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1955 DIGILAW 50 (KER)

In Re Parameswaran Pillai v. .

1955-03-14

M.S.MENON, SANKARAN, SUBRAMONIA.IYER

body1955
Judgment :- 1. This is a reference made by the Bench First Class Magistrate's Court, Trivandrum, in C.C. No. 1188 of 1954 under S. 432(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The following two questions have been referred: 1. "Whether the resolution of the Trivandrum City Corporation Council dated 15.2.1121 to impose license fee for chemical preparations is invalid and imperative? 2. Whether license fee can be imposed for storing Arishtom and Azavam". 2. The accused, an Ayurvedic Physician, is the proprietor of Kalady Vaidyasala. He is treating in-patients as also out-patients in his Vaidyasala and is himself manufacturing the required medicines. Among the medicines manufactured and stored by him are Aristoms and Azavoms. His Vaidyasala where the medicines are made and patients are treated is located within the limits of the Trivandrum Corporation. The Trivandrum City Municipal Act IV of 1116, applies to the case. Under S. 295 of the Act the Corporation Council passed a resolution dated 15.12.1121 imposing a license fee of Rs. 36 on the accused for "chemical preparations - storing, packing, pressing, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing by any process whatever". The specific charge against the accused was that he was storing Arishtoms and Azavoms in his Vaidyasala from 1.4.1953 and that he has not taken the license nor paid the license fee of Rs. 36 fixed for the purpose. A preliminary contention was raised before the Magistrate's Court that the case involves questions of law relating to the validity of the law which enabled the imposition of the license fee. A reference to this Court of these questions was prayed for by the accused. Hence this reference. 3. The court below was of the opinion that the Act under which the license fee was imposed contravenes Clause.(f) and (g) of Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. That court was further of the opinion that Schedule.4 to Act IV of 1116 which catalogues the various items for which license is to be taken under S. 295 does not apply to the preparation or storing of Arishtoms and Azavoms because the item "chemical preparations - Storing, packing, pressing, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing by any process whatever" within which the activity of the accused was considered by the Corporation to come is inapplicable. 4. 4. The ground on which the court below said that the head 'chemical preparations' is inapplicable to the activity of the accused is that the aforesaid head should be understood as "chemical-preparations - Storing, packing, pressing, cleansing, preparing or manufacturing by any process whatever" . In other words, the word 'chemical' should be read apart and independent of 'preparations', there being a hyphen in between the two words and the argument was that if so read Arishtoms and Azavoms not being chemicals, the provision is inapplicable. The learned counsel for the accused did not find his way to supporting this view of the court below. A scrutiny of the provision where the second word 'preparations' begins with a small letter and is followed by a hypen, which is followed by the word 'Storing' beginning with a capital letter with a comma, and subsequent words all beginning with small letters with commas following them, and the existence of the word 'preparing' towards the end all indicate that the head under contemplation is made up of the first two words "chemical preparations". The matter appears to be clear and no more discussion is needed especially as the learned counsel did not seek to support the view of the court below. 5. The argument of learned counsel for the accused on Clause. (g) of Art. 19 was that in preparing, storing and using medicines in his Vaidyasala the accused is pursuing his profession and that the imposition of a fee in the matter of storing the medicines which are used for treatment of his patients affects his fundamental right to pursue his profession. He also complains that the fee affects his fundamental right to hold, acquire and dispose of property under Clause.(f) of Art. 19. Clause.(v) and (vi) of Art. 19 authorise the imposition of reasonable restrictions in the public interest on the fundamental rights referred to in Clause.(f) and (g). To regulate the making, holding or dealing with things within the Municipal area by the issue of a license appears to us to be a reasonable restriction upon the rights of a person under Clause.(f) and (g). A fee for the license can also be imposed. Whether the fee transgresses its regions and develops into a tax is not a matter before us. 6. A fee for the license can also be imposed. Whether the fee transgresses its regions and develops into a tax is not a matter before us. 6. The main argument of learned counsel for the accused is based upon the concluding portion of the IVth schedule which reads: "In general, any purpose or the doing in the course of any industrial process anything which in the opinion of the Commissioner is likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property or is likely to create or cause a nuisance". The argument based upon this last portion is that in order to justify the passing of a resolution that a license should be taken for any one of the various matters mentioned in that schedule it has to be proved that the particular item is likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property or is likely to create or cause nuisance. In other words the argument is that the last clause relating to any industrial process for which also a license is required if that process in the opinion of the Commissioner is likely to be dangerous to human life, or health or property or likely to cause or create a nuisance qualifies each one of the various heads mentioned in that schedule. S. 295 of the Act provides under the head "Industries and Factories" of which it is the first section is as follows: "295. (1) No place within the limits of the City shall be used for any of the purposes mentioned in Schedule.4 without a license obtained from the Commissioner and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein. (2) The Commissioner shall, if so required by the Council, publish a notification in