decision arrived at in breach of some provision of law can be treated as acting in an illegal manner, that is to say, the manner in which the decision is reached is illegal. However, such a construction is permissible because when a court proceeds in breach of definite provisions of law, it does act illegally and it is not a mere conclusion of law. Pollock, J. has observed in his judgment in Narayan Sonaji's case (1948 Nag. 258) that it is impossible to define what is meant by 'illegally' or 'with material irregularity', and this was also recognised by Bose, J. himself. Pollock, J. has observed in his judgment in Narayan Sonaji's case (1948 Nag. 258) that it is impossible to define what is meant by 'illegally' or 'with material irregularity', and this was also recognised by Bose, J. himself. I would not attempt to venture on any definition of these words and will content myself with agreeing with Justice Pollock's view that there may be an illegality or material irregularity if the court acts in obvious disregard of some statutory enactment or some well established principle, because that might amount to an error of procedure and not merely an error of law. Beyond this it is neither possible nor necessary to say. The subject does not admit of any hard and fast rule, and the decision of each case must depend on its particular facts". 9. Chhatpar, J. also discussed the question with reference to the Privy Council cases and the ruling of the Supreme Court in 1953 S.C. 23, and also the decisions of the High Courts in India on the point, and came to the following conclusion: "In my humble opinion taking into consideration the two Privy Council rulings (Venkitagiri's case and Joy Chand's case) and the numerous High Court rulings before this decision of the Supreme Court and even after, I am inclined to hold that the Supreme Court did not intend to put a narrow interpretation on Clause.(c) confining its application to defects in procedure alone and it would still be open to the High Court to interfere in revision with decisions involving 'illegality' as distinguished from'mere errors of law or fact'. It is almost impossible to lay down definitely what cases will fall in the first or the second category. 'Illegality' has not been defined anywhere so far as I know, I will rest content with the meaning given in Venkitagiri's case as something'in breach of some provision of law' " 10. Baxi, J. observed: "In construing the expression'acted illegally' as having acted in breach of some provision of law did the Privy Council intended to lay down that the subordinate court should have acted in breach of a procedural law only or in breach of provision of other law also? Baxi, J. observed: "In construing the expression'acted illegally' as having acted in breach of some provision of law did the Privy Council intended to lay down that the subordinate court should have acted in breach of a procedural law only or in breach of provision of other law also? On this point I agree with respect with with the view of my Lord the Chief Justice that there may be an illegality or material irregularity if the court acts in obvious disregard of some statutory enactment or some well-established principles of law. The subject does not admit of any hard and fast rule and each case has to be decided on its own facts". 11. According to this decision, if the court acts in obvious disregard of some well-established principle of law it amounts to acting illegally within the meaning of Clause.(c) of S.115. I am inclined to accept this view if I may so, with respect. The question, therefore, for consideration will be whether, in refusing to give the third defendant permission to file additional written statement in the case, the court below acted in obvious disregard of well established principles to be followed by courts in the matter of amendment of pleadings. 12. As stated already, of the two reasons given by the learned District Judge for not allowing the third defendant's application one is that the proposed additional written statement will change the nature of the defence 'from one of admission of the plaintiff's claim to one of questioning the same'. This, obviously, is not the case. Even in the original written statement the third defendant contended that he was only a surety for the first defendant and that since the plaintiff allowed the security offered by the first defendant to be frittered away without his concurrence he was not liable under the promissory note executed by him; and he prayed that the suit might be dismissed as against him. It cannot, therefore, be said that the third defendant's original written statement was one of admission of the plaintiff's claim so far as he is concerned. It is true that the contentions raised in the proposed additional written statement are new contentions and that they are not meant merely to clarify the contentions raised in the original written statement. The question is whether the third defendant can be allowed to raise these new contentions at this stage. It is true that the contentions raised in the proposed additional written statement are new contentions and that they are not meant merely to clarify the contentions raised in the original written statement. The question is whether the third defendant can be allowed to raise these new contentions at this stage. 