JUDGMENT The suit (No. 6 of 1952 of the Sub-Judges Court, Manipur) which has given rise to the appeal was brought by the plaintiff-appellant for adjudging the sale deed dated 14-9-1946 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Moirangthen Mani Singh, respondent 2, Ex. A-2 as void and for recovery of Rs. 17,700/- as mesne profits on the allegation that he and defendants 1 to 3 were members of the Manipur Drivers Union Co-operative Association Ltd., and the plaintiff took a loan of Rs. 2500/- on 14-9-1946 from the Manipur Drivers Union through defendant 2 the then Secretary after pledging his lorry No. 427 A.S.M., but he executed the deed Ex. A-1 in the form of a sale deed. The plaintiff further alleged that even though the deed in question was in the form of a sale deed it was really a mortgage by conditional sale as he promised to repay the loan and take back the lorry within one month. Lastly the plaintiffs allegation was that the loan was satisfied by him within the prescribed time limit by giving a jeep to defendant 2 and then the receipt dated 15-10-1946 Ex. P-A was obtained by him. The lorry was kept in the custody of defendant 2 on the understanding that the plaintiff would get the net hire dues from this defendant, but the latter transferred the lorry to defendant 3 without giving any information to the plaintiff and defendant 3 took away the lorry, and so there was a litigation in criminal Court about this lorry. Criminal Case No. 247 of 1950 was started against the plaintiff while criminal case No.66 of 1947 was started by the plaintiff against defendant 3 and ultimately on 16-7-1951 it was held that the present plaintiff should approach a proper Civil Court for the recovery of the lorry from the defendants and the same decision was given in Criminal Case No. 66 of 1947-48 on 4-8-1951. It was then that the present suit No. 6 of 1952 was brought by the plaintiff in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Manipur on 24-11-1951 in forma pauperis for recovery of possession of the lorry and also for mesne profits. 2. The defendants contested the suit on the ground that the transaction between defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff was that of an out and out sale and the sale deed Ex. 2. The defendants contested the suit on the ground that the transaction between defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff was that of an out and out sale and the sale deed Ex. A-1 was duly executed by the plaintiff after receiving its full consideration of Rs. 2500/-. The transaction regarding the jeep car and the issuing of the receipt Ex. P-A was totally denied. It was also contended that the claim for mesne profits amounting to Rs. 17,700/- was barred by limitation under Art. 50, Limitation Act. Defendant 3 has urged in this Court that the present suit is not maintainable in view of the principle enunciated in S. 53-A, Transfer of Property Act. The learned Sub-Judge dismissed the suit and so the plaintiff has come in appeal to this Court. The following points arise for determination in this appeal : 1. Was the sale deed dated 24-9-1946 Ex. A-1 in reality a mortgage deed by conditional sale, and is the plaintiff entitled to redeem the lorry No. A.S.M. 427 in question? 2. Were the dues of defendants 1 and 2 duly paid up by the plaintiff by giving them a jeep on 15-10-1946, and is the receipt Ex. P-A genuine? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover any mesne profits from the defendants on account of hire dues relating to the lorry in question or is any portion of the claim for mesne profits time-barred? FINDINGS 3. Point No. 1. Kangabam Bira Singh plaintiff has stated that the transaction embodied in the deed Ex. A-1 dated 14-9-1946 was in reality a mortgage by conditional sale and entries were made in defendants account books as such. Aheibam Gokulchand Singh P. W. 8 has tried to vaguely support the plaintiffs statement on this point, but as the plaintiff has stood surety for him in a criminal case, his statement cannot be accepted at its face value. Moreover, Aheibam Gokulchand Singh P. W. 8 has not exactly proved the contents of the account as had been seen by him in the year 1948-49, and so his statement is very vague. H. Tomba Singh, P. W. 3 did not find anything in the defendants accounts regarding the transaction in question. Moreover, Aheibam Gokulchand Singh P. W. 8 has not exactly proved the contents of the account as had been seen by him in the year 1948-49, and so his statement is very vague. H. Tomba Singh, P. W. 3 did not find anything in the defendants accounts regarding the transaction in question. Pukhrambam Iboyaima Singh D. W. 1 became the Secretary of the M.D.U. in 1950 A. D., and his statement shows that he did not find any entry relating to any mortgage regarding the lorry