RAM LABHAYA, J. : This petition of revision is directed against an order of Shri R. Mehdi, Subordinate Judge, Lower Assam Districts. Gauhati dated 25-5-1954 by which he ordered that the Money Suit No. 52 of 1953 in­stituted in his Court by the petitioner before us be stayed pending disposal of the suit instituted by the opposite party defendant in the Calcutta High Court on its original side. (2) The facts leading to the institution of the suit in the Gauhati Court as alleged by the peti­tioner may be briefly stated: On 23-11-1948 the petitioner entered into an agreement with the op­posite party by which the petitioner was appointed by the opposite party the Sole Distributor of some medicines & certain other articles manufactured by them for sale in the States of Assam, Manipur and Tripura; one condition of the agreement was that the petitioner should prepay the full value of the goods received by the petitioner from the opposite party, who promised to take back the unsold goods and return their price to the petitioner. In pursuance of the said agreement the petitioner in­vested Rs. 70.000/- in the goods received for sale from the opposite party. The opposite party thereafter sent a notice to the petitioner determining the said agreement dated 23-11-1948, with effect from 1-8-1950 .At that time the petitioner had a stock of medicines of the value of Rs. 50,608/14/6 pies which the op­posite party according to the terms of the agree­ment was bound to take back and to pay for in addition to other sums payable to the petitioner under the terms of the said agreement. After this the opposite party sent their employee Mr. N. Gupta to scrutinise the accounts of the petitioner at Gauhati and Mr. Gupta found that Rs. 13,0597 9/9 pies were due by the opposite party to the petitioner. This was exclusive of the value of the stock of the medicines held by the petitioner and also the commission due to him till that date. On 23-8-1950 Mr. A. J. Judah, Managing Director of the opposite party came to Gauhati and proposed to the petitioner to work as a stockist under a new contract. The important conditions of the pro­posal were that the petitioner would keep stock of medicines and other articles supplied by the op­posite party at Gauhati and will deposit at least Rs. On 23-8-1950 Mr. A. J. Judah, Managing Director of the opposite party came to Gauhati and proposed to the petitioner to work as a stockist under a new contract. The important conditions of the pro­posal were that the petitioner would keep stock of medicines and other articles supplied by the op­posite party at Gauhati and will deposit at least Rs. 15.000/- for the goods supplied to him; he would get a minimum commission of Rs. 500/- per month but if he had to invest more than Bs., 20.000/- in the business, an additional commission of 2J per cent was to be paid to him on his excess invest­ment. The opposite party could take back from the petitioner such goods as they required and would pay for them; that the accounts were to be adjusted & all payments were to be made at Gau­hati & that the opposite party was to take back all unsold goods and pay for them on the termina­tion of the business. The stock already in the hand of the petiti­oner was to be taken back by the opposite party on cash payment under the terms of the terminat­ed contract; but it was to be treated as a part of the stock under the new contract. The proposal was agreed to and the business was carried on from 23-8-1950 to 23-1-1953 on the basis of the new contract. The new contract was also terminated at the instance of the opposite party by a letter dated 23-1-1953 with which was enclosed a letter alleged to have been written on 17-10-1952 though the petitioner never received any such letter. At this the petitioner by letters and telegrams re­quested the opposite party to take delivery of the stocks of medicines held by him on payment of their value and also to pay his dues on account of commission etc. But the opposite party adopted dilatory tactics and on one pretext or another avoided settling the matter. On 7-4-1953 the petitioner claimed by a regis­tered letter (marked I), payment of Rs. 68,912/5/3 pies from the opposite party and demanded that the said sum be paid within seven days of the re­ceipt of the letter to which the petitioner did not receive any reply. On 7-4-1953 the petitioner claimed by a regis­tered letter (marked I), payment of Rs. 68,912/5/3 pies from the opposite party and demanded that the said sum be paid within seven days of the re­ceipt of the letter to which the petitioner did not receive any reply. He then got a pleader's notice issued to the opposite party on 30-4-1953 demand­ing that if within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice full payment was not made, legal steps would be taken. On 19-5-1953 the Managing Director of the opposite party wrote to the peti­tioner a letter (annexure J) stating that he had arrived back from Europe only a few days before he was going through the accounts himself and that he would let the petitioner know his decision in due course. A few days later the Managing Director of the opposite party sent his son Mr. Derek Judah to Gauhati for scrutinising the account books of the petitioner and settling the accounts with him. Mr. Derek Judah examined the accounts thoroughly and after going back to Calcutta wrote a letter (an­nexure K) on 28-5-1953 saying "We are anxious to settle your accounts immediately." But on the next day i. e. on 29-5-53 the opposite party filed the suit No. 1917 of 1953 in the High Court against the petitioner. (3) The petitioner avers that before the insti­tution of the suit the opposite party never made any demand for any amount from the petitioner. On the other hand it was the petitioner who was making. demands for the stock to be taken back and his dues be paid and he was being given assurances in different forms that the matter was being settled. It is pointed out that the opposite party have not averred even in their plaint that the account sub­mitted by the petitioner was wrong or that they were entitled to recover any particular amount from him. It is further averred that the contract was made at Gauhati and according to its terms the opposite party had to settle their accounts and make all payments at Gauhati and the Calcutta High Court has no jurisdiction to determine the-dispute between the parties in regard to the liabi­lities of one or the other arising out of the agree­ment between them. The suit instituted in the Calcutta High Court is described as mala fide. The suit