13. The learned District Judge does not say that the averments in the affidavit filed by the third defendant are not true or that he is acting mala fide in making the application for permission to file additional written statement in the case. What is stated in the affidavit is that the business of the first defendant company was being managed by the second defendant and that it was only when the third defendant went through the transactions of the company fully that he came to know what the real position was as regards the plaintiff's claim. If this is true, it cannot be said that the object of the third defendant in asking for permission to file additional written statement is to over-reach the plaintiff or to protract the trial of the suit. It cannot also be said that the contentions raised in the proposed additional written statement are inconsistent with the defence raised in the original written statement. In the light of these facts, we shall consider the question whether the learned District Judge acted in obvious disregard of well-established principles in refusing permission to the third defendant to amend his written statement. 14. O. VI R. 17, Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties". According to this rule, it is the duty of the court to allow amendment of pleadings when it is necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy in the suit. As observed by Sarkar, J. in Ahamed Hussain v. Chemballi (1951 Cal. 262): "The making of amendments is not really a matter of power of a court but it is a duty; it is a duty which has been cast upon courts so that substantial justice may be done for which alone courts exist". 15. As observed by Sarkar, J. in Ahamed Hussain v. Chemballi (1951 Cal. 262): "The making of amendments is not really a matter of power of a court but it is a duty; it is a duty which has been cast upon courts so that substantial justice may be done for which alone courts exist". 15. The principle that should guide the court in the matter of amendment of pleadings is thus explained by Bowen, L.J. in Cropper v. Smith (1884, 26 Chancery Division 700 at page 710): "Now I think it is a well established principle that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. Speaking for myself, and in conformity with what I have heard laid down by the other division of the court of Appeal and by myself as a member of it, I know of no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to over-reach, the court ought not to correct if it can be done without injustice to the other party, Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendments as a matter of favour or of grace. O. XXVIII R.1 of the Rules of 1883, which follows previous legislature on the subject, says that "All such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties". It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected if it can be done without injustice as anything else in the case is a matter of right". 16. In Tildesley v. Harper (1879, 10 Chancery Division 393), Bramwell, L.J. laid down the rule thus: "My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that, by his blunder he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise". This rule was affirmed in Clarapede v. Commercial Union Association (32 W.R. Eng. 151, 262) Brett M.R. said: "However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side; there is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs". The same view was expressed by Lopes, L.J. in Weldon v. Neal (1887 Q.B. Dn. 394). Pollock, B. said in Steward v. The North Metropolitan Tramways Co. (1886,16 Q.B.Dn.178): "The test as to whether the amendment (of written statement) should be allowed is, whether or not the defendant can amend without placing the plaintiff in such a position that he cannot be recouped, as it were, by any allowance of costs, or otherwise". 17. In Ma Shwe v. Maung Mo Hnaung (1922 P.C. 249) Lord Buckmaster explained the position thus: "All rules of courts are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but none-the-less no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit". 18. The above principles were followed by a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in a recent case viz. Maruti v. Ranganath (1955 Hyderabad 1 F.B.). Planitkar, J. observed in that case: "The principle on which an amendment will ordinarily be allowed is that the proposed amendment should not alter the nature of the suit In certain cases an amendment will be allowed even to introduce a new ground of claim or allegation of fact inconsistent with the original pleadings if the court thinks it just and necessary. It is however well recognised that a plaintiff should not be allowed to amend the plaint in such a way as to introduce a new case altogether". 19. In Lakshman Singh v. Mahendralal (1938 Nag. 388) the rule of practice relating to amendment of pleadings was thus stated by Stone, C.J. and Vivian Bose, J.: "Amendment should always be made in our opinion, with great readiness. 19. In Lakshman Singh v. Mahendralal (1938 Nag. 388) the rule of practice relating to amendment of pleadings was thus stated by Stone, C.J. and Vivian Bose, J.: "Amendment should always be made in our opinion, with great readiness. In most cases up to issue stages special burden as to costs is called for and thereafter justice is met by leave being granted conditionally on the payment of costs thrown away. But where one seems an amendment asked for at so late a stage, which introduces a new cause of action, one should ask oneself: Where would the applicant be if he were to bring a fresh suit at the time he seeks this amendment? If you find that he is out of time and that he has not got the power to bring that fresh suit without finding himself opposed by the defence of limitation, very exceptional circumstances have to be present to justify a court letting him do in one litigation what he cannot do in another". 