in question, in the accounts books vide Ex. P-E. Moirangthem Mani Singh D. W. 2 has denied that the sale deed Ex. A-1 was ever intended to be simply a mortgage deed and as the contents of this deed go to support the defendants version, I think the learned Sub-Judge was justified in holding that the deed Ex. A-1 was an out and out sale deed. This deed provides as follows : "Let it be known that I, Kangabam Bira Singh, son of late Kangabam Thanil Singh at present resident of Wangkhei Ayangpalli, have sold my lorry A.S.M. 427 to Moirangthem Mani Singh, Secretary, Manipur Drivers Union, Imphal at Rs. 2,500/- (rupees two thousand and five hundred only). My licence No. is 89 M. S. (vide Ex. P-B). The Mahajan has kept the said lorry with me for my use for about one month. After the expiry of one month, I shall hand over it in a fit condition to the vendee. In case the Mahajan is not satisfied with the lorry, I shall repay the sum with interest. If he thinks to receive it, mutation may be effected to which I have no objection. I shall be responsible if any objection comes forward. Having received the money in full I execute the deed consciously and put my signature. Date 14-9-46 witness: Sd/-Bhisma Singh of Sagolband Nepra Menjor,14-9-46. Writer: Sd/-KrishnaMohan Singh 14-9-46. Of Keisamthong Leisom Leirak." 4. Sinam Krishna Mohan Singh D. W. 3 has also been examined in this case and Chabungbam Bhisma Singh D. W. 5, marginal witness has also been produced in the witness-box by the defendants, and their statements also go to support the defendants version. The contents of the deed Ex. Writer: Sd/-KrishnaMohan Singh 14-9-46. Of Keisamthong Leisom Leirak." 4. Sinam Krishna Mohan Singh D. W. 3 has also been examined in this case and Chabungbam Bhisma Singh D. W. 5, marginal witness has also been produced in the witness-box by the defendants, and their statements also go to support the defendants version. The contents of the deed Ex. A-1 clearly show that it was an out and out sale deed and the mere fact that the word Mahajan has been used in this deed, will not be sufficient to prove that this deed was only intended to embody a loan transaction, vide Somar Puri v. Shyam Narain Gir, AIR 1954 Pat 586 (A). If only a mortgage were intended to be created there would have been no reference to mutation proceeding. The moment an oral contract is reduced to writing it is not open to any of the parties thereafter to prove the terms of the contract by referring to any original oral agreement as S. 91, Evidence Act expressly prohibits it. Such a party would be precluded from proving the terms of the transaction otherwise than by the deed itself, vide Chanam Meher Singh v. Shamlal Ramji Das, AIR 1950 Pepsu 34 (B). The oral evidence of Matalik Mia P. W. 2, Toyaima Mia P. W. 4, S. Ibomacha Singh, scribe of Ex. P-A, L. Jugo Singh, Yamlem Ibeton Singh and Ningombam Ibobi Singh, who have tried to show that the transaction between the parties was that of a mortgage and the mortgage was repaid subsequently by means of Ex. P-A, cannot, therefore, be legally admissible, to show that the transaction embodied in Ex. A-1 was not that of a sale but merely of a mortgage. The former statement of Kangabam Bira Singh P. W. 1 in Criminal Case No. 247 of 1950 vide Exs. D-A and D-B clearly goes to show that he had never taken the alleged receipt Ex. P-A. As his statement is quite clear and the plaintiff had stated there that he never took any receipt for the alleged jeep which is stated to have been given to the defendant 2 for satisfying the mortgage dues, I am of opinion that the learned Sub-Judge was right in holding that the deed Ex. A-1 was really a sale deed, and the plaintiff had no right to redeem the lorry subsequently after its execution. 5. A-1 was really a sale deed, and the plaintiff had no right to redeem the lorry subsequently after its execution. 5. Point No. 2. The plaintiff has produced the alleged receipt Ex. P-A and Ibomacha Singh, Scribe, P. W. 9, Matalik Mia P. W. 2 and Toyaima Mia P. W. 4 have tried to prove it. The statement of Kangabam Bira Singh P. W. 1 shows that he gave the alleged jeep to defendant 2 in the presence of Gokulchand Singh, but this witness has not been withheld from the witness-box. The scribe does not state anything about the alleged jeep while Matalik Mia has merely stated that the document Ex. P-A was signed by him while other people had signed it before it was put up before him. Toyaima Mia has also stated that he did not see anybody signing this receipt, and he merely identified the signatures of the attesting witnesses. The statements of the plaintiffs witnesses show that the alleged jeep had not been registered and at the time when it was delivered to defendant 2 it had no battery, no spring and some other important parts were also missing. He