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1955 DIGILAW 49 (KAR)

V. S. A. BASITH SAHEB OF MESSRS. v. S. A. BASITH CO. IKON MERCHANTS VS V. H. M. ABDULLA

1955-12-19

PADMANABHIAH

body1955
( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition filed by the petitioner against the order of the learned First Additional District Judge of Bangalore in H. B. C. Appeal No. 26 of 1954 confirming that of the learned first Munsiff of Bangalore in H. R. C- No. 164 of 1953 directing the eviction of the petitioner from the schedule premises. ( 2 ) THE facts that have given rise to this revision petition are briefly as follows : the petitioner is admittedly a tenant of the respondent in the schedule premises. The respondent filed an application before the First Munsiff Bangalore, for eviction of the petitioner from the schedule premises on the ground that the premises was granted to the petitioner-tenant for his business purposes, that he had converted the same for residential purposes contrary to the terms of the lease deed executed by him, that the respondent wanted to start business and that therefore he required the premises for his own use. The petitioner-tenant contended therein that the premises was rented out both for business and residential purposes, that the same was not required by the respondent for his bona fide purpose and that the application was mala fide and was liable to be dismissed. The learned Muusiff held that the respondent wanted to start business, that the premises was required for his bona fide use and that the petitioner should be evicted. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge, bangalore, who confirmed the decision of the lower Court in h. R. C. Appeal No. 26 of 1954. As against this the present revision petition is filed. ( 3 ) NO doubt, there are concurret decisions in favour of the respondent but it appears to me that the petitioner has to succeed in spite of them. The learned District Judge appears to have fallen into an error in thinking that a landlord is entitled to evict a tenant from the premises rented out to him if the landlord intends to start a business. It appears to me that but for the fact that Section 8 (3) (a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation control Act, 1951 has subsequently been amended by Mysore act No. XXII of 1954, the learned Judge's order could have been upheld. It appears to me that but for the fact that Section 8 (3) (a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation control Act, 1951 has subsequently been amended by Mysore act No. XXII of 1954, the learned Judge's order could have been upheld. Section 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the 1951 Act runs as follows :" If the house, being a non-residential building, is required for a business which the landlord is carrying on or which he intends to start and be is not already in occupation for purposes of such business of a non-residential building of his own in the same city, town or other area concerned. " ( 4 ) THE words which he intends to start ' have been omitted from sec. 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the amended Act. What that amended section says is ;" In case it is a uon-residential building, it the landlord requires it for a business which he or a member of his family is carrying on and if for the purposes of the said business is not in occupation of a non-residential building which is owned by or to the possession of which the landlord or such member, as the case may be, is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise. " ( 5 ) THUS it is seen that under the amended Act it is only when the landlord requires the premises for a business which he or a member of his family is actually carrying on, that he is entitled to e-vict a tenant. As the words which he intends to start are not to be found in the amended Act, that cannot be a valid ground for evicting a tenant. ( 6 ) THE new Act, i. e. , the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation control (Amendment) Act, 1954 came into force on 2-8-54. The judgement of the appellate Court was pronounced on 30-10-54. Thus it is seen that the new Act was in force at the time when the judgment was pronounced by the learned District Judge. By virtue of Section 16 of Act 22 of 1954, the provisions of the amended Act are made applicable to all applications made, appeals preferred or other proceedings instituted under the principal Act and pending at the commencement of the Act. So the provisions of the amended Act should have been applied to the facts of the present case. By virtue of Section 16 of Act 22 of 1954, the provisions of the amended Act are made applicable to all applications made, appeals preferred or other proceedings instituted under the principal Act and pending at the commencement of the Act. So the provisions of the amended Act should have been applied to the facts of the present case. Therefore the order of the learned District Judge that the respondent required the premises for a business which he intended to start and that the petitioner should be evicted cannot be supported. ( 7 ) THE other ground urged by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the premises had been used by the petitioner for residential purposes contrary to the terms of the lease-deed, exhibit A, and that therefore he is liable to be evicted under section 8 (2) (iii) (b) of the House Rent and Accommodation control Act of 1961. Use of the premises for a purpose other than for which it was leased is one of the grounds enumerated in the above section for eviction of a tenant. It is no doubt admitted by the petitioner in his objection statement that he has been using the premises both for business and for residence. ( 8 ) HIS contention is that the property was leased for both the purposes. Though Ext. A does not specifically mention that the premises was leased both for business and for residence, yet from a perusal of the entire document it appears to me that the premises was not rented out purely or exclusively for business purposes. That idea does not appear to have been in the minds of the parties at the time when the lease was entered into because if that were the intention, I am sure, such a recital would have been included in it. We find certain conditions laid down in the lease-deed. It specifies certain purposes for which the premises should not be used. The omission in the lease-deed that the property should not be used for the purpose of residence goes to show that it was not thought of. Again, it is seen from a perusal of the Schedule in Ext. A. that the premises leased consists of four portions: the front portion, dining room, cooking room and latrine. Admittedly it is only the front portion that is made use of as a shop. Again, it is seen from a perusal of the Schedule in Ext. A. that the premises leased consists of four portions: the front portion, dining room, cooking room and latrine. Admittedly it is only the front portion that is made use of as a shop. If the idea of making use of the premises for residential purposes was not in the minds of the parties I do not know for what other purpose the other three rooms the dining room, cooking room and latrine were included in the lease-deed. It is stated in the lease-deed that the premises were required for business purposes and by this the parties could not have meant to say that it would not be used for any other bona fide purpose. What we can gather from Ext. A. is that the main purpose of the lease was to run business. Section 8 (2) (iii) (b) seems to apply to cases where the premises is rented out for a definite purppse and when it is actually made use of for some other purpose. ( 9 ) SUPPOSE a tenant leases a premises for the purpose of business pure and simple and subsequently he does not carry on any business therein but makes use of it exclusively for residential purposes. In such a case the landlord can rely on the provisions referred to above and ask for eviction of the tenant. But suppose, as in this case, the premises is rented out for purposes of trade without any condition that it should not be made use of for any other purpose and the tenant makes use of it for residence also in addition to his business. In such a case it cannot be said that the premises was used for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. When it is admitted that it is only in the front portion that business could be carried on and when the petitioner is actually carrying on business in that portion, what does it matter to the respondent-landlord for what purpose the tenant makes use of the dining room, kitchen and the latrine which are attached to the premises. After all, the petitioner has not rented out those portions to anybody else but has been making a bona fide use of those portions. That cannot be a ground for a landlord to evict the tenant. After all, the petitioner has not rented out those portions to anybody else but has been making a bona fide use of those portions. That cannot be a ground for a landlord to evict the tenant. ( 10 ) MOREOVER, that is not a ground on which the lower Courts allowed the respondent's application. The lower Courts have ordered the eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the only ground that the respondent-landlord intended to start a business which ground, in my opinion, is not a valid ground for eviction. I think the petitioner-tenant is entitled to succeed in spile of the concurrent decisions against him. ( 11 ) IN the result, the order of the learned District Judge ordering the eviction of the petitioner is set aside and this revision petition is allowed but without costs. --- *** --- .