20. In Amoloakchand v. Firm of Sadhuram Thularam (1944 Nag.200) Choudhury, J. discussed the principles that should be borne in mind in the matter of allowing a defendant to raise a new defence by means of additional written statement. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit for redemption of a mortgage. The defendants admitted plaintiff's right to redeem; but they claimed as price of redemption more amount than what was admitted in the plaint. Subsequently, the defendants filed an application for amendment of the written statement by which they claimed ownership and exclusive title to the property and denied the plaintiff's right to redeem it. The application was opposed by the plaintiff on the ground that the proposed amendment displaced the admission made by the defendants in their original written statement and that it was wholly inconsistent with that written statement. It was held that though the amendment would change the nature of the defence from one of admission to denial of the plaintiff's right to redeem and such an amendment would not be allowed if asked for at a late stage, yet if sufficient grounds were shown the defendants could be allowed to amend their defence. It was held that though the amendment would change the nature of the defence from one of admission to denial of the plaintiff's right to redeem and such an amendment would not be allowed if asked for at a late stage, yet if sufficient grounds were shown the defendants could be allowed to amend their defence. Taking into consideration the circumstances and the stage at which the application for an amendment was made it was held that no injustice would be done to the plaintiff by the amendment and consequently the order of the trial court allowing amendment on payment of costs was upheld by the High Court. The learned judge observed: "The object of the rule (0.6 R.17) is that the courts should get at and try the merits of the case that come before them and should consequently allow all amendments that may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties provided it can be done without causing injustice to the other side". The learned judge further observed; "No doubt the amendment would change the nature of the defence from admission to denial of the plaintiff's right to redeem. Such an amendment would not be allowed if asked at a late stage as was held in Laird v. Brigs (1880-1881 (16) Chancery Division 440). But if sufficient grounds are shown, the defendant can be allowed to amend his defence for the purpose of withdrawing his admission - see Hollis v. Burton (1892) 3 - Chancery Division 226". It was also held that the principles applicable to amendment of plaint would equally apply to amendment of written statement. It was further held that "the improbability of the convincing nature of the new defence sought to be raised is not in itself a ground for refusing to allow the amendment of the written statement by the inclusion of such defence." 21. The question as to the right of a defendant to raise additional defence in a case was considered by the Patna High Court in Union of India v. Shalimar Tar Products (1953 Patna 131). In that case the plaintiff brought a suit claiming damages against a railway administration on the allegation that an engine shunting a goods-train collided with a buffer and crashed in front of a laboratory erected by the plaintiff thereby causing damage to the laboratory. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit claiming damages against a railway administration on the allegation that an engine shunting a goods-train collided with a buffer and crashed in front of a laboratory erected by the plaintiff thereby causing damage to the laboratory. The defendant filed a written statement in which it was denied that there was any negligence on the part of the railway administration. Subsequently, the defendant applied for permission to file an additional written statement with the contention that the land on which the laboratory was constructed did not belong to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had no right to the laboratory. The application was rejected by the subordinate Judge. In revision the High Court allowed the amendment on terms relating to costs. Ramaswamy, J. observed: "Merely because the amendment sought is alleged to be inconsistent with the previous case of the defendant, this is no good reason for rejecting the application of the defendant for amendment. The general rule which is applicable to a case of this nature is that leave to amend ought to be granted unless the party applying is acting mala fide or by his blunder has done some injury to his opponent which cannot be compensated by award of costs; otherwise, whether the original omission arose from negligence, carelessness or accidental error the defect may be allowed to be remedied if no injustice is done to the other side". The principle was followed in Pramada Prasad v. Sagarmal (1954 Patna 439). In that case A who had become the managing agent of a colliery for B sued for rescission of the contract on the allegation that he entered into the contract as a result of misrepresentation and fraud practised by B and also claimed consequential reliefs. B contended in the written statement filed by him that the contract was not vitiated as alleged by the plaintiff and also contended that if it was found that the agreement was vitiated he was entitled to be restituted with the value of the coal raised by A. Subsequently he applied for amendment of the written statement by the addition of a claim relating to eight more items. The petition was allowed only in respect of two items and was disallowed as regards the other items on the ground that no such claim was made in the original written statement. The petition was allowed only in respect of two items and was disallowed as regards the other items on the ground that no such claim was made in the original written statement. Applying the principle laid down in 1953 Patna 131 the High Court allowed the defendant to amend the written statement as regards all the items claimed by him on condition that he paid costs to the plaintiff. 