has now tried to show that he got the receipt Ex. P-A, but in the former statements Exs. D-A and D-B he had clearly stated that he never got any receipt for this jeep. If the plaintiff had really given any jeep, he would have complied with the provisions of S. 31, Motor Vehicles Act, i.e. he would have within 30 days of the transfer of ownership got the name of the transferees duly entered in the official papers, but he did not do so. Again, if really any jeep had been given to defendant 2 the document Ex. A-1 should have been returned to the plaintiff or at any rate it should have been effectiveley cancelled, but the plaintiff never demanded its return. If the receipt Ex. P-A had been genuine it would have been registered according to the old Manipur Registration Rules, but this was not done and the plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever uptill now to get it registered. All these facts go to show that the theory of delivery of jeep is a myth, and if there had been any truth in this theory the alleged receipt Ex. P-A must have been produced in the earlier criminal cases. 6. All these facts go to show that the theory of delivery of jeep is a myth, and if there had been any truth in this theory the alleged receipt Ex. P-A must have been produced in the earlier criminal cases. 6. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the document Ex. P-A was duly proved and exhibited and so it should be inferred that the dues of the defendant had been duly satisfied by the plaintiff. In my opinion, the mere fact that a document was exhibited, will not be sufficient to establish the plaintiffs case as it has been held by Jagannadha Das, J., now of the Supreme Court, that where certain documents have been marked as exhibits in a case without objection but the contents thereof have not been put to the person connected with them either in their examination-in-chief or cross-examination, it is not possible to make use of the statements made therein for the purpose of drawing inferences one way or the other, vide Pratap Kishore v. Gyanendranath, AIR 1951 Orissa 313 at p. 323 (C). I have already shown above that the plaintiffs witnesses have totally failed to prove that any jeep was really delivered to defendant 2 on 15-10-1946. 7. Defendant 2 denied the receipt Ex. P-A and the plaintiff never took any step to get the alleged signatures of this defendant compared with his former admitted signatures by a handwriting expert. Under S. 47, Evidence Act the Court can take into consideration the opinion of anyone connected with the handwriting of the person by whom a document is supposed to be written when the Court has to form an opinion as to a person by whom that document was written or signed. Under S. 67, Evidence Act it is necessary that the signatures or the handwriting or so much of the document as is alleged to be in a particular persons handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. There are recognised modes of proving a signature and they are : (i) By calling a person who signed or wrote a document. (ii) By calling a person in whose presence the document was signed or written. (iii) By calling a handwriting expert. (iv) By calling a person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom the document is supposed to be signed or written. (ii) By calling a person in whose presence the document was signed or written. (iii) By calling a handwriting expert. (iv) By calling a person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom the document is supposed to be signed or written. (v) By comparing in Court the disputed signature or writing with some admitted signature or writing. (vi) By proof of an admission by the person who is alleged to have signed or written the document that he signed or wrote it. (vii) By the statement of a deceased professional scribe, made in the ordinary course of business, that the signature on the document is that of a particular person. (viii) A signature is proved to have been made if it is shown to have been made at the request of a person by some other person e.g. by the scribe who signed on behalf of the executant. (ix) By other circumstantial evidence. Vide Monirs Indian Evidence Act, Edn. 3, page 549. 