instituted in the Calcutta High Court is described as mala fide. It forestalled the petitioner's impending suit and had in view the defeating or delaying the claim of the petitioner made subsequently at Gauhati. (4) The order of the learned Subordinate Judge is assailed on the ground that the learned Judge committed material irregularity in coming to the conclusion that the suit at Calcutta was not a mala fide one. He merely observed that the pre­viously instituted suit will not, I think, constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the-correspondences referred to in the petition and the notices sent to the opposite party before the institution of the Calcutta suit lead unmistakably to the conclusion that the opposite party had no-bona fide claim to make and realising that the petitioner was about to institute a suit, the suit at Calcutta was instituted with the manifest in­tention of avoiding their liability arising out of the agreement between the parties. (5) There is no counter affidavit from the op­posite party. From the letters annexures I, N and J, it appears that the opposite party was not pre­ferring any claim or making any demand against the petitioner who is the plaintiff in the Gauhati suit. According to the terms of the terminated contract the opposite party had to take back the stock in charge of the petitioner and its value would have become payable by the opposite party since the value of the goods had already been paid by the petitioner under the agreement.. The like­lihood of the situation was that the opposite party had become liable for a substantial sum since the petitioner had a considerable quantity of unsold goods. The correspondence does not suggest and Mr. Ghose has also not been able to disclose any intelligible basis for any claim against the peti­tioner. It is apparent that before instituting their suit in the Calcutta High Court the opposite party never intimated to the petitioner that they had any claim against him. Even in that suit the pra­yer is for rendition of accounts and no attempt has been made to show that any sum was due which was demanded and was refused by the petitioner and there was any need or occasion for the suit. Even in that suit the pra­yer is for rendition of accounts and no attempt has been made to show that any sum was due which was demanded and was refused by the petitioner and there was any need or occasion for the suit. It appears at least prima facie from the documentary evidence that the suit at Calcutta was instituted mala fide. The petitioner was mak­ing efforts to recover his dues and to hand over the stocks lying in his hands. The suit at Cal­cutta had an ulterior purpose. This was one way of getting over the difficulty that could be created by the institution of the suit at Gauhati. (6) The question then arises as to whether in these circumstances the Court below could decline to stay the suit at Gauhati though subsequently instituted notwithstanding the provisions contain­ed in S. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, which pro­vides that no Court shall proceed, with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same Parties, or bet­ween parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits established or con­tinued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. The provision is emphatically mandatory. No Court can proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and sub­stantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. We have here two suits. The subject-matter of the two suits is al­most identical. There is some difference in the form in which relief is sought. Under S. 10 of the Civil P. C., the Court would be bound to stay the proceedings. Mr. Lahiri, the learned coun­sel for the petitioner has argued somewhat faintly that the matter involved in the two suits can­not be regarded as identical. We do not think he is on sure ground here. Under S. 10 of the Civil P. C., the Court would be bound to stay the proceedings. Mr. Lahiri, the learned coun­sel for the petitioner has argued somewhat faintly that the matter involved in the two suits can­not be regarded as identical. We do not think he is on sure ground here. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the matter in controversy in the two suits was substantially the same and we are not pursuaded to hold that the suit at Gauhati merely because it involves a claim for an ascertained sum can toe regarded as outside the scope of S. 10 of the Civil P. C. Considering the identity of the sub­ject-matter of the two suits, it would appear that the application of S. 10 is attracted. But the main contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that though the Calcutta suit was previously instituted, S. 10 will not apply by reason of the fact that the previously instituted suit has not been instituted bona fide and the identity of sub­ject-matter is not enough. In support of this con­tention the learned counsel has placed reliance on Ram Bahadur Thakur & Co. v. Devidayal Ltd., AIR 1954 Bom 176 (A). The judgment was deli­vered by Chief Justice Chagla. It was held in this case that: "The provisions of Ss. 10 and 151 of the Civil P. C. must be read together and if the Court which is asked to stay a suit comes to the conclu­sion that by staying the suit before it, it would perpetrate an abuse of the process of Court, or would enable the other party to obtain a benefit to which in view of his conduct he is not legiti­mately entitled, then, notwithstanding the provi­sion of S. 10. the Court would be justified in re­fusing to stay the suit before it, even though that suit is a subsequently instituted suit." (7) Section 10 has no application when a suit is instituted which constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court. the Court would be justified in re­fusing to stay the suit before it, even though that suit is a subsequently instituted suit." (7) Section 10 has no application when a suit is instituted which constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court. If a suit is filed in order to forestall a suit which is filed subsequently in another Court, or if a suit is filed which is vexa­tious and frivolous, or if a suit is filed in violation of contractual obligation to have the matter ad­judicated upon in another Court, Section 10 would not apply and the Court may in the exer­cise of its inherent power decline to stay a subse­quently instituted suit on the ground that the suit first instituted constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court. The principle laid down