Judgment.-The 4th defendant is the appellant and on his death pending the second appeal his legal representative has come on record as the second appellant. The suit was to enforce a mortgage, Exhibit P-1 for Rs.1,000, dated 21st October, 1918, executed by the first defendant for himself and as guardian of his minor undivided son, the second defendant, in favour of the first plaintiff. In execution of a money decree against the joint family of the first defendant one item of the mortgaged properties was sold in Court auction and was purchased by the decree-holders themselves represented by defendants 4 to 7 and 14. Their rights have now vested in the 4th defendant. The plaintiffs prayed for sale of the items comprised in the hypotheca including the item now claimed by the 14th defendant and the defence is that so far as that item is concerned, the suit is barred by limitation. The answer of the plaintiffs to get over the plea of limitation was that there was a registered endorsement of payment of Rs.25 on 20th October, 1930, that is, before the property liability under Exhibit P-1 and that even as regards the item sold out the claim is not barred by limitation since the suit was brought on 5th October, 1942, that is, within 12 years of the endorsement under section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. The trial Court dismissed the suit as against the item claimed by the 14th defendant but the lower appellate Court has reversed that decree and passed a preliminary decree against the entire hypotheca. Hence this second appeal by the fourth defendant claiming to have the item purchased by him exonerated from the operation of the mortgage decree,Under section 20, clause (1), of the Limitation Act where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt of legacy or by his duly authorised agent a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. If, therefore, it is held that the endorsement, dated 20th October, 1930, evidenced the payment made by the person liable to pay the debt, then the decision of the lower appellate Court is right, but what is argued is that in regard to the item which is claimed by the 14th defendant, it had gone out of the ownership of the first defendant’s joint family long before the payment was made towards the debt and that in that case any payment made towards the debt could not be a payment made by the person liable to pay the debt in respect of the property which has gone out of the ownership. Thus it is urged that no liability is imposed upon the property in which the equity of redemption has ceased to be with the mortgagor to pay any portion of it and if such payment is made, it cannot be considered to be one made under section 20 of the Limitation Act. The Full Bench decision in Pavayi v. Palanivela1, lays down that a mortgagor who has lost all interest in the mortgage property cannot bind by an acknowledgement under section 19 or by a payment of principal or interest under section 20 of the Limitation Act a person on whom his interest has devolved whether the devolution is of the whole of the mortgage properties or only a part thereof. In order to be binding on the assignee the acknowledgment or payment must be made before the person making it has parted with his interest in the property to the assignees. In the case before the Full Bench the payment was made after the equity of redemption in the entire properties had been assigned by the mortgagor to a third party and after the mortgagees had lost all their personal remedies against the mortgagor. In those circumstances the Full Bench held that the payment made by a person who has no liability whatever, either personal liability which had become barred or liability against the property which has already been transferred and the ownership in it has been lost by him, cannot bind the purchaser of any portion of the mortgage property. In those circumstances the Full Bench held that the payment made by a person who has no liability whatever, either personal liability which had become barred or liability against the property which has already been transferred and the ownership in it has been lost by him, cannot bind the purchaser of any portion of the mortgage property. Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to a passage at page 885 of the report wherein the learned Chief Justice observes as follows: “In certain of the cases to which I have referred the mortgagor retained an interest in part of the mortgage properties sold but do not consider that this makes any difference in principle. The question is whether a mortgagor who has lost all interest in the mortgage property can by an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 or by the payment of interest or principal within the meaning i of section 20 of the Limitation Act bind a person on whom his interest has devolved.” Because the learned Chief Justice did not consider that the retaining of interest in part of the hypotheca by the mortgagor would not make any difference in principle, jit is urged for the appellant that the Full Bench decision applies to the facts of the present case since at the time the payment was made by the first defendant on 20th October, 1930, except one item purchased by the 4th defendant, he had the ownership and possession of the rest of the items and that being the case he was personally liable to pay the debt. It is further urged that the words “by the person liable to pay the debt” specified in section 20(1) of the Limitation Act, implies and connotes a personal liability existing and not a liability charged or impressed upon the property, but this argument is against the trend of decisions of this Court which has been followed by the Calcutta High Court as well. This Court in Askaram Sowcar v. Venkataswami Naidu2 , following Chinnery v. Evans3, held that a purchaser of the equity of redemption is a person liable to pay the mortgage debt within section 20 of the Limitation Act and hence if under a mortgage decree for sale of the mortged property to which he is a party though exempted from personal liability he pays interest as such, such payment gives a fresh period of limitation for execution of the decree but the auction-purchaser of the mortgagor’s interest is undoubtedly not a person who has any personal liability. This decision lays down following the identical language of the English statute, that he is a person liable to pay the mortgage debt. The learned Judges also refer to the earlier case, Bolding v. Lane1 which was followed in Chinnery v. Evans2. The Calcutta High Court has laid down the same proposition, following Askaram Sowcar v. Venkataswami Naidu3, and the English Cases, in Bhuban Mohan Singh v. Ram Gobinda Goswami4, where B.B. Ghose and Cammiade, JJ., had held that the expression "‘a person liable to pay’ the debt in the first paragraph of sub-section 1 of section 20 of the Limitation Act comprehends not only the mortgagor and his personal representatives upon whom the contract is personally binding but includes the purchaser of the equity of redemption also." No decision laying down any contrary principle has been cited before me. It is, therefore, clear that when the first defendant made the payment he was a person liable to pay the debt because 12 years had not elapsed from the date of the execution of the mortgage in which case a suit for the sale of the properties brought on that date would not have got barred. The further question is even if it is paid by the person liable to pay the debt, whether the property which no longer belongs to him can be made liable by such payment. There are two decisions of this Court which take a view contrary to the contentions of the appellant. The further question is even if it is paid by the person liable to pay the debt, whether the property which no longer belongs to him can be made liable by such payment. There are two decisions of