8. It is settled law that the mere identification of the signatures of the witnesses of any document does not amount to proving of the execution of the document vide Kahanchand v. Mt. Jawandi, 79 Ind Cas 500 : (AIR 1923 Lah 174) (D). The plaintiff aught to have known full well that defendant 2 had categorically denied the transaction as well as the alleged receipt Ex. P-A and when his witnesses failed to prove that any jeep was given to defendant 2 then it was absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to have got the alleged signatures of defendant 2 compared with his other admitted prior signatures by a handwriting expert, but this was not done. The learned counsel for the appellant prayed that the suit be remanded to the trial Court for disposing of the amendment application given by the plaintiff and also for allowing an opportunity to the plaintiff to examine a handwriting expert. I find that even though no orders were written out on the amendment application, the amendment as a matter of fact was allowed and the learned Sub-Judge has taken into consideration the amended prayer "that the deed dated 14-9-1946 be adjudicated void and cancelled; and so there seems to be absolutely no occasion for remanding the case to the trial Court now. Even if there had been a comparison of signatures, that findings would not have been conclusive in any way, vide S. C. Gupta v. Emperor, 76 Ind Cas 425 : (AIR 1924 Rang 17) (E); Dhanji Arjan v. Ramji Mavji, AIR 1950 Kutch 58 (F) and Kishore Chandra v. Ganesh Prasad, AIR 1954 SC 316 (G). As it has been proved in this case that the deed Ex. A-1 was an out and out sale deed and as the plaintiff completely failed to prove that he gave any jeep to defendant 2, I think, no useful purpose would be served now by remanding the case to the trial Court. After taking into consideration the entire evidence on this record, I agree with the learned Sub-Judge in holding that the alleged receipt Ex. P-A is not genuine, and in any case no jeep was given to the defendants through it. 9. It was urged on behalf of the defendants-respondents that they should be allowed to put forward the unregistered deed Ex. A-1 as a shield against the plaintiffs claim in the present case, and reliance was placed in this connection on Chotelal Chandrika Prasad v. Ram Pratap, AIR 1955 Vindh Pra. 15 (H), in which it has been laid down that in considering whether S. 53-A, Transfer of Property Act has retrospective effect or not, it is not the date of the making contract but the date on which the suit is filed that is relevant, and in this sense S. 53-A, Transfer of Property Act has retrospective effect and even an unregistered document can be looked into for purposes of proving part performance. But as this case does not relate to immovable property, the doctrine of part performance has no application to this case vide Bhabi Dutt v. Ramalalbyamal, 152 Ind Cas 431 : (AIR 1934 Rang 303) (I). I have shown above that in pursuance of the sale deed Ex. A-1 the lorry was actually handed over to defendant 2 vide Exs. A-3 to A-12, and ultimately it was transferred to defendant 3. But the plaintiff never attempted to get the alleged receipt Ex. P-A registered or enforced and so he cannot now claim the lorry in question in this suit as it had been sold away as early as in 1946 A.D. I hold accordingly and this point is also decided against the appellant. 10. Point No. 3. But the plaintiff never attempted to get the alleged receipt Ex. P-A registered or enforced and so he cannot now claim the lorry in question in this suit as it had been sold away as early as in 1946 A.D. I hold accordingly and this point is also decided against the appellant. 10. Point No. 3. The evidence on this record clearly shows that the plaintiff had no interest left in the lorry in question after 14-9-1946, and so he could not lay any claim to profits regarding this lorry for any subsequent period. 11. The plaintiff claimed Rs. 17,700/- as mesne profits. Mesne profits have been defined in Whartons Law Lexicon, Edn. 14 as follows : "Mesne profits are the rents and profits which a trespasser has, or might have, received or made during his occupation of the premises, and which therefore he must pay over to the true owner as compensation for the tort which he has committed". 12. In S. 2 (12), Civil P. C. mesne profits appear to have been given the same meaning, but it has been provided that this word shall not include profits due to improvement made by the person in wrongful possession. These definitions make it clear that the mesne profits can be claimed regarding immovable property and not with regard to a motor lorry. As a motor lorry cannot be deemed to be immovable property, and as it has been proved in this case that defendants 1 and 2 became the full owners of this lorry after the execution of the sale deed Ex. A-1 and they remained in possession and the relevant documents were handed over to them and the plaintiff had no interest left in the lorry, he could not be allowed any decree for recovery of mesne profits or any profits in the present case. 13. The result is that this appeal has no force and it is dismissed with costs to the respondents. 14. A copy of the decree prepared in this appeal will be sent to the Collector (Deputy Commissioner, Manipur under O. 33, R. 14, Civil P. C. so that the court-fees dues may be realised from the appellant. Appeal dismissed.