is that if the previous suit can be regarded as an abuse of the process of Court, it would not be a suit the benefit of which may be taken for the purpose of S. 10. The Court would not lend its aid to a litigant i"0r a suitor who seeks to take advantage to which he could not be entitled or which he is disentitled for claiming by reason of his own conduct. Here the conduct of the opposite party as seen from the documents which have been placed on the record supports the contention raised on be­half of the petitioner. The petition is supported by an affidavit. The documents reveal that the opposite party was giving assurances to the peti­tioner that they would settle up the matter. The Managing Director wrote to the petitioner that he would be coming to Gauhati to scrutinise the accounts. His representative examined the ac­counts and instead of making any settlement the suit was instituted. Whenever there is some dispute or there is any claim against somebody normally a notice of demand is sent intimating the demand just to give the other party a chance to know his liability and clear it up if possible. Even such a notice was not sent to the petitioner in this case. It appears that the opposite party were produc­ing a false sense of security in the petitioner and were holding him back from rushing to Court to enable themselves to go to Court first. Even such a notice was not sent to the petitioner in this case. It appears that the opposite party were produc­ing a false sense of security in the petitioner and were holding him back from rushing to Court to enable themselves to go to Court first. It is clear that the Calcutta suit was not a genuine or a bona fide effort to realise any dues; it had some pur­pose other than recovery of the just dues. That suit therefore would be an abuse of the process of Court and would not be a suit on the basis of which stay of the subsequent suit may be granted under S. 10 of the Civil P. C as laid down in AIR 1954 Bom 176 (A). The Court may not apply S. 10 when a previously instituted suit amounts to a abuse of the process of the Court. If S. 10 of the Civil P. C. does not apply, the Court naturally will have to draw on its inherent powers under S. 151 to determine whether the suit at Gauhati should be stayed or not. In the circum­stances of the case we have no doubt that the opposite party could not be deemed to have made out a case for stay of the suit here. Under S. 151 therefore the stay prayed for should have been refused. (8) As stated above, the- learned Subordinate Judge disposed of this most important point with the observation that he did not think that the previously instituted suit constituted an abuse of the process of Court, it could not be said on the, basis of this observation that he fully applied his^ mind to the evidence placed before him. He should have given reasons with reference to the documentary evidence placed on the record which j had a very important and direct bearing on the, decision of the question. The learned Judge does not even refer to the evidence. It may well be regarded as a finding not based on evidence. It would be vitiated by material ir­regularity in the exercising of jurisdiction by the learned Subordinate Judge and may be interfer­ed with on that basis. The learned counsel for the opposite party has argued that there is no question of jurisdiction involved in the case and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was based on findings of law or fact. The learned counsel for the opposite party has argued that there is no question of jurisdiction involved in the case and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was based on findings of law or fact. The finding that the previously instituted suit was not an abuse of the process of Court was a finding of fact which cannot be challenged in revision. It is not possible to adopt this view. It seems to us fairly obvious that the learned Subordinate Judge has not considered the available materials and his finding rests on no evidence. It is therefore a case in which the revisional jurisdiction of the Court may be appropriately invoked. (9) The learned counsel for the opposite party has also argued that on account of the disputes between members constituting the opposite party company (Albert David Co. Ltd.) an administration suit was instituted at Calcutta and in that suit a receiver has been appointed. He has con­tended that the receiver should be made a party before this petition is disposed of. We have not before us any copy of the plaint or of the order appointing the receiver. It is not known what duties or functions have been assigned to the re­ceiver. Mr. Ghose has not been able to show us that this petition cannot proceed unless the re­ceiver is impleaded in substitution of the oppo­site party or in addition to it. We do not think that the mere fact that a receiver has been appointed in some suit between the members of the company would make it neces­sary for the petitioner to implead him in this pro­ceeding. The opposite party is the company it­self and therefore the party with the beneficial interest being before the Court there, can be no objection to the disposal of this petition in the absence of the receiver. The petition is merely for obtaining a reversal of the stay order. No final decision in the suit or in respect of any property belonging to the company is being given at this stage. The learned counsel for the oppo­site party has not shown why this petition may not be regarded as properly constituted or may not be disposed of in the absence of the receiver. The contention therefore cannot prevail. (10) The petitioner has also prayed that the opposite party be restrained from proceeding with the suit at Calcutta. The learned counsel for the oppo­site party has not shown why this petition may not be regarded as properly constituted or may not be disposed of in the absence of the receiver. The contention therefore cannot prevail. (10) The petitioner has also prayed that the opposite party be restrained from proceeding with the suit at Calcutta. But no such injunction was prayed for in the Court below and therefore no direction could have been given as far as this prayer was concerned. In the circumstances, we cannot entertain this claim in revision. The order of the learned Judge is set aside. The case shall go back and the learned Judge shall proceed to dispose of it according to law. The petitioner will recover his costs of this petition from the oppo­site party; hearing fee Rs. 50/-. (11) SARJOO PROSAD C. J.: I agree. Revision allowed.