this Court which take a view contrary to the contentions of the appellant. Lional Leach, C.J. and Lakshmana Rao, J., had to consider a case in Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar,5 where the facts were as follows: After the mortgagor had created two mortgages on certain properties he was adjudged insolvent but before that, some of the mortgage properties had been sold by him and the rest of the properties were sold by the Official Receiver. The legal representatives of the purchaser of the rest of the properties from the Official Receiver paid a sum towards the interest due on the mortgage and this payment was duly, endorsed on the mortgage deed. The question was whether such a payment would keep the mortgage debt alive even on the properties sold by the insolvent before he was adjudged. The decision in Askaram Sowcar v. Venkataswami Naidu3 was followed by the learned Judges in holding that the purchaser of the equity of redemption is one liable to pay the mortgage debt within the meaning of section 20 of the Limitation Act. They also refer to the decision of Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., in Thayyanayah Ammal v. Sundarappa6, where at the time the payment and endorsement were made, the property had passed out of the ownership of the mortgagor but the personal liability remained. As the payment was within six years of the mortgage, Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., held that a part payment by a mortgagor who has already parted with the mortgage property but is a person liable to pay under his covenant saves the right of suit against the purchaser of the equity of redemption. Following that observation and applying it to a case of the survival of the property liability, Leach, C.J., held that a payment which falls within the provisions of section 20 of the Limitation Act starts a fresh period of limitation for an action on the debt against all persons who are liable thereon. Following that observation and applying it to a case of the survival of the property liability, Leach, C.J., held that a payment which falls within the provisions of section 20 of the Limitation Act starts a fresh period of limitation for an action on the debt against all persons who are liable thereon. They also refer to the Full Bench decision and distinguish it on the ground that it related to a case where the mortgagor who had lost all interest in the mortgage property and was not a person liable to pay the debt could not bind by an acknowledgment under section 19 or by payment of principal or interest under section 20 of the Limitation Act the person on whom his interest had devolved. It was further elaborated by stating that in order to bind the assignee the acknowledgment or payment must be made before the mortgagor had parted with his interest in the property. Therefore though the Full Bench decision was expressly restricted to a case where there was neither personal liability nor property liability subsisting at the time of the payment the observation that it does not make any difference in principle whether the mortgagor has retained interest in part of the mortgage property should be understood in the light of the explanation given by the learned Chief Justice in Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar5. It is therefore, clear that either the personal liability or the property liability must remain with the person making the payment. If he has disposed of all his interest in the property but the personal liability remains and the payment is made within six years then Thayyanayaki Ammal v. Sundarappa1, is an authority for holding that the suit is not barred. If on the other hand, the personal liability is barred and at least part of the mortgage property remains with the mortgagor or his assignees, then the payment made by such a person would bind the person on whom the other properties have devolved. But Mr.Vijayaragavachariar argued that the decision in Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar2, is a case where the payment was made by the purchaser of some of the properties and not by the mortgagor himself. But Mr.Vijayaragavachariar argued that the decision in Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar2, is a case where the payment was made by the purchaser of some of the properties and not by the mortgagor himself. I do not find any difference in principle for the reason that the purchaser of part of the properties who makes the payment if anything has not got the same liability as the original mortgagor. If such a purchaser by making a payment can keep the mortgage debt alive as against the other items of properties it is all the more reasonable that the original mortgagor himself by making the payment can keep it up. Both these cases were considered by Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J., in Kempamma v. Racha Setty3, where the payment was made after the mortgagor had parted with one item and his personal liability had got barred. The learned Judge observes as follows:- "The Full Bench decision in Pavayi v. Palanivela4, gives rise to some doubt whether in such a case it could not be successfully urged that the suit was barred, but two later decisions have made it abundantly clear that if a payment is made under section 20 of the Limitation Act by the person liable to pay, a fresh period of limitation would start in favour of the creditor. The decisions are Thayyanayaki v. Sundarappa1 and Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar2. The second decision accepts the interpretation of the Full Bench decision given by Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ. The Chief Justice delivered the judgment in the Full Bench case as well as in Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar2. The principle is that so long as the mortgagor has not parted with his interest in the mortgaged properties and continue to be liable under the mortgage he can make a payment which will serve under section 20 of the Limitation Act to start a fresh period of limitation. " With respect I am in entire agreement with the observations of the learned Judge. In a discussion of the Full Bench case Pavayi v. Palanivela, in the Notes of Indian Cases5, there is the following statement:- "In between these two views there is another line of thought that at any rats if the mortgagor making the payment has at that time some interest in the mortgage properties the prior assignees from him would be bound by such payment. Vide Chinnery v. Evans6." Next, reliance is placed upon the decision of Raghava Rao and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ., in Marayanappa Naicker v. Ramalingam Pillai 7 , where there are certain observations to the effect that if the person sought to be bound by the acknowledgment or payment is a person who has prior to such acknowledgment or payment acquired an interest in the property the acknowledgment or payment will not be binding upon him although the person making the acknowledgment or payment is at the time possessed of some interest or other in the properties mortgaged. But this decision makes no reference whatever to the explanation of the Full Bench case by the learned Chief Justice himself in Narayana Reddiar v. Venkatesa Reddiar2. There is also no discussion as to whether the person who makes the payment is one liable to pay the debt. It has also to be remembered that the case, Marayanappa Naicker v. Ramalingam Pillai7, was a case of acknowledgment under section 19 of the Limitation Act and not a payment under secti on 20 of the said Act. There is certainly some difference between the two and I do not think that the observations of Raghava Rao, J., can be made applicable to a payment under section 20 of the Limitation Act. I am therefore of the opinion that the decision of the lower Court is right. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.