JUDGEMENT : NEVASKAR, J. This is a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition submitted by Mohansingh s/o Budhsingh of Ratlam against the Revenue Commissioner, Southern Division, Madhya Bharat, Indore, Collector Ratlam and one Lalchand s/o Kaluram Kothari of Ghaumukhi Pool, Ratlam. 2. The allegations on which the petition is based are as follows: Petitioner Mohansingh was initially a resident of a village in Gujarat District West Punjab which now is situated in Pakistan. He shifted to Ratlam about five years back and settled there as a refugee. The petitioner, on learning that the house belonging to opponent Lalchand had become vacant, applied to the Collector Ratlam opponent No.2 to allot the same to him. The Collector thereupon passed an order on 10-4-1953 allotting the premises to the petitioner in exercise of his powers under S.14, Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. He caused a notice to be served upon opponent No.3 stating the fact about the premises having been found vacant and of their having been allotted to the petitioner and required him to give the same on rent to the petitioner. On receipt of this notice opponent Lalchand applied on 14-4-1953 stating that he had got the house vacated as he wanted to sell the same and that in case the petitioner wanted to purchase he could do so, else the notice dated 10-4-1953 be quashed. The Collector thereupon gave one month's time to the landlord to sell the same and directed the petitioner to settle with him in case he was desirous of purchasing the same. It was further ordered that till then the landlord should not lease out the same to any one. It appears that the house remained unsold even at the close of one month's time referred to above and on 29-5-1953 he again applied for possession of the premises allotted to him. The Collector thereupon passed an order on 5-6-1953 requiring the owner to state when he would sell the house and intimating to him that the house could not be allowed to remain vacant for an indefinite period. On 13-6-1953 the Collector ordered the delivery of possession of the premises to the petitioner as the owner failed to appear or answer the notice referred to above. On 13-6-1953 the Collector ordered the delivery of possession of the premises to the petitioner as the owner failed to appear or answer the notice referred to above. On 15-6-1953 the opponent No.3 again applied for further extension of time by two or three months to enable him to sell the house. The Collector rejected that application the same day. It appears that in pursuance of the Collector's order possession was given to the petitioner on 15-6-1953. Next day i.e., 16-6-1953 opponent again applied for redelivery of possession to him on the ground that he would sell the same within 15 or 20 days and that he could not sell for a fair price unless he was in actual possession. He further stated that the petitioner had not shifted his goods till then. The Collector thereupon passed an order the same day requiring the petitioner not to take possession of the premises allotted to him and that in case he had put any goods belonging to him there it should be removed at once at the expense of the owner. Notice of this order was ordered to be served upon the petitioner at once. 3. On 19-6-1953 the landlord, who was unable to obtain possession in pursuance of the order aforesaid, again applied for immediate delivery of possession stating that he had received a notice dated 12-6-1953 from the Municipality Ratlam, for removing the corrugated iron sheets which had become loose and were dangerous to passers-by. The Collector thereupon passed an order on 19-6-1953 stating that the petitioner could not be contacted and that the condition of corrugated iron sheets roofing had become dangerous and was likely to do harm to the passers-by and requiring the Nazir to go to the premises. It was further ordered that in case the petitioner was present the house might be got opened and the same might be shown from inside to the owner. However if he was not there the lock might be broken open, Panchanama of the goods might be made and the vacant premises delivered to the, owner. The Collector by the same order required the owner to repair the house early and sell the same warning that if this was not done the initial order of allotment would be confirmed. On 23-6-1953 notice of this order was served upon the petitioner. The Collector by the same order required the owner to repair the house early and sell the same warning that if this was not done the initial order of allotment would be confirmed. On 23-6-1953 notice of this order was served upon the petitioner. He thereupon applied stating that he had already put his furniture and belongings in the premises and that he might be given eight days' time to find another house. The Collector ordered him to remove his goods the same day. On that very day the owner too applied mentioning the fact of his having sold the house to one Ramakishore and of his having contracted to give him vacant possession and prayed for early delivery of possession to him. 4. The Collector upon this passed an order the same day directing that intimation be given to Mohansingh to the effect that the house had been sold away by the owner to Ramakishore and that the latter wanted it for his own residence but that in case Ramakishore did not reside therein he should move again. It was further ordered that he should remove his furnitures and goods at once and also directed the Nazir to make over his goods to the custody of a Supratdar in case the same was not removed. 5. The petitioner preferred appeal against this last order to Revenue Commissioner, Southern Division, Indore. The learned Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector. He however exercised his revisional powers and held that there was no proper enquiry. He therefore framed four issues and remanded the case to the Collector for decision after giving findings on the same. 6. The Collector after remand decided that he could not pass an order of allotment without hearing the other side and without taking the premises in his possession. He therefore set aside that order and directed redelivery of property to the owner as the same was based on an erroneous order. He further proposed to consider whether the premises ought to be allotted to the petitioner. 