our Government Gazette and in two or more local newspapers that any place at a distance within three miles of the limits of the City shall not be used for any one or more of the purposes mentioned in Schedule.4 without a license obtained from the Commissioner and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein: Provided that no such notification shall take effect: (a) unless the sanction of Our Government has been obtained therefor; and (b) until the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication in Our Government Gazette. (3) The owner or occupier of every place for the use of which for any purpose a license is required under sub-s. (1) or sub-s. (2) shall apply to the Commissioner for such license not less than thirty days before the place is used for such purpose or within thirty days of the publication of the notification under sub-s. (2) in Our Government Gazette, as the case may be. (4) Every application for a license for the use of any place for the purpose of storing or selling explosives, timber or other combustible materials shall contain a statement showing the boundaries and measurements of such place. (5) The Commissioner may grant such license subject to such restrictions and regulations as may be specified by him therein or he may refuse to grant such license. (6) Every such license shall expire at the end of the year for which it is granted, or at such earlier date as the Commissioner may, for special reasons, specify in the license. (7) Applications for renewal of such license shall be made not less than thirty days before the commencement of the year for which the renewal is sought:". And Schedule.4 is headed "purpose for which premises may not under S. 295 be used without a license", and various purposes are mentioned one after another and has a proviso at the last which reads: "Provided that no license shall be required for the storage only of any of the articles mentioned in this schedule or for boiling paddy or for soaking arecanuts, when such storage or boiling or soaking is for domestic use and limited to such quantities as may from time to time be fixed by the Commissioner". The last portion on which the stress is laid follows the proviso. On a plain reading of the Schedule it does not appear that the last portion qualifies any of the previous items. All those previous items mention purposes for which the premises may not be used without a license whether those purposes have or have not the qualification as to their being dangerous or otherwise, as contemplated in the last portion. License is required for those purposes because it has been provided by the section and the schedule. It is in respect of items not specially mentioned but which in the opinion of the Commissioner are likely to be dangerous to human life etc. License is required for those purposes because it has been provided by the section and the schedule. It is in respect of items not specially mentioned but which in the opinion of the Commissioner are likely to be dangerous to human life etc. etc., which also require a license. Learned counsel for the accused relies upon the decision of Krishnan, J. in A.I.R. 1924 Madras 375. That decision was rendered under the Madras District Municipalities Act, V of 1920, as it stood before its amendment in the year 1930. The Vth Schedule to that Act corresponds to the IVth Schedule in the Trivandrum City Municipal Act, IV of 1116. The various items for which license was necessary were catalogued and numbered in that schedule. Items (b) and (n) are as follows: "(b) boiling paddy, or camphor; (a) selling or storing timber, firewood, thatching materials, hay, grass, straw, fibre, coal or charcoal". The last item is (q) which reads: "(q) in general storing any explosive or combustible material, manufacturing anything from which offensive or unwholesome smells arise, using for any industrial purpose any fuel or machinery or doing in the course of any industrial process anything which is likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property". This was followed by the following proviso: "Provided that no license shall be required for the storage of timber, firewood, thatching materials, hay, grass, straw, fibre or coal or for boiling paddy for private use". The question in the case was whether the qualification "likely to be dangerous to human life or health or property" in (q) applied to the whole of (q), i.e., to the several matters mentioned therein or only to the last, i.e., "doing in the course of any industrial process anything". The learned judge reached the conclusion that the last words applied to the whole of (q) and he sought aid to that construction from the language of the proviso, the last three words of which "for private use" should be applied to each one of the previous words in that proviso. The decision thus does not help the accused in any manner. The decision thus does not help the accused in any manner. The view of the court below that in order that license fee should be imposed upon any of the items included in Schedule.4 there should be evidence that it satisfies the requirements contemplated in the last portion of the schedule which has been already read is not correct. The last portion of the clause beginning with'in general', namely, 'is likely to be dangerous to human life and health or property or is likely to create or cause a nuisance', applies only to what is contemplated in that last portion beginning within general' and does not apply to any one of the previous items expressly mentioned as a purpose for which premises could not be used without license. We, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative and hold that the resolution of the Corporation dated 15.12.1121 imposing a license is valid and operative. 7. As regards the second question, we are not in a position to answer it for want of a finding whether Arishtoms and Azavoms constitute chemical preparations within the meaning of Schedule.4 to the Act. Whether they will or will not constitute a chemical preparation will depend upon the nature of the various processes involved in the preparation which question has to be found on evidence. The reference is answered accordingly. This will not, however, stand in the way of the court below making a further reference should that be deemed necessary after evidence is taken and the facts found.