22. I have no doubt that in this case the learned District Judge acted in obvious disregard of the above well-established principles in disallowing the application of the third defendant to amend his written statement. As stated already, the learned judge was mistaken in thinking that the contentions raised in the proposed additional written statement would change the nature of the defence and that they are inconsistent with the defence raised in the original written statement. The proposed additional written statement only raises new contentions not raised in the original written statement. The rulings are all to the effect that there is nothing in law to prevent a defendant from raising such additional contentions so long as there is no mala fide on his part and so long as no injustice that cannot be compensated by cost is likely to be caused to the plaintiff. It cannot be said that in this case if the third defendant is allowed to amend his written statement the plaintiff will be put to any loss that cannot be compensated by costs. 23. The second reason given by the learned District Judge for disallowing the application of the third defendant is that it is belated. In the first place, mere delay in making the application for amendment of pleadings is no ground to reject it unless by allowing the amendment at a late stage the opposite side will be placed in such a position that he cannot be sufficiently compensated by costs. It was so held by Brett. M. R. in Clarapade and Company v. Commercial Union Association (1883) 32 W.R. Eng. 262) already referred to. Reference may also be made to a decision of this court in Narayana Kurup v. Eapen (I.L.R. 1952 T.C. 1011) Subramonia Iyer, J. observed in that case: "An application for amendment can be allowed however late it may be made. M. R. in Clarapade and Company v. Commercial Union Association (1883) 32 W.R. Eng. 262) already referred to. Reference may also be made to a decision of this court in Narayana Kurup v. Eapen (I.L.R. 1952 T.C. 1011) Subramonia Iyer, J. observed in that case: "An application for amendment can be allowed however late it may be made. Amendment can be allowed not merely by the trial court but also by the court of appeal or even of second appeal. Mere delay in making the application has never been considered by itself to be a ground for rejecting it". As stated already, although the suit was filed in the year 1950 only the second defendant has been examined in the case and the third defendant has been partly examined. No other evidence has been adduced by either party. It cannot also be said that the defendants were responsible for the delay in the trial of the suit. In the circumstances, I do not think that by allowing the third defendant to amend his written statement the plaintiff will be put to any loss that cannot be compensated by costs. The learned District Judge has not considered this aspect of the case. 24. For the above reasons, I hold that in disallowing the application of the third defendant to amend his written statement the court below acted in obvious disregard of well-established principles relating to amendment of pleadings. I therefore, think that this is a fit case in which this court should interfere in revision. But the application of the third defendant can be allowed only on terms. It cannot be denied that there has been negligence on his part in not making the application earlier. Although he was not managing the business of the first defendant company it was his duty to have made necessary enquiries relating to the transactions between the plaintiff and the first defendant, before filing his written statement. In the circumstances, his application for permission to file additional written statement can be allowed only on condition that he pays the counter-petitioner Rs. 300/- (Rupees three hundred only) as costs within a week from today. The payment will be irrespective of the result of the suit. If the amount is paid within that time the order of the court below will stand set aside and the revision petition allowed without costs. 300/- (Rupees three hundred only) as costs within a week from today. The payment will be irrespective of the result of the suit. If the amount is paid within that time the order of the court below will stand set aside and the revision petition allowed without costs. If the amount is not paid within that time the order of the court below will stand confirmed and the revision petition dismissed with costs. 25. The delay in the trial of this case has been, to a great extent due to the fact that the court has been preoccupied with sessions work. I think that for the speedy disposal of the suit it is better that it is transferred to the Bench of one of the additional District Judges of the Alleppey District Court. The suit is, therefore, transferred to the Bench of the First Additional District Judge. The learned judge will give priority to this case and see that it is disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Allowed.