7. The petitioner again preferred appeal to the Commissioner and the latter dismissed it on the ground that no final order had been passed and there was merely an interim order. This he did on 9-10-1953. 8. The present petition under Art.226 of the Constitution is filed after this last order of the Commissioner. 9. 7. The petitioner again preferred appeal to the Commissioner and the latter dismissed it on the ground that no final order had been passed and there was merely an interim order. This he did on 9-10-1953. 8. The present petition under Art.226 of the Constitution is filed after this last order of the Commissioner. 9. The principal grounds raised in this petition are : "Firstly: The Commissioner had no jurisdiction to exercise revisional jurisdiction and order a remand for determining what, according to him, were material points involved in the case. Secondly : The Commissioner could not act in exercise of his revisional powers as the order of the Collector regarding allotment had become final. Thirdly : The Collector had no power to vacate his initial order of allotment as the same had been confirmed by him." 10. In the return submitted by the Commissioner it was contended that the order of the Collector dated 10-6-1953 allotting the shop premises to the petitioner was ex parte and had been passed without notice to opponent Lalchand. On Lalchand approaching the Collector the latter gave him time to put through the transaction of sale which he proposed to make and on his failure to do so within time granted by him ordered possession to be given to the petitioner. This order too was ex parte. The possession was given in pursuance of it. But when owner applied again complaining of likely hardship he directed redelivery of property by modifying his previous ex parte order. It is contended by the commissioner that the Collector throughout these proceedings was acting in his executive capacity and not judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. The authority and power conferred upon the Commissioner on an appeal being filed under S.14 (2), Sthan Niyantran Vidhan is an administrative one and the action taken by him is purely executive and the mechanism of an appeal provided by law is with a view to further examine the executive action of the Collector. 11. It was denied that either he or the Collector acted in excess of the powers which were not judicial in any sense. He had power to examine correctness of executive action of the Collector and the Collector after remand acted within the limits of the remand order. 12. Opponent Lalchand too filed his return. 11. It was denied that either he or the Collector acted in excess of the powers which were not judicial in any sense. He had power to examine correctness of executive action of the Collector and the Collector after remand acted within the limits of the remand order. 12. Opponent Lalchand too filed his return. Therein it was contended that no order for allotment under S.14, Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan could be passed by the Collector without taking possession of the premises. This was not done and initial order of allotment was without jurisdiction. 13. Besides this ground he took up practically the same stand as is taken by the Commissioner on rest of the material points involved in this case. 14. On the respective stands taken by the parties the following points arise for consideration: "1. Whether both the Collector and the Revenue Commissioner, Southern Division acted in their executive capacity while dealing with the matter under consideration and the various orders passed by them were in the administrative capacity. 2. Whether the proceedings upto the time when the petitioner was put into possession were proper and the proceedings subsequent to that stage were contrary to law and a nullity. 3. Whether the initial order of allotment was not in conformity with S.14 (1), Sthan Niyantran Vidhan and for that reason the entire proceedings including an order of allotment in petitioner's favour were bad and did not clothe the petitioner with any authority to submit any petition." 15. It is clear that in case I hold in favour of the opponents on point No.1 the present petition for issue of a writ of certiorari or prohibition is not competent. 16. As regards the propriety of issuing a writ of mandamus since no final order is passed by the Collector either refusing or allotting the premises to the petitioner there is no legal or statutory right vested in the petitioner nor is there any jurisdiction for interfering with the matter at this stage. 17. I shall therefore first consider the first question raised on behalf of the opponent mentioned above. 18. On behalf of the opponent principal reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in - 'Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas', AIR 1950 SC 222 (A). 19. 17. I shall therefore first consider the first question raised on behalf of the opponent mentioned above. 18. On behalf of the opponent principal reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in - 'Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas', AIR 1950 SC 222 (A). 19. Material section of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan under which the Collector was moved by the petitioner for allotment of the shop premises belonging to opponent No.3 is S.14 (1). 20. Under that section a Collector is authorised to take possession of the premises which are vacant and are situated within his own District and after provisionally fixing their rent to make use of the same either for rehabilitation of refugees or affording residential accommodation to public servants or for any public purpose. No provision is made in the Act for giving notice to the owner, for hearing objection, if any raised by him and determining any question judicially as between the prospective allottee and the house owner. 21. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the law cast a duty upon the Collector to act judicially. Section 14 (2) no doubt provides for an appeal against the order of the Subha (Collector) to the Revenue Commissioner whose order is made final but for that reason alone it cannot be said that the Collector while acting under S.14 (1) is required by law to act judicially. Mere circumstance that a person's right to hold property and to give it on rent to anybody or to dispose of the same any way is likely to be interfered with by the exercise of the power under S.14 (1) by the Collector will not make it obligatory upon the latter to hear the owner and the prospective allottee and to determine any dispute between them judicially where the law does not provide for it. The provision for appeal may be for controlling an executive action. 22. No doubt before Subha could exercise his powers the premises ought to be vacant but where that fact which enables the Subha to act under S.14 (1), is not disputed the exercise of the power becomes an administrative act and no writ of certiorari or prohibition can be issued. 22. No doubt before Subha could exercise his powers the premises ought to be vacant but where that fact which enables the Subha to act under S.14 (1), is not disputed the exercise of the power becomes an administrative act and no writ of certiorari or prohibition can be issued. Further before ordering the use of the premises for one of the three purposes mentioned in the Section the necessity for such a purpose must exist and the Subha, in exercise of his power, must come to the conclusion that such a necessity does exist. But in coming to this conclusion the law does not provide for a judicial approach. It does not require to hear the owner and to determine judicially whether the requirements of the Section are fulfilled. 23. In AIR 1950 SC 222 (A) the question for consideration was whether the action of the Government requisitioning certain premises in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under S.3, Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, was a quasijudicial or administrative. The majority of their Lordships considered the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent to the effect that where there are objective tests indicated in the legislative provision for the exercise of power and the act is likely to affect the right of some one then the matter ought to be dealt with judicially and repelled the same. Judgment of Kania, C.J. clearly indicates the line adopted by the Supreme Court. At page 225 of the report it is stated : "When the fact has to be determined by an objective test and when that decision affects rights of some one, the decision or act is quasi-judicial. This last statement overlooks the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights of some one or the other. Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine these facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an, objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereupon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari." 24. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an, objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereupon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari." 24. His Lordship pointed out at page 227 of the report that a writ of certiorari can only be asked for if two conditions are fulfilled. Firstly the decision of the authority must be judicial or quasi-judicial and secondly challenge must be in respect of the excess or want of jurisdiction of the deciding authority. 25. Applying these tests indicated by their Lordships it seems clear to me that the decision which the Subha is required to take while acting under S.14 (1) is not judicial or quasi-judicial. The law does not provide for his acting judicially while exercising power under that Section. 26. In view of this position it seems to me clear that the petitioner cannot ask for the issue of a writ of certiorari or prohibition both of which are governed by the same principle. 27. It was next contended that the petitioner is at least entitled to a writ of mandamus. But even this writ cannot successfully be invoked by the petitioner. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that once the Collector has passed an order in exercise of the powers conferred upon him and allotted the premises to the petitioner and made over possession of the same to him he becomes functus officio. However that contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in the first place the Commissioner, to whom an appeal as provided by law was preferred, had jurisdiction to consider the propriety of Collector's order and to direct him to do what according to him law requires him to do. In doing so he set aside Collector's order allotting the premises to the petitioner and in exercise of his revisional powers he directed the Collector to reconsider the matter on the basis of material points indicated in his decision. The matter is to be considered by the Collector. No final order is passed and for that very reason the Commissioner refused to interfere before the Collector finally decides the case. 28. The matter is to be considered by the Collector. No final order is passed and for that very reason the Commissioner refused to interfere before the Collector finally decides the case. 28. Even if the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not provided for by law this objection will not any way help the petitioner. The order with regard to allotment and delivery of possession to the petitioner is held by the Commissioner to be erroneous. This he held in exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon him. Even if this order stands the petitioner is out of Court. But apart from this I feel that the principle of functus officio does not apply to administrative actions and it is permissible for the same or higher authority to act for correction of what according to them is an error. It is on account of this consideration that a suitor while praying for a writ of mandamus is required to demand justice before coming to High Court. Moreover there is no cause to apprehend that the Collector would not properly deal with the matter. 29. Grant of writ of mandamus rests purely on the discretion of this Court and in the circumstances of the present case I am not inclined to grant the same as I do not feel that any substantial injustice will result in case the power is not exercised. 30. In view of my view on point No.1 it is unnecessary to consider other two points set forth above for consideration. 31. For all these reasons there is no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. 32. Parties will bear their costs. 33. SAMVATSAR, J.: I agree. Petition dismissed.